OSAE vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 446
13 July 1979 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 17 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 53Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) R. v. Ofoni (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 1.
(2) R. v. Lloyd Jones (1838) 8 C. & P. 288; 173 E.R. 498.
(3) R. v. Wolstenholme (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 313.
(4) R. v. Nwagbani (1942) 8 W.A.C.A 19.
(5) R. v. Okorodudu (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 129.
(6) Aboah v. R. (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 252.
(7) Bediako v. Commissioner of Police, Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled Judgments,Criminal, January-June 1958, p. 95, unreported.
(8) The State v. Agyekum and Amofa [1962] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 442.
(9) Datsa v. The Republic [1971] 1 G.L.R. 418.
(10) R. v. Morris (1933) 24 Cr.App.R. 105, C.C.A.
(11) R. v. Lawson [1952] 1 All E.R. 804; 116 J.P. 195; [1952] 1 T.L.R. 889; 36 Cr. App. R. 30. (12) R. v. Balls (1871) L.R. 1, C.C.R. 328; 40 L.J.M.C. 148; 24 L.T. 760; 35 J.P. 820; 19 W.R. 876; 12 Cox C.C. 96.
[p.448] of [1980] GLR 446 (13) R. v. Sheaf (1925) 134 L.T. 127: 89 J.P. 207. 42 T.L.R. 57; 28 Cox C.C. 86; 19 Cr. App. R. 46, C.C.A.
(14) R. v. Grove (1835) 7 C. & P. 635; 1 Mood. C.C. 447; 173 E.R. 278.
(15) R. v. Chapman (1843) 1 Car. & Kir. 119; 1 L.T. (o.s.) 414; 1 Cox C.C. 47.
(16) R. v. Lambert (1847) 2 Cox C.C. 309.
(17) R. v. Moah (1856) Dears C.C. 626; 25 L.J.M.C. 66; 26 L.T. (o.s.) 286; 20 J.P. 85; 2 Jur. (N.S.)
213; 4 W.R. 255.
(18) R. v. Wright (1858) 1 Cox C.C.413, C.C.R.; (1858) Dears & B. 431; 27 L.J.M.C. 65; 30 L.T. (o.s.)
292; 22 J.P. 71; 4 Jur. (N.S.) 313; 6 W.R. 225; 7 Cox C.C. 413, C.C.R.
(19) R. v. Tomlin [1954] 2 Q.B. 274; [1954] 2 W.L.R. 1140; 118 J.P. 354; 98 S.J. 374; [1954] 2 All E.R. 272; 38 Cr. App. R. 82, C.C.A.
(20) The State v. Hagan [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 652.
(21) Vyras v. Commissioner of Police, Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled Judgments, Criminal, January-June 1958, p. 1, unreported.
(22) Asare v. The Republic [1978] G.L.R. 193, C.A.
(23) R. v. Clarke (1905) 69 J.P. 150; 49 S.J. 261, C.C.R.
(24) R. v. Keena (1868) L.R. 1, C.C.R. 113; 37 L.J.M.C. 43; 17 L.T. 515 ; 32 J.P. 148; 16 W.R. 375; 11 Cox C.C. 123.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a conviction for stealing entered by a circuit court. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
G. K. Mensa-Etsi for the appellant.
Yaw Wiredu Peprah for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
The appellant in this case appeals against his conviction on four counts charging him with the offence of stealing various sums of money, the property of his employers, the Pioneer Tobacco Company, Tamale branch.
