REPUBLIC vs. NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS AND OTHERS; EX PARTE FAIBIL III AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 731
26 March 1986 · EDWARD WIREDU JA · ≈ 18 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) R. v. Aston University Senate; Ex parte Roffey [1969] 2 Q.B.538; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1418.
(2) Broughton v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1899] A.C. 251, P.C.
(3) Republic v. Agboka VI; Ex parte Deh III [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 582, C.A.
(4) Yiadom I v. Amaniampong [1981] G.L.R. 3, S.C.
(5) Dinizulu v. Attorney-General and Registrar-General [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1252; [1958] 3 All E.R. 553, D.C.
(6) R. v. Dunsheath; Ex parte Meredith [1951] 1 K.B.127; [1950] 2 All E.R. 741, D.C.
(7) R. v. Guardians of Lewisham Union [1897] 1 Q.B. 498.
(8) R. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise; Ex parte Cooke and Stevenson [1970] 1 All E.R.
1068,: D.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the decision of the High Court, Accra granting an order of mandamus to issue for the removal of the appellant’s name from the national register of chiefs. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Edward of Wiredu J.A.
COUNSEL
Gaisie (with him Hughes and W. A. N. Adumua-Bossman) for the appellant.
Essel for the respondents.
[p.734] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 731
JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.
The appellant was until the events leading to the proceedings in the High Court, Accra, which has resulted in this appeal, the Omanhene of Wasa Fiase Traditional Area with the stool name, Nana Ntsiful Essel IV. The facts before the court show that he was enstooled on 19 March 1975. A report of that enstoolment was forwarded to the registrar of the National House of Chiefs on 15 April 1975 by the Western Regional House of Chiefs under section 15(1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370). The facts further show that along with the report was a caution letter in the following terms:
“Please note that a petition against the installation of Nana Amihiere Agyiliha as Nana Ntsiful Essel IV, Omanhene of Wasa Fiase Traditional Area, has been filed before the judicial committee of this house.”
The undisputed evidence shows that the appellant’s enstoolment in spite of the “warning letter” was published in the Local Government Bulletin No.27 of 20 June 1975. It is therefore clear that from 20 June 1975 the appellant became the recognised Omanhene of the Wasa Fiase Traditional Area.
The respondents to the appeal are two divisional chiefs in the Wasa Fiase Traditional Area. They are also kingmakers of the Omanhene stool of that area. The evidence shows that the two had supported the appellant’s enstoolment from 1975 up to 1982 when they presented their application to the High Court for mandamus to have the appellant’s name removed from the National Register of Chiefs.
Their complaint as gathered from the affidavit sworn to by the first respondent on his own behalf and on behalf of the second respondent (with the authority of the latter) is in the following language:
“(3) That the first applicant and I are divisional chiefs in the Wasa Fiase Traditional Area, and kingmakers of the paramount stool of Wasa Fiase and members of the Wasa Fiase Traditional Council.
(4) That I am advised and verily believe the same to be true that the first and second respondents have the legal duty for the registration of chiefs and the notification in the Gazette or otherwise of the status of persons as chiefs in Ghana, the third respondent is the agency through which the said public notification is effected.
(5) That by a circular letter No. N.H.C. 1/S.F. 23 Vol. 1/55 dated 5 June 1974 the National House of Chiefs admonished the registrars of all regional houses of chiefs not to despatch CD forms in respect of disputed enstoolment to the National
[p.735] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 731
House of Chiefs for the purpose of public notification of the enstoolment in the Gazette or Local
Government Bulletin. A copy of the said letter is herewith attached and marked exhibit A.
(6) That the queenmother of the Wasa Fiase paramount stool, Nana Abena Gyedua II, filed a petition in the regional house of chiefs, Sekondi against the installation of Nana Amihere Agyiliha as the
Omanhene of Wasa Fiase under the stool name of Nana Ntsiful Essel IV on 14 April 1975.
