KUNGUA AND OTHERS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 489
1 May 1985 · ADJABENG J · ≈ 20 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Quansah v. The Republic [1980] G.L.R. 263.
(2) Brutus v. Cozens [1973] A.C. 854; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 521; [1972] 2 All E.R. 1297, H.L. (3) Jordan v. Burgoyne [1963] 2 Q.B.D. 744; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 1045; [1963] 2 All E.R. 225, D.C. (4) Vernon v. Paddon [1973] 1 W.L.R. 663; [1973] 3 All E.R. 302; [1974] Crim. L.R. 51, D.C. (5) Apaloo v. The Republic [1975] 1 G.L.R. 156, C.A.
(6) R. v. Aryee (1907) 2 Ren. 425.
(7) R. v. McVitie [1960] 2 Q.B. 483; [1960] 2 All E.R 498; 44 Cr. App. R. 201, C.C.A. (8) Akowuah v. Commissioner of Police [1964] G.L.R. 475, S.C.
(9) Boahene v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 279, S.C. (full bench).
(10) Andoh v. The Republic, Court of Appeal, 23 January 1970; digested in (1970) C.C. 42. (11) Osei v. The Republic (No. 2) [1971] 1 G.L.R. 449.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the decision of the District Magistrate Grade I, Sekondi convicting three of the appellants of the offence of offensive conduct conducive to a breach of the peace under section 207 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), and the fourth appellant of abetting the crime aforesaid and convicting the first appellant of assault. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
James Mercer for the appellants.
Acquah, Assistant State Attorney, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF ADJABENG J.
This is an appeal against the judgment of the District Magistrate Grade I, Sekondi dated 28 September 1984 convicting the appellants. The first appellant was convicted of the offence of assault on count one and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment with hard labour. The first, second and third appellants were each convicted of the offence of offensive conduct conducive to a breach of the peace on count two and sentenced to a fine of ¢200 each or two months’ [p.492] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 489 imprisonment with hard labour, and also bonded over to be of good behaviour for six months and in default, two months’ imprisonment with hard labour. The fourth appellant was convicted of the offence of aiding and abetting crime on count three and sentenced to a fine of ¢200 or two months’ imprisonment with hard labour and was also bonded over. The appeal is against both the conviction and the sentences.
The facts giving rise to the prosecution in this case were stated by the trial magistrate in his judgment. The facts are that since the death of the chief of Butre, the first prosecution witness, Kobina Asuonam, had been appointed caretaker at Butre. As such caretaker or regent he became the caretaker of Asemko. As the first prosecution witness lived at Asemasi, he appointed the second prosecution witness, Ekow Biren, to stand in his stead at the village. By this arrangement, anybody who wanted to do anything at Asemko contacted the second prosecution witness who would inform the first prosecution witness. On 10 September 1984 in the morning at about 11 o’clock the second prosecution witness heard that a gong-gong was being beaten at Asemko village. Apparently he became startled as he had not authorised it. He sent for the third prosecution witness, Kwame, the gong-gong beater, to find out if he had any idea. The third prosecution witness informed him that he had no idea. They, therefore, together with the fifth prosecution witness, Maame Abrokwa, went to find out those who were beating the gong-gong. They met them at a place near the market. Here they asked them under what authority they were beating the gong-gong. They were told. Apparently they were not satisfied so they tried to take the gong-gong from the second appellant. The first appellant in the process pushed down the fifth prosecution witness who fell down and became unconscious. Some water was poured on her to revive her. She was taken to the house and she collapsed a second time. The first, second and third appellants were consequently detained by the people. Later they were taken to the police station. Maame Abrokwa was taken to the hospital and was treated and discharged.
The appellants were later charged, tried, convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. They therefore appealed to this court. The appellants filed the following grounds of appeal:
“(1) The convictions cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
(2) The convictions are wrong law in that the interpretation of section 207 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), by the trial judge, namely that ‘behaviour’ in the said section is not related to any statutory qualification, is contrary to law, reason and precedents.
[p.493] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 489
(3) The charge under section 207 of Act 29 does not disclose any triable offence.
(4) That the sentences are harsh, unconscionable and vindictive.”
