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[1980] SLR (HC) 68High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

WUSU vs. DONKOR AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 616

29 July 1980 · AMPIAH J · ≈ 15 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 68
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OSCOLAWUSU v DONKOR AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 616 [1980] SLR (HC) 68
APAWUSU v DONKOR AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 616, [1980] SLR (HC) 68 (Ghana).
BluebookWUSU v DONKOR AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 616, [1980] SLR (HC) 68 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.

(2) Yeboah v. Krah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 247.

(3) Kwaena v. Aninkora [1964] G.L.R. 299, S.C.

(4) Noel v. Ahuloo (1950) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 264.

(5) Mensah v. Nsowah [1964] G.L.R. 288, S.C.

[p.618] of [1982-83] GLR 616

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for a declaration that the sale and consequent purchase in execution of certain immovable properties of the plaintiff were void ab initio and of no legal effect. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Obeng-Manu for the plaintiff.

W. Y. Oppong for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.

By his writ of summons the plaintiff claims against the defendants jointly and severally a declaration that the sale and purchase in execution of certain properties were “illegal, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect.” He claims for the recovery of possession of these properties, an order for accounts in respect of the house from 1966 to the date of judgment, damages for trespass and an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents and assigns from interfering with these properties in any manner whatsoever.

The properties are: House No. DE 19 Mim; a cocoa farm at Ayisesuagye on Mim stool land, having boundaries with the properties of Kwasi Addae, the plaintiff’s fallow or scrub land and the Ayisesu River; a cocoa farm at Ayisesu on Mim stool land, having boundaries with the properties of Akosua Nsia, Amma Tawiah and the Ayisesu River and cocoa farm at Onyinasiso also on Mim stool land and bounded by the properties of Kwasi Bio, Ofori and S. K. Owusu.

There does not seem to be any real dispute about the identity of these properties. Since their sale in or about 1966, the respective purchasers or their successors or both have been in actual possession of these properties with the knowledge of the plaintiff.

It is the case of the plaintiff that some time in 1964 or 1965, in the course of his operations as a timber contractor, he felled some timber trees which caused damage to the cocoa farms of the first and fourth defendants. Both took action against him in the High Court, Sunyani, claiming damages. The two suits were entitled, Donkor v. Wusu — suit No. LC.23/63 and Kramo v. Wusu — suit No. LC.29/63. Judgment was given in both cases against him. The plaintiffs in that case, namely the first and fourth defendants herein, took out a writ of fi. fa. to execute the judgment against him. In consequence thereof, his above-named properties were attached and sold. His house No. DE 19 at Mim was sold to one Paul Mensah; the cocoa farm at Ayisesuagya was sold to the second defendant; the cocoa farm at Ayisesu was sold to one Kwadwo Boampong and the cocoa farm at Onyinasiso was sold to one Kwadwo Agyapong. The house No. DE 19, Mim, was subsequently sold to the fifth defendant who, on that ground, was

[p.619] of [1982-83] GLR 616 joined in this action later. The second defendant has succeeded to Kwadwo Boampong and is therefore now in possession of the farm at Onyinasiso. The plaintiff claims that these properties were all attached and sold without first attaching and selling his movables. Counsel for the plaintiff contends therefore that the attachment and sale of the immovables were in contravention of the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A); the whole sale was therefore `illegal, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect.” The plaintiff therefore claims against the defendants jointly and severally for the reliefs indorsed on his writ of summons. The attachment and sale of these properties took place between 1965 and 1967.

It is the contention of the defence counsel that the attachment and sale were regular, and for that matter, legally carried out and that even if there was non-compliance with the rules, the sale became only voidable. In the circumstances, not only is the plaintiff debarred by the rules from bringing this action, but he is also debarred by statute, namely the Limitation Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 54), from taking any action on the matter.

The plaintiff did not offer any evidence but relied solely on the legal issue whether or not the attachment and sale were proper; he thus threw the onus on the defendant to establish the legality of the attachment and sale of the properties.

The first defendant gave evidence for himself and on behalf of the fourth defendant. All the other defendants gave evidence personally and called two witnesses, the first defendant witness, Mr. James Dominic Ampomah, the licensed auctioneer who conducted the sale, and the second defendant witness, Mr. Samuel Morris Kotei, the High Court Registrar.

The attachment and sale having been admitted and the identity of the properties not being in dispute, the issues which arose for determination in this case, were:

(a) whether or not the attachment and sale of the plaintiff’s immovable properties in execution was null and void; and

(b) whether or not the plaintiff is estopped by conduct or statute from bringing this action.

Order 42, r. 3 of LN 140A provides:

“3. A judgment for the recovery by or payment to any person or money may be enforced by the attachment and sale of the property of the party against whom judgment was given or the decree made, or, subject to the provisions of Order 69, by his imprisonment or both.”

Rule 46 of this Order, however, provides that:

[p.620] of [1982-83] GLR 616

“46. If the judgment debtor has sufficient movable property within the Judicial Division in which the judgment was issued to satisfy the debt, damages, and costs recovered, his immovable property shall not be levied upon; but if he has not sufficient movable property within the Judicial Division it shall be optional to the execution creditor to levy upon his immovable property within the same Judicial Division before levying on his movable property elsewhere, or to levy upon the movable property of such judgment debtor wherever it may be found within the Gold Coast, before having recourse to his immovable property.”