(7) That in spite of paragraphs 5 and 6 above, the registrar of the Western Regional House of Chiefs forwarded the C.D. Form 2 for the publication of the enstoolment of Nana Ntsiful Essel IV to the National House of Chiefs, but added a postscript and a letter ref. No. H.C./S.C. 4 Vol. 2/264 dated 15 June 1975 to the effect that ‘A petition against the installation of Nana Agyiliha as Nana Ntsiful Essel
IV, Omanhene of Wasa, Fiase Traditional Area has been filed’ (see exhibit B).
(9) That notwithstanding the warning that a petition had been filed against the enstoolment of Nana Ntsiful Essel IV, the CD Form 2 went through the National House of Chiefs and the Chieftaincy Division of the Office of the National Redemption Council — now Office of the Provisional National Defence Council — and the enstoolment of Nana Ntsiful Essel IV, was speedily published in the Local Government Bulletin No.27 of 20 June 1975.
(10) That the registrar of the National House of Chiefs wrote to the Principal Secretary (Chieftaincy Division) Office of the National Redemption Council on 4 July 1975 and asked that appropriate action be taken to cancel the publication of the enstoolment of Nana Ntsiful Essel IV which appeared in the Local Government Bulletin No. 27 of 20 June 1975. But up to now no action has been taken.
(The letter referred to is exhibit C attached).”
The appellant who originally was not made a party to the respondents’ application and who on the facts was the only person to be seriously affected by the result joined on his own motion and strongly resisted the application.
The learned trial High Court judge after hearing arguments in support and against the application, appeared to have been satisfied with the case made on behalf of the respondents. He therefore acceded to their request and decreed mandamus to issue for the removal of the
[p.736] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 731 appellant’s name from the national register of chiefs and the cancellation of the publication of his enstoolment in the Local Government Bulletin of 20 June 1975.
It is from the above orders of the High Court that the appellant is by his present appeal seeking their reversal in his favour. It is therefore clear at the outset of this case that at the time of the presentation of the respondents’ application to the High Court the appellant was the Omanhene of the Wasa Fiase Traditional Area. He as such Omanhene had a statutory right to have his name registered in the national register of chiefs. This right he can by mandamus enforce unless there is shown against such registration a legal impediment to justify non-registration.
On that basis the registrar of the National House of Chiefs was within his legitimate right in causing the registration of the appellant’s enstoolment and in reporting same for publication in the Local Government Bulletin as was done in this case in compliance with his statutory duties.
The burden therefore fell heavily and rightly in my view on the respondents to show a just and recognised legal cause for seeking a removal of what amounts to the appellant’s statutory recognition as the Omanhene of the Wasa Fiase Traditional Area.
I shall now examine the case as was presented by and on behalf of the respondents to see how far they succeed in this task, to justify the judgment in their favour. It is not difficult to find from the facts before us that the respondents’ case even on a cursory examination was beset with a number of setbacks.
First is the want of legal basis for the presentation of the application itself. As noted elsewhere in this judgment the notification, registration and the publication of the appellant’s name in the national register of chiefs and the Local Government Bulletin of 20 June 1975 respectively were done in compliance with statutory requirements under Act 370. The Act itself has provisions for causing amendments and removal of names of chiefs from the national register of chiefs: see section 145 (4) of Act 370. Occurrences under the Act that may justify an amendment and removal or both of a chief’s name from the register include: (a) the death of a chief; (b) the abdication of a chief; (c) destoolment of a chief; and such other occurrences as are recognised by law or as are added by law.
The respondents rested their claim on the matters recited in their affidavit (supra) filed on 1 December 1982 in support of their application with particular reference to paragraphs 5-10 thereof.
