SAKYI vs. BASARE [1984-86] 1 GLR 638
22 May 1985 · OSEI-HWERE JA · ≈ 10 min read
[1985] SLR (CA) 39Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Tonazzi v. Brunetti (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 403.
(2) Dam v. Addo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 200, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision of the High Court declaring the plaintiff owner of a house in dispute and dismissing the counterclaim by the first defendant. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Osei-Hwere J.A.
COUNSEL
Kofi Acquah for the appellant.
No appearance by or on behalf of the plaintiff.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.
Osei-Hwere J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. On 27 March 1985 we allowed this appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial High Court and in place thereof we gave judgment to the first defendant on his counterclaim. We reserved our reasons which we proceed to give now.
The plaintiff’s claim indorsed on his writ was for:
“an order of the court setting aside the purported sale of house No 23, Block VII Old Tafo West, formerly house No 28, Block 2, Old Tafo West, Kumasi, by the second defendant to the first defendant of which purported sale was without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, the owner of the said house and therefore unlawful.”
His plaint (as pleaded) was that in 1960 the second defendant, his cousin, informed him that one Opanin Adade wanted to sell the disputed house which, at the time, was unroofed and contained six rooms. He provided the money to the second defendant for the purchase of the plot including the uncompleted house and he further supplied various sums of money to the second defendant to complete the house. He put the second defendant in charge of the construction because he lived at Konongo whilst the second defendant lived at Old Tafo, Kumasi.
On completion of the house he allocated some rooms to the second defendant to take care of the house and to collect rents from the tenants
[p.640] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 638 on his behalf. In 1968 the plaintiff left Ghana to seek medical care for his wife and on his return in 1975 or 1976 the second defendant told him that he had sold the house to the first defendant. He protested and pressed the second defendant to redeem the house for him. When he failed to do so he mounted his action against the first and second defendants.
In paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of his statement of claim the plaintiff averred fraud and illegality as follows:
“12 Unknown to the plaintiff, the second defendant and the first defendant had entered into an agreement conveying the house to the first defendant, and in the execution of the said conveyance the second defendant had used the name of the plaintiff, which was Kofi Basare, without his knowledge, and then he, the second defendant, had thumbprinted as if the thumbprint were that of the plaintiff.
13 Through this fraudulent means, the payment for the house was effected without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff who is the owner of the house, to the second defendant, and under further pretext that the second defendant had been affected by the compliance order even though he was a Ghanaian citizen.
14 The plaintiff maintains that at no time did he authorise the sale of the house in question, nor was he ever consulted in its sale, and therefore the conveyance is unlawful.”
The plaintiff’s evidence-in-chief, although brief, followed in substance the averments in his statement of claim except that he gave the impression that he dealt directly with Opanin Adade who prepared documents on the land for him. Again, he testified that he was away for four years eight months. This will peg the year of his return to about 1973 instead of 1975 or 1976 as pleaded by him. He tendered, among other documents, exhibits A1 to A3 and exhibits B to B2. Exhibit A1 is the document evidencing the outright sale of the house by Kofi Basare to Benjamin Kwaku Sakyi (the first defendant) and exhibits A2 and A3 are the receipts issued by Kofi Basare on payments made by the first defendant in respect of the house sold to him.
Curiously, exhibit A2, which is dated 15 May 1970, certified that Kofi Basare had received from the first defendant “cash the sum of N¢1,340 . . . being full payment of one compound swish house . . .”, whilst exhibit A3, which is dated 21 May 1970, also certified that Kofi Basare had received from the first defendant:
“cash the sum of N¢1,200 . . . being cash deposit against . . . compound swish house . . . deposited for an agreed purchase price of N¢1,340 as per deed of sale dated 15 May 1970 and that the
[p.641] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 638 balance of N¢140 be made payable to him at the end of the month.”
The plaintiff said that the second defendant handed those documents in the exhibit A series to him and that they are the documents which the second defendant signed in his name.
The contents of exhibits B, B1 and B2 are the same. They evidence the “outright sale of one half-way built swish house containing six rooms unroofed” by Kwabena Adade to Malam Kassim Basare of Old Tafo. They are purported to have been executed by Kwabena Adade on 7 September 1960 although it is stated in the documents that the sale took place on 10 September 1960. Among those who signed the documents as witnesses is Ayi Shetu, the only witness called by the plaintiff and who is designated as Shetu Basare in the documents.
According to the first plaintiff witness (Ayi Shetu) it was her deceased aunt Magagia Basare (alias Mariama) who took word to the plaintiff that Opanin Adade wanted to sell his swish uncompleted house and she returned with the plaintiff to meet the vendor. She said that the plaintiff was accompanied and represented on his side by the second defendant and her aunt when they met later to prepare the document on the sale. She was also invited by the plaintiff to be present at the meeting. After the document had been prepared she and her aunt were asked to thumbprint it which they did. The second defendant later sent her to Konongo on two occasions where, on the first occasion, she collected £30 from the plaintiff and on the second occasion, she collected £40. This money was for the completion of the rooms.
