REPUBLIC vs. HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX PARTE PLOETNER [1984-86] 2 GLR 107
24 March 1986 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 46 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. James Town Circuit Court Judge; Ex parte Annor [1978] G.L.R. 453.
(2) Rigden v. Whitstable Urban District Council [1959] Ch. 422; [1958] 3 W.L.R. 205; [1958] 2 All E.R. 730.
(3) Lewis v. Green [1905] 2 Ch. 340; 93 L.T. 303; 74 L.J.Ch. 682.
(4) Walsall Overseers v. London & North Western Rail Co. (1878) 4 App.Cas. 30, H.L.
(5) Luguterah v. Northern Engineering Co. Ltd. [1979] G.L.R. 477.
(6) Mason v. Schuppisser (1899) 81 L.T. 147.
(7) Amoabimaa v. Badu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 214, W.A.C.A.
(8) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
(9) Karletse-Panin v. Nuro [1979] G.L.R. 194, C.A.
(10) Alapatire v. Halliday, Davies’ Trustee (1881) Sar. F.C.L. 250; Sar. F.L.R. 20; Red. 188; Ren. 52. (11) Swanzy v. Bailey (1899) Red. 191.
(12) Davies, In the Matter of; A Bankrupt, Full Court, 22 April 1881, unreported.
(13) De Bordes v. De Bordes (1884) Sar. F.C.L. 268.
(14) Stephenson v. Garnett [1898] 1 Q.B. 677; 78 L.T. 371; 46 W.R. 410, C.A.
(15) Metropolitan Bank Ltd. v. Pooley (1885) 10 App. Cas. 210; [1881-85] All E.R.Rep. 949, H.L.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION by the applicant moving the Supreme Court to quash by way of certiorari, the ruling of the High Court restraining him from holding the position of a director for seven years from the date of the order except by the leave of the court. The facts are fully set out in the judgments of Adade and Taylor JJ.S.C.
COUNSEL
Joe Reindorf for the applicant.
Dr. A. C. Kuma (with him S. O. K. Oteng) for the respondent.
[p.111] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107
JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.
Adade J.S.C. delivered the judgment of himself and Apaloo C.J., Sowah and Archer JJ.S.C. Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana) Ltd., (hereafter referred to as CP (Ghana)) is a company incorporated in 1975 under the laws of Ghana. By May 1976, the shareholding in this company had re-organised itself as follows:
H. Krahmer 1 share Martin Ofosuhene 40,000 shares}110,000 Bernhard Ploetner 69,999 shares These three persons were and are the only shareholders in the company. Bernhard Ploetner says in an affidavit that Martin Ofosuhene holds only 10,000 of his 40,000 shares beneficially; the remaining 30,000 are held by the said Ofosuhene in trust for him, B. Ploetner. This allegation was not controverted by Ofosuhene, but a resolution one way or the other is not relevant for the purposes of this ruling. Bernhard Ploetner and his wife had another business in Germany, run under the name Carl Ploetner (Bremen) (hereafter referred to as CP (Bremen)). It is not too clear from the little that there is on record whether CP (Bremen) was a limited liability company in the Ghanaian sense or whether it was a partnership. In all probability it was a partnership. This, however, we do not know for certain. In 1979, CP (Bremen) encountered some financial difficulties with its suppliers in West Germany. The exact nature of these financial difficulties is given only by B. Ploetner in paragraph 12 of an affidavit filed by him in the High Court on 21 October 1981 as follows:
“12 In January 1979 CP (Bremen) went into liquidation as a result of a curious and unauthorised decision of Heins Krahmer (referred to in exhibit BP A) who then managed CP (Nigeria). The said Krahmer had ordered on behalf of CP (Bremen) equipment from dealers in Germany who in the normal trade practice granted credit facilities up to 36 months for as large purchases as worth six million Deutche marks (DM 6,000,000). For some unexplained reasons the said Krahmer issued sight drafts presentable rather in twelve months. CP (Bremen) was unable to honour these drafts because at the material time the Federal Government of Nigeria had delayed payment of a debt of DM 28 million owed to CP (Bremen). The Ghana Government which also owed CP (Bremen) over DM 3 million had similarly delayed payment. In the result, CP (Bremen) infringed German laws which enjoined honour of such drafts within 24 hours or so.”
We do not know the view taken by the German courts of the admitted infringement of German laws “which enjoined honour of such drafts within 24 hours or so.” The proceedings or ruling (if any) in the
[p.112] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107
German court were not exhibited in this case and it is not even known from the record before this court, whether a Mr. Ralf Gottschalk who came to Ghana in 1979 ostensibly to follow some assets of Mr. and Mrs. Ploetner in Ghana was armed with any authority or document from any German court. The record is silent on this.
Mr. Ofosuhene says however, that the outcome of these financial difficulties, details on which he apparently does not know apart from what B. Ploetner himself says in the paragraph quoted above, was that CP (Bremen), was declared bankrupt by the German courts and that by virtue of that declaration, Mr. and Mrs. Ploetner, the only “partners” in CP (Bremen) must be deemed to have been declared bankrupt too. He says a Mr. Gottschalk was appointed the trustee in bankruptcy and that he came to Ghana in 1979 to gather in the assets of Mr. & Mrs. Ploetner.
Mr. Ofosuhene says therefore that Mr. Ploetner, a bankrupt, cannot continue to be a director in CP (Ghana) in view of section 182 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179). He instituted these proceedings by way of an originating summons for a declaration, inter alia, that Mr. Ploetner, “being an undischarged bankrupt has no capacity to hold the position of a director of CP (Ghana), and therefore should be removed forthwith.” The action was instituted in the name of the Ghanaian company, and purports to be between:
“Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana) Ltd. Plaintiff v.
Bernhard Ploetner Defendant.”
The High Court (Anterkyi J.) on 2 February 1982 found for the plaintiff-company. The defendant has come to this court, on certiorari, asking the court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under article 119 of the Constitution, 1979 to quash and set aside the whole of the proceedings, judgment and final order made by the High Court on 2 February 1982.
As stated above, the main ground of the plaintiff’s application to the High Court was that the defendant, Bernhard Ploetner, is an undischarged bankrupt; and the only “proof” of this averment is the statement in paragraph 3 of the affidavit accompanying the summons viz, “That some time in or before 1979 the said Bernhard Ploetner was declared a bankrupt by an order of the Bremen Courts, West Germany.”
(The emphasis is ours.)
