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[1980] SLR (HC) 43High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

REPUBLIC vs. NANA AKUAMOAH BOATENG II; EX PARTE DANSOA AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 333

8 February 1980 · APATU-PLANGE J · ≈ 24 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 43
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREPUBLIC v NANA AKUAMOAH BOATENG II; ex parte DANSOA AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 333 [1980] SLR (HC) 43
APAREPUBLIC v NANA AKUAMOAH BOATENG II; ex parte DANSOA AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 333, [1980] SLR (HC) 43 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v NANA AKUAMOAH BOATENG II; ex parte DANSOA AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 333, [1980] SLR (HC) 43 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 893; [1968] 1 All E.R. 763, C.A.

(2) R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners; In re Nathan (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 461; 53 L.J.Q.B. 229; 51 L.T.

46; 48 J.P. 452; 32 W.R. 543, C.A.

(3) R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner; Ex parte Parker [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1150; [1953] 1 All E.R.

717; 117 J.P. 440; 97 S.J. 590, D.C.

(4) Republic v. Controller and Accountant-General; Ex parte Dizengoff (W.A.) Ltd. [1974] 1 G.L.R.

337.

(5) R. v. Lewisham Union [1897] 1 Q.B. 498; 66 L.J.Q.B. 403; 76 L.T. 324; 61 J.P. 151; 45 W.R. 346;

13 T.L.R. 154; 41 S.J. 210.

(6) Yardom v. Minta III (1926) F.C. ‘26- 29’, p. 76.

(7) R. v. Woolwich Borough Council; Ex parte Woolwich Union (1922) 128 L.T. 374; 87 J.P. 30.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for mandamus to compel the Omanhene of the Kwahu Traditional Area to allow the Obomenghene swear the oath of allegiance to him. The facts are stated in the ruling.

[p.335] of [1981] GLR 333

COUNSEL

E. G. Tanoh (with him S. K. Amofa) for the applicants.

Ofosu-Asante for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF APATU-PLANGE J.

This is an application for an order of mandamus under Order 59, r. 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), to compel Nana Akuamoah Boateng II, the Omanhene of the Kwahu Traditional Area, the respondent herein, to allow one Nana Obeng Akrofi described as the new Obomenghene to swear the oath of allegiance to him, the respondent, as custom demands in order to pave the way for the said Obomenghene to be introduced to the Kwahu Traditional Council to enable him take his place at the said traditional council. This application was vehemently opposed by the respondents. [The court after referring to the history and circumstances that prompted the application for mandamus continued.] The applicants swore to an affidavit in support of their application and their paragraphs (9), (10) and (11) support in every detail the evidence of their witnesses, Commander Osei and the Nifahene. I reproduce below the said paragraphs in order to clarify the position:

“(9) That the Regional Commissioner and Mr. Joe Appiah, true to their word, settled the matter at Abene and to all intents and purposes, the matter had come to an end to pave the way for the omanhene to receive the new Obomenghene for the swearing of oath ceremony as the omanhene’s public duty demands.

(10) That as a result of the settlement, the Nifahene has presented the new Beponghene to the omanhene and the swearing of oath ceremony was performed and the new chief has been introduced to the Kwahu Traditional Council accordingly.

(11) That with reference to the Obomenghene, the omanhene has admittedly refused to accept the Obomenghene even though he has been properly and constitutionally nominated, elected and installed.”

The respondent also swore to an affidavit in support of his case and called two witnesses. The relevant portions could be found in paragraphs (9), (10), (11), (12) and (14) and for the purposes of clarity I reproduce them below:

“(9) That it is not correct that the suit between the queenmother of Obomeng and the omanhene has been settled.

(10) That attached hereto are copies of the petitioner’s notice of discontinuance and a letter from the regional commissioner which are all clear, and marked D and E respectively. Attached

[p.336] of [1981] GLR 333 herewith also a photocopy of the court order striking out the actions marked F. It is self-evident that Ampadu knows that their suit against the omanhene has not been settled. He therefore perjures himself by deposing to the contrary in his affidavit.

(11) That with regard to the Nifahene’s petition, the Nifahene was in accordance with custom pronounced guilty in the presence of the regional commissioner and Mr. Joe Appiah at Abene. He was asked to apologise and he did through the regional commissioner and Mr. Joe Appiah and obtained eight cases of rum, two sheep and twelve ‘cash’ sheep of nine pounds six shillings each and he has paid all these.

