WILSON vs. SMITH [1980] GLR 152
12 April 1979 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 21 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Accra Furniture and Rubber Foam Co., Ltd. v. Indart S.P./A. of Rome [1973] 2 G.L.R. 289, C.A.
(2) Republic v. Greater Accra Regional Commissioner: Ex parte Naawu III [1976] 2 G.L.R. 25.
(3) Rossage v. Rossage [1960] 1 W.L.R. 249; [1960] 1 All E.R. 600; 104 S.J. 231, C.A.
(4) J. (An Infant), In re [1960] 1 W.L.R. 253; [1960] 1 All E.R. 603; 104 S.J. 232.
(5) McLardy v. Slateum (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 504; 59 L.J.Q.B. 154; 62 L.T. 151; 38 W.R. 349; 6 T.L.R.
184, C.A.
(6) Gill v. Woodfin (1884) 25 Ch.D. 707; 53 L.J.Ch. 617; 50 L.T. 490; 32 W.R. 393, C.A. (7) Atlanta Timber Co. v. Victoria Timber Co., Ltd. [1962] 1 G.L.R. 221.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the judgment of a circuit court granting the respondent’s application for summary judgment under Order 14, r. 1 of L.N. 140A. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of Apaloo C.J.
COUNSEL
Joe Reindorf for the appellant.
No appearance by or on behalf of the respondent.
[p.155] of [1980] GLR 152
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
On 12 August 1974, the respondent issued against the appellant, a specially indorsed writ claiming the sum of ¢3,100 being balance of the sum of ¢5,000 which the “plaintiff paid to the defendant for the supply of frozen imported fish and which said fish the defendant failed to supply.” The writ was taken out on the respondent’s behalf by her solicitor but the latter did not “indorse upon the writ of summons the address of the plaintiff” as required by Order 4, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A).
The writ was served on the appellant by substituted service and on 14 November 1974, the appellant entered appearance by his solicitor. On 2 December 1974, the appellant filed a defence to the action and also filed a counterclaim. In addition to the copy intended for the court, a copy was indorsed with the address of the respondent’s solicitor and was clearly intended to be served on him. On 11 February 1975, the respondent took out a summons for judgment under Order 14, r. 1 and in the supporting affidavit sworn to by one Timothy Adewale, the respondent’s solicitor’s clerk, it was deposed in paragraph 1 as follows, “That I have the authority of the plaintiff to swear to this affidavit and that the matters deposed to herein are within my knowledge information and belief as evidenced by receipts and other letters in my possession.”
The summons came before the court on 25 February 1975, and the record shows that neither the appellant nor his counsel appeared. The respondent’s counsel, however, appeared in court and moved for judgment. That application was acceded to and final judgment was entered in favour of the respondent for the amount claimed with costs. On 27 February 1975, the appellant moved to set aside that judgment and prayed for leave to defend or in the alternative, sought leave to appeal to this court against that judgment on a number of grounds which I shall presently examine. The court declined to set aside the judgment but granted leave to appeal.
On the appeal coming before us, Mr. Reindorf, counsel for the appellant, submitted that the judgment was bad and infringed the procedural rules and ought to be set aside. For this submission, counsel made three complaints, namely: firstly, that the jurisdiction under Order 14, r. 1 of L.N. 140A was wrongly invoked because the affidavit in support of the summons for judgment was sworn to by a person who had no personal knowledge of the facts; secondly, at the date that judgment was given, a statement of defence had been filed which raised triable issues and that summary judgment ought not to have been given, and thirdly, inasmuch as the respondent failed to indorse the respondent’s address on the summons the writ was “irregular and therefore null and void.”
[p.156] of [1980] GLR 152
The first two points were in fact raised before the circuit judge unsuccessfully. In my opinion, they were perfectly valid points of law and ought not to have been rejected. In an application under the old Order 14, r. 1 of L.N. 140A for summary judgment on a specially indorsed writ, it is provided that “the plaintiff may on affidavit made by himself or by any other person who can swear positively to the facts, verifying the cause of action . . . “ This provision clearly requires that the plaintiff or someone with personal knowledge of the facts deposes to them. A solicitor’s clerk who comes to this knowledge from the solicitor’s instructions is not such a person since his statement in the affidavit would be hearsay.