The defendant’s reaction to this is paragraph 13 of his affidavit in opposition, that:
[p.113] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 “13 I admit paragraph 2 of the plaintiff’s affidavit but I deny paragraph 3 thereof and say that CP (Bremen) was declared bankrupt in Bremen. Even if I were declared bankrupt in Bremen, I am advised and verily believe same to be true that I am not incompetent to act as a director in Accra in so far as no court in Ghana has declared me a bankrupt and I have properties in Ghana worth over six million Deutche marks (DM 6,000,000).”
(The emphasis is ours.)
In this paragraph the defendant draws a clear distinction between his personal fortunes and those of CP (Bremen) as a corporate Organisation. The important thing is that he denies in no uncertain terms that as a person he has ever been declared a bankrupt.
This position immediately called into question two important issues:
“(a) What was the exact nature of the organisation called CP (Bremen)? Did it have a separate existence outside the persons constituting it in the Salomon v. Salomon sense or did a pronouncement against that entity tantamount to a pronouncement against each and every one of the members thereof? And more important still, (b) what were the terms of the pronouncement allegedly made, in the plaintiff’s words, by “the Bremen Courts, West Germany?”
To resolve these questions there is absolutely nothing on record to help anyone to any firm conclusion one way or the other. The plaintiff only knows that there was a CP (Bremen), but he produced no reliable evidence, oral or documentary, to help the court determine the true character of this company, and more particularly the relationship between the company and its members, for any court to say from the record how the members of the company are affected by any pronouncement against the company. But what is even worse, the plaintiff has nothing on record to give anyone the slightest knowledge of which court said what. All he has said is that the defendant was declared bankrupt “ by the Bremen courts, West Germany.” How many courts in Bremen took part in this exercise, and what indeed did they say?
As stated earlier, the defendant by denying the plaintiff’s paragraph 3, denied that “Bernhard Ploetner was declared a bankrupt by an order of the Bremen courts, West Germany.” Of course these are matters which ought normally to be taken on appeal, rather than by way of certiorari. However, to establish that he has not personally been
[p.114] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 declared bankrupt, the defendant exhibited to his affidavit, a writ of summons which he says he filed against Mr. Gottschalk, the liquidator, to restrain him from touching any asset of his in Ghana. He says in paragraph 14 of the affidavit:
“14 I deny the averments in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the defendant’s affidavit, and say that when the liquidator came down to Ghana to trace the assets of CP (Bremen), my said wife and I in our personal capacities and not CP (Ghana) commenced an action against him to restrain him. A copy of the said action and the judgment thereon is annexed marked BP B. An action commenced on behalf of CP (Ghana) against the liquidator which did not concern the assets of CP (Bremen) in Ghana was dismissed. A copy of the writ is also annexed marked BP C.”
(The emphasis is ours.) Exhibit BP B shows that on 23 July 1979 Bernhard Ploetner and his wife succeeded, in an ex parte application for injunction, to restrain Ralf Gottschalk from “dealing with any of [their] assets in the Republic of Ghana.” Exhibit BP C showed that on 27 April 1979 CP (Ghana) instituted an action in the High Court against (1) Ralf Gottschalk, (2) Bernhard Ploetner, and (3) Mrs. Bernhard Ploetner, as the defendants, for a liquidated sum of ¢3,083,728.70 “being expenses incurred for and on behalf of the second and third defendants in connection with [certain road contracts].” This said writ of summons was accompanied by a statement of claim.
The statement of claim averred in paragraphs 2 and 9 thereof that:
“2 The first defendant is and was at all material times appointed in Germany as trustee in bankruptcy for the first and second defendants of West Germany, a firm of partnership in which the second and third defendants were partners …
9 On or about 16 July 1979 the second and third defendants were declared bankrupt in Germany and the first defendant appointed as trustee in bankruptcy.”
The defence to these averments in the statement of claim, exhibit BP C, was never revealed, so we do not know what the defendants in these actions or any of them said about these allegations. On the prompt of Professor A.C. Kuma, who was counsel for CP (Ghana) in the High Court, the High Court held that because the defendant exhibited the statement of claim (exhibit BP C) to his affidavit, he had adopted the contents of the said statement of claim as his own and that paragraphs 2 and 9 quoted above constituted an unequivocal admission
[p.115] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 by him that he had been declared bankrupt in West Germany. The learned judge said:
“The defendant of his own accord supplied affidavit evidence as argued by counsel for the plaintiff-company, admitting unequivocally that he was a bankrupt in Germany. This is borne out by paragraphs 2 and 9 of the statement of claim exhibited together with the writ as exhibit BP C to that effect.”
He then goes on:
“But for this admission in his instant affidavit there was no evidence that he had been declared a bankrupt in Germany and therefore the words “or elsewhere” in section 186 (1) (b) of Act 179 could not have been proved and it could not have been contended for the plaintiff-company that the defendant had been adjudicated a bankrupt under that section. This court in those circumstances could not have been invited to make an order under the section, for there would be no evidence that he had been adjudged a bankrupt in Ghana.
In the absence of such admission by the defendant by that affidavit evidence, the argument of Jonathan Arthur, learned counsel for the defendant, that the questions or matters posed on the originating summons called for investigation by the court, could have been upheld.”
The learned judge then concluded: “I uphold that from the affidavit of the defendant referred to above, he admits that he had been adjudged a bankrupt in Germany, and I hold that he is still an undischarged bankrupt in that regard.” (The emphasis is ours.) On the basis of this reasoning, the High Court found for the plaintiff on his originating summons, and declared the defendant disqualified to act as a director of CP (Ghana).
The defendant complains, inter alia, that the High Court’s interpretation of exhibit BP C is completely erroneous, and constitutes an error of law sufficient to ground an application for certiorari. We have no doubt whatever in our own minds that the defendant is absolutely right. The defendant exhibited exhibit BP C merely to show that CP (Ghana) sued him and others in 1979. The writ was filed together with a statement of claim on 27 April 1979 as one document. Paragraphs 2 and 9 of the statement of claim are only two of the thirteen paragraphs in that document.
The defendant did not exhibit his own defence to that action, nor did the plaintiff see it fit to exhibit it either. In the circumstances no one knows what the defendant’s reaction was to the said paragraphs 2 and
[p.116] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 9. Indeed, the defendant says in his affidavit that the action, exhibit BP C, was dismissed. The court’s judgment was not exhibited; so, again, no one knows on what grounds the action was dismissed. Did the grounds include a finding against the plaintiff on the crucial question of bankruptcy or not? CP (Ghana) made no effort to help the court on this matter in any direction at all.
