O.K. BAZZAR vs. DE GRAFT HANSON AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 87
20 February 1979 · MENSA BOISON J · ≈ 5 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 49Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Amo-Mensah v. Owusu [1972] 1 G.L.R. 250.
(2) Peacock v. Bell and Kendall (1667) Wms. Saund. 69; 85 E.R. 81.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
MOTION for a stay of execution and an order to pay the judgment debt by instalments. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
J. Alarah for the applicant-judgment-debtor.
Lokko for the respondent-judgment-creditor.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA-BOISON J.
The defendant judgment-debtor by counsel moves the court for stay of execution of a judgment debt of ¢20,610 and for a payer to pay by proposed monthly instalments after the issue
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of a writ of fieri-facias by the judgment-creditor. Although it is conceded that there is power for the court to stay execution by virtue of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 42, r. 16 (1) (b), it is contended that the rule does not enable the High Court to grant the applicant the further relief of an order for payment of the judgment debt by instalments. Order 42, r. 16 (1) (b) provides, “The Court or a Judge may, at or after the time of giving judgment or making an order, stay execution until such times as they or he shall think fit.” Mr. Lokko arguing for the contention relies on Amo-Mensah v. Owusu [1972] 1 G.L.R. 250 where Taylor J. sitting at the Kumasi High Court declined jurisdiction to make an order for payment by instalment upon a stay of execution, on the ground that Order 42, r. 16 (1) (b) did not empower the High Court to do so. In contrast with Order 42, r. 16 (1) (b) of L.N. 140A, the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.) Sched. II which now governs civil practice in district courts, by Order 41, rr. 7 and 8 specifically provide for the relief in these terms:
“7. The Court at the time of making any judgment or order, or at any time afterwards, may direct the time within which the payment or other act is to be made or done, reckoned from the date of the judgment or order, or from some other point of time, as the Court thinks fit, and may order interest at a rate not exceeding £5 per centum per annum to be paid upon any judgment, commencing from the date thereof or afterwards.
8. Where any judgment or order directs the payment of money, the Court may, for any sufficient reason, order that the amount shall be paid by instalments, with or without interest. Such order may be made at the time of giving judgment, or at any time afterwards by the same or any other Judge, Magistrate, or other judicial officer having the necessary jurisdiction, and may be rescinded upon sufficient cause at any time.”
It is, I think, as it ought to be, that in the provisions governing district court practice the rules spell out the power to grant payment by instalments or stay of execution. For with the inferior court nothing is within its jurisdiction unless it is specifically so provided, whereas everything is within the jurisdiction of the High Court unless it is specifically taken away: see Peacock v. Bell and Kendall (1667) Wms. Saund. 69 at p. 74.
A stay of execution under Order 42, r. 16 (1) (b) of L.N. 140A is an exercise of the court’s discretion. In my view it is not inconsistent with the exercise of that discretion to attach conditions to the stay. Nor does it make the exercise of the discretion any less so, because the suppliant specially asks for a condition viz: payment of the judgment
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debt by stated instalments, during the stay. The effect will be that the stay if granted by the court is not an absolute stay, but upon condition that the applicant pays the judgment debt by stated instalments during the stay.
That construction of the rule commends itself to me on consideration of the identical English rule which is Order 42, r. 19 (1) and which in the English Annual Practice (1959 ed.), Vol. 1 at p. 1015, it reads:
“Where a judgment is given or an order made for the payment of money by any person and the Court or a Judge is satisfied on application made at the time of the judgment or order or at any time thereafter by the judgment debtor or other party liable to execution that there are special circumstances which render it inexpedient to enforce the judgment or order or that the judgment debtor is unable from any cause to pay the money, then, notwithstanding anything in Rule 17, 17A or 18 of this Order, the Court or Judge may by order stay execution of the judgment or order by writ of fieri facias either absolutely or for such period and subject to such conditions as the Court or Judge thinks fit.”
The application of the rule calls for balancing against each other of two competing principles; firstly, that of a victorious litigant having the fruits of his success, and that of giving some respite to the vanquished. The applicant here is in commercial business and his inability to pay, as deposed to, is the result of losses arising from a fairly recent burglary; and forcible sale of his goods by military action, of which I may be permitted to take judicial notice. The first misfortune may be said to be a usual business hazard, which a prudent man may insure against. The latter is almost a vis major which human ingenuity could hardly foresee.
I think it is to the health of the economy of the country that people should stay in business. I am satisfied that the applicant’s straitened circumstances are special circumstances which make him unable to pay the ¢20,610 outright without putting him out of business. It is for these reasons that I have decided to exercise my discretion in the applicant’s favour without losing sight of the claims of the respondent.
I accordingly grant the application for stay of execution by the writ of fieri-facias subject to the following conditions: that the applicant makes a down payment of ¢5,000 which represents about twenty-five per centum of the judgment debt and not later than 28 February 1979; that the balance of ¢15,610 which shall carry interest on the diminishing balance at ten per centum per annum, shall be paid at the monthly instalment of ¢1,500, payment to be made not later than the last day of each month. The matter then resolves itself in having the judgment debt paid within eleven months or so.
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Application granted accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
DECISION
Application granted.
S. O.