The facts of the case led in evidence by the prosecution are that at the relevant times the appellant was a salesman of the said Pioneer Tobacco Company, Tamale branch. As a salesman he was assigned a van and was the sole custodian of one of two keys which opens and closes the padlock to the van. It was said by the prosecution that the other key was for security reasons in the custody of the Standard Bank, Tamale. On May 1977 the appellant collected 262 milles of cigarettes valued ¢11,595.50 for sale on the Salaga route. He was driven on the van by a driver employed by the Pioneer Tobacco Company, Tamale. After the sales they returned from trek
[p.449] of [1980] GLR 446 and rendered accounts to the company. The quantity of cigarettes which he returned as unsold was 45.7 milles valued ¢1,854.30. This means that he must have sold 216.3 milles valued ¢9,741.20 and should therefore pay to the company the said amount. Instead when the amount which the accused brought was counted it was ¢9,481.35 representing short payment by ¢259.85. This sum is the subject-matter of the stealing charge in count one. On 7 June 1977 the appellant went on trek again and this time he took cigarettes valued at ¢24,610.50. Having regard to the value of cigarettes returned unsold, namely, ¢2,393.25 the amount the appellant paid over to his employers showed a shortage of ¢1,088.13. This amount is the subject-matter of the stealing charge in the second count. In the third count, the accused went on the Yendi route on 1 August 1977 with cigarettes worth ¢31,363. He returned on 4 August 1977 with unsold cigarettes worth ¢5,289.87 but the amount he paid in showed a deficit of ¢2,883.39. On 8 August 1977 he took out cigarettes worth ¢26,712.75. Having regard to what he returned unsold, he ought to have paid in ¢20,580.90, he, however, paid in ¢20,212.90 giving rise to a short payment of ¢378. This is the subject-matter of the charge in the fourth count.
The evidence led by the prosecution touching the quantity of cigarettes supplied to the appellant for sale, the quantity he returned to the company unsold as well as the amount of money which he paid in was admitted and was not challenged in any way whatsoever by the appellant. The case for the prosecution is that since the appellant must have sold the cigarettes not returned and has failed to account for the proceeds of sale, he must have misappropriated the sums and was therefore guilty of stealing.
The appellant gave evidence and raised a number of defences. In the first place, he admitted the shortages as I have already pointed out and added that he did not know precisely how the shortages came about. He surmised that the shortages might be attributed to his customers some of whom he said were not honest. He indicated that on 1 August 1977 when his van was being loaded the manager sent him to the office to bring his cash box and stock books. He said it took him some time to come back because he could not trace the items in time. He said when he came back he found that his truck had been fully loaded and a box of tusker left behind. On this occasion when he returned from trek to render accounts he found that he had incurred a really very heavy shortage amounting to ¢2,883. This is obviously related to the charge on the third count. He also gave evidence that one of the drivers of the other vans lost his key and that the manager told him that he would change his padlock and give him the padlock of the missing key. The manager denied this
[p.450] of [1980] GLR 446 and said he changed the padlock entirely. There is no admissible positive evidence on record that the appellant’s padlock was, in fact, changed. What is important in regard to the question of the keys (as the evidence of the prosecution showed) is that the appellant had one and the Standard Bank kept a duplicate. Finally the appellant led evidence by a night watchman that on one of the occasions when he went on the Yendi route and while the van was parked overnight at the Ghana National Trading Corporation yard, the said night watchman heard someone attempting to insert a key in the padlock. When he shouted he discovered that it was the appellant’s driver who was thus interfering with the padlock.
The facts of the case, leaving aside the defence of the appellant to be dealt with later in this judgment, would seem to raise the vexed question of whether it is proper to charge a person with stealing in cases referred to in the books as cases of general deficiency, namely, cases in which as a servant with a duty to account for his master’s money, a person shows a deficit in his accounts and is unable to offer an explanation as to how the deficit arose. That question in one form or another has agitated the attention of our courts for some time. One of the earliest instances in which the matter arose is R. v. Ofoni (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 1. In that case the appellant, a manager of the United Africa Co., Ltd., who was solely in charge of the stock, cash and books of the company and was the person in sole control of the safe of the company had his books checked and it was found that between 4 June and 1 July 1939 his books showed a general shortage of £304.19s. 11d. He was unable to offer any explanation. The West African Court of Appeal following the English cases of R. v. Lloyd Jones (1838) 8 C. & P. 288 and R. v. Wolstenholme (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 313, held upholding the submission of his counsel that though it was proved that a general deficiency existed in his account, that was not sufficient to support the conviction unless it was additionally proved that some specific sum had been stolen.