If the High Court’s reasoning is right, viz that the defendant had admitted the contents of the statement of claim by merely exhibiting it, then what does one make of paragraph 12 of the statement of claim that: “12 The plaintiffs say that defendants are truly indebted to them in the above sum [of ¢3,083,728.70].” By the High Court’s reasoning, the defendant admitted this paragraph too, viz that he and the others were “truly indebted [to CP (Ghana) in the sum of ¢3,083,728.70].” So, one may ask, is any court in Ghana likely to give judgment for CP (Ghana) on the basis of this so-called “unequivocal admission” for ¢3,083,728.70? It is as clear to me as daylight that the learned judge was wrong in construing exhibit BP C, the way he did. There was, by the mere attachment of exhibit BP C to his affidavit, no admission by the defendant of the contents of the statement of claim.
In the result, as the learned judge himself pointed out, there was no proof of any kind of the bankruptcy of the defendant. It follows that there was no evidence on which the court could come to a decision that the defendant had been adjudged bankrupt. In so fundamentally misconstruing the purport of exhibit BP C, the learned judge committed an error of law. This error is apparent on the face of the record.
Where a court makes a speaking order, i.e. one in which the grounds and the reasons therefor are adequately and clearly stated, and the said grounds are found to be patently erroneous in law on the face of the record, a superior court ought to quash the order on certiorari: see, e.g. Republic v. James Town Circuit Judge; Ex parte Annor [1978] 1 G.L.R. 453, per Taylor J. (as he then was).
We are of the opinion that the defendant’s application should succeed. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to discuss any of the other grounds which counsel so ably argued. We only wish to comment briefly on one of them. Mr. Reindorf argues that the action commenced by an originating summons rather than by a writ of summons was incompetent and should have been struck out.
By Order 2, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A): “Every action in the [High Court] shall be commenced by a writ of summons, . . .” (The emphasis is ours.) In spite of its peremptory tone, the rules themselves create exceptions. One such exception is Order 54A. It is captioned: “DECLARATION ON ORIGINATING SUMMONS”, and reads:
[p.117] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107
“1. Any person claiming to be interested under a deed, will, or other written instrument, may apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument, and for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested.
2. Any person claiming any legal or equitable right in a case where the determination of the question whether he is entitled to the right depends upon a question of construction of a statute, may apply by originating summons for the determination of such question of construction, and for a declaration as to the right claimed.
3. The Court or a Judge may direct such persons to be served with the summons as they or he may think fit.
4. The application shall be supported by such evidence as the Court or a Judge may require.
5. The Court or Judge shall not be bound to determine any such question of construction if in their or his opinion it ought not to be determined on originating summons.”
(The emphasis is ours.)
Mr. Reindorf says that an originating summons is used to resolve questions of construction of deeds and documents; that the plaintiff’s action here raised no question of construction, and was not therefore a proper cause for an originating summons. Professor Kuma replies that the plaintiff’s claim depends upon the construction or interpretation of a section in Act 179 which, according to him, is a “written instrument” within the ambit of Order 54A (1) of L.N. 140A above. To quote his written answer:
“The second leg of the applicant’s contention that the respondent court lacked jurisdiction is also based on the incompetence of the originating summons before the respondent court. Here the applicant says that to have brought the action that was before the respondent court one must have a right or interest arising under a written instrument or depending upon the construction of such document or instrument. It was not argued that the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) was not a written instrument that could be construed under originating summons since that would have been an obvious misconception of law.”
We are afraid the position is rather the reverse; it seems a clear “misconception of law” to contend that an Act of Parliament is a “written instrument” in the context of Order 54A, r. 1. The phrase “or other written instrument” is used in rule (1), and comes directly after
[p.118] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107
“deed, will, …” The whole phrase reads “…deed, will, or other written instrument…” By the usual canons of interpretation, “other written instrument” must be construed ejusdem generis, to include only written material belonging to the class of deeds, wills, etc. Thus construed, “other written instrument” will take in such documents as agreements, contracts, powers of attorney, deeds of gifts, personal declarations, etc but certainly not Acts of Parliament.
Statutes are specifically mentioned in Order 54A, r. 2 of L.N. 140A, but to proceed on an originating summons under this rule the plaintiff must be claiming a right, his entitlement to which depends upon the construction of the statute. In this case, the plaintiff is obviously not claiming to be entitled to any right; all he is saying is that the defendant is a bankrupt and that section 182 (2) must be applied to him to remove him as a director. No question of construing section 182 arises. If the defendant is found to be an undischarged bankrupt, the section applies and he ceases to be a director.
In Rigden v. Whitstable Urban District Council [1958] 2 All E.R. 730, the plaintiff applied by an originating summons for a declaration that an enforcement notice served on him by the defendants under section 23 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, was unenforceable because it failed to comply with the provisions of the said Act. The plaintiff had turned a piece of agricultural land into a caravan site. The council, contending that he had “developed the land” (section 12 of the Act) without permission, served the notice requiring him to remove the caravans from the site by a certain date and to restore the land to its original use as agricultural land. The court, interpreting rules similar to our rules (1) and (2) above, dismissed the application as improper. For although the plaintiff was certainly interested in having the notice declared invalid, he could not be said to be a “person interested under a deed, will or either written instrument within the meaning of rule 1.” Danckwert J. continued at 732: “He cannot really be interested under a notice; he is merely interested in trying to show that the notice is invalid and does not comply with the Act.”
And as regards the application of Order 54A, r. 2 of L.N. 140A the court was of the opinion that closely studied the plaintiff was not “claiming any legal or equitable right depending on the construction of a statute.” The application was not a proper one for an originating summons, and the court declined jurisdiction.
In Lewis v. Green [1905] 2 Ch. 340 the court (Warrington J.) observed that originating summons is intended for situations where a decision on the question for construction will finally determine all the matters in difference between the parties. Where on the face of the
[p.119] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 affidavits this is not likely to be the case, and a decision one or the other will involve further litigation, then an originating summons is not the proper procedure. In that event, a full-blown action is the proper course.
We share these sentiments, and are the considered opinion that on the face of the affidavits, this case is not a proper one to be commenced by originating summons.
In our opinion the application succeeds.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.