In support of grounds 2 and 3 of the grounds of appeal which counsel for the appellants argued together, counsel submitted that the second count did not disclose a triable offence. Counsel submitted that on a true interpretation of section 207 of Act 29, a charge under the said section must aver the most important and fundamental gravemen of the offence, that is that the conduct, behaviour or words used are threatening, insulting or abusive. Counsel submitted that in the absence of that important and fundamental averment the charge could not disclose a triable offence. In counsel’s own words: “it will be like alleging fraud without averring intention to defraud or like charging a person with murder without averring intent.” Counsel submitted further that any charge which merely stated that a person exhibited a behaviour simpliciter or used words simpliciter could not amount to an offence under our Code. He submitted therefore that the trial magistrate’s contention could not therefore hold. Counsel cited the case of Quansah v. The Republic [1980] G.L.R. 263 and the English case of Brutus v. Cozens [1972] 2 All E.R. 1297, H.L. Counsel also later supplied the court with the English case of Jordan v Burgoyne [1963] 2 All E.R. 225, D.C. and Vernon v. Paddon [1973] 3 All E.R. 302, D.C. Counsel for the appellants submitted that if his submissions in respect of count two were accepted then count three on aiding and abetting would also fall. As regards count one on assault, counsel submitted that if his argument on count two were upheld then the first appellant was exercising a lawful act and nobody had the right to interfere with that right and that under section 39 (d) of Act 29, the first appellant would be absolved. Counsel also submitted that there was no evidence on record to support an insulting, abusive or threatening behaviour.
On sentence, counsel for the appellants confined himself to the sentence of three months’ imprisonment with hard labour imposed on the first appellant for assault and argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive and was awarded on the wrong footing. Counsel submitted that on the authority of Apaloo v. The Republic [1975] 1 G.L.R. 156 at 191, C.A. the prison sentence imposed on the first appellant was excessive and that what the trial magistrate said was his own conjecture unsupported by the evidence and that it was this conjecture which obviously influenced his mind to impose a prison term. Counsel also argued that it was wrong for the magistrate to award a deterrent sentence in this case as the offence was not a grave one and was unpremeditated and felt that a fine was the appropriate sentence to be awarded in this case.
[p.494] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 489
On behalf of the Republic the learned assistant state attorney, while conceding that the learned trial magistrate’s interpretation of section 207 of Act 29 was wrong as it was held in the English case of Brutus v. Cozens (supra) that the adjectives do qualify not only words but behaviour as well, was of the view that the omission of the adjectives in the particulars of the offence did not render the charge incurably defective. This is because the said adjectives neither constituted the mens rea nor the actus reus of the offence and did not therefore form the gravemen of the offence under section 207 of Act 29 as claimed by counsel for the appellants. The learned state attorney argued that under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), as amended by sections 1, 2 and 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), all that was necessary was to give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge and “it shall not be necessary for it to contain any further particulars than the said particulars.” The learned assistant state attorney was of the view therefore that the decision of the trial magistrate was correct, his findings of fact including the finding that “the gong-gong beaten by the first, second and third accused persons were unauthorised and in the special circumstances at Asemko, was likely to occasion “a breach of the peace” were also correct. The learned assistant state attorney therefore invited the court not to disturb the decision of the trial court as to both conviction and sentence.
Now, what is the offence the prosecution said the accused persons had committed as regards count two on the charge sheet? Count two states:
“Statement of Offence Offensive conduct conducive to the breach of peace: contrary to section 207 of Act 29.
Particulars of Offence You on 10 September 1984, at Asemko in a public place did exhibit a behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace to wit: by beating gong-gong calling on the people not to pay revenue to the abusuapanyin of Asemko which behaviour was likely to cause a breach of the peace.”
Section 207 of Act 29 reads:
“207. Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
[p.495] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 489
The learned state attorney conceded the argument of counsel for the appellants that the adjectives “threatening, abusive or insulting” qualify not only “words” but “behaviour” as well, as was held in the case of Brutus v. Cozens (supra) cited by counsel for the appellants and so disagreed with the interpretation of the trial magistrate, now circuit judge, that the said adjectives did not qualify “behaviour.” Lord Reid reading his opinion in the House of Lords in Brutus v. Cozens said at 1300 as follows:
“Therefore vigorous and it may be distasteful or unmannerly speech or behaviour is permitted so long as it does not go beyond any one of three limits. It must not be threatening. It must not be abusive. It must not be insulting . . . If I had to decide, which I do not, whether the appellant’s conduct insulted the spectators in this case, I would agree with the justices. The spectators may have been very angry and justly so. The appellant’s conduct was deplorable. Probably it ought to be punishable. But I cannot see how it insulted the spectators.