In R. v. Nwagbani (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 19, the West African Court of Appeal coram: Kingdon C.J., Butler Lloyd and Baker JJ., was quite categoric in stating the principle. In that case the appellant was a clerk employed by Messrs. John Holt and Co. He drew money for the purchase of stamps and kept a book showing the disbursement. When his accounts were checked it was found that he was short by £16 6s. 9½ d. Upon these facts he was convicted in the High Court. The appellate court had no difficulty in quashing the conviction and declaring very firmly at p. 19: “In our opinion this merely amounts to a general deficiency in account and is not sufficient to found a charge of stealing. Appellant was not proved to have stolen any particular stamps or sum of money.”
[p.451] of [1980] GLR 446
The principle reflected in these two cases was restated in R. v. Okorodudu (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 129 at p. 130, Aboah v. R. (1953)14 W.A.C.A. 252 and in the judgment of Granville Sharp J. in Bediako v. Commissioner of Police, Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled Judgments, Criminal, January-June 1958, p. 95, unreported. It was reiterated by Djabanor J. in The State v. Agyekum and Amofa [1962] 1 G.L.R. 442 at pp. 447-448 and by Francois J. (as he then was) in Datsa v. The Republic [1971] 1 G.L.R. 418. In the Aboah case Foster-Sutton P. delivering the judgment of the court purported to accept the said principle on the ostensible authority of R. v. Morris (1933) 24 Cr.App.R. 105, C.C.A. and said at pp. 252-253:
“ . . . where a person is charged with stealing, fraudulent conversion or embezzlement proof must be given of a specific appropriation of a particular sum of money, and that it is not sufficient in such cases to prove a general deficiency.”
Of course in R. v. Morris (supra) the point taken by Lord Hewart C.J. in the course of delivering the judgment of the English Court of Criminal Appeal dealt not with “general deficiency” but fraudulent conversion of “a general balance.” This is an entirely different concept and it is therefore strictly speaking not a proper authority on the supposed law of general deficiency. It would be recalled that in R. v. Morris (supra) at p. 107, which came before Lord Hewart C.J., Avory J. and Lawrence J. the Lord Chief Justice said: “it is quite obvious that the appellant was charged with the fraudulent conversion of a general balance alleged to be due and that is a course which cannot properly be taken.” It is characteristic of Lord Hewart C.J. to state principles at times rather too widely and in the subsequent case of R. v. Lawson [1952] 1 All E.R. 804 Lynskey J., after examining the cases of R. v. Balls (1871) L.R. 1, C.C.R. 328, and the opinion of Avory J. in R. v. Sheaf (1925) 19 Cr.App.R. 46, C.C.A. had occasion to criticise this statement of the principle. He said at p. 808:
“ . . . it seems to me that R. v. Morris ((1933) 24 Cr.App.R. 105) is in conflict with earlier decisions. It states the law too widely. There may be cases where it is proper to allege what, in effect, is a general deficiency if one can prove that there was a fraudulent conversion of either the whole or a part of it at one time.”
The locus classicus is the old English case of R. v. Lloyd Jones (1838) 8 C. & P. 288 where Alderson B. would seem to have laid down the principle after admirably analysing the case of R. v. Grove (1835) 7 C. & P. 635 which was then supposed to be the genesis or of the principle. He laid it down thus at p. 289:
[p.452] of [1980] GLR 446
“Whatever difference of opinion there might be in the case of R. v. Grove, that proceeded more upon the peculiar facts of that case than upon the law. It is not sufficient to prove at the trial a general deficiency in account. Some specific sum must be proved to be embezzled, in like manner as in larceny some particular article must be proved to have been stolen.”