I am in entire agreement with the judgment read by my brother Adade J.S.C. that the motion of the applicant in this certiorari proceedings be granted. I find, however, that the facts of the case are so scandalous and the conduct of the real respondent in the case, Mr. Ofosuhene, who is apparently sheltering behind the veil of a corporate body, so repulsive that although I agree with my brother Adade J.S.C., I am reluctant to merely concur in his judgment without expressing my own strongly held opinion about the utter contempt with which I view the whole proceedings. Furthermore, I have fears that by keeping silent, this honourable court may inadvertently give the impression to Mr. Ofosuhene and like minded persons that there is nothing amiss in the decision to mount what in my opinion is a vicious action. This is particularly so because it appears to me that my brother Adade J.S.C. has contemptuously ignored the distasteful aspects of the case and the possible encouragement to litigants which this may thus probably engender will in my respectful opinion compromise the integrity of the judicial process.
This is the main reason why I am writing a separate opinion. Moreover, the case raises very important issues concerning procedure and substantive law which need to be articulated and for that reason also and in order to highlight by laying bare the reprehensible conduct of Mr. Ofosuhene, it seems to me that the facts and the circumstances that have led to the dispute need to be adverted to in some detail in order to put in their proper perspective the legal points that call for decision in this welter of evil machinations. This is therefore my apology for my separate contribution in the judgment of this court in this case.
This is a motion on notice filed by Mr. Bernhard Ploetner, a West German national, invoking the jurisdiction of this court under article 119 of the Constitution, 1979 for an order of certiorari to quash and set aside the proceedings in a case in the High court, Accra between Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana) Ltd. and the said Bernhard Ploetner. That case ended with the High Court delivering a ruling on 2 February 1982 that as from 16 January 1979, Mr. Bernhard Ploetner,
[p.120] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 the defendant in that case and the applicant herein, automatically, vacated his post as a director of the plaintiff-company and that any duty he performed as such director from 16 January 1979 to the date of the said ruling was null and void. The High Court also suo motu exercising inherent jurisdiction ordered:
“that the defendant Bernhard Ploetner shall not without the leave of the court be a director of, or in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in the management of any company or act as auditor, receiver, or liquidator of any company for a period of seven years and so most particularly of the plaintiff-company, namely Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana) Ltd.”
The proceedings sought to be set aside were initiated by Professor Kuma, a solicitor of this court, on behalf of Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana) Ltd. on the instructions of Mr. Martin Kweku Ofosuhene, a legal practitioner of this court and resident director, secretary and solicitor of the said Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as CP (Ghana)). The suit was, in fact, commenced on 18 September 1981 by originating summons under Order 54A of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), and the facts upon which the High Court ruling was founded were contained in an affidavit in support of the summons sworn to by Mr. Ofosuhene and one in opposition sworn to by the applicant herein, Mr. Ploetner.
It is of importance to note at this stage that some of the facts in the affidavits which the High Court judge depended upon for his ruling were not controverted at all, but that other extremely relevant facts which he relied upon rather heavily in his ruling were explicitly challenged and were thus rendered practically vacuous and virtually unacceptable as facts on the basis of which any construction of an instrument or statute can be made if the contentious facts are unresolved.
The events leading to the dispute between the parties had their beginning in or about 1975 when Mr. Ploetner, the managing director of a construction company in West Germany called Carl Ploetner-Bremen (in this judgment referred to as CP (Bremen)) decided to expand to Ghana and Nigeria and he accordingly sent down two of his employees, Mr. Heins Krahmer and Mr. Reinhold Oscar Hitler, to Accra for the purpose. These employees engaged the services of Mr. Ofosuhene as solicitor and with his assistance and on his advice Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana) Ltd. was registered with apparently 100,000 shares, the two employees had one share each and Mr. Ploetner the remaining 99,998 shares.
[p.121] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107
On the advice of Mr. Ploetner, Mr. Ofosuhene was retained as a solicitor of the company and appointed resident director at a fee of ¢6,000 per month plus DM 5,000 a month including rent free accommodation with medical and other benefits. The duties assigned to him covered administrative, secretarial and legal matters. Mr. Ploetner depended on him as a friend , a representative and legal adviser and relied upon him for everything especially as he Ploetner was hardly proficient in the English language.
Some time in 1976, as legal adviser to the company, Mr. Ofosuhene advised Mr. Ploetner that a new legislation in Ghana enjoined Ghanaian participation in construction companies and so he should convey 40 per cent of his shares to him, Ofosuhene, to held in trust for him, Ploetner
Mr. Ploetner was delighted with this suggestion and smarting under the impression that it was a genuine advice given in good faith in the interest of his company, he, in fact, agreed that Mr. Ofosuhene should rather take 10 per cent of the shares for himself and hold 30 per cent in trust for him and accordingly, on 29 May 1976 by a special resolution of the company, the shareholding was re-organised to reflect this understanding as follows: Martin Krahmer 1 share; Martin Ofosuhene 40,000 shares and Bernhard Ploetner 59,999 shares.
On 17 January 1979, CP (Bremen) went to liquidation as a result of the activities of Carl Ploetner (Nigeria) which was then being managed by Mr. Heins Krahmer. Mr. Krahmer had ordered on behalf of CP (Bremen) equipment from dealers in Germany who normally are said to give credit facilities up to 36 months for purchases as large as DM 6 million, the apparent value of the goods so ordered; for inexplicable reasons Mr. Krahmer issued rather sight drafts presentable within twelve months. CP (Bremen) was unable to honour the said drafts because at the material time the Nigerian Government had delayed payment of DM 28 million owed to CP (Bremen) and the Ghana Government had also similarly delayed payment of its debt to CP (Bremen) in the sum of over DM 3 million. Since by German law sight drafts ought to be honoured within 24 hours or so presentation, the failure to honour the drafts resulted in the company, CP (Bremen), going into liquidation. There was no question of any person being declared bankrupt. In fact, on 23 July 1979 the liquidator of CP (Bremen), a Mr. Ralf Gottschalk, who sought to call in the assets of Mr. and Mrs. Ploetner because presumably he though he was their trustee in bankruptcy, was restrained by an order of the High Court in a suit instituted at the instance of the Ploetners from interfering with their said assets.
[p.122] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107
In 1979, CP (Ghana) commenced an action against the liquidator as the first defendant and Mr. Ploetner and his wife as second and third defendants. This had nothing to do with the assets of the Ploetners and the said action was subsequently dismissed by the High Court. In paragraph 9 of the statement of claim so dismissed, CP (Ghana) averred: “On or about 16 January 1979 the second and third defendants were declared bankrupt in Germany and the first defendant appointed as trustee in bankruptcy.”
In his affidavit in opposition to the originating summons, Mr. Ploetner exhibited the writ and the statement of claim in support of his allegation that CP (Ghana) did, indeed, commence an action which was later dismissed.
