SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1980] SLR (HC) 65High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX; EX PARTE NATIONAL EMPLOYERS MUTUAL GENERAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 556

28 July 1980 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 65
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREPUBLIC v COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX; ex parte NATIONAL EMPLOYERS MUTUAL GENERAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 556 [1980] SLR (HC) 65
APAREPUBLIC v COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX; ex parte NATIONAL EMPLOYERS MUTUAL GENERAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 556, [1980] SLR (HC) 65 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX; ex parte NATIONAL EMPLOYERS MUTUAL GENERAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 556, [1980] SLR (HC) 65 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maatschappij de Fijnhouthandel N.V. (Fynhout) [1974] 1 G.L.R.

283, C.A.

(2) Commissioner of Police v. Ellis, High Court, 1 June 1959, unreported.

[p.558] of [1982-83] GLR 556

(3) R. v. Chancellor of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocese; Ex parte White [1948] 1 K.B. 195;

[1947] 2 All E.R. 170; 97 L.J. 345; 177 L.T. 488; 63 T.L.R. 523; 91 S.J. 369, C.A.

(4) Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 163;

[1969] 1 All E.R. 208; 113 S.J. 55, H.L.

(5) Republic v. Jiagge Commission; Ex parte Inkumsah [1968] G.L.R. 373.

(6) Inkumsah v. The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 776, C.A.

(7) R. v. Pereira; Ex parte Khotoa Bawasab [1949] W.N. 96.

(8) R. v. Thomas (1901) 18 T.L.R. 71.

(9) R. v. Barnes; Ex parte Vernon (1910) 102 L.T. 860.

(10) McCarthy v. Grant [1959] N.Z.L.R. 1014.

(11) R. v. Law Society of Alberta; Ex parte Demco (1967) 64 D.L.R. (2d) 140.

(12) R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer; Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B.

380; [1965] 2 All E.R. 836; [1965] 3 W.L.R. 426; 129 J.P. 447; 109 S.J. 475; 63 L.G.R. 353;

[1965] R. V. R. 384; [1965] R.A. 177, C.A. affirming [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1186; [1964] 3 All E.R.

200, D.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

PRELIMINARY objection to the jurisdiction of the High Court raised by the respondent in an application for certiorari to quash tax assessments and notice of refusal to amend the assessments. The facts are fully stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Kwame Tetteh for the applicant.

Kudjovie for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

In this motion, the National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the applicants), have applied for certiorari to quash the tax assessments for 1962-63 to 1970-71 accounting years levied on them on 23 April 1971 and notices of refusal to amend the said assessments dated 17 March 1972. The assessments and the notices of refusal to amend were all filed in these proceedings. The application is alleged to be founded on an error of law and the error of law was formulated as follows:

“(a) the Commissioner for Income Tax failed to give adequate consideration to the law and fact that the society was a guaranteed mutual and non-profit making insurance company, membership whereof comprised its policy holders only; it did not trade or do business. As such it was in law not liable to income tax because it did not earn income.

[p.559] of [1982-83] GLR 556

(b) The members were only contributors to a common fund in pursuance of a scheme for their mutual insurance, which excluded outsiders. Even though surpluses were repayable to members in accordance with the memorandum of association such repayments did not constitute distribution of profits or dividends but rather refund to members of funds over-contributed by them. Ever since the inception of its business in Ghana the applicants have not distributed or repatriated any such surpluses.”

Although the applicants ostensibly indicate that they were proceeding on the basis of error of law, an examination of the documents filed and the alleged ground (b) together with all the affidavits would seem to rather show that the case is in effect one of the alleged quasi-jurisdictional error.

After the assessments and the refusal to amend, the applicants lodged an appeal some time in 1974 with the Tax Commissioner. It seems the duration of office of the commissioner expired some time in 1974 and to date the appropriate authority has not appointed a Tax Commissioner despite several pleas from the applicants. It is in these circumstances that the applicants apply to the court by the apparent alternative remedy of certiorari to quash the assessments and the notices of refusal to amend the assessments.

On the motion coming before me, Mr. Kudjovie, counsel for the respondent, the Commissioner for Income Tax, raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the application. Counsel referred me to section 1 of the Taxation Act, 1971 (Act 388), as amended by the Taxation (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (NRCD 97), and submitted that as the case is pending before the Tax Commissioner certiorari does not lie and so the court has no jurisdiction.

Moreover, counsel maintained that the Tax Commissioner acts as a superior tribunal. He submitted that in carrying out his judicial functions under the Taxation Act, 1971, as amended, the Tax Commissioner has the powers of the High Court. Furthermore, he submitted that as an appeal from the Tax Commissioner was to the Court of Appeal, the Tax Commissioner must be considered a superior court and his acts are therefore not subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. To buttress his argument, counsel submitted that the former jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain tax cases is now vested in the Tax Commissioner and that that commissioner has exclusive original jurisdiction in all tax cases.

He referred me to section 2 (3) of NRCD 97 and the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maatschappij de Fijnhouthandel N.V. (Fynhout) [1974] 1 G.L.R. 283, C.A. as well as Commissioner of Police v. Ellis, High Court, 1 June 1959, unreported and he submitted that the

[p.560] of [1982-83] GLR 556

determination by the High Court of tax cases is not competent; that such determination is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner for Income Tax and the Tax Commissioner and that on the authority of R. v. Chancellor of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocese; Ex parte White [1948] 1 K.B. 195, C.A. certiorari can never be resorted to at the High Court to question a tax assessment by the Commissioner for Income Tax. And finally, counsel submitted that since the case is already pending before the Tax Commissioner, bringing it before the High Court is contempt of the Tax Commissioner.

