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[1979] SLR (HC) 63High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

REPUBLIC vs. GHANA CARGO HANDLING CO., LTD.; EX PARTE MOSES [1980] GLR 206

20 February 1979 · MENSA BOISON J · ≈ 10 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 63
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v GHANA CARGO HANDLING CO., LTD.; ex parte MOSES [1980] GLR 206 [1979] SLR (HC) 63
APAREPUBLIC v GHANA CARGO HANDLING CO., LTD.; ex parte MOSES [1980] GLR 206, [1979] SLR (HC) 63 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v GHANA CARGO HANDLING CO., LTD.; ex parte MOSES [1980] GLR 206, [1979] SLR (HC) 63 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) R. v. Wandsworth Justices; Ex parte Read [1942] 1 K.B. 281; [1942] 1 All E.R. 56; 111 L.J.K.B.

234; 106 J.P. 50; 116 L.T. 118; 58 T.L.R. 88, D.C.

(2) Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v. Hamilton; Fraser & Co. (1887) 12 App.Cas. 484; 56 L.J.Q.B. 626; 57 L.T. 695; 56 W.R. 337; 3 T.L.R. 764; 6 Asp.M.L.C. 200, H.L.

(3) R. v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920), Ltd.

[1924] 1 K.B. 171; 93 L.J.K.B. 390; 130 L.T. 164; 88 J.P. 13; 39 T.L.R. 715; 68 S.J. 188, C.A.

(4) R. v. National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians (Disputes Committee); Ex parte Neate [1953] 1 Q.B. 704; [1953] 1 All E.R. 327; 79 S.J. 116, D.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

RULING on an application for an order of certiorari to quash the proceedings of a committee of inquiry established to inquire into an alleged misconduct of the applicant. The facts are fully stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Sawyerr for the applicant.

Dr. Anane for the respondents.

[p.208] of [1980] GLR 206

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.

The applicant is an employee of the Ghana Cargo Handling Co., Ltd., the first respondents. The second respondent was an ad hoc committee of senior staff constituted by the first respondents to inquire into an allegation of misbehaviour against the applicant.

In this application a rule absolute for certiorari is sought against the respondents to quash, firstly, the proceedings of inquiry conducted by the second respondent, and secondly, the decision of the first respondents reducing the applicant in rank and salary. The decision of the first respondents is contained in a letter exhibited as B in the affidavit in support, and the proceedings of the committee, tendered as a result of the ex parte hearing.

By the affidavit the applicant was, until October 1977, a traffic research officer which post was of a zonal managerial grade. In about December 1977, the applicant was given a new schedule of the grade of terminal manager, which was lower in status. In connection with his new posting, the applicant wrote two letters addressed to the managing director, dated 4 and 13 January 1978 respectively, protesting against his new posting, in answer to a query. These letters are respectively exhibited as A and B, in the respondents’ affidavit.

The first respondents took indignant exception to the language of the letter exhibit A, as being rude and insulting, and eventually led to the setting up of a committee, i.e. the second respondent, appointed by the first respondents to investigate the conduct of the applicant and to submit its report.

The recommendation of the second respondent does not appear to have been exhibited. But from the submission of counsel for the applicant, the committee appears to have treated the matter as domestic, and tendered a recommendation that the management accepts the apology of the applicant and give him a warning only. The management’s decision exhibit B to reduce the applicant in rank and salary was therefore least expected, and has led to this motion.

The grounds upon which the order is moved, as appear in the statement, are amorphous and far from succinct, bordering on the nature of an affidavit. It is as well to draw attention that by Order 59, r. 3 (2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), the facts should be deposed to in an affidavit and not on the statement accompanying the motion: see R. v. Wandsworth Justices; Ex parte Read [1942] 1 K.B. 281, D.C. From the submissions of learned counsel for the motion it was possible to glean therefrom

[p.209] of [1980] GLR 206 the following grounds:

1. That the institution of the committee of inquiry and the punishment meted out by the management were ultra vires the rules of the company.

2. That the committee denied the applicant, a fair and full hearing in breach of the audi alteram partem rule:

(a) when they misled the applicant to dispense, with the services of counsel at the inquiry;

(b) in not having the managing director give evidence viva voce to enable the applicant to cross-examine him instead of accepting the managing director’s version by letter.

3. That there was bias in so far as the management, having itself set up the committee of inquiry, acted upon the committee’s recommendation and imposed punishment on the applicant.

Exhibit C is an extract of the terms and conditions of service, and covers only rules 85 to 92. Rule 88 coming under “disciplinary procedure” under which the respondents purported to act reads:

“An officer who commits an offence necessitating his dismissal such as stealing, embezzlement of funds or other serious offence shall be made to appear before a joint management/senior staff association investigation board or committee of inquiry and shall be given the fullest opportunity to defend himself.”

Learned counsel’s contention is that the alleged insulting conduct of the applicant, not being an act tending to cause financial loss to the company, was not covered by the phrase “other serious offences,” since insulting conduct or behaviour cannot be regarded ejusdem generis with “stealing or embezzlement of funds.” The rule of construction, ejusdem generis, applies where the general word which follows particular and specific words is of the same nature as itself. In that case the general word takes its meaning from the particular words, and is presumed to be restricted to the same genus as those words: see Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v. Hamilton; Fraser & Co. (1887) 12 App.Cas. 484, H.L. What this submission comes to is that the words “other serious offences” are to mean offences of the same kind as stealing and embezzlement. I think the class or category of offences mentioned do not sufficiently form a genus to admit of “and other serious offences” being read ejusdem generis.

