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[1980] SLR (HC) 12High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

REPUBLIC vs. AKROKERE SUB-TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; EX PARTE CARR AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 925

30 January 1980 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 11 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 12
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v AKROKERE SUB-TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; ex parte CARR AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 925 [1980] SLR (HC) 12
APAREPUBLIC v AKROKERE SUB-TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; ex parte CARR AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 925, [1980] SLR (HC) 12 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v AKROKERE SUB-TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; ex parte CARR AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 925, [1980] SLR (HC) 12 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Asare v. Donkoh [1962] 2 G.L.R. 176.

(2) Paul v. Kokoo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 213.

(3) Fordjour v. Ayakwa (1950) Native Court A, New Juaben, unreported.

(4) Asantewa v. Boanyire (1948) Native Court A, New Juaben, unreported.

(5) Kofi v. Sesu (1948) D.C. Land ‘48-’51, 91.

(6) Yaw v. Amobie (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 406.

(7) Mensah v. Takyiampong (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 118.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for certiorari to quash an arbitration award made by a tribunal wrongly described as the “Akrokere Sub-Traditional Court.”

COUNCIL

K. Asumadu-Sakyi for the applicants.

JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.

By their motion, the applicants seek an order of certiorari to quash the order, award and costs granted against them by an institution designated as the “Sub-Traditional Court, Akrokere.” The application takes its origins from a writ of summons which one Abena Suhyen caused to issue from the District Court Grade II, Obuasi. A statement of claim attached to that writ was exhibited with the motion. In the statement of claim, the plaintiff (the respondent in the instant application) complained that she had instituted an action against the applicants at what she styled the [p.927] of [1980] GLR 925

“Akrokere Sub-Traditional Court” in respect of a land matter; that the sub-traditional court found the applicants guilty and gave judgment in her (the plaintiff’s) favour; that when she presented her bill of costs (in respect of the proceedings before the sub-traditional court totalling ¢312) to the applicants they (the applicants) failed or refused to pay it.

The ground upon which the applicants base their grievance is that the Akrokere Sub-Traditional Council had wrongly assumed jurisdiction in a land matter in spite of their protestations. By section 12 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), every traditional area was provided with a traditional council. Under section 15 (1) of the said Act each traditional council was given exclusive jurisdiction “to hear and determine any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which arises within its area.” This jurisdiction conferred on traditional councils is, by section 28 (2) of the Act, to be exercised by a judicial committee of the traditional council comprising three or five persons appointed by the council. These judicial committees of traditional councils, being inferior courts created by statute, are restricted in their judicial functions by the statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction on them. They cannot arrogate to themselves jurisdiction over matters upon which the parent statute is silent. Since the jurisdiction conferred on these councils is limited to “cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.” It is the import of this phrase that we must primarily concern ourselves with.

Section 113 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), informs us that “cause or matter affecting chieftaincy” means:

“. . . any cause, matter, question or dispute relating to any of the following:

(a) the nomination, election, appointment or installation of any person as a Chief or the claim of any person to be nominated, elected, appointed or installed as a Chief;

(b) the destoolment or abdication of any Chief;

(c) the right of any person to take part in the nomination, election, appointment or installation of any person as a Chief or in the destoolment of any Chief;

(d) the recovery or delivery of stool property in connection with any such nomination, election, appointment, installation, destoolment or abdication;

(e) the constitutional relations under customary law between Chiefs.”

Clearly, the definition of the phrase “cause or matter affecting chieftaincy” does not include any cause or matter between ordinary

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citizens which does not relate to chieftaincy. The dispute between the applicants and the respondent being purely a land matter wholly unconnected with any facet of chieftaincy, the Sub-Traditional Council of Akrokere (even if it had any statutory foundation) had no jurisdiction to entertain it.