The principle was thereafter consistently stated by the English judges and in some cases, the English courts applied or purported to apply it. In R. v. Chapman (1843) 1 Car. & Kir. 119, William J. applied it and directed the jury to acquit. Erle J. purported to apply it in R. v. Lambert (1847) 2 Cox C.C. 309; Pollock C.B., Coleridge J., Williams J. and Martin B, purported to apply it in R. v. Moah (1856) Dears. C.C. 626 at the Court for Crown Cases Reserved to convict a prisoner and in R. v. Wright (1858) 1 Cox C.C. 413, C.C.R. Campbell C.J. and Coleridge J. would seem to have had the principle in mind when they dismissed the appeal. Avory J. in R. v. Sheaf (1925) 19 Cr.App.R. 46, C.C.A. in an obiter dictum which sought to state the principle said at p. 49:
“ . . . it is not sufficient to charge the embezzlement of a general deficiency unless it appears that by the conduct or course of business it was the duty of the defendant on the date specified to hand over the lump sum which he had received . . . “ Speaking for myself I must confess that Avory J.’s exception is difficult to appreciate, since in most of the decided cases, the defendant was shown to have a duty to account or hand over the sum on the specified date and his failure to so hand over was responsible for his being charged with the offence. A study of most of the English cases as well as the local cases does reveal that although it is easy to state the supposed principle, its application would seem to present some difficulty. For instance, in R. v. Okorodudu (supra) which would seem to be a case of general deficiency, the conviction of the appellant was upheld by the West African Court of Appeal and at p. 130 the court restated the principle:
“It is clear that the mere omission to pay over moneys received by a clerk or servant does not suffice to show a conversion, nor does the mere facts of there being a deficiency as shown by the accounts, for he may have done no more than fail properly to enter items of disbursement in his books, or may have lost the money by negligence, or have spent it on his master’s account. There must, therefore, be some evidence that the particular account specified was misappropriated at a particular date and place.”
[p.453] of [1980] GLR 446
The facts of the Okorodudu cases would seem to fall within and be covered by the principle. The appellant would seem on the principle to be entitled to acquittal nevertheless he was convicted and the conviction upheld on appeal. I notice, however, that the case exhibits certain features. The appellant received between 27 and 29 June 1946 four sums totalling £83 12s. 9d. He was the treasurer of the native administration and custodian of the funds which he was apparently under a duty to put in his safe. The total cash found in his safe when he was checked on 16 July 1946 was £8 12s. 9d. It was proved by evidence that the appellant was in financial difficulties prior to 16 July 1946. He had consulted a “diviner” in regard to shortages, the results likely to accrue therefrom and his hopes of extricating himself by resort to a “money doubler.” It was also shown that although he had been missing moneys from his safe for a long time he made no report of these losses. It is upon these facts that the appellant was convicted and it seems to me that the amount the appellant received, the amount found in the safe and all the other attendant circumstances would seem to have been taken into account by the courts as evidencing mens rea to ground convicting the appellant. That this is so would seem to be vindicated by a close reading of the case of Aboah v. R. (supra) where the check of the appellant, a native authority treasurer at Suhum, revealed a shortage of £446 13s. 3d. That sum in 1952 when the case was decided was a large one indeed by the standards of time. The appellant would seem to have attempted to avoid his accounts being checked by absenting himself from duty on 9 March, 8 April, 4 May and 4 June 1952 when the Senior Regional Administrator went to Suhum to check his account. Indeed when the account was ultimately checked the appellant was found at Kibi and he was brought down to Suhum for the check. Clearly, the circumstances showed mens rea and I believe it is on this basis that Aboah v. R. (supra) ought to be appraised. The English case of R. v. Tomlin [1954] 2 Q.B. 274, C.C.A. is also a case in point. Many of our local cases also illustrate the point. Typical of which is the judgment of Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) in The State v. Hagan [1961] 1 G.L.R. (Pt. II) 652 at p. 654, S.C.