By 25 November 1980 relations between Mr. Ofosuhene and Mr. Ploetner had deteriorated and Mr. Ploetner in a letter of that date indicated his future course of action in his relationship with Mr. Ofosuhene as follows: “Because of the present bad relationship between us which is not at all in the interest of the company, I think it is necessary to take immediate steps to bring our business partnership to an end.”
The reaction of Mr. Ofosuhene is reflected as follows in an excerpt of his views expressed on 11 February 1981 in his letter to Mr. Ploetner’s solicitors in which he claimed, inter alia, to be the “only member of Carl Ploetner (Ghana)”:
“Bernhard Ploetner has nothing to complain of in view of his letter dated 25 November 1980. I personally cannot sit at board meeting with him. I take his letter to be a resignation as a director of Carl Ploetner (Ghana) … I am the only lawful owner of Carl Ploetner (Ghana).”
On 26 June 1981, Mr. Ofosuhene wrote to the Minister of the Interior informing him, inter alia, that Mr. Ploetner is a fraudulent person and a bankrupt and he advised that his immigration quota should be withdrawn forthwith so that he could presumably be deported.
After this letter, on 3 September 1981 Mr. Ofosuhene who had been acting as secretary of the company describing himself as resident director and solicitor of the company and signing himself now as chairman of a one man board of directors wrote further, inter alia, to Mr. Ploetner:
“The attention of the company, Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana) Ltd. has been drawn to your incapacity to hold directorship of the company since being declared bankrupt on 16 January 1979. This being so, please take notice that from
[p.123] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 today 3 September 1981 you should cease to act as a director of the company. Meanwhile the company is taking appropriate steps to regularise this default in the interest of the company … [T]he company has no other alternative than to ask you to refrain from regarding yourself as a member from today 3 September 1981.”
Since CP (Bremen) had gone into liquidation, Mr. Ploetner and his family had moved to Accra and as the majority shareholder and chairman of the board of directors he had begun to take active part in the running of CP (Ghana). He averred that he discovered that the advice which Mr. Ofosuhene as legal adviser had given him about Ghanaian participation in construction companies was false and no doubt he felt he had been defrauded at least of the ten per cent shares, which he gave to Mr. Ofosuhene. In view of this, and other specified acts of Mr. Ofosuhene which he considered to be professionally improper and unbecoming of a lawyer, he sent a petition to the General Legal Council on 4 September 1981 with a copy to Mr. Ofosuhene complaining of Mr. Ofosuhene’s conduct and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him for professional misconduct.
There is no indication in the various affidavits as to the precise time of day at which Mr. Ofosuhene received his copy of the petition, but by a curious coincidence CP (Ghana) Ltd. was said by Mr. Ofosuhene to have held an extraordinary general meeting on that same day, 4 September 198 1, pursuant to the provisions of sections 150 and 271 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179), at which the unchallenged evidence reveals that Mr. Ploetner the managing director and the majority shareholder was clearly not even given any notice although he and Mr. Ofosuhene are at the material time the only two shareholders.
The purpose of the meeting and Mr. Ofosuhene’s letters of 11 February 1981, 26 June 1981 and 3 September 1981 are sufficiently explanatory of the reasons why Mr. Ploetner was given no notice at all. At the said meeting convened by Mr. Ofosuhene and notice of which was presumably sent to only Mr. Ofosuhene and which was attended clearly by Mr. Ofosuhene, a resolution was said to have been passed to the effect that: “Mr. Bernhard Ploetner being an undischarged bankrupt has no capacity to hold the position of a director of the company and therefore should be removed forthwith.” This would seem to be the only business transaction at this one-man really extraordinary meeting.
It was two weeks after the petition to the General Legal Council and after this amazing so-called extraordinary general meeting of single individual that Mr. Ofosuhene on his own initiative caused the
[p.124] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 originating summons, the subject of the certiorari proceedings, to be filed on behalf of Carl Ploetner (Ghana) by his solicitor, the said Professor Kuma. It is significant that without claiming on behalf of CP (Ghana) any interest under any written instrument or any legal or equitable right which depended on the construction of any statute and indeed, without submitting any question of construction to the High Court, the solicitor asked in the summons for two declaration and an order formulated thus, that:
“(1) The said Bernhard Ploetner is by virtue of section 182 (1) (e) of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) incompetent and disqualified to act as director of Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana)
Ltd., or any company in Ghana.
(2) The resolution of the extraordinary general meeting of Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana) Ltd. held on Friday 4 September 1981 pursuant to sections 150 and 271 of Act 179 to the effect that ‘Mr. Ploetner . . . be removed forthwith’, is in conformity and enforcement of the Act 179 and valid and regular.
(3) The said Bernhard Ploetner either by himself or his agents or assigns or privies be perpetually restrained from holding himself out as a director of Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana)
Ltd. or in any way whatsoever interfering or intermeddling in the affairs and management of Carl Ploetner Engineering Construction (Ghana) Ltd.”
It is quite plain and noteworthy that the three matters set out above do not in themselves involve the determination of any question of construction of any instrument or statute. In view of the circumstances surrounding his professional association with CP (Ghana), it is difficult to appreciate how Mr. Ofosuhene can muster this Dutch courage and make those demands in a court of justice. Now have the effrontery to Order 54A, rr. 1 and 2 of L.N. 140A are as follows:
“1. Any person claiming to be interested under a deed, will, or other written instrument, may apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument, and for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested.
2. Any person claiming any legal or equitable right in a case where the determination of the question whether he is entitled to the right depends upon a question of construction of a statute, may apply by originating summons for the determination of such question of construction, and for a declaration as to the right claimed.”
[p.125] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107
Rule 1 of Order 54A is clearly inapplicable as there was no written instrument involved in the proceedings. Rule 2 is equally irrelevant and inapposite because the plaintiff on the summons did not ask for the provisions of sections 150, 182 (1) (e) and 271 or indeed any other provisions of Act 179 or in fact any other statute to be construed; he merely asked for the provisions which needed no construing to be applied to the defendant in the two declarations he sought, and when so applied he prays in aid the relief of the well-known and oft-resorted to remedy of perpetual injunction to make effective the application of these provisions. There was no request in the summons for the rights of the parties to be declared. In Lewis v. Green [1905] 2 Ch. 340 at 343 Warrington J. explained the scope and ambit of Order 54A:
“The order is confined to enabling the Court to decide questions of construction and nothing else, and the order does not enable the Court to grant any relief; it can only determine the question of construction, and declare the rights of the parties.”