Counsel for the respondent contended that the elders who constituted the tribunal which heard and determined the matter did not sit as a judicial committee of the Akrokere Traditional Council, but as a panel of arbitrators. This, he said was supported by the fact that there is no legal entity known as the Akrokere Sub-Traditional Court or Council. He explained that the name Akrokere Sub-Traditional Court originated with the plaintiff-respondent who, being an illiterate and not versed in the legal arts, relied on a letter-writer equally unversed in law to draft her writ of summons for her. The imperfect appreciation of the description which the plaintiff gave of the tribunal resulted in the letter-writer giving the high sounding name of Akrokere Sub-Traditional Court to a mere panel of customary law arbitrators. He informed the court that leave had since been granted by the magistrate’s court to amend this misdescription of the tribunal that heard and determined the matter, by substituting “arbitrators” wherever that misdescription appears.

It is now settled law that the main requisites of a valid customary law arbitration are that the parties must voluntarily submit their dispute to disinterested third parties as arbiters and that there must be a prior agreement by the parties to be bound by the award of the arbiters, subject, of course, to the rules of natural justice being observed at the arbitral proceedings. In considering whether there has been a voluntary submission by the parties we are warned by authorities such as Asare v. Donkor [1962] 2 G.L.R. 176 at p. 179 and Paul v. Kokoo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 213 at p. 217, to distinguish between disputes voluntarily submitted by both parties to third parties for investigation and adjudication; and disputes submitted by one party to third parties, but in consequence of which the other party is invited by the third parties to appear before them to have the matter ventilated. In the former, voluntary submission is inferred from the conduct of the parties, whereas in the latter there must be some evidence that the party who is invited did not only appear out of respect for, or fear of, the third parties, but that when he did appear, he was made to understand clearly and distinctly that the third parties were to arbitrate the dispute about which a complaint was lodged; and he, as well as the party complaining, would have to agree that the dispute be settled by the third parties before the third parties could validly entertain the matter. It is when they signify their agreement after this explanation that it may be said that

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there has been voluntary submission by both parties. All too often, some simple rustic dangerously oblivious of his legal rights is hauled on a complaint laid by another, to appear before a chief thirsty for judicial powers, and there made to pay a fee in spite of protestations, to signify his submission to the jurisdiction of the chief and his elders over a dispute between the parties.

In the reports of some of the earlier arbitral proceedings in the native courts it would appear that after an award has been brought in by the arbitrators, the parties paid to the arbitrators what is variously called “aseda” or “stamping fee” to signify their acceptance of the award: see Fordjour v. Ayakwa (1950) Native Court A, New Juaben, unreported and Asantewa v. Boanyire (1948) Native Court A, New Juaben, unreported, but cited by Allott at p. 127 of his book Essays in African Law. Thus until the payment of “aseda” by the parties, or the successful party has been reimbursed by the losing party, either party may resile from the arbitration: see Kofi v. Sesu (1948) D.C. Land ‘48-’51, 91.

The law is now settled that after a valid arbitration has been held and an award published, the award is binding on the parties, whether they accept it or not and they cannot resile after the publication of the award: see Yaw v. Amobie (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 406. However, may I make so bold as to suggest that where the arbitral proceedings did not originate with a complaint laid by one party alone, the rule that a part cannot resile from the proceedings appears to be eminently fair. Afterall both parties agreed on their arbiter and submitted to his investigation and adjudication of the matter. But where such arbitral proceedings originated with a complaint lodged by one party to an arbiter of his choice, and the other party is compelled out of fear or cringing respect to agree to the dispute being determined by that arbiter, it appears to me to be grossly unjust not to allow such a party to resile from the award by a refusal to pay “aseda” or to reimburse the successful complainant.