I think a close study of both the local and the English cases do reveal that the principle may have been inadvertently stated perhaps too widely. I think the exceptions indicated in the principle are not exhaustive. The true statement of the Ghana position reflecting the principle running through all the cases and omitting cases of the so called general balance will be thus: It is not sufficient in a charge of stealing money to merely prove general deficiency. Proof must rather be given of a specific misappropriation of a particular sum of money or of circumstances from which it can be reasonably inferred that
[p.454] of [1980] GLR 446 the accused stole the whole or part of the sum involved. I think it is this later alternative qualification that is capable of explaining cases like R. v. Okorodudu (supra); Aboah v. R. (supra); The State v. Hagan (supra) and the decision of van Lare Ag.C.J. in Vyras v. Commissioner of Police, Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled Judgments, Criminal, January-June 1958, p. 1, unreported. As can be seen from the statement of principle formulated by me, the shortages in the four counts represent indeed a general deficiency in the accounts of the appellant and there is nothing in the facts or circumstances to bring in the exception and to disable him from relying on the general principle. That being so the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained and will for this reason be quashed.
Furthermore, there are certain features of this case which cast doubt on the conviction of the appellant. There was the defence of a missing key. The learned circuit court judge dealt with the matter thus: “I am of opinion that whether one salesman lost his key and his padlock was given to the accused or not that does not affect the case one way or another.” With the utmost respect, I find it difficult to accept this proposition. If indeed a key got missing and the padlock was given to the accused then it means (assuming the other salesman’s driver had merely hidden the key), that there is in existence a key in the hand of a stranger who if he chooses to be dishonest can easily follow the appellant and when the van is packed, he will attempt to extract cigarettes from the van. This will obviously result in shortage. This evidence must be considered alongside the evidence of the witness which the appellant called that at one time in the night he heard the driver inserting a key to the padlock while it was packed at the Ghana National Trading Corporation yard where he was the watchman. Admittedly, he did not cross-examine the driver when he was giving evidence. Furthermore, he gave evidence of an occasion when he was sent by the manager when his van was being loaded and thus deprived of the opportunity of checking the stock. As Anin J.A. said in the recent case of Asare v. The Republic [1978] G.L.R. 193 at p. 198, C.A.: “it is settled law that where the law casts the onus of proof on the accused, the burden on him is lighter than on the prosecutor. The standard of proof required is the balance of probabilities.” Although this statement correctly stated the principle applicable in the instance given, I think it is also the law that quite apart from the law casting an onus on an accused, if at any time of the trial he voluntarily assumes the onus of proving his defence or some facts, as happened in this case, the standard he must discharge is on a balance of probabilities. The learned circuit court judge did not consider whether short of believing the appellant, his defences
[p.455] of [1980] GLR 446 are reasonably probable or cast doubt on the case for the prosecution having regard to the huge sums he received and particularly as the Standard Bank was not called to give evidence, that the second key was in their custody at the relevant dates of the offences. Furthermore, no positive or circumstantial evidence of any sort was led as to whether the appellant took cigarettes or actually misappropriated money. His charge, of course, was stealing the sums of money mentioned in the charge sheet. The whole circumstance of the case however does reveal that it may either be loss of cigarettes or loss of money. As was decided in the case of R. v. Clarke (1905) 69 J.P. 150, if the charge alleges stealing of money an accused person cannot be convicted of stealing goods. A fortiori in this case where the evidence led shows that what the complainant company lost may either be money or cigarettes it is obvious a conviction for stealing money cannot also be sustained: see also R. v. Keena (1868) L.R. 1, C.C.R. 113. Such a situation is covered by the general principle that for the prosecution to succeed in a charge there must be no reasonable doubt that the particular charge has been proved: see Asare v. The Republic (supra).
For all the reasons I have advanced in this judgment, I think the conviction is erroneous in law. I will therefore quash the conviction, set aside the sentence of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour on each count and acquit and discharge the appellant. The orders for restitution since they are based on the conviction are also cancelled. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
DECISION Conviction quashed. Appeal allowed.
S. O.