On the face of the originating summons therefore and having regard to the fact that the declarations and the order referred to therein were asked for in the absence of any rights or any disputed question of construction formulated for the High Court as appears in the ruling of 2 February 1982, it is quite clear that Mr. Ofosuhene should have rather caused the jurisdiction of the court to have been invoked by means of a writ of summons under the provisions of Order 2, r. 1 of L.N. 140A. The resort to an originating summons under Order 54A for the declaration and an order as is ex facie conceded in the ruling is in the circumstances an error of law patent on the record and the proceedings should in my opinion be quashed and set aside by this Supreme Court by order of certiorari and the order of the High Court of 2 February 1982 declared null and void: see in this respect the dictum of Lord Cairns LC in Walsall Overseers v. London & North Western Rail Co. (1878) 4 App. Cas. 30 at 40, H.L.
This should have been the end of the matter, but unfortunately in its ruling of 2 February 1982, the High Court advanced legal reasons to sustain its assumption of jurisdiction and its vaunted reasons do therefore need to be examined. Before us moreover counsel for the applicant has in a well-prepared statement set out some arguments attacking the assumption of jurisdiction by the High Court on many grounds revolving around the High Court’s lack of jurisdiction, its excessive exercise of jurisdiction, its erroneous assumption of jurisdiction, and the like. In fact, it was seriously contended for the applicant herein that the originating summons was resorted to by Mr. Ofosuhene for glaringly evil purposes which presumably should not
[p.126] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 have escaped the notice of a vigilant court. In the light of all this, it is necessary to examine the approach of the High Court to this suit so ill-advisedly commenced in order to appraise the ratio decidendi of the ruling and appreciate counsel’s strictures.
When the originating summons came before the High Court for hearing, Mr. Ploetner, the defendant, apparently averred his affidavit and he was not challenged at all that he and Mr. Ofosuhene were at all material times the only two directors and shareholders of the company, and as the managing director and majority shareholder commanding at least 60 per cent of the shares, if an extraordinary general meeting had indeed been held as Mr. Ofosuhene maintained, then since it was also not challenged that he had no notice of the said meeting, the proceedings of the alleged meeting would be null and void. The High Court judge appreciated this aspect of the case but he thought it was irrelevant as by his subsequent reasoning, he would seem to have held that the case could be decided on other grounds. It seems to me, however, that by the provisions of section 152 of Act 179, provisions studiously ignored by the High Court, Mr. Ploetner as a shareholder is mandatorily entitled to notice, and failure to give him the statutory notice rendered the proceeds of the supposed meeting invalid as I had occasion to decide in the High Court in Luguterah v. Northern Engineering Co. Ltd. [1979] G.L.R. 477 at 495.
In his affidavit it will be recalled that he also swore that it was CP (Bremen), the West German company, that went into liquidation and that he had not been adjudged bankrupt in Germany. He averred that he rather owned assets in Ghana worth more than Dm 6 million. This assertion of his that he is not a bankrupt was explicitly challenged by Mr. Ofosuhene and the High Court sought to resolve this disputed fact by a form of reasoning which I shall examine presently but which I confess does not, with the greatest respect, commend itself to me. In this regard, in his affidavit in opposition to the summons Mr. Ploetner swore, as I have already pointed out, that an action commenced by CP (Ghana) against the liquidator, himself and his wife was dismissed by the High Court and to authenticate his point he attached to his affidavit, the writ and statement of claim in the said dismissed action.
Now because in the said statement of claim the plaintiff had stated that on or about 16 January 1979 Bernhard Ploetner was declared bankrupt in Germany and the liquidator was appointed as his trustee in bankruptcy, the High Court held in its ruling that by exhibiting the said statement of claim to prove that such suit was, indeed, commenced against him, he had vouched the truth of the averments contained therein and he was consequently estopped from denying that he was
[p.127] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 declared bankrupt in Germany. This is patently an error. In the dismissed suit Mr. Bernhard Ploetner was not the plaintiff, he was a defendant. If he reports truthfully the nature of the claim and allegations made against him which he had successfully resisted, it sounds rather incongruous and indeed illogical to me if a conclusion were arrived at that the report is ipso facto evidence that he accepts all averments made by the plaintiff in the said statement of claim in vindication of his abortive claim. Surely to argue that a defendant who resists the claim of a plaintiff and succeeds in getting the claim dismissed by a court of competent jurisdiction, has by referring in subsequent proceedings to the statement of claim so made against him accepted the statement of claim against his interest is a process of reasoning that cannot possibly be accepted with equanimity as fair argument to flaunt before it by any court or tribunal bent on doing justice to its citizens.
On this aspect of the case I agree entirely with the analysis of my brother Adade J.S.C. in his judgment and I accept his conclusion that there was on the affidavit evidence no admission whatsoever by Mr. Ploetner that he was an undischarged bankrupt. In the circumstances the alleged bankruptcy of Mr. Ploetner becomes a disputed fact and as long as it remains unresolved an originating summons will be ill-suited to decide any question involving his bankruptcy.
Order 54A, r. 5 of L.N. 140A provides that: “The Court or Judge shall not be bound to determine any such question of construction if in their or his opinion it ought not to be determined on originating summons.” In interpreting this rule in the corresponding provision of the English rules, Stirling J. in Mason v. Schuppisser (1899) 81 L.T. 147 at 149 said: “One class of cases to which an originating summons has been held not appropriate is where there is a disputed question of fact.” In this case therefore an originating summons cannot be an appropriate procedure with the disputed fact which is very relevant remaining unresolved. For this reason it seems the proceedings before the High Court must be set aside as misconceived and I will accordingly set it aside.
I have, however, given in considerable details the circumstances, facts and events leading to this litigation because although the grounds on which the proceedings in the High Court were attacked hinged mainly on the disputed fact of Mr. Ploetner’s alleged bankruptcy, there were also at least other grounds which deserve consideration having regard to the facts and circumstances and, at least, one of the said grounds raised questions of fundamental importance in company law and private international law.
[p.128] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107
The said three grounds which I now propose to deal with are:
“(1) That the originating summons is not the act of the company and it is therefore incompetent to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court.
(2) That section 182 (1) (e) of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) disqualifies only persons adjudicated bankrupt by a competent court in Ghana.
(3) That the action before the court was brought in the utmost bad faith and was motivated by virulent malice and therefore in exercise of its discretion the High Court should have dismissed it.”