The matter is really concluded by authority. In Accra Furniture and Rubber Foam Co., Ltd. v. Indart S.P./A. of Rome [1973] 2 G.L.R. 289, C.A., this court refused to accept a solicitor’s affidavit in support of an application for summary judgment. The court observed at p. 292 that the solicitor “ . . . did not have any personal knowledge of the facts. He could only have come by it through information imparted to him by his clients. He was therefore in no position to swear positively to the facts.” Accordingly, the court concluded at p. 292, “We think therefore that there was no jurisdiction to invoke the summary procedure laid down by Order 14, r. 1.” This exclusion of hearsay even in an affidavit was also the ground of Taylor J.’s decision in Republic v. Greater Accra Regional Commissioner; Ex parte Naawu III [1976] 2 G.L.R. 25 at p. 31 to disregard an affidavit sworn to on behalf of the respondent to a habeas corpus application. There, the deponent could only depend on information provided by the regional commissioner. See also Rossage v. Rossage [19601 1 W.L.R. 249, C.A. and J. (An Infant), In re [1960] 1 W.L.R. 253 and Order 38, r. 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). It seems clear the law clerk’s affidavit reproduced (supra), bases itself, inter alia, on “receipts and letters” the evidence of which under Order 37, r. 60 of L.N. 140A is only admissible in the circumstances there stated and which circumstances were not shown to have existed in this case. I think therefore that the necessary support for a successful application under Order 14, r. 1 of L.N. 140A was absent. Accordingly, leave to sign summary judgment under Order 14, r. 1 of L.N. 140A ought to have been declined.
As I said, the appellant also complained that at the date judgment was given, a defence had been duly filed which raised a triable issue and that leave to sign final judgment ought not to have been given. This point was made to support the appellant’s application to set aside the summary judgment. The application was resisted on the
[p.157] of [1980] GLR 152 ground that “they should not have filed the defence without asking leave of the court.” The appellant’s contention before the circuit court and before us, is that he did not need leave of the court before filing a defence under a specially indorsed writ. The learned circuit judge did not directly pronounce on the issue. She seems to have decided by necessary implication that the only method by which leave to defend could have been granted was by an affidavit in opposition. As she put it, “In the interim period, the defence could at least have filed an affidavit in opposition. They failed to do this.. .”
For my part, I do not consider that the defendant under a specially indorsed writ needs leave of the court to file a defence or that an affidavit in opposition is the only legally permissible mode of resisting summary judgment. Upon the plaintiff making application under Order 14, r. 1 (a) of L.N. 140A, “ . . . The Judge thereupon, unless the defendant shall satisfy him that he has a good defence to the action on the merits or shall disclose such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend the action generally, may make an order. . . “ It seems to me that under that provision, the defendant’s responsibility of satisfying the judge is not required to be discharged in any particular way. There is no necessary format provided. It seems enough if the defendant uses a procedurally recognisable format such as a statement of defence. True the later provision of Order 14, r. 3 (a) of L.N. 140A says, “The defendant may show cause against such application by affidavit, or the Judge may allow the defendant to be examined upon oath.” But this provision is not expressed in mandatory terms. It indicates some way whereby cause may be shown but it cannot be read as exclusive when in the language of the old Order 14, r. 1 (a) of L.N. 140A, the defendant’s responsibility is generally to satisfy the judge that he has a good defence.
In McLardy v. Slateum (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 504, C.A. the headnote reads:
“An application for leave to sign judgment under Order XIV, r. 1, need not necessarily be made before the defendant has, in the ordinary course, delivered his defence, but if the application is made after that time the plaintiff must show circumstances which justify the delay.”
In that case, a defence was filed after an application for summary judgment. It was found to be a sham defence. If it had been a good defence, the defendant would have discharged his obligation under Order 14, r. 1 (a) and this would have disabled the judge from granting leave to sign judgment.
[p.158] of [1980] GLR 152
It seems to me that where the defence filed on its face is not a sham one, a judge who is still not entirely satisfied, can properly exercise his discretion under Order 14, r. 3 (a) of L.N. 140A and allow the defendant to be examined on oath. In that event, the judge would have the benefit of evidence given on oath. This would be a better course than to disregard a defence on the file. It would indeed be strange if a defendant cannot satisfy a judge under Order 14, r. 1 of L.N. 140A that he has a good defence if he has in fact filed one. I cannot accept the argument that the defence which was in fact filed, was not properly filed because leave to do so was not obtained. In my opinion, the granting of leave to defend the action is not a necessary precondition to filing a defence to a specially indorsed writ. One must distinguish between leave to defend the action which is required from leave to file a defence which is not a statutory requirement. Indeed under Order 21, r. 6 of L.N. 140A, the provision for delivering a defence within fourteen days applies also to actions in which the writ has been specially indorsed with or accompanied by a statement of claim under Order 3, r. 6 of L.N. 140A “unless … the plaintiff in the meantime serves a summons for judgment under Order 14.” (The emphasis is mine.)
