REPUBLIC vs. INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE; EX PARTE OBLIE [1981] GLR 328
16 July 1979 · MENSA BOISON J · ≈ 7 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 79Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASE REFERRED TO
Cheetham v. Manchester Corpn. (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 249; 44 L.J.C.P. 139; 32 L.T. 28.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Inspector-General of Police in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction under regulation 23 of L.I. 993. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
E. N. Moore for the applicant.
Amui, Chief State Attorney for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.
This is an application for an order of certiorari to bring up and quash the decision of the Inspector-General of Police (I.G.P.), in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction under the provisions of the Police Force (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations, 1974 (L.I. 993), in a certain disciplinary proceeding against the applicant, Paul Ashalley Oblie. The said decision is dated 26 September 1978, and marked herein as exhibit A.
As shown by the affidavits, the applicant, a police corporal, was charged and found guilty of a misconduct contrary to section 17 (k) of the Police Service Act, 1970 (Act 350), in that, on 6th day of April, 1977 in Accra did ride a certain police force motorcycle No. GP 902 without due care and attention as a result of which you rode into the off-side fender of a Worsely private car
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No. GF 5403, and caused damage to both vehicles.” The recommendation of the disciplinary authority that the applicant be reprimanded and pay ¢960, being cost of repairs to the force cycle, was duly confirmed and being aggrieved thereby, the applicant appealed to the Inspector-General of Police. The appeal was in due course dismissed without the applicant being heard.
The facts as outlined above do not appear to be in dispute, no affidavit in opposition having been found necessary. The matter is therefore an issue of law. The grounds upon which this is rested are:
(1) That the procedure adopted by the respondent in determining the applicant’s appeal without first giving the applicant a hearing was in breach of the rules of natural justice.
(2) That the said procedure so adopted by the respondent has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
Before I proceed to examine the arguments, I may permit myself to make certain observations on the propriety of the decision of the Police Central Disciplinary Board to treat the matter as a departmental misconduct.
The common law principle of equality before the law is now axiomatic in our law. But this does not relieve some persons as a class from being subject to special set of laws. An example is a person who joins the army, by his own volition or on conscription may, besides the general law applicable to citizens generally, be subject to martial law. In like manner, a person in the police force may, alike with his class, be subject to departmental code of discipline. Such class laws apart, the soldier or policeman is, as a citizen, equally subject to the general laws of the country,
The aforesaid charge of a misconduct is in fact the traffic offence of driving without due care and attention contrary to section 18 of the Road Traffic Ordinance, 1952 (No. 55 of 1952), which provides:
“18. (1) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on a road without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds or imprisonment not exceeding six months or to both such fine and imprisonment.”
On the face of the particulars of the aforesaid misconduct there is nothing peculiar and restrictive to the police force to make the general traffic offence special “misconduct.” What Act 350 envisages as a “misconduct” is firstly, an act which is not an offence or crime under the general law, but which, by reason of the person’s calling as a policeman, deserves disciplinary sanction. Secondly,
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the act or conduct may constitute an offence or crime under the general law, and having so been dealt with, the person by reason that he is a policeman will be amenable to departmental disciplinary sanction. The oft-quoted principle that no man should be punished twice for the same offence does not arise here, simply because in the departmental proceedings the charge the offender is called upon to face will not and should not be the same offence. By this means equality before the law may be real, and the civilian or uniformed citizen alike becomes answerable to sanctions of the general criminal law or statutory offences.
What appears to have happened in the present case was to refrain from prosecuting the applicant in the court of the land, for, an offence under the general law, and to treat it as a departmental misconduct, This was, of course possible and easy to achieve because the applicant happens to be a member of a force to which is entrusted to a large degree investigations and prosecutions of crimes and offences under the law of the land. It is a dangerous practice and must be frowned upon by all engaged in the due administration of criminal justice in this country.
Be that as it may, the Police Force (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations, 1974 (L.I. 993) which governs the matter, by regulation 23 (2) and (6) provides:
“23. (2) Where a penalty is imposed on a police officer below the rank of Inspector he may appeal to the Inspector General of Police against the decision, and the penalty shall thereupon take effect until the appeal is determined …
(6) The Police Council or the Inspector-General of Police on hearing an appeal under the Regulations may substitute a finding of their own for any finding appealed against and may allow or dismiss the appeal and shall have power to reduce, cancel, increase or alter any penalty imposed.”
The contention of Mr. Moore for the applicant is simple, that is, the “hearing of an appeal” within the meaning of regulation 23 (6) means a hearing in which the appellant is given opportunity and heard unless there is a statutory exception to displace the normal practice as occurs in tribunals in hearing appeals. It is the contention of Mr. Moore that failure to hear the appellant, prejudiced a fair hearing of the appeal and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice. This contention was founded on ground (2) above, and, in arguing it, learned counsel went to the extent of pointing out several discrepancies in the evidence, and the disciplinary inquiry officer’s unfavourable view discrediting the “prosecution” witness.
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There is no doubt that the nature of the appellate jurisdiction given to the Inspector-General of Police by regulation 23 (6) obliges him to act judicially. The proceedings of the disciplinary inquiry, including the charges, as well as the grounds of appeal are placed before him. And as set out in regulation 23 (6), between the two poles of allowing or dismissing an appeal, the Inspector-General of Police has a wide range of powers. He may substitute a fresh finding or cancel, reduce, increase or alter any penalty imposed. All these may, if the appellant were present, be urged upon the Inspector-General of Police in an oral hearing.
It is well-known law that the legislature may by apt words permit the hearing of an appeal ex parte, or permit enforcement powers against persons and property ex parte: see Cheetham v. Manchester Corpn. (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 249. The learned Chief State Attorney was unable to show any provision in L.I. 993 or any law which could remotely be interpreted to mean that an oral hearing or opportunity was not intended within regulation 23 (6). Indeed the learned attorney confessed that there was no procedure laid down for the hearing of appeals in L.I. 993. That being so, he contended that the hearing of an appeal by the Inspector-General of Police was an administrative act, in which no hearing viva voce was intended and no certiorari could therefore lie. Mr. Amui’s analogy to certain “forms” in use in the courts missed the mark and need not be re-hearsed here.
The further submission that since by regulation 23 (2) the penalty was exacted notwithstanding an appeal, certiorari will not lie because there was nothing to quash, appears to be misconceived. Were that right no appeal will ever be of any use once sentence has been served or penalty paid. What is sought is to quash the decision in exhibit A; and the penalties even if already exacted would have to be restored because they were not lawful. As it happens in this case however, the ¢960 fine is to be paid in instalments by way of stipulated deductions from the applicant’s monthly salary. So that even if there were the relief for an order of prohibition, there is yet some matter upon which the order may be effected. But what I notice is that the motion prayed only for an order of certiorari and it seems to me no relief of prohibition can be properly asked for in the statement. Fortunately when the decision in exhibit A is quashed, it follows that there was never any lawful right to deduct the fine.
I am satisfied this application should succeed. The failure to hear the applicant disabled the Inspector-General of Police in his appellate jurisdiction to determine the appeal fairly and thereby
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gravely prejudiced the applicant’s appeal. It amounted to a denial of justice. Accordingly, I hereby grant the relief of certiorari and quash the decision of the Inspector-General of Police. For the avoidance of doubt my order, in effect, quashes the whole proceedings of the disciplinary inquiry as well. There will be costs of ¢450 for the applicant.
DECISION Application for certiorari granted.
Order accordingly.
D. F. L.