The first question to answer here is whether the circular letter of 5 June 1975 referred to in paragraph 5 of the said affidavit emanating from the report of the research committee of the National House of [p.737] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 731
Chiefs has legal force to be enforced? There is nothing before the court to show that the said recommendation has been elevated to the status of a recognised law. It may properly be referred to as a recommended administrative directive. The National House of Chiefs has not taken steps to have it elevated to the status of law under the provisions of Act 370 and no amendment to the law relating to the registration of chiefs has so far been shown which cover the present situation under consideration. However laudable the rationale behind the issuance of that circular is, that rationale per se is no justification for elevating it to the status of an enforceable law. “The respondents therefore failed to surmount the first hurdle.
The second setback to the respondents’ application is the failure on the part of the trial judge to have considered the discretionary nature of the relief sought judicially. Two matters of importance militated against the exercise of that discretion. The first is the tardy nature of the application and secondly, the bad faith shown by the conduct of the respondents. The respondents as kingmakers of the Omanhene stool supported the enstoolment of the appellant in 1975 and acquiesced in the registration of his name and the publication of his enstoolment in the Local Government Bulletin in June 1975. They dissociated themselves from the petition filed by the queenmother against the enstoolment of the appellant. How can they now be heard to use the same petition they had dissociated themselves from as a justification for undoing what they had supported from the beginning after a lapse of seven years? On the effect of delay: see the cases of R. v. Aston University Senate; Ex parte Roffey [1969] 2 Q.B.538 and Broughton v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1899] A.C. 251, P.C. Their conduct in this regard is tantamount to bad faith and must be held to estop them from now relying on the petition to ground a cause against the appellant. There is evidence before the court that destoolment charges have been preferred against the appellant in the Western Regional House of Chiefs and that the respondents are among the petitioners. There is also evidence that the petition, the bedrock of their complaint, had been determined against the queenmother.
The significance of the above facts should have alerted the High Court judge to have weighed the equities in the case before deciding either to exercise the court’s discretion in favour of granting or refusing the application. In the case of the Republic v. Agboka VI; Ex parte Deh III [1984-86]1G.L.R. 582 at 587, C.A. Francois J.S.C. commenting on the discretionary nature of prerogative orders (certiorari in that case) had this to say;
“One must not lose sight of the fact that a prayer for the grant of certiorari must be considered from a very broad perspective. Being a discretionary power it must be shown that there is real
[p.738] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 731 justification for its grant. Where more appropriate remedies are available the odds against its grant automatically narrow. When set against the special constitutional position of chiefs and the history of legislation affecting chieftaincy in this country with the emphasis placed on the exclusiveness of jurisdiction in the traditional courts, the stakes for allowing relief become even less attractive.
That is not to say that the supervisory powers of the High Court cannot be invoked in appropriate cases, nor does it imply that where alternative remedies exist, the prayer would not be granted. The remedies available are not exclusive one against the other. The point however that is stressed is that where the results of granting the order achieves no real or just result, the discretion is not exercised see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 11 at p.141, para. 266.
(The emphasis is mine.)
The point of importance here is that the respondents have by their present application chosen to achieve by a short-cut procedure, what their destoolment action pending before the Western Regional House of Chiefs is in effect intended to achieve. Under such a situation the caution is for the court to be slow in the exercise of its discretion so as not to arrogate to itself a jurisdiction it would not otherwise have had: see the case of Yiadom I v. Amaniampong [1981] G.L.R. 3, S.C.
The third and perhaps the most important setback is one of jurisdiction. Our law has set down a six-month time limit within which an application for mandamus may be brought: see Order 59 of L.N. 140A. Where an applicant is out of time provision is made for him to apply for an extension. In the instant case the matter complained about occurred in 1975 and it was not until a lapse of seven years that the respondents presented their application without applying for an extension of time. They were statutorily out of court and their application should not have been entertained.
In the result the respondents having failed, in my view, to make any justifiable case to warrant the judgment and the orders in their favour, the appeal ought to succeed.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.S.C.
I agree and have nothing useful to add.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.
I agree with the judgment read by my brother Wiredu J.A. He has lucidly demonstrated why the appeal ought to succeed. I would, however, wish to make certain observations, if only by way of emphasis.