In the instant case, the defence was filed on 2 December 1974, over two months before the summons for judgment was served on 14 February 1975. It was therefore properly filed in accordance with the rules of court. It therefore ought to be considered in determining whether the defendant “has a good defence to the action” within the meaning of Order 14, r. 1 of L.N. 140A. The judge noted that the statement of defence was not placed on the docket at the date the summary judgment was given. But in actual fact and according to the record, the defence was filed long before that date. It would be wrong to visit the administrative lapse of the officers of the court on the defendant. At all events, when the motion to set aside the summary judgment came before the court on 12 March 1975, the judge became aware that a statement of defence had been filed two months before she gave summary judgment against the defendant. If the judge had not taken the view, erroneous in my opinion, that the defendant was obliged to obtain leave by filing “an affidavit in opposition,” she would have set aside the judgment.
At the present time, a contention that a defendant to a specially indorsed writ can only show cause by “affidavit in opposition” would be less plausible because since the delivery of judgment in
[p.159] of [1980] GLR 152 this case, Order 14, r. 3 of L.N. 140A has been repealed and re-enacted in slightly altered language by the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) (No. 2) Rules, 1977 (L.I. 1129), which came into force on 30 September 1977. Rule 3 (1) of L.I. 1129 provides that, “A defendant may show cause against the application by affidavit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the Court.” (The emphasis is mine.) In my opinion, the appellant’s position here is stronger than that of a defendant against whom judgment is sought in default of defence under Order 27, r. 2 of L.N. 140A. In such circumstances, it has been held that a defence filed after the application was made but before the hearing of the application was not a nullity and should be looked at: see Gill v. Woodfin (1884) 25 Ch.D. 707, C.A. Accordingly, as I said, the appellant was entitled to have the summary judgment vacated on both grounds. Clearly, there has been filed a defence which raises a triable issue and a counterclaim and the appellant is entitled to have them determined on the merits.
The appellant also complained that the respondent’s solicitor failed to “indorse on the writ of summons the address of the plaintiff.” Having looked at the writ of summons, I agree that the complaint is factually correct. Order 4, r.1 of L.N. 140A requires this endorsement in mandatory terms— “shall indorse.” To the extent that compliance has not been made with this rule, I accept that the writ was defective but I cannot go along with Mr. Reindorf’s contention that this makes it “null and void.” I think this is only an irregularity which can be cured under Order 70, r. 1 of L.N. 140A. I believe the main object of this provision is to enable the defendant to know the whereabouts of the plaintiff in order to serve process on him and if he happens to be out of the jurisdiction, to apply that he gives security for costs. In this case, the appellant knew the respondent’s whereabouts and indeed counterclaimed against her. The counterclaim was not only served but a defence to it was duly lodged. He was in no way damnified by the respondent’s failure to comply with this rule and cannot reasonably have been. Accordingly, on the facts of this case, this contention is a technicality rectifiable by amendment and if this has been the only point of this appeal, I would have granted the respondent leave to amend the writ by endorsing thereon her address.
But in view of my accession to the two complaints made against the judgment, this appeal ought to succeed. I would allow it and set aside the judgment together with the order for costs. I would remit this case to the court below with a direction that the court do grant the appellant leave to defend the action. Thereafter, the suit
[p.160] of [1980] GLR 152 must take its normal course. The appellant is entitled to costs of this appeal, but I would direct that costs in the court below should abide the result of the fresh hearing.
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.
I am in entire agreement with the leading judgment of the Chief Justice. However, out of deference to the learned circuit judge whom we are reversing on important procedural matters, I have decided to add a few reasons of my own in support of those so lucidly and cogently advanced in the leading judgment.
The principal ground of appeal canvassed by Mr. Reindorf was that “the learned trial judge erred in giving judgment to the plaintiff under Order 14, r. 1 of L.N. 140A when the defendant had already filed a defence and counterclaim which disclosed a complete answer and defence to the plaintiff’s claim.” Put in a nutshell, his argument was that in an application for summary judgment under Order 14 of L.N. 140A, the court is entitled to look at and consider any statement of defence filed in lieu of an affidavit in opposition in order to decide whether it should grant the defendant leave to defend the suit on account of triable issues disclosed therein. In this case, the learned judge failed to advert her mind to the statement of defence and counterclaim which had been filed and rather bemoaned the defendant’s failure to file an affidavit in opposition to the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment.