It is therefore clear from these provisions that the immovables of the judgment debtor should only be fallen upon to satisfy the judgment debt and costs after the movables of the judgment debtor have been exhausted, provided, however, that these movables are within the jurisdiction of the court. The usual practice is that after the issue of the writ of fi. fa., the properties of the execution debtor was seized and attached for sale. Where there are no goods to be attached, the deputy sheriff makes a return of nulla bona that the execution debtor has no goods or chattels in the bailiwick. The immovables of the execution debtor could then be fallen upon to satisfy the judgment debt and costs.

In the instant case, the particulars about the execution and sale are almost all missing. The second defendant witness, the registrar of this court who testified on behalf of the defence, stated that it is now over fifteen years since the sale and that a thorough search conducted by him and his staff has only revealed very scanty material on the matter. A duplicate copy of the writ of fi. fa. applied for by the solicitor of Kofi Donkor, the first defendant, in suit No. LC.23/63, and which fortunately had been kept was produced and tendered as exhibit 2. The indorsement on the writ shows that the application was made for the sale of the movable and immovable properties of the judgment debtor (the plaintiff herein). These properties were particularised at the back of the writ of fi. fa. It is not known what return the deputy sheriff had made before proceeding to attach the immovable properties, but the evidence shows that house No. DE 19, Mim, was sold under the writ to settle only a balance of the judgment debt and costs. It is also clear from the evidence that this house was the first to be sold. In the absence of any other evidence to the contrary, it could be presumed that a proper return was made by the deputy sheriff and that the immovable properties were attached and sold after the deputy sheriff had satisfied himself that the execution debtor had no movables within the jurisdiction. The maxim is, “from lapse of time all things are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly” (ex [p.621] of [1982-83] GLR 616 diuturnitate temporis omnia praesumuntur esse rite et solemnitur acta). Equity also regards as done that which ought to be done.

The second defendant witness gave evidence on the two cases and the attachment of the plaintiff’s properties in execution of the judgments which were obtained against the plaintiff. The first defendant witness, the auctioneer, gave evidence of the attachment and sale of the properties. He stated that certain papers on the attachment and sale were missing but he remembers issuing receipts and certificates of purchase. The defendants gave evidence and tendered in evidence various exhibits. On the available evidence, I hold that there was proper attachment and sale of the various properties described in the writ of summons.

Assuming that this conclusion is wrong, would the non-compliance with the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 make the attachment and sale of the properties void? If it is void, then on the authorities: see Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. – any action to set proceedings aside would not be barred by delay since the claimant would be entitled ex debito justitiae to bring the action.

However, Order 70, rr. 1 and 2 of L.N. 140A provides that:

“1. Non-compliance with any of these Rules, or with any rule of practice for the time being in force, shall not render any proceedings void unless the Court or a Judge shall so direct, but such proceedings may be set aside either wholly or in part as irregular, or amended, or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such terms as the Court or Judge shall think fit.

2. No application to set aside any proceedings for irregularity shall be allowed unless made within reasonable time, nor if the party applying has taken any fresh step after knowledge of the irregularity.”

Counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that this Order does not apply to the attachment and sale proceedings, as these matters arose after the judgment had been given in the case and since the non-compliance makes the attachment void and not voidable. Counsel for the defendants on the other hand contends that execution proceedings are affected by the provisions of Order 70 since this Order was made to provide for non-compliance with any of the “Rules or with any rule of practice for the time being in force.” I hold that the provisions of Order 70 apply to proceedings before and after judgment. I am also of the view that the non-compliance with the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 makes the proceedings voidable; such proceedings would not be a nullity. If the immovables of a person have been attached wrongfully and he is aware of this fact he could apply to the court to have the attachment set aside. Although the authorities have it that a return of

[p.622] of [1982-83] GLR 616 nulla bona is required before the sale of the immovables, failure to make the return would only be an irregularity.

The inactivity of the execution debtor would lend support to the fact that infact he has no goods or movables within the jurisdiction which could be attached. And since in any case, the execution creditor could have the immovables of the execution debtor sold, it could not be said that the attachment and sale were a nullity. It is accepted that the provisions of Order 70, rr. 1 and 2 would not apply to nullify proceedings. But, any failure to comply with Order 42, r. 46 is to be treated as an irregularity and not as a nullity; such proceedings may be set aside. Form 1105 at p. 694 of Chitty and Jacobs Queens Bench Forms (19th ed.), tends to support my view as a summons to set aside proceedings for irregularity would appear to include executions issued.

In Yeboah v. Krah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 247, Osei-Hwere J. held that the sale of a house in execution was wrong and could not be made to stand. The issue whether or not the attachment and sale of the immovable property was void or irregular was never argued in that case. It is not disputed that an action could be brought to set aside any attachment or sale found to be void or irregular.

