REPUBLIC vs. INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE; EX PARTE CANTARA [1982-83] GLR 528
21 December 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 10 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 34Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) R. v. Inner London Quarter Sessions; Ex parte D’Souza [1970] 1 W.L.R. 376; [1970] 1 All E.R.
481; (1969) 114 S.J. 86; 54 Cr.App.R. 193, D.C.
(2) R. v. Williams; Ex parte Phillips [1914] 1 K.B. 608; 83 L.J.K.B. 528; 110 L.T. 372; 78 J.P; 148.
(3) R. v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Wood [1973] 2 G.L.R. 113.
(4) Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Central Disciplinary Board of the Ghana Police Force dismissing the applicant from the Police Force. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Miss Sutherland for the applicant.
Owoo, Principal State Attorney, for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
Until his dismissal, the applicant was a general police constable with service No. 22499 CC/1 stationed at Tarkwa in the Western Region. Some time in October 1981, two charges of misconduct contrary to section 17 (k) of the Police Service Act, 1970 (Act 350), were preferred against him.
The procedural rules for the trial of offences committed by police officers are contained in the Police Force (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations, 1974 (L.I. 993). Under regulation 3 (1), the hierarchy of the disciplinary authority is: (a) a superior officer who shall have power to impose a penalty not more severe than stoppage of increment for one year; (b) a regional board which has power to impose all penalties on all ranks up to sergeant; and all minor penalties; and (c) the central board at the Police Headquarters, Accra, which has power to impose all penalties. Before it takes legal effect, a penalty imposed by a superior officer requires the approval of the regional board. Similarly, any penalty imposed by a regional board requires the approval of the central board: see regulation 3 (3), (4) and (5).
[p.532] of [1982-83] GLR 528
Whenever an offence is committed and after investigations the regional board is of the opinion that it should be dealt with by formal disciplinary proceedings, the board has a mandatory duty under regulation 16 (c) to formulate charges against the officer accused of the offence and nominate an officer to hear the case. Officer here should mean a superior officer as referred to in regulation 3 (1). Under regulation 2 (2), the regional board consists of the superior police officer in charge of the region and two other superior police officers appointed by the Inspector-General of Police; and regulation 2 (3) lays down that the quorum of a regional board shall be two.
It is apparent from the record of proceedings that when the regional board received a report against the applicant, it was of the opinion that the case should be dealt with by formal proceedings and accordingly, the board, constituted by two members, Messrs. J. O. Tham and E. K. Abotsi, formulated charges against the applicant and nominated Mr. S. K. K. Senti, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kwesimintsim, to hear the case (see letter dated 25 October 1979, W.R.H./175/V.42/108). The charges were that the defendant had used a cane to whip two persons, one a suspect and the other a police officer, at the charge office.
Before Mr. Senti could conduct the inquiry, Mr. E. K. Abotsi, a member of the Western Regional Board, by a letter dated 6 February 1980, ref. T.K.W./DIVHQ.52/VOL.8/9, unilaterally instructed Mr. S. O. Dokyi, Deputy Superintendent of Police; to hold the inquiry at Tarkwa without further delay. Mr. S. O. Dokyi heard the case and found the defendant guilty of one of the counts and acquitted him of the other. He did not impose a penalty within his powers but recommended to the regional board that the defendant should be dismissed from the Police Force. The regional board accepted the recommendation and in turn recommended the defendant’s dismissal to the central board which ordered the dismissal.
The entire disciplinary proceedings have been virulently attacked by Miss Sutherland, counsel for the applicant. She pinpoints what she terms an irregularity in the appointment of Mr. Dokyi and submits that the irregularity makes the proceedings null and void. Mr. Owoo, Principal State Attorney, does not see anything wrong with the appointment of Mr. Dokyi to conduct the inquiry. His argument is that after appointing Mr. Senti, the regional board had power to revoke that appointment in favour of another officer. He relied on section 11 of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), which provides:
“11. Where an enactment confers power to grant a licence, authorisation or permit, the power includes power to revoke, suspend or amend the licence, authorisation or permit.”
[p.533] of [1982-83] GLR 528
Mr. Owoo argued that the police authorities had power to revoke the appointment of Mr. Senti in favour of Mr. Dokyi.
Miss Sutherland’s submission appears to bear substantial merit and I would prefer it to Owoo’s. Regulation 2 (3) of L.I. 993 confers power on two members of the regional board to appoint or nominate a superior police officer to conduct an inquiry. Mr. Abotsi alone could not constitute an appointing authority. Therefore, he alone could not revoke the appointment of Mr. Senti by appointing Mr. Dokyi. Since Dokyi’s appointment was not made in accordance with regulation 2 (3) of L.I. 993 it was void. Dokyi’s appointment, being without statutory authority, denuded him of the requisite jurisdiction to hold the inquiry.
The inquiry held by Dokyi was consequently void for want of jurisdiction and so were the subsequent orders made by the regional and central disciplinary boards based on Dokyi’s recommendation that the applicant be dismissed. In R. v. Inner London Quarter Sessions; Ex parte D’Souza [1970] 1 All E.R. 481, D.C. the facts were that under section 7 (1)(a) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1964, the quarter sessions should be constituted by the chairman or his deputy and one justice of the peace when hearing an appeal. On 13 February 1969, the deputy chairman alone sat to hear an appeal and certiorari was applied for to quash the proceedings. Lord Parker C.J. said at p. 482: “… as it seems to me, the deputy chairman here on the second day, 13th February, was not constituting a court of quarter sessions.” The Court of Appeal granted an order of certiorari to quash the proceedings.