Granted that the statement of defence and counterclaim mysteriously disappeared from the docket on 25 February 1975 when the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment was heard and that on that day there was no appearance either by or for the defendant, nevertheless, the learned judge had an opportunity subsequently of hearing the defendant’s motion for the setting aside of the summary judgment and other ancillary reliefs; and by then the statement of defence and counterclaim had re-surfaced in the docket and learned counsel appeared to argue his motion.
In her ruling on this later occasion, dated 12 March 1975, the learned judge held that, having been served with the summons for judgment and the supporting affidavit on 14 February 1975, “the defence could at least have filed an affidavit in opposition” in the intervening period since the summons was not heard until 25 February 1975. “They failed to do this,” she continued “and further failed to come to court. In the circumstances, I dismiss the defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment.”
The position taken by the learned judge on that occasion was no doubt due to her acceptance of the submissions of the plaintiff’s
[p.161] of [1980] GLR 152 counsel. According to the notes of his submissions, learned counsel objected to the motion and contended that the defendant should not have filed his defence “without asking leave of the court. They were not here to satisfy the court under Order 14, r. 1 of L.N. 140A that they had a good defence to the suit. The issue is whether he sought leave to defend.” The contrary argument of the defendant’s counsel that “it is not true the defendant has not a right to defend unless with leave; if the claim is specially indorsed, the defendant does not have to apply for leave to defend” apparently carried no weight with the court.
While it is true that the rationale behind the summary procedure under Order 14 of L.N. 140A is to provide the plaintiff with a speedy mode of recovery of judgment in cases properly falling under it and thereby to prevent him from being delayed and put to an unnecessary and protracted trial—provided of course there is no arguable defence to the action—nevertheless, the Order was not intended as an engine for the suppression of the defendant. The Order is only intended to apply to cases where there is no substantial dispute as to the facts or the law. Indeed under the old Order 14, r. 9 (b) of L.N. 140A:
“9. (b) If the plaintiff, makes an application under this Order where the case is not within the Order, or where the plaintiff, in the opinion of the Judge, knew that the defendant relied on a contention which would entitle him to unconditional leave to defend the application may be dismissed with costs to be paid forthwith by the plaintiff.”
How, then, may a defendant protect his rights under Order 14 of L.N. 140A and oppose the plaintiff’s application for leave to sign judgment against him? Must he invariably swear to an affidavit in opposition as a condition precedent to being allowed to defend the suit generally, as was contended successfully by plaintiff’s counsel in the court below? Or can he resist the application in any other way?
The answer to the questions posed is that the defendant is not confined to showing cause against the application by affidavit in opposition or sworn testimony alone. The permissive rule in the old Order 14, r. 3 (a) of L.N. 140A enabling the defendant to show cause against such application by affidavit or examination upon oath is not exhaustive of all the possible modes of opposition to the application for summary judgment available to the defendant.
In the first place, a defendant may resist a plaintiff’s application for summary judgment by showing on technical grounds that
[p.162] of [1980] GLR 152 one or more of the conditions precedent to the application have not been complied with. No affidavit is obviously required in support of such a technical objection. In general, such a technical objection to the application may be upheld if, for example, (a) there is no special endorsement within the meaning of Order 3, r. 6 of L.N. 140A; or (b) there is no due verification of the claim either by the plaintiff or by any other person who can swear positively to the facts and state that in his belief there is no defence to the action except as to the amount of damages claimed; provided that in either case the judge does not grant leave to amend under the old Order 14, r. 1 (b) of L.N. 140A. In the former case, the action is obviously not within the ambit of Order 14 of L.N. 140A and the plaintiff is consequently not entitled to apply for summary judgment; while in the latter case, the application is incompetent as having been brought in violation of the relevant rules. See, for instance this court’s decision in Accra Furniture and Rubber Foam Co., Ltd. v. Indart S.P./A. of Rome [1973] 2 G.L.R. 289, where the affidavit in support of the application by a solicitor who was acting in a professional capacity and did not have personal knowledge of the facts except for the information imparted to him by his clients, was held to be incompetent under the rule and the appeal was allowed on the ground that there was no jurisdiction to invoke the summary procedure laid down by Order 14, r. 1 of L.N. 140A in the respondent’s favour.