In spite of the prolix defence filed by the first defendant, his defence, briefly, was that he bought the house for N¢1,340 from the second defendant as the owner and that he did not tell him that he had even bought the house from Opanin Adade. He knows the second defendant as Kofi Basare and he also knows his Mohamedan name as Kassim Basare. The second defendant became his tenant after he had bought the house. He then left Ghana whilst his wife and children remained behind in the house; on his return he pleaded with the first defendant to resell the house to him which he refused. The first defendant’s evidence suggests, although not pleaded, that the plaintiff’s action was a ruse, and abuse of the process of the court to claim the house for the second defendant. Predictably the second defendant failed to enter appearance and default judgment was entered against him.
The plaintiff was subjected to a gruelling cross-examination and at the end of it all it will seem that one could well say of his case: “Things fall apart and the centre cannot hold.” If as the evidence of the first plaintiff witness confirms (and indeed the totality of the plaintiff’s evidence discloses), it is true that the plaintiff was in direct touch with Opanin Adade in negotiating for the purchase of the house then the big
[p.642] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 638 question is why the document on the sale (exhibit B) came to be prepared in the name of Malam Kassim Basare, a name the plaintiff has never borne. Why, it may also be asked, was it that the second defendant kept this document from 1960 up to the date after the plaintiff’s return to Ghana when he retrieved it. It took the plaintiff some five years to assert his right to the house by this action. If he had truly been wronged would any man in his position have suffered this inactivity for all these years just because the second defendant kept on promising to redeem the house? The plaintiff said that he never knew the first defendant and that he never confronted him about the property by any letter. Did the plaintiff’s cool and temperate conduct exemplified by failing to confront the wrongful purchaser of his house, either face to face or even by letter, commensurate in the least degree with the reaction expected of a person unlawfully deprived of his proprietary right? Contrary to his own pleading and also to what is clearly contained in exhibit B tendered by him he denied that the house sold to the second defendant comprised six unroofed rooms. He said that the house he bought rather contained fourteen uncompleted rooms of which ten were swish and four blocks. The plaintiff obviously did not know the uncompleted house he allegedly purchased.
Had the trial judge not consigned the plaintiff ‘s answers to cross-examination to the lumber room but had rather recalled them as well as the totality of his evidence together with the evidence before the court for his due assessment, we daresay he would have arrived at a different conclusion. In Tonazzi v. Brunetti (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 403, it was held that although an appellate court has to pay great respect to the findings of fact of a trial judge yet when the judgment appealed from is not based upon the whole evidence and all the facts and circumstances of the case have not been taken into consideration by the trial judge the issues become at large and it is the duty of the appellate court to arrive at its own conclusion on the evidence. The grounds of appeal filed on behalf of the first defendant-appellant adumbrate the failure of the trial judge to consider the evidence before him.
In his judgment the trial judge made the following findings of fact and of law: (a) the first defendant firmly established that he bought the house believing the same to belong to the second defendant and that on no occasion did he have cause to believe that the house belonged to any person other than the second defendant; (b) Notwithstanding the above, the first defendant’s title is dependent upon the title of the second defendant; (c) the first defendant was unable to support the fraud and collusion he alleged between the plaintiff and the second defendant, and (d) the second defendant held the house as a trustee for the plaintiff, a fact which the second defendant has not denied. Following from these findings he ultimately held that the first defendant acquired from the
[p.643] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 638 second defendant a title which the second defendant did not have and, therefore, could not transmit. He, therefore, gave judgment for the plaintiff and set aside the sale of the house and he, at the same time, dismissed the first defendant’s counterclaim which, inter alia, sought for a declaration that he validly acquired the building from the second defendant.
It must be noted that the first defendant never pleaded any fraud and collusion. It was rather the plaintiff who pleaded fraud but failed to prove same. Again, the second defendant’s failure to deny that he was a trustee, because he did not appear to defend the suit, cannot be held to prove any trust against the first defendant. The very question of a trust was not pleaded and the trial judge was not entitled to set up a case for the plaintiff different from what he had pleaded: see Dam v. Addo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 200, S.C. Exhibit B firmly evidences the sale of the house to the second defendant and the plaintiff’s own conduct, in our view, completely negatived any finding of a trust in his favour.
It is trite law that if trust property is sold by a trustee to a third party without the authority of the beneficial owner he can recover it from the third party into whose hands it has fallen unless it is proved that he bought it in good faith and for value without notice of the want of authority. The bona fide purchaser for value without notice stands, accordingly, in an invulnerable position. Having found that the first defendant bought the house in good faith and without notice of any trust, the trial judge was bound to follow the one and only legal consequence, and that was to declare the sale valid and dismiss the plaintiff’s action. His holding otherwise (assuming there was a trust) was a complete error in law which we are bound to correct. It was for this reason, and also for the reason that the plaintiff failed to prove any legal or equitable title to the house, that we unhesitatingly set the judgment aside, dismissed the plaintiff’s action and allowed the first defendant’s counterclaim.
DECISION
Appeal and counterclaim allowed.
J. A. A.