I would allow the appeal with costs.”
Now that it is agreed that the words “threatening, abusive or insulting” should qualify “behaviour” contrary to what the trial court held, does the omission of these words from the particulars of the offence in count two affect the charge which should inure to the benefit of the appellants? Counsel for the appellants said that in the absence of the said words the charge disclosed no triable offence under our Act 29. The learned state attorney disagreed and relying on sections 1, 2 and 7 of Act 261, argued that their omission was not fatal. The learned state attorney also argued that the said words did not constitute either the mens rea or the actus reus of the offence and so could not be considered as the gravemen of the offence. I must say that I do not understand this latter argument of the learned state attorney.
Amissah J.A. (as he then was) in his book, Criminal Procedure in Ghana at p. 79, under the heading, “Defect in the Particulars and Its Consequence” stated:
“Before the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 there were authorities to the effect that if an essential particular was omitted from the particulars of offence, as distinct from the statement of offence, on the charge as laid, the conviction had to be quashed on appeal as the accused would have been convicted on a non-existent charge.”
Amissah said that R. v. Aryee (1907) 2 Ren. 425 was the first available reported case on this point. The position, however, changed when in
[p.496] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 489
1960 the English Court of Criminal Appeal decided the case of R. v. McVitie [1960] 2 Q.B 483. of [1984-86] 2 GLR 489-501 About this case Amissah stated in his book at page 80 as follows:
“The appellant had been charged under a provision of the law making it an offence to have knowingly in one’s possession an explosive. The particulars of the offence omitted to state that the appellant had possession ‘knowingly.’ On appeal from his conviction, the court held that the charge upon which he was tried consisted of both the statement of offence and the particulars of offence and that the particulars merely elaborated the statement of offence. Thus where the offence charged was properly stated in the statement of offence but an ingredient was left out in the particulars of offence, the omission did not make the charge non-existent but only defective, i.e. an existent charge with defective particulars. Therefore even though the defect in the charge was not formally amended during the trial, if evidence is given at the trial in respect of the matter omitted from the particulars, the defence suffers no prejudice and the defect in the charge will be regarded as cured. The previous authorities to the contrary were overruled. This case was followed by the Ghana Supreme Court in the State v. Lawmann [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 698] . . . “
But the decision by the Supreme Court in Akowuah v. Commissioner of Police [1964] G.L.R. 475, S.C. confused the situation again leading to the passing of Act 261, whereby sections 112 and 202 of Act 30 dealing with particulars were amended to the effect that, “Notwithstanding any rule of law to the contrary it shall not be necessary for it (the charges) to contain any further particulars than the said particulars”, that is those necessary to give reasonable information to the accused. Nevertheless, according to Amissah, the full bench of the then Supreme Court held after this amendment, in Boahene v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 279, S.C. (full bench) that the omission to state in the particulars of a charge of conspiracy to forge or alter (utter) forged currency notes that the appellant conspired to forge or alter (utter) the forged currency notes with “intent to defraud” was fatal to the conviction on that charge. Amissah calls this “a judicial repeal of a legislative provision.” Amissah states, however, at p. 81 that:
“The issue seemed to have been settled by the case of Andoh and Another v. The Republic [1970 C.C. 421] decided in January 1970, in which the Court of Appeal came down in favour of the cases of the State v.
Lawmann and R. v. McVitie and expressly disapproved of the cases of Akowuah and Yao Boahene.”
[p.497] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 489
The Court of Appeal held in Andoh v. The Republic, 23 January 1970; digested in (1970) C.C. 42 that:
“If the omission does not cause any embarrassment or prejudice to the accused person’s case, and the defect is cured by the evidence adduced at the trial, the courts are bound to dismiss an appeal on this ground because no substantial miscarriage of justice would have been occasioned thereby.”