[p.739] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 731
At the hearing of the motion before the trial judge the question of jurisdiction made its early impact. It was argued on behalf of the respondents at the trial court that the motion, if granted, would make a chief no chief and that it was, therefore, a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy over which the High Court had no jurisdiction. The learned trial judge took the robust view that he derived jurisdiction under the supervisory powers of the High Court over inferior courts as laid down in section 20 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). He did not also feel that if he granted the order it would say that the enstoolment of the incumbent chief was irregular. Counsel for the respondents also argued in support of the ruling on appeal. According to him the definition of a chief under section 48 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), has been curtailed by article 181 of the Constitution, 1979.
The view taken by the learned trial judge that he derived his jurisdiction to hear the motion under section 20 of Act 370 was, with due deference to him, erroneous. Jurisdiction under that section is directed at “inferior courts . . . and other adjudicating authority other than a military court or tribunal.” The application for the issue of the order of mandamus was, of course, not directed at any such adjudicating authority. It was aimed at both registrars of the National House of Chiefs and the Western Regional House of Chiefs as well as the Principal Secretary, Chieftaincy Secretariat — all persons in administrative capacities.
There is no doubt that the philosophy which informed the framers of the Constitution, 1979 was that there could be no genuine independence of and security for chiefs unless the power of the executive to “recognise” or withdraw recognition from chiefs was finally abolished. They recognised that some chiefs perform important statutory and other functions it was necessary and desirable that the government and the general public should have a definite and uniform means of determining who was properly entitled to perform the functions of a chief. Although recognising the need and justification for a system of registration and public notification of the identity and status of a chief, they totally rejected the granting of discretionary power to any authority to determine who was a chief or to institute a procedure of “recognition” as a necessary prerequisite for the validity of the status of any chief. They took the view that the registration and public notification of the status of chiefs should be an administrative act which must be taken as soon as it was established that the steps and procedure necessary to confer the status of chief on a person in accordance with the applicable law and custom had in fact been taken. It was also their view that where there was a dispute on the facts or the law, such dispute should be left to be settled by the appropriate bodies specified for the purpose in the Constitution. They accordingly
[p.740] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 731 proposed a provision stating that Parliament should have no power to enact any legislation which conferred on any person or authority the right to accord or withdraw recognition to or from a chief see The Proposals of the Constitutional Commission, 1978, p.98, paras. 258 and 259.
These ideals were reflected in articles 177 to 181 of the Constitution, 1979. By these provisions a chief was a chief if he satisfied the definition in article 181. But although a chief, he would have been a toothless chief if his name was not registered in the register maintained by the National House of Chiefs. For it was the fact of registration that accorded him the right to exercise the statutory functions of a chief. The result was that the application which was granted rendered the appellant before us powerless and a chief but in name. This is mischief which the courts must be very slow to encourage or they must not encourage at all especially where there was another remedy open to the applicants.
The learned trial judge reasoned that because article 177 (3) (b) empowered a traditional council, a regional house of chiefs and the National House of Chiefs to establish and operate a procedure for the registration of chiefs and the publication in the Gazette or otherwise of the status of persons as chiefs in Ghana there was implicit in that article the power in these bodies to withdraw recognition. No such power to withdraw recognition is described in the provisions of the said article. Indeed, reading section 48 (2) and section 50 (7) of Act 370 together, a duty is rather imposed on the National House of Chiefs to register the namely of a chief who qualifies to be registered. To effectuate the maintenance of the register the Form C.D.F. 2 was undoubtedly devised under statutory authority.
