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[1979] SLR (CA) 8Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

REPUBLIC vs. CAPE COAST CIRCUIT COURT REGISTRAR; EX PARTE ARTHUR [1980] GLR 165

12 April 1979 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (CA) 8
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v CAPE COAST CIRCUIT COURT REGISTRAR; ex parte ARTHUR [1980] GLR 165 [1979] SLR (CA) 8
APAREPUBLIC v CAPE COAST CIRCUIT COURT REGISTRAR; ex parte ARTHUR [1980] GLR 165, [1979] SLR (CA) 8 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v CAPE COAST CIRCUIT COURT REGISTRAR; ex parte ARTHUR [1980] GLR 165, [1979] SLR (CA) 8 (Ghana Ct. App. 1979).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from a ruling of the High Court, Cape Coast, granting an application for mandamus to compel the Cape Coast Circuit Court Registrar to issue a certificate of purchase to the applicant. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of the court delivered by Apaloo C.J.

COUNSEL

Joe Reindorf for R. A. Ankrah.

Short for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. On 26 August 1975, house No. H.176, Agona Swedru, was sold by auction to satisfy a judgment obtained against one Rachel Aku Ankrah. There was some dispute about the validity of that sale. On account of this, when the registrar of the circuit court was asked by the purchaser to issue a certificate of purchase in accordance with the rules of court, he declined to do so.

[p.167] of [1980] GLR 165

To compel him to do this, the purchaser, Mary Arthur, sought leave of the High Court, Cape Coast, for an order of mandamus to compel him to issue such certificate. Leave was granted. When the court was about to be moved pursuant to such leave, the judgment debtor, Rachel Aku Ankrah was served with notice of the application. This accorded with Order 59, r. 4 (2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), because she was directly affected by the application.

Upon being served with the application, she filed in court, two affidavits dated 27 October and 27 November 1975. The first affidavit impugned the regularity of the sale from a purely procedural standpoint and the second deposed to facts, which properly construed, alleged payment of the debt to the judgment creditor’s solicitors at an imprecise point of time. But it seems clear her object in lodging these affidavits was to persuade the court that no lawful sale of her house took place and that the application for mandamus should be refused.

She did not however appear to have instructed counsel to present any legal argument on her behalf. So the question of the lawfulness or otherwise of the sale of her house was debated by the registrar of the circuit court and the purchaser. Both sides were represented by counsel. On 10 March 1976, the High Court, presided over by Mrs. Owusu-Addo J. ruled that the sale of the house “was perfectly regular” and ordered the registrar to issue a certificate of purchase to the applicant within fourteen days. It is against that ruling that the registrar appealed to this court on the somewhat vague ground that “Her Lordship erred in the law applicable in the matter.”

In the true sense of the word, the registrar was purely a nominal appellant. Having no interest in this case, it would not matter much to him whether or not a certificate of sale was issued. The real person whose interest was vitally affected by the order was the said Rachel Aku Ankrah. She stood in danger of losing her property by reason of the court’s conclusion and consequential order. She however filed no appeal and can in no sense be described as an appellant before us.

As is now fashionable, the appellant-registrar intimated in paragraph 3 (2) of the notice of appeal that “other grounds to be filed on receipt of the record of proceedings.” Apparently, the record of proceedings did not disclose any other grounds of appeal, so he did not implement his declared intention and no “other grounds” of appeal were filed by him. Had he done so, he could not be heard on them without leave of this court because rule 8 (5) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), provides in express

[p.168] of [1980] GLR 165

terms that, “The appellant shall not, without the leave of the Court, urge or be heard in support of any ground of objection not mentioned in the notice of appeal, but the Court may … etc.” It seems that the said Rachel Aku Ankrah has, since the adverse judgment against her, retained Mr. Reindorf. He obviously considered that the judgment of the court below could be impeached on more weighty grounds than those filed on behalf of the appellant-registrar. So on 20 November 1978, he filed what he captioned Further grounds of appeal and those grounds claimed that his client being “a person directly affected by this appeal and aggrieved by the judgment appealed against, will seek leave to be heard by the court in argument on the following further grounds of appeal.” Four grounds of appeal numbered consecutively as “a” to “d” were then set out. It is perhaps worthy of note that Mr. Reindorf did not sign as solicitor for the appellant but as “solicitor for Rachel Aku Ankrah.”

When counsel sought leave to be heard on these grounds, Mr. Short, counsel for the respondent, objected that the aforesaid R. A. Ankrah though apparently aggrieved by the judgment of the court below, did not appeal. Not having done so, she did not file any grounds of appeal which she can properly be permitted to supplement by “further grounds.” It was said she was permitted to intervene in the court below and was entitled to appeal if she had so desired, but having elected not to do so, she cannot be heard either by herself or counsel on this appeal.