In regard to the first ground, Mr. Ploetner was not challenged when he swore that at the inception of the summons he was the majority shareholder and the managing director, and the minority shareholder was Mr. Ofosuhene. According to his unchallenged evidence, he did not sanction the suit in his capacity as the managing director, and it follows also that the board of directors had clearly taken no decision to commence any suit nor had the members met to take any decision to commence proceedings in court. In fact, the action was on the evidence clearly instituted at the instance and on the authority of only Mr. Ofosuhene and the capacity in which he thus acted can only be as the resident director.
Section 139 of Act 179, makes provision for lawful acts of a limited liability company as follows:
“139. Any act of the members in general meeting, the board of directors, or a managing director while carrying on in the usual way the business of the company shall be treated as the act of the company itself, and accordingly the company shall be criminally and civilly liable therefor to the same extent as if it were a natural person …”
There is a proviso which is irrelevant in the present proceedings. And section 140 (1) of Act 179 also provides: “Except as provided in section 139 of this Code, the acts of any officer or agent of the company shall not be deemed to be the acts of the company…” There are exceptions in section 140 (1) (a) and (b) of Act 179 but these are inapplicable on the facts and circumstances of the case put forward in the affidavit supporting the originating summons. Obviously by virtue of these two provisions of Act 179, the objection which Mr. Ploetner raised by his affidavit completely renders the High Court bereft of jurisdiction to adjudicate on the summons because the institution of the proceedings was not an authorised act of the company and the court’s
[p.129] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 assumption of jurisdiction when it was brought to its attention that it was Mr. Ofosuhene’s act is in the circumstances legally erroneous and its decision null and void. On the basis of the principle canvassed in Amoabimaa v. Badu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 214 at 216, W.A.C.A. and Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337 at 342, S.C. and reiterated quite recently by Francois J.A. (as he then was) in the Court of Appeal in Karletse Panin v. Nuro [1979] G.L.R. 194 at 213, C.A., I will pronounce the proceedings on the summons founded on the unauthorised act of Mr. Ofosuhene instead of on the lawful acts of the company as wholly void and I will set it aside ex debito justitiae.
The second ground is in effect an assertion that only persons adjudicated bankrupts in Ghana and not foreign bankrupts are contemplated by section 182 (1) (e) of Act 179, which provides that “an undischarged bankrupt, unless he shall have been granted leave to act as director by the Court by which he was adjudged bankrupt” shall not be competent to be appointed or to act as a director of a company. Now under section 186 (1) (b) of Act 179, the High Court has jurisdiction, inter alia, when “a person is adjudicated bankrupt whether in Ghana or elsewhere” to suo motu restrain him from acting as director without the leave of the court. It seems to me that the combined effect of these two provisions is to give jurisdiction to the High Court in appropriate circumstances to restrain persons adjudged bankrupt whether in Ghana or outside the jurisdiction of the courts from managing companies in Ghana as directors.
The argument, however, which counsel for the applicant vigorously urged on this court is that the said section 182 (1) (e) and presumably section 186 (1) (b) of Act 179 are dormant legislative provisions since Ghana has as yet to have an insolvency legislation. The thrust of the argument pressed on us in a very plausible manner is that until an insolvency or bankruptcy legislation is passed in Ghana there can be no bankrupts in Ghana and no question of restraining bankrupts to act as directors will arise. To buttress this argument, a strong reference albeit persuasive was made to the following comments on section 182 (1) (e) by Professor Gower, the father of our Act 179 in his Comments:
“6. The desirability of prohibition on undischarged bankrupts, as in paragraph (e) was recognised by the Working Party but, as they pointed out, it was hardly practicable in the absence of bankruptcy legislation (the provision in the present Table A, referred to above, hardly makes sense either). Para.
(e) is inserted on the assumption that insolvency legislation will be passed.”
It seems to me that this argument is clearly non sequitur and in my opinion it is unacceptable. I reject it because it ignores the fact that the
[p.130] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 status of a bankrupt is not unknown to our legal system in spite of the absence of legislation vesting jurisdiction in bankruptcy in our courts. From 1876 to the present day although our judiciary has not had bankruptcy jurisdiction reposed in it, nonetheless a number of cases dealt with by our courts in the decade following the establishment of the Supreme Court in 1876 demonstrated clearly that bankruptcy as a status with its incidents recognised by our law. In this regard it is worthy of note that on 14 April 1881, for intance, barely five years after the Supreme Court Ordinance, the Full Court coram: Marshall C.J. Macleod and Smith JJ., sitting in Lagos, heard a number of cases on appeal from the then Supreme Court of the then Gold Coast. These appeals were concerned with the status and incidents of bankruptcy arising outside the jurisdiction of our courts. The cases are:
1. Alapatira v. Halliday – Davies’ Trustee
2. Seidu Salaku v. Halliday – Davies’ Trustee
3. Laniyonu v. Halliday – Davies’ Trustee
4. Brown v. Halliday – Davies’ Trustee
5. Payne v. Halliday – Davies’ Trustee
6. Halliday – Davies’ Trustee v. Sogoro
Reserved judgments were delivered on 20 April 1881. With the exception of the Alapatira case (1881) Sar. F.C.L. 250, all the other cases are unreported. They were mostly founded on somewhat similar facts and all dealt with the status of a bankrupt.
Mr. Halliday, the party in all the proceedings, was the trustee in bankruptcy of one Mr. J.P.L. Davies. The suits involved various sums of money paid by the other parties in the various suit to Mr. Davies, the bankrupt or his agent and Mr. Halliday the trustee claimed that those payments were made when the payers had received notice of the bankruptcy of Mr. Davies, with the result that by the payment to Davies their liability was individually not discharged and by the law of the land they must pay over again to the trustee. This proposition was accepted by the Full Court.
In the Alapatira case (supra) the judgment of Macleod, the trial judge, against which the appeal to the Full Court was lodged, was delivered on 9 July 1880, and the appellant asked for leave against which the appear asked for leave to appeal on 14 April 1881. The facts of the case as were given by Macleod J. in his dissenting judgment in the Full Court at 250 of the report in Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Laws and the majority judgments of Marshall C.J. and Smith J. at 253 and 255 respectively, thereof, show clearly that even in the absence of a bankruptcy jurisdiction, the status of a bankrupt is accepted by our courts. Although the majority reasoning in granting leave of appeal six months after the judgment of trial court, was for procedural reasons subsequently overruled in the Nigerian case of
[p.131] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107
Swanzy v. Bailey (1899) Red. 191 by Rayner C.J. and Nicol J., with Griffith J. dissenting, nevertheless, the acceptance of the status of a bankrupt inherent in the views of the entire court in the Alapatire case (supra) and the other cases was never doubted by any member of the court even in Swanzy v. Bailey (supra). Illustrative of this stance is Halliday, Davies’ Trustee v. Sogoro, in which by the unanimous judgment of the Full Court delivered by Smith J., it was held, inter alia:
“With regard to the merits of the case, it appears to us that there is evidence of payment by the respondent to the bankrupt and none to the contrary and as no notice of an action in bankruptcy was found to have been given to him and as in the absence of evidence to the contrary we must assume that the payment was prior to the adjudication, the decision of the court below was right and must be affirmed.”