(14) That with full knowledge of all these facts, and since the queenmother was not at Abene when the regional commissioner and Mr. Joe Appiah came there to settle the Nifahene’s case, she cannot be heard to swear that her suit has been settled. Her motion is in bad faith. Her statements are false.”

The picture presented by the above therefore was that Commander Osei and Mr. Joe Appiah came to Abene to settle the two consolidated cases withdrawn from the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs but succeeded in settling only the Nifahene’s case.

The first witness for the respondent was one Albert Kyei, the District Chief Executive stationed at Mpraeso. He explained that he on Thursday, 27 October 1977 went with the regional commissioner and Mr. Joe Appiah to Abene to settle the dispute between the Nifahene and the omanhene. According to him, he was present when the dispute between the Nifahene and the omanhene was settled and the Nifahene was found guilty, and was made to pay pacification by slaughtering sheep and providing drinks, and that this happened in the main yard. He added that after this, they all moved to the omanhene’s private parlour where drinks were served. According to this witness, it was while drinks were being served that Mr. Joe Appiah tried to suggest that if possible, the two candidates to the Obomeng stool should be asked to step down but the matter was not pursued.

He therefore maintained that the Obomeng stool dispute was never discussed when they visited Abene. Under cross-examination, this witness admitted that he was aware of the rift between the Nifahene and the omanhene and that it stemmed from the fact that the omanhene was keeping the Obomeng stool and its paraphernalia. He admitted that he knew at the time that there were two issues pending, one between the Nifahene and the omanhene and the other about the Obomeng stool affairs. He

[p.337] of [1981] GLR 333 however maintained that at the settlement at Abene, only the Nifahene and the omanhene’s rights were discussed and settled.

The second witness for the respondent was one Okyeame Osei Ababio, a linguist to the Omanhene of Kwahu. According to him about two years ago, at about 9 a.m., he saw Mr. Joe Appiah and Commander Osei, and the district chief executive at Abene in the chief’s palace. He also maintained that he saw other chiefs including the Nifahene of Obo. According to him Commander Osei settled the rift between the nifahene and the omanhene and after the matter had been gone into the nifahene was found guilty.

As a result, he said the elders demanded that the nifahene should slaughter twelve sheep but he slaughtered two and the rest was paid in cash and he also paid in cash the equivalent of twelve cases of drinks. According to him, later the omanhene took Commander Osei and Mr. Joe Appiah as well as the nifahene into his hall. In the hall, Mr. Joe Appiah asked him to ask the omanhene about the position of the Obomenghene’s case, and when this was put to the omanhene, he replied that the Kwahus had already accepted Colonel Osei Owusu as a chief and he had been admitted to the Kwahu Traditional Council, so he had nothing to say about that case. The witness said Commander Osei then agreed that if Nana had taken a decision, he would not pursue the issue any longer.

The evidence of the district chief executive as to what transpired at Abene is in sharp conflict with the evidence of the linguist. The respondent in his affidavit in opposition deposed that the dispute between the Queenmother of Obomeng was never mentioned when Commander Osei and Mr. Joe Appiah visited Abene. The district chief executive contended that Mr. Joe Appiah mentioned rather casually that both candidates to the Obomeng stool should step down but the matter was never pursued and as such no discussions in respect of the said Obomeng stool affairs came up for discussion.

The omanhene stated that the Kwahu people had already accepted Colonel Osei Owusu as Obomenghene and since he had already been admitted to the Kwahu Traditional Council, there was nothing he could say about that matter, and that Commander Osei replied that if the omanhene had taken that decision then he would not disturb it.

It seems to me that the evidence of the respondent’s two witnesses as to what happened at Abene in respect of the Obomeng Stool affairs was so conflicting that this court is unable to accept any of the evidence as true. That apart, the omanhene’s affidavit in opposition also conflicts with the evidence of his linguist. The only inference therefore must be that their story cannot represent the truth of the matter.

[p.338] of [1981] GLR 333

Counsel for the applicants also referred the court to the resolution passed by the Kwahu Traditional Council on 18 May 1978 which was signed by the omanhene and submitted that paragraph (9) of that resolution was a clear admission by the omanhene that the two consolidated cases in question were settled by the regional commissioner. Paragraph (10) of this resolution which was exhibited with the supplementary affidavit filed by the applicants stated:

“Whereas in consequence whereof the action was withdrawn and now both suits then pending before the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs (judicial committee) at Dodowa have been withdrawn and struck out as settled. In fact, both writs were consolidated at Dodowa and so the withdrawal thereof is indivisible and relates to both actions.”