The information to be supplied in Form C.D.F. 2 is unequivocal. With regard to enstoolment what appears to be the vital information required is whether the new chief is in possession of the stool property (including the Black stool.) This is questionnaire No. 6 on the form in question which drew a positive answer. Questionnaire No. 5 on the form is, “Is there any appeal pending in the case?” The required information as to the pendency of an appeal obviously refers to a case of destoolment. The incongruous answer supplied that there was a petition against the installation of Nana Amihere Agyiliha I as Nana Ntsiful Essel IV was, to use the much favoured phrase, neither here nor there. The appellant qualified for the registration of his name as a chief. There was no question of any mistake as all the necessary Information, together with the information about the pending destoolment petition, was supplied. As the registration and the publication of the enstoolment were properly done it rested on the respondent (as the applicants in the High Court) to show that they had good cause to obtain an order for
[p.741] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 731 their expunction. The ratio for the decision in Dinuzulu v. Attorney-General and Registrar-General [1958] 3 All E.R. 555, D.C. is that if the entry in a register is intra vires mandamus will not lie to correct or erase the entry.
It is well to heed the admonition of Lord Goddard C.J. in R. v. Dunsheath; Ex parte Meredith [1950] 2 All E.R 741, D.C. for guidance. There he said at 743:
“It is important to remember that mandamus is neither a writ of course nor a writ of right, but that it will be granted if the duty is in the nature of a public duty and specially affects the rights of an individual, provided there is no more appropriate remedy. This court has always refused to issue a mandamus if there is another remedy open to the party seeking it.”
Again, in R. v. The Guardians of the Lewisham Union [1879] 1 Q.B. 498 at 500 it was stated by Wright J, who was said to be an authority on these matters, as follows:
“Certainly, so long as I have had anything to do with applications for a mandamus I have always understood that the applicant, in order to entitle himself to a mandamus, must first of all shew that he has a legal specific right to ask for the interference of the Court.”
The question then is whether the applicants had the necessary interest in making the application for a mandamus. This, as indicated by the above cases, has always been dealt with on a very strict basis. The learned judge thought they had and descended, full blast, in his commendation of the stand of the applicants. He said:
“I think, as divisional chiefs of the traditional area concerned, and kingmakers for that matter, the applicants owe a duty to the subjects of the traditional area and to other chiefs of the area to ensure the termination of chieftaincy disputes in the area for restoration of peace and progress and smooth running of traditional matters and administration. I think also as chiefs, it is their duty to see to the removal of all uncertainties regarding the status of their paramount chief by making sure that the chieftaincy dispute which has been pending since April 1975 is settled one way or the other, justly and in accordance with the customary practice of the Wasa Fiase Traditional Area. I believe these and others not mentioned will amount to sufficient interest and a sort of quasi public responsibility resting on the applicants to bring this application; they have shown, I believe, that they have sufficient traditional interest to protect for and on behalf of
[p.742] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 731 other chiefs and citizens of the area and for and on behalf of themselves, as divisional chiefs and kingmakers of the paramount stool. I will here add that as responsible divisional chiefs of the traditional area concerned, having an interest in seeing that the respondents perform their legal or public duty in respect of matters affecting Wasa Fiase Traditional Area, they are entitled to bring this application.”
It has been explained in Halsbury’s Law of England (3rd ed.), Vol.11, at p.105, para. 196 that:
“… the mere fact that a person is interested in the performance of a duty as a member of a class of persons, all of whom may be regarded as equally interested, but himself having no particular ground for claiming performance . . . will not be sufficient grounds for granting a mandamus.”
But the affidavit of the applicants articulated, without any blush, their motive for bringing the application. This was to make short shrift of their destoolment petition against the appellant. Far from winning laurels their ill-motive permeated and polluted their application. Unfortunately the trial judge lost sight of this aspect of the application. In R. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise; Ex parte Cooke and Stevenson [1970] 1 All E.R. 1068, D.C. it was held that the applicants had failed to show that they had some interest over and above the interests of the Community as a whole to support their application, their only interest or motive was the ulterior one of putting their competitors out of business; accordingly, their application for mandamus failed.
The short and long of it all is that the ruling of the court below issuing the mandamus, in my opinion, ought to be set aside and the appeal allowed.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
M.C.N.-N.