But whether a court can set aside such a sale as of right or in its discretion depends upon whether the sale is void ab initio or only irregular. If it is only irregular, Order 70 of L.N. 140A would apply to the situation; if it is void the court would set the sale aside as a matter of course. In Yeboah v. Krah (supra) his lordship found that the execution creditor had not given the sheriff any choice as to what properties were to be attached; in his application, the execution creditor had directed what properties were to be attached. It is pertinent to refer to the observation made by his lordship in the above-named case at p. 249:

“I do not believe that the Divisional Court case of Noel v. Ahuloo (1950) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 264 as applied in Badu v. Kwadjo (supra) lays down any infrangible rule that in all cases there must be proof that the judgment creditor knew of the existence and whereabouts of the debtor’s movables before he will be prevented from exercising his right of sale over the debtor’s immovables. Each case as to whether he had such knowledge or not must depend upon its own peculiar merits.”

In the Supreme Court case of Kwabena v. Aninkora [1964] G.L.R. 299 at p. 306 it was held, inter alia, that “since the sale of the land was illegal rather than irregular, it was therefore void ab initio.” In that case their lordships had found that there was an infringement against both section 51 of the Local Courts Act, 1958 (No. 33 of 1958), and regulation 97 of the Local Courts Procedure Regulations, 1959 (L.N. 337/59). They therefore held the sale void ab initio. There

[p.623] of [1982-83] GLR 616 was no reference to the provisions of Order 70 of L.N. 140A. Their lordships, however, observed at pp. 306-307:

“The discretion of the bailiff to attach immovable property as contained in regulation 146 may only be exercised in such circumstances as to make it just and reasonable. It is certainly wrong for the bailiff to have attached land and building in this case valued at least G2,500 pounds for an alleged debt of G71 pounds, without first levying execution against the personality … If it had just been an injudicious exercise of discretion by the bailiff, the remedy of the appellant would have been a civil action in trespass based upon irregularity and not an illegality which vitiates the whole transaction. But in this case there is also the fact that the execution itself is illegal.”

From this observation by their lordships, I think if their lordships were seised with facts or evidence such as exists in the instant case, where the complaint is only as to the attachment and sale of immovable properties instead of movables and in a situation where it is not possible to tell whether the application had been made first for the attachment of the immovables, they would have declared the situation as a mere irregularity capable of being remedied under the provisions of Order 70. I am persuaded by the holding in Noel. v. Ahuloo (1950) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 264 that the non-compliance with the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 does not render a sale void but only voidable. See also the case of Mensah v. Nsowah [1964] G.L.R. 288, A. C.

Order 70, r. 2 of L.N. 140A requires that any application to have the proceedings set aside must be brought within a reasonable time or at a time when the aggrieved party has not taken any fresh step after knowledge of the irregularity. The evidence shows that it is almost about fifteen years since the attachment and sale of the properties in dispute, and that the plaintiff has been aware of the sale all the time. He has since litigated with the second defendant regarding a portion of the farm he claimed was not included in the sale. Exhibit 7A is a letter written by Paul Mensah’s solicitor requesting the plaintiff to vacate house No. DE 19, Mim, and exhibit 7B is a letter from the plaintiff pleading with the solicitor for more time to find an alternative accommodation. There is evidence from the defence that since the purchase, the respective purchasers and their successors have been in possession of the properties and have greatly improved upon them. By reason of this delay and the plaintiff’s own conduct, this court cannot exercise a discretion in his favour to set aside the attachment and sale of his properties, even if there was non-compliance with the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 of L.N. 140A.

There is evidence also that the respective purchasers offered valuable consideration for their purchases and have not been told until

[p.624] of [1982-83] GLR 616 fifteen years later of any defect in the title of the properties or in the attachment and sale. I hold therefore that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice.

Section 10 (1) of the Limitation Decree, 1972 (NRCD 54), Provides that:

“No action shall be brought to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person bringing it or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person.”

It is now about fifteen years since the sale and the taking of possession by the second and third defendants and Paul Mensah. Since I have found that there was regular attachment and sale of the properties, the plaintiff is debarred from bringing an action to recover the properties. Even if there was non-compliance with the rules, since this makes the proceedings only irregular, I think the plaintiff would be barred by statute from bringing an action to recover the properties: see also section 10 (6) of N.R.C.D. 54 which provides that, “On the expiration of the period fixed by the Decree for any person to bring an action to recover land, the title of that person to the land shall be extinguished.”

Even if it is held that non-compliance with the rules makes the proceedings void; in the particular circumstances of this case, it would not be just to say that there was non-compliance since it is not possible by reason of the delay and the consequent loss of relevant evidence coupled with the conduct of the plaintiff to say that there was, in fact, non-compliance. As stated earlier in this judgment, both under common law and equity the position is that the law presumes from lapse of time that that all was required to be done had been done rightly and regularly.

On the evidence and on the law, I cannot declare the attachment and sale illegal, null or void. It follows that the plaintiff cannot recover the properties described in the writ of summons nor the other reliefs. The plaintiff’s action therefore fails and it is accordingly dismissed against each and every one of the defendants. The defendants are awarded costs of ¢400 each against the plaintiff.

DECISION

Action dismissed.

M. C. N. -N.

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