The above resolution was passed in May 1978 about seven months after the meeting at Abene. Paragraph (10) of that resolution clearly stated that both suits were settled. This therefore goes to support the case for the applicants and their witnesses.

The parties to the said settlement were the Eastern Regional Commissioner, Commander Osei and Mr. Joe Appiah as the arbitrators, with the omanhene on one side and the Nifahene representing himself and the queenmother’s faction. Consequently the evidence of any of them is bound to carry more weight than any other person. It is in this light that I am unable to attach much weight to the statement attributed to the second applicant in this case that he was recorded as having said at Dodowa on 15 November 1977 that the case between Nana Faa Dansoa and Others v. Nana Akuamoah Boateng has not been settled.

The nifahene explained that the second applicant was not a party to and was not present at the settlement and could not therefore have known exactly what took place. However, I heard Commander Osei give evidence. He was the chief architect behind the withdrawal of the case for settlement out of court. It was a result of this settlement that he sought the assistance of Mr. Joe Appiah and travelled with him all the way to Abene.

It seems to me that under those circumstances, it will be preposterous for Commander Osei not to have settled the whole matter. It is upon this reasoning that I accept his evidence that he, in fact, settled the Obomeng Stool dispute together with the Nifahene and even that of the Beponghene. Commander Osei was in this case in the position of the independent person and he struck me as a witness of truth. I do not think he lied to this court. That apart, his evidence was corroborated in every respect by the evidence of the Nifahene who was a party to the settlement and who represented the queenmother’s faction. Their story that both suits were settled

[p.339] of [1981] GLR 333 by Commander Osei and Mr. Joe Appiah was further corroborated by paragraph (10) of the resolution passed by the Kwahu Traditional Council and to which the omanhene, who denied that there was any settlement, was a signatory. The affidavits of the applicants also supported Commander Osei’s evidence, the nifahene’s evidence and the Kwahu Traditional Council’s resolution.

In the circumstances, I have no hesitation in holding that on 27 October 1977, when Commander Osei and Mr. Joe Appiah visited Abene to effect settlement of the cases which Commander Osei had caused to be withdrawn from Dodowa, they, in fact, settled both disputes. In the case of the Obomeng stool dispute the settlement was to the effect that the queenmother’s nominee, Nana Obeng Akrofi, should be the one to occupy the Obomeng stool as against Colonel Osei Owusu. As a result, a sheep was slaughtered to stamp the settlement.

It is the case of the applicants, that even though the issue of the occupancy of the Obomeng stool has been settled in favour of the queenmother’s nominee, i.e. Nana Obeng Akrofi, the omanhene has refused to allow the said Nana Obeng Akrofi to swear the oath of allegiance to him as custom demands, and the applicants are seeking to compel the omanhene to allow the said Obomenghene to swear the said oath of allegiance by means of an order of mandamus. The respondent contended that mandamus could not lie against him under the circumstances. It is therefore the duty of the applicants to satisfy this court that mandamus can lie.

Counsel for the applicants in his submission contended that the omanhene as the President of the Kwahu Traditional Council holds a public office. He therefore argued that a chief is not a private person within the arm of the law. He added that although the functions chiefs perform are customary, custom is now part of the general law of the land. He submitted that the occupant of a subordinate stool cannot take his place among the chiefs in their traditional council unless he has first sworn his oath of allegiance to his omanhene.

He therefore submitted that the omanhene is under a duty to see to it that every chief swears the oath to him before taking his place in the traditional council. He argued that since chieftaincy is an institution recognised by the Constitution, 1979, and has powers conferred upon it as well as obligations, then any member of such an institution is a public officer for the purposes of performing or not performing those obligations. According to counsel for the applicants, the omanhene has a customary public duty to perform by accepting the new Obomenghene, once the Obomeng people themselves have chosen their own chief, and to allow him to swear the oath of allegiance to him to pave the way for him to take his

[p.340] of [1981] GLR 333 place in the traditional council, and thus having failed or refused to perform that public and customary duty, the prerogative order of mandamus should lie.

As regards the challenge by the respondent of the applicants’ capacity to bring this application, counsel for the applicants submitted that if there is a public duty to be performed which is not being performed, any one who is an interested party and who is affected by the non-performance of that duty can bring an application for mandamus. He explained that in the instant case the matter affects the queenmother’s own stool as well as her nominee to the stool, so she and the stool royals, have an interest which they are entitled to protect and are therefore qualified to bring this application.

