REPUBLIC vs. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE 1, TARKWA; EX PARTE PANYIN III AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 552
11 January 1982 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 6 min read
[1982] SLR (HC) 18Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASE REFERRED TO
Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] G.L.R. 133, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for orders of certiorari and prohibition against the order of the District Magistrate, Tarkwa to the applicants to execute a bond to keep the peace. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
James Mercer for the applicants.
Gaisie for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
Pursuant to leave granted by this court on 7 September 1981, this court was moved on 9 November 1981 by Mercer, counsel for the applicants, for the orders of certiorari and prohibition to issue against a certain criminal summons issued by the District Magistrate
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Grade 1, Tarkwa, dated 13 August 1981 and all orders made in connection therewith particularly the orders dated 12 and 25 August 1981. Under section 22 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), it is provided that:
“Whenever a District Magistrate is informed on oath that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public peace, or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public peace, the Magistrate may require him to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace for such period as the Magistrate thinks fit.”
Section 24 of Act 30 provides that whenever it is necessary to require any person to show cause under section 23, the magistrate shall make an order in writing setting forth: (a) the substance of the information received; (b) the amount of the bond; (c) the purpose of the bond and its term; and (d) the number, character and class of sureties. The procedure for requiring any person to show cause is by issuing a criminal summons directed to the person and section 27 requires that a copy of any written order made under section 24 should accompany the criminal summons and be served on the person concerned.
The brief facts of the case as can fairly and reasonably be gathered from the proceedings were as follows: Upon the basis of an information he received that the life and peace of somebody were in danger, the learned magistrate made an order purporting to be an order under section 24 of Act 30. The order is dated 12 August 1981. The following day the learned magistrate issued a criminal summons requiring the persons against whom the order of 12 August was made to appear before the court to show cause why they should not be ordered to execute a bond to keep the peace.
The hearing of the criminal summons had already been deferred to 25 August 1981. On the latter date, the learned magistrate merely recorded certain allegations made by Sam Esq., who held Gaisie’s brief, for the complainants, and without hearing evidence from those against whom the complaint was made, ordered them to execute the bond and ordered the apprehension of those against whom the complaint was made but had failed to appear before the court.
The case was then adjourned to 2 September 1981. When sitting of the court resumed on 2 September, Gaisie, for the complainants, and Quarshie, for those accused of disturbing the peace, told the learned magistrate that the criminal summons issued on 13 August was not accompanied by a copy of the order made on 12 August as required by section 27 of Act 30 and therefore the summons and the order ought to be rescinded. The learned magistrate declared the summons a nullity, rescinded it and made an order for fresh summons to be issued.
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It has been argued by counsel for the applicants herein that the criminal summons was a nullity because it failed to comply with section 24 of Act 30 and since it was a nullity the learned magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter thereunder. It was also argued that the orders of 12 August 1981 were totally null and void because like the order dated 25 August they failed to state the nature of the information. With the greatest respect, I am unable to share the view expressed by both learned counsel and the learned magistrate that the mere omission of the information in the order of 12 August 1981 made the proceedings a nullity or that failure to accompany the criminal summons with the order of 12 August made the proceedings invalid.
This is because the view overlooks the provisions of section 406 of Act 30 which states, inter alia, that no order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reviewed on account of any omission or irregularity in the summons or other proceedings under the Code unless such omission or error or irregularity has occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice. If there was anything in the proceedings which occasioned substantial miscarriage of justice, it was the fact that on 25 August 1981 the learned magistrate failed to give the applicants an opportunity to show cause why they should not be bonded to keep the peace. In that regard, there was an infringement of the natural justice injunction that no one should be condemned unheard. Certiorari could therefore lie to quash the bond.
But the learned magistrate with the concurrence of both counsel for the parties avoided miscarriage of justice by vacating the criminal summons and the order so there is no need to raise that issue again.
The question that arises is whether the learned magistrate can continue the proceedings on the strength of the fresh criminal summons which he ordered after vacating the previous one. This depends upon whether the learned magistrate has jurisdiction over the information he received that the applicants had acted in a manner likely to occasion a breach of the peace within his area of jurisdiction. The answer is that he has jurisdiction.
It is clear from the record that the learned magistrate was under no illusion whatsoever that he was dealing with a matter within his magisterial district. And this court had no illusion whatsoever about that. Section 22 (2) of Act 30 gives to a magistrate exclusive jurisdiction to keep the peace within the local limits of his jurisdiction. There is therefore no warrant in the hands of the High Court to issue an order of prohibition against a magistrate in respect of proceedings under section 22 of Act 30.
Errors made by a magistrate within his jurisdiction cannot be a subject for certiorari or prohibition; they are, however, appealable: see Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133, C.A. In the instant case, since counsel for the parties together with the learned magistrate realised an
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omission or irregularity in procedure and the learned magistrate acted upon such realisation of errors by vacating his previous proceedings and issuing fresh proceedings, neither counsel should be allowed to take advantage of the irregularity in the proceedings. I would refuse this application. However, since the learned magistrate expressed satisfaction with the facts complained of, it would mean that he has made up his mind already and it would be unfair for him to continue the fresh proceedings ordered. Accordingly, I order that the case be transferred from the district court to the Circuit Court, Tarkwa to be heard and determined by the circuit court judge.
DECISION
Application for certiorari and prohibition refused.
Case ordered to be transferred to circuit court.
J. A. A.