Similarly, in the instant case, the affidavit in support of the application was sworn to by the plaintiff’s solicitor’s clerk who retailed hearsay information. Ex facie, his affidavit did not constitute verification of the cause of action and the amount claimed within the meaning and intendment of the rule. In the event, there was no need for an affidavit in opposition to be sworn to before a technical objection could be taken to the patently defective application. Strict compliance with the prescribed rules is required in a party applying for summary judgment under Order 14 of L.N. 140A; and failure to do so may result in his application being dismissed with costs to be paid forthwith under the old Order 14, r. 9 (b). However, the old Order 14, r. 1 (b) gives the judge a wide discretion to amend the endorsement forthwith or even to give judgment for the part of the claim brought under Order 3, r. 6 and allow the action to proceed as to the residue.
In the second place, the defendant may in the words of the old Order 14, r. 1 (a) “satisfy the Judge that he has a good defence to the action on the merits or may disclose such facts as may be
[p.163] of [1980] GLR 152 deemed sufficient.” These words describe the general conditions upon which a prima facie case for summary judgment may be met; while the old Order 14, r. 3 (a) sets out a particular mode, i.e. by either an affidavit of merits or sworn testimony, in which those conditions may be fulfilled. And in the White Book of 1952 at p. 188, an annotation on “Merits” provides:
“The defendant may show that he has a good defence to the claim on the merits; or that a difficult point of law is involved, or a dispute as to the facts which ought to be tried; or a real dispute as to the amount due which requires the taking of an account to determine; or any other circumstances showing reasonable grounds of a bona fide defence.”
The fact that a defendant has delivered a defence may be sufficient to enable him to get leave to defend. But it is recognised from such cases as McLardy v. Slateum (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 504 and Atlanta Timber Co. v. Victoria Timber Co., Ltd. [1962] 1 G.L.R. 221, that a plaintiff may apply for summary judgment even after defence has been delivered. In the former case, such an application was successfully made one month after the filing of the defence; while in the local case of Atlanta Timber (supra) the application for judgment, filed after defence delivered and an affidavit in opposition, was dismissed since it was held by Charles J. that the statement of defence disclosed a triable issue which could not be determined on affidavits and the case was accordingly set down for hearing. Unless a defence filed before the plaintiff ‘s application for summary judgment is held by the judge to be a mere sham, it deserves to be considered on its merits and scrutinised for any triable issues it may disclose.
In Odgers on Pleading and Practice (16th ed.) at p. 59 it is stated:
“The defendant may show cause against the application by stating his defence to the action. Formerly this had to be by affidavit, but this is not always necessary now, though an affidavit may be used and is generally desirable.”
And since the recent amendment introduced by the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) (No. 2) Rules, 1977 (L.I. 1129), order 14, r. 3 (1) now provides, “A defendant may show cause against the application [for summary judgment] under rule 1 by affidavit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the Court” (The emphasis is mine.) There can be no doubt but that the court is entitled to satisfy itself by means other than an affidavit (e.g. by a defence filed)
[p.164] of [1980] GLR 152 in resolving the question whether cause has been shown against the grant of an application for summary judgment in a particular case.
The instant case, however, was decided on 25 February 1975 before the promulgation of L.I.. 1129. It is clear from the foregoing that at that time the defendant was not confined to an affidavit in opposition as the sole mode of resisting the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment. The learned judge ought to have had due regard to the defence and counterclaim filed and to the technical objections raised by counsel on the later occasion when she was invited to reconsider her refusal of leave to defend.
The statement of defence and counterclaim filed raised serious triable issues of law and fact. The counterclaim overtopped the claim and was closely connected with it. The principal claim was for an amount of ¢3,100 being the balance outstanding out of a sum of ¢5,000 allegedly paid by the plaintiff to the defendant for the supply of frozen imported fish and which said fish the defendant had allegedly failed to supply; while the counterclaim was for ¢5,000 representing the value of a car alleged to have been wrongfully detained by the plaintiff after it had been offered to her as security for the supply of the said quantity of frozen fish. Clearly, the pleadings disclosed serious triable issues of law and fact; and the learned judge ought to have granted the defendant leave to defend the action unconditionally. I would in the circumstances also allow the appeal and concur in the consequential orders.
JUDGMENT OF KORANTENG-ADDOW J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
Action remitted to trial court with direction that appellant be granted leave to defend. S. O.