In reply, counsel for the respondent submitted that the instant application is incompetent and that in the state of the law as at present this prerogative order cannot lie against the respondent. In support of this he referred to the case of R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 1 All E.R. 763, C.A. Counsel invited the court to direct its mind to the operative words, “remedy against public officers to see that they do their public duty.”

Counsel therefore submitted that for this application to be maintainable, the applicants must establish firstly, that the respondent is a public officer and secondly, that the duty he is being called upon to perform is a public duty. According to counsel, this public duty is being used in contra-distinction to a mere private or parochial duty, and thus the argument that the omanhene is a public officer is false, because a chief is only a public officer when he is exercising judicial functions by way of sitting as a member of the traditional council.

It was the contention of counsel therefore that as far as the relief sought against the respondent is not being sought against him as a member of any judicial committee, mandamus cannot lie. He also submitted that the duty to be performed must be a public duty or a statutory duty and since the customary functions of a paramount chief to allow his sub-chief to swear the oath of allegiance is neither a statutory nor a public duty but a parochial duty limited to this traditional area only, mandamus cannot lie against him in respect of that parochial duty.

Again counsel submitted that mandamus will only lie against a party to compel him to fill an office which is vacant and that the respondent’s position is that the post of Obomenghene has been filled by Colonel Osei Owusu and therefore the instant application cannot lie. Counsel again submitted that since the applicants discontinued their action at the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs without liberty to institute fresh action, they cannot now bring the

[p.341] of [1981] GLR 333 present application, because the reliefs in the two actions were the same and they cannot use another judicial process to gain or seek the same relief.

Counsel further submitted that according to the applicants the matter between the respondent and the applicants was settled and in view of the evidence of Commander Osei, one can say that there has been an arbitration and if that was even the case, mandamus cannot lie to enforce the said arbitration award. He therefore urged this court to dismiss the application.

In Hood Philips’ Constitutional and Administrative Law (3rd ed.) at p. 671, mandamus is described by Blackstone as:

“a command issuing in the King’s name from the King’s Bench and directed to any person, corporation or inferior Court of jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing, therein specified, which appertains to their duty or office.”

In R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, In re Nathan (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 461 at pp. 478-479, C.A. Bowen L.J. said, “A writ of mandamus, . . . is a high prerogative writ, invented for the purpose of supplying defects of justice . . . If, therefore, there is no other means of obtaining justice, the writ of mandamus is granted to enable justice to be done.” And in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 11 at p. 84, mandamus is also described as:

“an order of a most extensive remedial nature, and is, in form, a command issuing from the High Court of Justice, directed to any person, corporation, or inferior tribunal, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. Its purpose is to supply defects of justice; and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right; and it may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effectual.”

The authorities also make it abundantly clear that the legal obligation or duty which is the foundation of mandamus can arise from the common law, from a statute or even from contract: see R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner; Ex parte Parker [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1150 at p. 1153, D.C. and Republic v. Controller and Accountant-General; Ex parte Dizengoff (W.A.) Ltd. [1974] 1 G.L.R. 337 at p. 343.

Counsel for the respondent has argued at length that the court must be satisfied that the respondent must be holding a public office and must be proved to be refusing to perform a public or

[p.342] of [1981] GLR 333 statutory duty before the order of mandamus can lie. I do not think that is a correct statement of the law. It seems to me that bearing in mind the statements of the legal position as referred to in the cases cited above, this court first has to find out how far the facts of the present case accord with the statement of the law. This means that this court has to determine whether any obligation has been imposed on the respondent by any statute, common law, or contract for the benefit of the applicants.

It is trite learning that chieftaincy is founded upon tradition and customary law, and that the accredited holders of traditional office are the custodians of the traditions and customary laws of the people: see Essays in Ghanaian Law, p. 49. Counsel for the respondent’s argument covered chieftaincy under statutory law where under the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), a chief sits as a member of a judicial committee and thereby will be deemed to be holding a public office. But we have authority under customary law and that is, the one who has been duly nominated, elected or appointed and installed in accordance with customary law. Such a chief holds a customary office and is charged with the performance of certain customary functions. In Essays in Ghanaian Law, at p. 48, Mr. Victor Owusu, the then Attorney-General moving the second reading of the Chieftaincy Bill is quoted as having made this point when he said:

“I would like to demonstrate this distinction between customary functions and statutory functions with a few examples. Pouring libation on the black stool on important festivals, serving as customary arbitrator or conciliator in inter-family disputes, receiving customary homage and tribute from subjects and performing all religious duties incidental to Chieftaincy are functions which lie exclusively within the province of customary law.”