Obedience, we read, is the bond of rule, and there could hardly be in any commercial enterprise or business organisation, a more

[p.210] of [1980] GLR 206 serious offence than insubordination. In the absence of the full articles or service rules in exhibit C, I hold the conduct of the applicant was covered by rule 88 and that the inquiry was properly constituted.

Now the committee’s finding was no more than a recommendation that the apology of the applicant be accepted and given a warning. That was in fact giving a blessing to what the applicant described as his informal stand-point. In that case a court might not readily exercise its discretion in granting the remedy of certiorari against the second respondent, because although the committee went through a hearing it had, as it were, kept the bargain by its recommendation, in virtually bending over to the informal stand-point. The absence of counsel for the applicant in my view can hardly be said to have been a denial of a fair and full hearing. The fact that the first respondents ignored the views of the committee and chose to inflict much severer punishment is another matter, and cannot affect the conduct of the proceedings before the committee.

As I have noted, exhibit C contains only part of the service rules. There is nothing to show that the management “shall” act on the recommendation of the committee. That is a burden on the applicant, and in absence of that proof, I hold that the verdict of the committee being but a recommendation, the management was not precluded from refusing to act by that recommendation.

The complaints that the failure of the managing director to give evidence viva voce to afford opportunity for cross-examination; and the conduct of the management in instituting the committee, and adjudging upon the committee’s recommendation including the award of punishment on the applicant, may be disposed of shortly by asserting that it has not been shown that the committee was obliged to adopt a judicial procedure strictu senso, or that the management was under a duty to act judicially.

I have just said enough on the merits in deference to learned counsel’s effort and time in arguing the motion. But in point of fact I think the motion can be disposed of shortly on the question whether the remedy of certiorari lies in such a case. As it may be seen, the rule 88, together with the rest exhibited, is the outcome either, of voluntary collective bargaining between the management and the other employees, or it is a rule of service condition to which the employee subscribes to by way of his contract of employment. Thus rule 88 may mean no more than a voluntary submission to a form of procedure, akin to an arbitration or domestic tribunal. It

[p.211] of [1980] GLR 206 is not imposed by statute, nor has it been shown by the applicant that he is enjoined by some legislation to submit to proceedings before the committee apparently set up under rule 88.

Now the courts by means of prerogative orders perform a restricted function of supervisory nature, in seeing to it that inferior courts or other bodies charged by statute to discharge some judicial or quasi-judicial functions keep within their jurisdiction. Like prohibition, the orders of certiorari may issue wherever anybody of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority: see R. v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B. 171 per Atkin L.J. at pp. 204-205, C.A. It has been explained that for this purpose “legal authority” generally means statutory authority and consequently, neither certiorari nor prohibition will issue to a private arbitral body which derives its jurisdiction from contract.

R. v. National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians (Disputes Committee); Ex parte Neate [1953] 1 Q.B. 704, D.C. was a case in which an infant Robin D. G. Neate bound himself by an indenture to serve for five years as an apprentice to a dental surgeon to learn the craft of dental mechanics. By clause 6 of the indenture the parties agreed that all differences of disputes in respect of or arising out of the subject-matter shall be submitted to the National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians. A dispute as to the right to terminate the apprenticeship having arisen between the infant and the firm of dental surgeons that had succeeded to the indenture; and the infant being aggrieved by the decision of the disputes committee under the indenture, obtained leave to move for orders of certiorari and prohibition, directed to the disputes committee to quash their award, declaring the employers of Neate entitled to terminate the apprenticeship and prohibiting them from further proceedings in the arbitration. The rule nisi was discharged. At pp. 707-708 Lord Goddard C.J. referring to the two remedies stated the law thus:

“But the bodies to which in modern times the remedies of these prerogative writs have been applied have all been statutory bodies on whom Parliament has conferred statutory powers and duties which, when exercised, may lead to the detriment of subjects who may have to submit to their jurisdiction.”

[p.212] of [1980] GLR 206

Later on he adds at p. 708:

“Prohibition is a writ which lies from a superior court to an inferior court. Certiorari lies to bring up the decision or record of the inferior court to this court with a view to it being quashed. It is granted and directed to one of the inferior courts, such as magistrates’ courts and county courts, and it has been extended to the various bodies which have been entrusted by Parliament with duties partly of an administrative character and partly of a judicial character in some cases, but cases in which subjects may be affected by their decisions.

There is no instance of which I know in the books where certiorari or prohibition has gone to any arbitrator except a statutory arbitrator, and a statutory arbitrator is a person to whom by statute the parties must resort.”

The Ghana Cargo Handling Co., Ltd., is a private commercial company registered, it seems, under the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179). The service conditions and rules as exhibited, in exhibit C, are domestic rules not imposed by the legislature. The courts have no business to meddle, by way of prerogative orders with regards to disputes arising therefrom. Some other remedy such as injunction or declaration could possibly arouse the court to action. It follows that the order nisi will be discharged and the application consequently dismissed. Dr. Anane, counsel for the respondents, does not ask for costs.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

S. O.

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