In the application now before this court the applicants complain that the chief of Akrokere and his elders assumed jurisdiction over the dispute between them and the respondent in spite of protestations from the applicants. In an affidavit filed in opposition to this application, deposed to by Nana Owusu Sampah III, Akrokerehene, on behalf of the respondent, he denies that the applicants protested against the hearing and determination of the suit by him and his elders. Nowhere in the affidavit, however, does he say that when the applicants appeared in answer to the plaintiff’s summon he made them to understand clearly and distinctly that he and his elders proposed to arbitrate the dispute concerning which a

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complaint had been lodged and that if all the parties did not agree to have the dispute settled by them they could not proceed with the arbitral proceedings. I am of the opinion that had the parties been informed that an arbitration was what was being held, the successful plaintiff would not have referred to the tribunal that determined the matter as the Akrokere Sub-Traditional Court in his writ of summons.

Again, by paragraph (4) of the affidavit in opposition it is stated that “when the said Abena Suhyen issued her summons against the applicants, the applicants were served and a day was fixed for the hearing of the arbitration.” To begin with, in arbitral proceedings, the complainant does not initiate proceedings by issuing a summons. He lodges a complaint with some elders and the elders call or invite the other party to appear before them for them to find out whether he would agree to their hearing and determining the dispute. One distinguishing feature of arbitral proceedings is the absence of any coercion to make another submit to the jurisdiction of arbiters. A summons threatens that if you do not appear in answer to it, judgment may be given against you or you may suffer some penalty. In so far as any proceedings begin with the issuance of a summons they cannot be classified as customary arbitration. Secondly, if no summons is issued in customary arbitrations then it follows that there can be no service of it.

Finally, the deponent betrayed himself in paragraph (14) of his affidavit which reads, “that I am advised and verily believe same to be true that I and my elders have jurisdiction to sit in arbitration over issues involving people who voluntarily subject themselves to my court.” (The emphasis is mine.) It is plain to me that Nana Akrokerehene sat as a court to hear and determine this dispute and that is why a summons was issued to compel the attendance of the applicants at his court. I hold therefore that if what was intended were arbitral proceedings, then the proceedings were invalid because the applicants did not voluntarily submit to the tribunal.

I find as a fact that the tribunal that purported to hear and determine the dispute between the parties was the Akrokere Sub-Traditional Court. And since it is conceded by counsel for the respondent that there is no legal entity designated Akrokere Sub-Traditional Court it follows that there is no such tribunal having the jurisdiction to sit as a court to hear and determine land disputes or in fact any other dispute between parties. I order therefore that a writ of certiorari to issue directing the respondent, the Akrokere Sub-Traditional Court, to bring up to this court the proceedings in the case entitled Abena Suhyen v. Kwaku Kyei and Others and held in August 1979 for the same to be quashed.

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The first applicant in his affidavit in support of this application deposed to the fact that a day after he was granted leave by this court to apply for an order of certiorari, Abena Suhyen led bailiffs of the magistrate court to his room where they removed his personal effects and advertised them for sale. The proceedings before the said magistrate’s court are not the subject of this application, but I consider it necessary to comment briefly on those proceedings before any more harm is done.

In the first place, on the authority of Mensah v. Takyiampong (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 118 a customary arbitration award cannot be enforced even by the superior courts in the sense that the successful party cannot invoke the aid of the court to proceed to execution upon it even though it be valid. The parties are nonetheless bound by it and the award may be used in support of title in an action for declaration of title or as an estoppel to resist an action for such declaration. The attempted enforcement of the bill of costs by action was, therefore, wrong in law: see Mensah v. Takyiampong (supra) at p. 120.

The district court is an inferior court and its jurisdiction is spelt out under section 37 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). As such, it is restricted to the jurisdiction conferred on it by that Act. I see nothing in the said section conferring jurisdiction on the district court to enforce arbitration awards, whether customary or otherwise. The power of the High Court to enforce non-customary arbitration awards stems from the Arbitration Act, 1961 (Act 38). Neither the superior nor the inferior courts have any power to enforce customary arbitration awards in the same manner as a judgment or order by entering them as judgments or orders and ordering execution thereon.

In my view, the district court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action in as much as it was an attempt by the plaintiff to enforce the costs awarded at a customary arbitral proceedings. I award costs of ¢300.

DECISION

Application granted.

K. A. A. M.

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