Mr. Owoo argued in the alternative that even assuming Dokyi wrongly assumed jurisdiction, the applicant cannot complain, nor can he obtain certiorari because he acquiesced in the wrong usurpation of jurisdiction by Dokyi. He tendered a letter from Dokyi informing the applicant that he had been nominated to hear the applicant’s case and the applicant’s reply to the said letter and said since the applicant raised no objection he was deemed to have acquiesced in the nomination. Miss Sutherland submitted, however, that since the applicant did not know of the irregularity he could not be deemed to have acquiesced. Here again, I find Miss Sutherland’s submission much more convincing. It is a general principle of law that a person cannot acquiesce in a matter of which he had no knowledge. Indeed, there is authority to be found in R. v. Williams. Ex parte Phillips [1914] 1 K.B. 608 to the effect that if a party to litigation applies to a court for certiorari, certiorari will not be granted if no objection to the jurisdiction was taken before the adjudicating authority unless the party was unaware of the absence of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the applicant did not know that D. S. P. Senti had been duly appointed by a quorum of two members of the regional board and that D.S.P. Dokyi’s appointment was irregular.
[p.534] of [1982-83] GLR 528
I need hardly emphasise that the superior courts have a duty to see to it that persons or groups of persons invested with statutory powers conform strictly to the requirements of the statute. Thus my brother Edusei J. (as he then was) in R. v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Wood [1973] 2 G.L.R. 113 quashed police disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the superior police officer who held the inquiry was not appointed by the Inspector-General of Police as required by regulation 3 of the Police Service (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations, 1971 (L.I. 688). In that case, the regional police disciplinary board usurped the power of the Inspector-General of Police to appoint the adjudicator. This case, which was relied upon by Miss Sutherland, supports her submissions and I concur in them.
Even assuming for a moment that Mr. Dokyi was properly appointed to hold the inquiry, the question again arises as to whether his recommendation that the applicant be dismissed could be upheld as falling within the orbit of his jurisdiction. Here it is essential to refer to regulations 3, 16 and 17 of LI 993. Regulation 3 prescribes the powers of the three disciplinary authorities. Regulation 16 confers upon the regional board power to hear cases either summarily or by formal proceedings and regulation 17 invests the central board with power to do the same.
On a proper interpretation, each disciplinary authority has a duty to try all cases falling within its jurisdiction and to impose the penalty prescribed for it under regulation 3. The only qualifications are that any penalty imposed by a superior officer is subject to review and approval by the regional board and the penalties imposed by the latter are subject to review and approval by the central board: see regulation 3 (3) and (4). There is no warrant whatsoever for any disciplinary authority, after hearing a case, to recommend a penalty to the other authority. That authority which tries a case must impose a penalty prescribed for it under regulation 3 (1).
No delegation of sentencing powers is permitted under regulation 3 (1). When a statute creates an adjudicating authority and invests it with jurisdiction to impose a penalty within a certain range, such adjudicating authority cannot remit the case to a higher adjudicating authority to impose a severe sentence than the remitting authority can impose unless the statute expressly provides that the lower tribunal can refer cases to the higher tribunal for sentence. No such provision can be found in L.I. 993. Under regulation 3 (1) of L.I. 993, a superior officer cannot recommend or impose a penalty of dismissal. His limit is suspension of increment for one year. Therefore Mr. Dokyi’s purported recommendation of dismissal and the subsequent recommendation of the regional board of the same penalty and the final approval by the central board were all made in excess of jurisdiction and void.
[p.535] of [1982-83] GLR 528
Mr. Owoo also argued that inasmuch as the regional and central boards had been invested with jurisdiction to impose all penalties including dismissal, he would invite the court to treat the recommendation by the regional board and its approval by the central board as erroneous decisions within jurisdiction and relied on Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133, C.A. The headnote of that case runs as follows:
“there is a distinction between an order or judgment which a court is not competent to make, and an order which, even if erroneous in law or fact, is within the court’s competency: where there is no jurisdiction the proceedings are void; but where a court of competent jurisdiction makes an erroneous order it is appealable.
R. v. Bolton [1841] 1 Q.B. 66 and dictum in R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. [1922] 2 A.C. 128 at p. 152, P.C.
considered.”
Erroneous decision within jurisdiction implies in my view that the proceedings being taken are regular on their face and that the inferior tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the matter: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed.), Vol. 1, p. 63, para. 57. Miss Sutherland argued, and I share her view, that the proceedings in the instant case were irregular on their face and the court ought not to accept anything to the contrary. For example, it was irregular for the regional board to accept the recommendation of dismissal by D.S.P. Dokyi because Dokyi had no such jurisdiction and, worse still, the regional board which had jurisdiction to impose that penalty did not hear the case. And the central board knowing that the regional board did not impose the penalty also approved of it. If these proceedings are not irregular on their face then I am at a loss as to what proceedings can ever be irregular.
It seems to me pre-eminently important, if only for the guidance of the police disciplinary authorities, that the gravity of offences should always be taken into consideration and only that disciplinary authority having jurisdiction to impose a penalty commensurate with the gravity of the offence, should try the case. I think the applicant has made his case and accordingly, I would grant him an order of certiorari and quash the order dismissing him from the Police Force. There will be ¢500 costs for the applicant. DECISION Application granted.
J. K. E. E.