It seems to me that this view of the customary position and functions of chiefs is the correct statement of the customary law and I adopt it in dealing with this issue. Consequently one can safely say that for an omanhene to allow his sub-chief to swear the oath of allegiance to him is a customary law duty incidental to chieftaincy and is a function which lies exclusively within the province of customary law.

In article 4 (1), (2) and (3) of the Constitution, 1979, it is provided:

“4. (1) The laws of Ghana shall comprise, (a) this Constitution;

(b) enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by this Constitution;

[p.343] of [1981] GLR 333

(c) any Orders, Rules and Regulations made by any person or authority pursuant to a power conferred in that behalf by this Constitution;

(d) the existing law; and (e) the common law.

(2) The common law of Ghana shall comprise the rules of law, generally known as the common law, the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity and the rules of customary law including those determined by the Superior Court of Judicature.

(3) For the purposes of this article, the expression ‘customary law’ means the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana.”

Thus since by our Constitution customary law is recognised as part of the common law of Ghana, any rule of customary law must be deemed to be part of the common law of Ghana.

The office of the Omanhene of the Kwahu Traditional Area is a creature of customary law, which is part of our common law. again the obligation imposed on him by customary law to allow his sub-chief to swear the oath of allegiance to him is a common law duty which enures to the benefit of his said sub-chief.

My conclusion therefore is that the respondent herein, holding a customary office as the Omanhene of the Kwahu Traditional Area, has a customary or common law duty to allow his sub-chiefs who have been nominated, elected and installed as such to swear the oath of allegiance to him. The affidavit sworn to by the applicants showed clearly that Nana Obeng Akrofi has been nominated by the queenmother, elected and installed as Obomenghene, and consequently the omanhene has a common law duty imposed upon him by custom to allow the said Nana Obeng Akrofi to swear the oath of allegiance to him. The applicants have therefore proved the existence of a common law duty imposed on the respondent to permit the said Nana Obeng Akrofi to swear the oath of allegiance to him and mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to perform that common law duty.

It is also argued that for an order of mandamus to lie the applicant must have an interest. The applicants herein are the queenmother of Obomeng who nominated the said Nana Obeng Akrofi as Obomenghene and the second applicant, Opanin Kwadwo Ampadu, is said to be an abusuapanin in the Obomeng royal house. They therefore have a direct and tangible interest in seeing to it that their chief swears the oath of allegiance to the omanhene to enable him take his rightful place in the Kwahu Traditional

[p.344] of [1981] GLR 333 Council. In effect the applicants have a customary or common law duty to enforce the performance of the duty imposed on the respondent herein: see R. v. Lewisham Union [1897] 1 Q.B. 498 at p. 500 per Wright J. This common law duty imposed on the respondent by custom cannot therefore be said to be a parochial or private duty.

Counsel for the respondent also contended both in his affidavit and in his submission that the nifahene had never at any time presented the said Nana Obeng Akrofi to the omanhene to swear the oath of allegiance and so the application is incompetent. Admittedly, the law requires that before the court will issue a mandamus there must be evidence of a demand to perform the act sought to be enforced and that the demand was met with a refusal: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 11 at p. 106. In the instant case, there was clear evidence from the nifahene that as soon as the settlement was effected in favour of Nana Obeng Akrofi, he as Nifahene, it being his responsibility to take the said Nana Obeng Akrofi to the respondent to swear the oath of allegiance, asked the respondent to fix a date for that purpose and the respondent promised to do so.

Then later when he pressed for the time the respondent told him openly in the traditional council that he would not “spit and lick it again” and that whether what he has done by swearing in Colonel Osei Owusu as a chief was good or bad he was not going to go back on it, and that rather than accept Nana Obeng Akrofi he would rather abdicate for the Nifahene to take over the paramount stool. This piece of evidence was never challenged and it was a clear demonstration on the part of the respondent that he was meeting the demand with a refusal.