Despite the decision of Hayfron-Benjamin J. (as he then was) in the case of Osei v. The Republic (No. 2) [1971] 1 G.L.R. 449, which seemed to change the above position and was based on the Constitution, 1969, Amissah submits at page 82, para. 4 of his book “that until reversed by higher authority, Andoh v. The Republic remains the definitive authority on the issue.” It would seem therefore that defective particulars in a charge may not automatically render that charge incurably bad, especially where the statement of the offence is correctly made out and where the evidence adduced cures the defect in the particulars of the charge. In the instant case, there is no doubt in my mind that the particulars of the offence in count two are defective. I say that the particulars do not disclose a triable offence under our Code. The statement of offence on the other hand correctly states the offence under which the appellants have been charged in count two, i.e. offensive conduct conducive to breaches of the peace. And the section of the Code has also been correctly stated as section 207 of Act 29. It would appear therefore that the appellants have been given reasonable information as to the nature of the offence for which they have been charged especially as the particulars clearly state that it is their beating of the gong-gong which is the subject-matter of the complaint.
Now, is there evidence on record adduced by the prosecution to establish the offence under section 207 of Act 29? The learned assistant state attorney conceded (as has been said earlier in this judgment) that the words “threatening, abusive or insulting” must qualify “behaviour” on which the prosecution based their case. In other words, the behaviour of the appellants, i.e. in beating the gong-gong, in this case, must either be threatening, abusive or insulting. In my judgement or view, the prosecution could not succeed if they did not establish one or more of the above conducts. I cannot find on the record any piece of evidence which has established that the appellants’ conduct or behaviour in beating the gong-gong at Asemko on 10 September 1984 was either threatening, abusive or insulting. Here I must repeat the words of Lord Reid in the English case of Brutus v. Cozens (supra) at 1299-1300, H.L. where he said:
[p.498] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 489
“It would have been going much too far to prohibit all speech or conduct likely to occasion a breach of the peace because determined opponents may not shrink from organising or at least threatening a breach of the peace in order to silence a speaker whose views they detest. Therefore vigorous and it may be distasteful or unmannerly speech or behaviour is permitted so long as it does not go beyond any one of three limits. It must not be threatening. It must not be abusive. It must not be insulting.”
In the case of Jordan v. Burgoyne [1963] 2 All E.R. 225, Mr. Jordan was convicted of the offence because it was held that his words were insulting to the body of young men including Jews who were being restrained by the police from disrupting the meeting. Also in the case of Vernon v. Paddon [1973] 1 W.L.R. 663 at 664, Mr. Vernon was convicted because there was evidence that:
“the defendant used to that constable words and behaviour that were threatening and insulting. The surrounding circumstances were such that a breach of the peace was likely to result from the defendant’s conduct.”
In the instant case, where is such evidence? The learned trial magistrate was wrong in my view when he held that:
“Following from this then the gong-gong beaten by the first accused, the second accused and the third accused was unauthorised and in the special circumstances at Asemko was likely to occasion a breach of the peace.”
Where is the evidence in support of this finding? Is it an offence to beat a gong-gong? The mere beating of gong-gong, in my view, is no offence. It is definitely not an offence under section 207 of Act 29 unless the gong-gong is beaten in such a way that the behaviour of the person beating it becomes threatening, abusive or insulting. In Vernon v. Paddon (supra) at 665, it was said that:
“In the sort of situations that most commonly give rise to a prosecution for this offence it is in practice rarely possible, and often quite unrealistic to dissociate words from behaviour. The significance of physical behaviour, such as a gesture, can often only be inferred from accompanying words, and vice versa. In the course of a single brief incident several phrases and gestures may be used, some aptly described by the epithet ‘threatening’ some ‘insulting’ and others ‘abusive’.”
It was not said in this case that when the gong-gong was beaten the appellants said anything which was threatening abusive or insulting, or
[p.499] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 489
that they beat the gong-gong in such a way that the act threatened, abused or insulted anybody in the ordinary meaning of those words.