In the case of Payne v. Halliday, Davies’ Trustee, the judgment of the court delivered by Smith J. indicated:
“. . . the defendant admitted having notice of the bankruptcy proceedings before he paid Davies and … we take the record to mean that the payment was made to Davies with a full knowledge of the risk he (the appellant) ran in thus paying his debt and that the court below was satisfied of this. The judgment must therefore be affirmed, with interest at five per cent on the instalments.”
In the Alapatira case, Macleod J. reserved for the consideration of the Full Court the question as to whether the Supreme Court had bankruptcy jurisdiction. On 22 April 1881 the said reserved question was heard by the Full Court in In the Matter of J.P.L. Davies; A Bankrupt, unreported. Marshall C.J. in his judgment in the case said: “In my opinion the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast Colony has no jurisdiction in bankruptcy. It has not only never been conferred upon it but has been purposely and intentionally withheld.” And Mr. Justice Smith in support observed: “Jurisdiction in bankruptcy has never been specifically given to the courts here.” The same point was subsequently made by Hector Macleod J. in Des Bordes v. Des Bordes and Mensah (1884) F.C.L. 267 at 268.
In my opinion the combined effect of sections 182 (1) (e) and 186 (1) (b) of Act 179 is to render a person who is adjudged bankrupt outside Ghana incompetent to act as director of a company in Ghana without leave. Speaking for myself, I should think that in view of the authorities I have referred to, if in this case the proceedings had been regular and admissible evidence had been adduced whether by affidavit or otherwise to establish that Mr. Ploetner was adjudged bankrupt in Germany, then the order of the High Court disqualifying him as a
[p.132] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 director of C.P. (Ghana) would in my opinion be proper although no court in Ghana had so adjudged him bankrupt. The argument of counsel urging a contrary view is in my opinion misconceived. It will have the pernicious effect of unleashing foreign bankrupts on us and I dismiss it.
The last ground argued is that the originating summons was inspired by virulent malice and was brought in utmost bad faith. I am afraid on the evidence it is difficult to resist these conclusions. Consider the facts and circumstances: The evidence led overwhelmingly shows that Mr. Ploetner as the majority shareholder and the principal and moving spirit behind CP (Ghana) has treated Mr. Ofosuhene with utmost kindness giving him access to very generous facilities. A payment of DM 5,000 which was benevolently and extravagantly made to him every month from about 1975 was an amount he was legally not entitled to because the Exchange Control Act, 1961 (Act 71) specifically deplores such payment and yet instead of gratitude his appetite was whetted by this bonanza and he sought to appropriate to himself the entire source from which the booty flows and to leave nothing to his benefactor. Invited in his professional capacity as a legal practitioner to join CP (Ghana), he has against the ethics of his profession and with malevolence manoeuvred to profit unjustly from his client and with his pretended legal knowledge has endeavoured to embarrass the client unfairly.
This is not all. Although his client has done him no wrong at all and had on the contrary made a gift of ten per cent of his own shares in the company to him, he covets the entire shares and with no qualms whatsoever he sought the help of the State apparatus through the executive branch of the government to get his benefactor deported from Ghana so that he would alone run the affairs of the company, and have sole and absolute proprietary right in the hen that lays the golden eggs. It would seem the executive turned deaf ears to his acrimonious fulminations. Having thus failed with the executive, he now seeks the support of the judiciary to reap where he has not sown and to unleash his venom on the man who had treated him so kindly.
My lords, I have certainly no doubt at all in my mind that this court which has inherited the equity jurisdiction of the common law system and the rational jurisprudence of our indigenous customary laws, operating precariously in these perilous revolutionary times, is inherently incapable of giving any succour to a person who on the evidence before us would seem to reveal himself as a shameless rascal; nor do I think that this court should shy away from the painful but necessary duty of expressing in as strong a language as decorum demands its utter disgust at this immoral attempt to use its machinery as an instrument of evil. Speaking for myself, I do not think this
[p.133] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 107 honourable court should mince words in condemning this mean and horrible conduct so overwhelmingly established by unchallenged evidence in these proceedings.
I beseech your lordships to concur with me in asserting very firmly and without equivocation that this infant Republic of ours cannot afford in its dealings with foreigners to give an impression which will receive judicial sanction that such scandalous and vicious acts of its own citizens as are revealed here in these proceedings will when discovered and exposed be pushed under the carpet, perhaps as a sort of dubious cover-up in the name of any misconceived notion of protecting our national image. That image, in my respectful opinion, is better protected at all times and particularly in these alleged revolutionary times when we give evil, whatever complexion it wears, no quarter at all in our national life.
In my opinion the originating summons so needlessly initiated under Order 54A of L.N. 140A, was motivated as the applicant has maintained all along by virulent and utterly callous malice and was wickedly pursued in sheer bad faith. In view of this reason, as I have been at pains to canvass in this judgment, I think in exercise of the jurisdiction of this court under article 119 of the Constitution, 1979, the proceedings and ruling founded on it should be quashed by certiorari and the so-called declarations and order made thereunder declared null and void.
In any case this so-called action by originating summons was really a subterfuge for vindictiveness. It was clearly mounted to harass Mr. Ploetner and it was not a bona fide action. It was a transparent strategy to get the help of the court for an unworthy cause. This court has inherited the inherent jurisdiction of the English legal system to protect itself against what is clearly a frivolous, wicked and vexatious abuse of its process. In this connection I will on the evidence adopt the words of Chitty L.J. in Stephenson v. Garnett [1898] 1 Q.B. 677 at 681:” The jurisdiction which we are now exercising is the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to prevent frivolous and vexatious litigation which the Court considers to be a mere abuse of its process.” See also Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley (1884-85) 10 App. Cas. 210.
Under the inherent jurisdiction I will also set aside the proceedings. The application in my view succeeds and I will grant the application for certiorari in favour of the applicant and award costs against Mr. Ofosuhene in protest against his conduct, as in my opinion he is the real respondent in these proceedings.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