Again counsel for the respondent contended that the applicants were not entitled in law to bring an application for mandamus since they were entitled to sue to enforce the arbitration award and that since a prerogative order is discretionary and not issued as of right, especially where there is an alternative common law remedy, the application should not be granted. In support of this argument counsel referred the court to the case of Yardom v. Minta III (1926) F.C. ‘26-’29, 76.

I have carefully examined the said judgment but have not been able to find in what way that judgment can defeat the present application. First of all, none of the parties to the meeting at Abene has ever referred to what transpired there as an arbitration. If it were, then the applicants may sue to enforce the terms of the arbitration award, and that would have been an alternative remedy, but even in such a case the court in the exercise of its discretion will only refuse an order when it is proved that there is an alternative specific remedy of law which

[p.345] of [1981] GLR 333 is not less convenient, beneficial and effective: see R. v. Woolwich Borough Council; Ex parte Woolwich Union (1922) 128 L.T. 374.

In the instant application, there was a settlement and not an arbitration. In fact, the evidence shows that no evidence was taken from the parties and none was allowed to cross-examine the other. It was purely a customary settlement which was sealed with the slaughtering of sheep and providing of drinks. If therefore one party fails to honour the settlement the other party cannot sue to enforce the said settlement. The applicants can perhaps go back to the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs to announce the terms of the settlement for the house to record. But the house of chiefs cannot issue orders to enforce the said settlement. There was under the circumstances, therefore, no other remedy at law left for the applicants than the prerogative order of mandamus. That apart, the applicants are not by this application, seeking to enforce the terms of the settlement. They are only seeking to compel the respondent to carry out his common law or customary duty which is entirely different from the enforcement of an award.

Counsel for the respondent also contended that since the applicants discontinued their case before the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs without liberty, they are estopped from pursuing the same matter again by another process. The short answer to this submission is that in the house of chiefs the applicants were asking for a declaration that as between Nana Obeng Akrofi and Colonel Osei Owusu, Nana Obeng Akrofi is the person who has been properly nominated, elected and installed as Obemenghene. The instant application is entirely different in nature and substance from the one discontinued. Here the applicants are asking for an order to compel the omanhene to allow Nana Obeng Akrofi to swear the oath of allegiance to him. The applicants therefore cannot be estopped per rem judicatam in bringing the present application.

Counsel for the respondent also referred to exhibit A and contended that the contents indicate that Commander Osei did not settle the issue between the queenmother of Obomeng and the respondent when he visited Abene. A careful examination of exhibit A shows clearly that it was written in December 1977, about two months after the said settlement. By exhibit A Commander Osei was only forwarding a petition from the stool elders to the then Head of State requesting him to accord recognition to Nana Obeng Akrofi as the Obomenghene. The only inference one can draw from the petition is that it emanated as a result of the settlement in favour of the queenmother’s nominee. Commander Osei

[p.346] of [1981] GLR 333 in his covering letter was informing the Head of State of the respondent’s original agreement at the settlement to allow the kingmaker’s nominee to be presented to him and his later refusal to honour the settlement by attempting to introduce Colonel Osei Owusu to the traditional council as Obomenghene and which was met with opposition from some of the members of the traditional council. He then went on to make his own suggestion to the then Head of State as to how to meet the situation. It cannot be said upon proper construction of the terms of the exhibit A that it is inconsistent with the evidence of Commander Osei.

Finally, it seems to me that the applicants have in this application succeeded in establishing that a common law or customary duty was imposed on the respondent for the benefit of the applicants. They also succeeded in establishing a specific common law or customary right. They also succeeded in establishing that in the events that transpired, there was no other specific remedy open to them by which justice can be done except by an order of mandamus: see In re Nathan (supra). For the above reasons, I consider this application properly made and the application for mandamus is therefore granted as prayed. Consequently, this court hereby orders that the respondent should permit the queenmother’s nominee, i.e. Nana Obeng Akrofi, the present Obomenghene, to swear the oath of allegiance to him, the respondent, as custom demands.

It seems to me that the nature of the relief being sought demands that time should be given for the carrying out of this order. I therefore order that arrangements should be made by both the respondent and the applicants for this swearing of the oath of allegiance to be carried out within six weeks from the date of this order, i.e. on or before 21 March 1980.

This case commenced in 1977 and has had over 35 adjournments and as at each hearing the chiefs had to come down from Kwahu with their retinue, it seems to me that this is a proper case in which substantial costs ought to be allowed. Costs of ¢3,000 to the applicants.

DECISION

Application granted.

K. A. A. M.

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