The record shows that this appeal was dismissed on 26 June 1978, when both parties failed to turn up. It was re-listed on the application of the aforesaid R. A. Ankrah and to do this, she deposed to an affidavit in which she claimed that she was the party directly affected by the appeal and was entitled to be heard. It was said by counsel that during the hearing of this motion, counsel for the respondent did not make any issue of the fact that she did not appeal and did not object to her being heard. Accordingly, it was submitted that it is too late to raise the point that she had not appealed or entitled to be heard. Alternatively, it was urged by Mr. Reindorf, that rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962, says the respondent “(a) in a civil appeal means any party (other than the appellant) directly affected by the appeal.” By that definition, so the argument ran, R. A. Ankrah is a respondent and can properly be heard here inasmuch as she is directly affected by this appeal. Counsel said the requirement of rule 16 of L.I. 218 which obliges a respondent to serve notice of a specified nature is met by the “further grounds” filed.

An appeal, broadly speaking, is an application “to set aside or vary the decision of another tribunal on the ground that it was

[p.169] of [1980] GLR 165

wrongly made.” As has been said ad nauseam, the creation of a right of appeal is an act which requires legislative authority. It cannot be conferred by implication. Such right is normally conferred on a person aggrieved or dissatisfied by the decision and the exercise of the right is itself normally statutorily regulated. That being so, we are unable to see how the equitable doctrine of estoppel can be said to confer such right on an aggrieved litigant. We cannot accept that because in a motion to re-list the appeal, the respondent did not raise this point, he is precluded from raising it now. We do not see that any facts were disclosed, which make it inequitable for the respondent to aver the obvious truth that R. A. Ankrah did not appeal and is not entitled to be heard.

Section 10 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), confers on her a right to appeal against the order made by the judge in this case and L.I. 218 provides the machinery by which she could exercise that right. Being the only person directly affected by the order, she chose not to complain or have it vacated in the manner laid down by law. This court has no inherent jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a person affected by an adverse judgment if such person failed to exercise his statutory right of appealing and doing so in the manner laid down by the law. We think she is properly a stranger to this appeal and the respondent’s contention that she is neither entitled to file “further grounds of appeal” nor be heard, was right.

As we said, counsel argued in the alternative, that R. A. Ankrah is a respondent and being a party can be heard in that capacity. A respondent is normally in this context, a person who appears in support of the judgment or a person who while accepting the soundness of the conclusion, seeks either to have it varied or affirmed on grounds other than those on which the decision was rested. Is R. A. Ankrah such a person? Clearly she is not and cannot be. She identifies herself with the registrar who claims to be “dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court, Cape Coast” and who claims in paragraph (4) of his notice of appeal that “the ruling of the lower court be set aside and ruling entered in his favour.” A person who seeks to achieve the same result by “further grounds of appeal” plainly is not a respondent in this appeal. Perhaps it is not without significance that counsel shrank from describing himself as solicitor for the “respondent” or “appellant.” With understandable caution, counsel described his own role empirically as “Solicitor for R. A. Ankrah.” We are therefore unable to accept that “the further

[p.170] of [1980] GLR 165

grounds of appeal” sought to be argued satisfied the requirement of rule 16 (1) L.I. 218 which provides for a genuine respondent within the definition we gave that term. The truth is, that R.A. Ankrah seeks to hide behind the term respondent by which she can technically be described under rule 1 of L.I. 218 to play the role of an appellant and seek the reversal of the order of the court below. We cannot concede her this role.

In view of the fact that the court’s decision seeks to deprive R.A. Ankrah of title to her house and the not uninteresting point of law on which the judge’s decision was based, we ourselves have given consideration to the question, whether we should permit her counsel to address us as amicus criae. We have accordingly tried to ascertain the proper role and definition of an amicus curiae. According to the Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt, the term means:

“a friend of the court, that is to say, a person, whether a member of the Bar not engaged in the case or any bystander, who call the attention of the court to some decisions, whether reported or unreported, or some point of law which would appear to have been overlooked.”

We do not think such definition can properly fit Mr. Reindorf. He was briefed in this case clearly to use his professional skill to secure the reversal of the order complained against. He is not here as a disinterested person who seeks to draw the court’s attention to an overlooked point of law. Indeed, he seeks and asserts a right to be heard on behalf of the person adversely affected by the judgment of the court below. Accordingly, we cannot properly grant him audience as amicus curiae. As we see it, the only role that he can properly play is to hold a “watching brief” for his client and to render as much assistance as he can to the appellant-registrar who is in truth fighting her battle on her behalf.

In view of what we said, we have no alternative but to sustain Mr. Short’s objection and refuse leave for the “further grounds of appeal” to be urged.

DECISION

Objection upheld.

Leave to argue further grounds of appeal refused.

S. O.

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