ASAMOAH vs. ZWENESS [1980] GLR 867
7 February 1980 · SARKODEE J · ≈ 8 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 3Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. Rent Magistrate; Ex parte Kessie [1968] G.L.R. 207.
(2) Sackey v. Kumah [1978] G.L.R. 361.
(3) Republic v. Accra Rent Magistrate; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1965] G.L.R. 613.
[p.869] of [1980] GLR 867
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the judgment of the Rent Magistrate, Sekondi, ordering the tenant to give up possession of a dwelling-house. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Dr. Ernest Nii Tackie Otoo for the appellant.
Atta Erskine for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF SARKODEE J.
This is an appeal against the order of the Rent Magistrate, Sekondi, for the recovery of possession of house No. 3, Ketan Estate, Sekondi, from the appellant; the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) having given the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the tenant) six months’ notice to quit, which had expired on 30 April 1979. The tenant failed to give up possession. The ground upon which the landlord demanded vacant possessions is contained in an affidavit which accompanied the application for a writ of summons which is as follows:
“I, Wilhelmina Zweness of Sekondi make oath and say as follows:
(1) That I am the deponent herein.
(2) That I swear to this affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff whose authority I have to do so.
(3) That the plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and the Efaina family of Elmina on whose behalf the plaintiff acts.
(4) That the plaintiff is desirous of remodelling the said house No. 3, Ketan Estate, of which the defendant is a tenant and six months’ previous notice to that effect had been given to the defendant who has refused and still refuses to quit.
(5) That the plaintiff’s niece who is a seamstress has entered into a reputable firm to make dresses for sale and she needs the premises to be remodelled for occupation and start to operate.
(6) That I swear to this affidavit in support of the plaintiff’s application for a writ of summons to issue.” As far as can be gathered from the affidavit, the landlord intended to remodel the premises and then to give it to his niece for the purpose of her business as a seamstress. No investigations were conducted either by the rent magistrate or by a rent officer as provided by the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), and no evidence was taken by the rent magistrate. The only evidence before the magistrate is that contained in the affidavit. Indeed, the whole trial was conducted in a summary manner; the tenant being asked to plead to, after reading and explaining
[p.870] of [1980] GLR 867 to him what was called a charge. Perhaps it would be useful to reproduce the entire proceedings which are:
“Parties present.
Mr. Erskine (Snr.) for the plaintiff present.
Claim: Ejectment.
C.R. & E. in English: Plea liable I plead for extension of time.
By court: Judgment is hereby entered in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant is to quit the plaintiff’s home on or before 31 December 1979. The plaintiff is awarded ¢50 costs.”
The tenant appealed and prayed that the judgment be set aside.
It is clear from a careful study of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and its amendments especially, those enacted by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council that even though it is not meant to intimidate landlords it is fundamentally an Act for the protection of tenants. As a general principle therefore no order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any dwelling-house to which the Act applies or for the ejectment of a tenant can be made unless certain circumstances are satisfied. Section 17 (1) of the Act sets out these circumstances which must prevail before a rent magistrate or a judge can order recovery of possession or order ejectment. The question is not whether it is reasonable for the landlord to seek possession but whether the court having regard to all the circumstances is bound to grant it. By section 7 of the Act a rent magistrate has the same powers as a district magistrate and should act judicially in arriving at his decision: per Amissah J.A. in Republic v. Rent Magistrate; Ex parte Kessie [1968] G.L.R. 207. Nevertheless, when a district magistrate sits as a rent magistrate, the exercise of his jurisdiction is subject to the provisions of Act 220 and the regulations made thereunder. Therefore the procedure under the Act takes precedence over the normal procedure which he should follow in other matters: see Sackey v. Kumah [1978] G.L.R. 361. It is, in my opinion, perfectly clear therefore, that the duty of the rent magistrate is to take into account all relevant circumstances as they exist at the date of the hearing. In so doing, he must act in a broad commonsense way and within the spirit of the Act as a man of the world having regard to all the relevant factors in each given situation: see section 9 of Act 220.
In this connection, regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369), makes it imperative where a landlord requires his premises for the purposes of section 17 (1) (g), (h), (i) or (k) to furnish to the appropriate rent officer with a declaration as in form 14 of the First Schedule to L.I. 369. Remodelling of premises comes under section 17 (1) (i) (ii). Therefore the landlord ought to have complied with
[p.871] of [1980] GLR 867 regulation 18 of L.I. 369. In form 14 the landlord should state the purpose for which he requires the premises, which purpose must come under one of the provisions of section 17 (1) (g), (h), (i) or (k), of Act 220 and should make a declaration that the premises will not be re-let to another tenant within a certain period or that the tenant will be reinstated on the completion of the works. He is also required in the form to state the duration of the works. After the landlord has complied with regulation 18 it will be the duty of the rent officer to investigate the matter and report to the rent magistrate for his decision. But this does not mean that the rent magistrate is thereby precluded from conducting an independent inquiry of his own. For he is to act judicially: see Republic v. Accra Rent Magistrate; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1965] G.L.R. 613. It was therefore not enough for the rent magistrate to have relied solely on the affidavit before him. It was the duty of the landlord to satisfy the court that it was reasonable to make the order for possession. If the rent magistrate had investigated the matter thoroughly it would have occurred to him that under section 17 (1) (i), (ii) on which the landlord appeared to rely, where the tenant becomes a statutory tenant (as in the instant case) and the remodelling cannot be carried out with the tenant in occupation, section 18 of the Act should be applied and the statutory tenant so dispossessed given an option to be reinstated in the premises after completion of the works at the recoverable rent assessed in accordance with section 18 (4). This should be the case even where the tenant voluntarily gives up possession after notice. Also a thorough investigation would have led the rent magistrate to decide whether or not the claim of the landlord was genuine.
Assuming that the landlord required the dwelling-house for his personal occupation or for a member of his family (and this in my view would include his niece) the magistrate cannot make the order for possession if greater hardship would be caused to the tenant by granting the order than by refusing it. The fact that the tenant pleaded liable is immaterial for in the first place, the landlord must satisfy the court; it would then be the duty of the court to consider whether or not it would be reasonable for it to make the order. If the full facts were brought to the knowledge of the tenant and the court ruled that the landlord has discharged his duty, then the onus would be on the tenant to satisfy the court that greater hardship would be caused by granting the order than by refusing it. Obviously, the rent magistrate erred in not investigating the matter fully or at all. He thus excluded from his consideration matters which he ought to have taken into account. He approached the matter as though the only issue he had to consider was whether the house was reasonably required by the landlord to the extent that he took into account
[p.872] of [1980] GLR 867 only the needs of the landlord in relation to the house. He made no attempt in determining the comparative hardship on the two parties concerned. The result is that he construed Act 220 not as one designed to give security of tenure to the tenant as in this case. There are questions that are within the jurisdiction of the rent magistrate which remain to be considered and decided. There are questions of fact as to the hardship, if any, of compelling the tenant to vacate the premises, there are questions whether or not the tenant had expended money upon the premises. Above all, there is the general question of whether in all the circumstances and having regard to section 17 of the Act, the order ought to be made. The rent magistrate has failed to consider matters which he ought to have taken into account. He has excluded from his consideration matters which he ought to have taken into account. He has left undone those things which he ought to have done. The result is that this appeal succeeds and there must be a new trial. I accordingly order a trial de novo before another rent magistrate. Court below to carry out.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
New trial ordered.
D. F. L.