I find these rather robust submissions to be very disturbing. And I must confess that although I dismissed the preliminary objection peremptorily without calling on counsel for the applicants and reserved my reasons to today, further reflection gives me an uneasy feeling that the case is not without difficulty. Perhaps, it would have been better to have sought further assistance by calling on counsel for the applicants.

Be that as it may, I have a duty to examine counsel’s objection. I will first deal with the objection founded on the jurisdiction of the High Court. As formulated by counsel for the respondent, the Tax Commissioner is a superior tribunal and so this court has no jurisdiction to supervise his acts. I am afraid I cannot accede to that proposition. In Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147, H.L., the concept of an inferior tribunal was canvassed and it was observed that the term is not derogatory and that it merely referred to a tribunal with limited jurisdiction. The Tax Commissioner’s jurisdiction is limited to tax cases and is therefore by the definition in the Anisminic case (supra), an inferior tribunal. Furthermore, the claim that it is a superior tribunal is legally erroneous, for under article 114 (5) of the Constitution, 1979, the superior courts of Ghana have been constitutionally specified. The article reads:

“(5) The Judiciary shall consist of the Supreme Court of Ghana, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice which shall be the superior courts of record and which shall constitute one Superior Court of Judicature, and such other inferior Courts and traditional Courts as Parliament may by law establish.”

In the light of this, it is impossible to maintain that the Tax Commissioner is a superior tribunal. The argument of counsel that in tax cases, the Tax Commissioner has the powers of the High Court and so its decisions must be taken to be High Court decisions, particularly as appeals from the Tax Commissioner goes to the Court of Appeal, is singularly erroneous. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Republic v. Jiagge Commission; Ex parte Inkumsah [1968] G.L.R. 373 is

[p.561] of [1982-83] GLR 556

authority for the proposition that the fact that a tribunal exercises certain powers of the High Court does not mean that the decisions of the tribunal are decisions of the High Court. To the same effect is the Court of Appeal decision in Inkumsah v. The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 776, C.A.

The matter that has given me such anxiety is the submission that the applicants have lodged an appeal with the Tax Commissioner and so certiorari does not lie. On principle, certiorari is a discretionary remedy and the court takes into consideration all the circumstances before granting it. Where the remedy by way of appeal exists and the applicant has lodged an appeal which is pending, it seems to me that the court should be wary in granting certiorari. The late Professor de Smith who devoted much time and energy to study this remedy observed at p. 375 in his famous book, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed.) as follows: “… it is not the practice of the court to exercise its discretion in favour of an applicant if he has already lodged an appeal to a court and the appeal is pending.”

In support of this proposition, Professor de Smith cited as authorities, inter alia: R. v. Pereira; Ex parte Khotoa Bawasab [1949] W.N. 96; R. v. Thomas (1901) 18 T.L.R. 71 and R. v. Barnes; Ex parte Vernon (1910) 102 L.T. 860. However, at p. 376 of the same book, de Smith referred to a New Zealand case McCarthy v. Grant [1959] N.Z.L.R. 1014 and R. v. Law Society of Alberta; Ex parte Demco (1967) 64 D.L.R. (2d) 140 as authority for this proposition:

“(v) If the application for certiorari is made while an appeal is pending, an award of certiorari may still be justified if the questions to be raised on appeal go to the merits of the case and the application for certiorari is based on jurisdictional grounds or breach of natural justice not going to the merits.”

In this case, although the ground alleged is said to be founded on error of law, it seems to me that it pertains more of jurisdictional error than error of law simpliciter and, in the cases of jurisdictional error, certiorari is a more appropriate remedy than appeal as would seem to have been held by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer; Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 380.

As I have already pointed out, certiorari is a discretionary remedy. In this case, the applicants appealed as far back as 1974. Six years after the appeal a Tax Commissioner has not been appointed and there is no indication that one is about to be appointed. The delay is so inordinate that I am persuaded to exercise my discretion in favour of the applicants by permitting them to canvass the jurisdictional point before this court. This is not to say that the application must per force be successful. It will depend on the nature of the argument and having

[p.562] of [1982-83] GLR 556

regard to the Fynhout case (supra) I expect counsel to convince me, if the case does come before me, that the principle canvassed by Azu Crabbe C.J. in the said Fynhout case, (supra) is inapplicable in this case.

I do not think it is necessary for me to consider the argument that bringing the case before the High Court is contempt of the Tax Commissioner. The right of the citizen to seek redress if aggrieved by any act of his fellow citizen or public officer or even the government is a constitutional right. It is guaranteed by the Constitution, 1979, and it is enshrined in article 26 of the said Constitution. I cannot see in what possible way the exercise of a constitutional right can be said to amount to contempt and I would therefore peremptorily reject this ground of objection as totally and grossly misconceived.

For these reasons, I would overrule all the objections of counsel and hold that the application is maintainable before this court. As the end of term is near and the substantial motion was not fixed for hearing today, I will adjourn further hearing sine die for the parties to apply to the registrar to fix the case before the vacation judge. Order accordingly.

DECISION

Preliminary objection to jurisdiction of court overruled.

E. P. T.

Scroll to Top