The appellants, according to the second prosecution witness’ evidence, beat the gong-gong and made an announcement that nobody should “pay land revenue to Adu and that whoever pays the revenue to Adu will pay it again when Obeng comes to demand it.” The second prosecution witness also said in his evidence that the appellants announced that they had authority from the fourth appellant to beat the gong-gong and to make the announcement. I cannot see how this message can be considered offensive within the meaning of the provisions of section 207 of Act 29. In any case, who is being threatened, abused or insulted in this case? Is it Adu to whom revenue should not be paid, or is it the first or the second prosecution witnesses or those who were around? In the Jordan case, there was a body of young men including Jews and communists whose aim was to stop the meeting and the speakers from speaking. But so long as nobody insulted or threatened anybody the police were able to control the situation and there was no need for any prosecution. It was only after Jordan had insulted the said young men that there was trouble and the police had to prosecute Mr. Jordan. Again in the case of Brutus v. Cozens, (supra) even though the conduct of the appellant was considered by Lord Reid as deplorable and caused annoyance to the spectators and some of them even wanted to strike the appellant, the House of Lords held that the appellant’s conduct did not insult the spectators within the meaning of the Act as it did not in the ordinary sense of the word insult them and so allowed the appeal.
The fourth appellant claimed that he was the proper person to cause gong-gong to be beaten in the village by virtue of his judgment against the said Adu. Whether or not he is the proper person to cause a gong-gong to be beaten in the village is a chieftaincy matter to be decided by the appropriate forum. A criminal court has no right, in my view, to interfere in such a matter. A criminal court should come in only when the criminal law has been infringed. In this case, the court could only rightly have convicted the appellants if their conduct was proved to be threatening, abusive or insulting. The duty of the trial magistrate simply to look at the evidence adduced and to decide if it supported the charge laid. It was not, the duty of the trial court to indulge in the deductions it made to the effect that in a village only a chief can cause a gong-gong to be beaten and any person who beats gong-gong without the authority of the chief will be conducting himself in a manner that is likely to occasion a breach of the peace, and as the appellants did not have any authority from the regent of Asemko or his
[p.500] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 489
representative before beating the gong-gong, they were guilty of offensive conduct conducive to a breach of the peace under section 207 of Act 29. It is not part of the duty of the magistrate to resort to his own ideas about the rights of a chief in a village. The magistrate in my view clearly misdirected himself. And the learned assistant state attorney also fell into the same error. I hold therefore that the charge under count two was not proved against the appellants. Their conviction was therefore wrong. I set it aside and order that the first, second and third appellants be acquitted and discharged of the offence under count two. I also set aside the order for the bond and the order that the said appellants pay ¢200 fine each. The fine if paid, shall be refunded to the said appellants.
In view of my decision on count two, count three involving aiding and abetting of the offence in count two cannot also stand. The conviction of the fourth appellant in respect of that charge is therefore also set aside and the fourth appellant is acquitted and discharged. The order for the bond and the fine of ¢200 imposed on the fourth appellant are set aside and I order that the fine if paid, shall be refunded to him.
In respect of count one involving assault on which the first appellant was convicted and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment with hard labour, I cannot accept counsel’s argument that the first appellant was justified under section 39 (d) of Act 29 in pushing down the fifth prosecution witness. I accept the findings of fact made by the trial court on the issue and I do not intend to disturb those findings. The conviction of the first appellant on count one therefore stands. I am of the view, however, that the sentence of three months’ imprisonment with hard labour in respect of the assault charge in the circumstances of this case is rather harsh and excessive. Even though counsel for the appellant argued that the trial magistrate said elsewhere that he was awarding a sentence of three months’ imprisonment with hard labour to serve as a deterrent there is nothing of the sort in the record of proceedings. The judgment only says that the “first accused is sentenced to three months’ imprisonment with hard labour on count one.” No reason has been given in the judgment for imposing a prison term instead of a fine on the first appellant. There is nothing on record to show that the first appellant had previous conviction. In addition to the term of imprisonment, the first appellant was bonded over to be of good behaviour and to keep the peace for six months and in default, two months’ imprisonment with hard labour.
I shall set aside the sentence of three months’ imprisonment with hard labour. In view of the fact that the first appellant served almost three weeks of the sentence, I do not intend to impose any sentence on
[p.501] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 489
him again. The order for the bond however still stands. I also order that the gong-gong seized from the appellants which is in the custody of the court be restored to the appellants.
DECISION
Appeal allowed in part.
L. K. A.
