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[1980] SLR (CA) 6Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

REPUBLIC vs. NEW JUABENG TRADITIONAL COUNCIL EX PARTE NANA SARKODEE I [1980] GLR 915

28 January 1980 · JIAGGE JA · ≈ 5 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (CA) 6
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v NEW JUABENG TRADITIONAL COUNCIL ex parte NANA SARKODEE I [1980] GLR 915 [1980] SLR (CA) 6
APAREPUBLIC v NEW JUABENG TRADITIONAL COUNCIL ex parte NANA SARKODEE I [1980] GLR 915, [1980] SLR (CA) 6 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v NEW JUABENG TRADITIONAL COUNCIL ex parte NANA SARKODEE I [1980] GLR 915, [1980] SLR (CA) 6 (Ghana Ct. App. 1980).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASE REFERRED TO

Akufo-Addo v. Quashie-Idun [1968] G.L.R. 667, C.A. (full bench).

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against a High Court order prohibiting a traditional council from hearing destoolment charges on the ground of likelihood of bias. It is unnecessary to state the facts.

COUNSEL

S. K. Amofah for the appellants.

Joe Reindorf for the respondent.

[p.916] of [1980] GLR 915

JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.

The appellants in this case preferred destoolment charges against the respondent in the New Juabeng Traditional Council. The respondent, while the action was pending against him, applied to the High Court for leave to issue a writ of prohibition against the New Juabeng Traditional Council on the ground that the appellants were not competent to prefer destoolment charges against him. The ex parte motion for leave was granted and notices together with all the relevant papers were served on the parties concerned.

The respondent later filed a supplementary affidavit which was summed-up by the trial court in the judgment as follows:

“(1) That he had been summoned by the New Juabeng Traditional Council to defend a charge that he had disclosed to a newspaper that charges were to be preferred against its ‘chairman,’ i.e. the omanhene.

(2) That he had been declared destooled by that council, as he failed to appear before the council.

(3) That the order of destoolment had later been reversed by the Court of Appeal.

(4) That another summons in a further effort to destool him had then been issued against him by the same council, requiring him to answer charges, [including] the principal complaint against him in the earlier

case, viz. that he was after the destoolment of the Omanhene, the President of the Council.

(5) That the members of the council, who would try the new case, would be some of the councillors, who had declared him destooled.

(6) That there was therefore a likelihood of considerable bias operating against him . . .”

The court found that there was real likelihood of bias (or malice as stated in the judgment) on the part of the councillors to disqualify them from hearing the matter and the order for prohibition was granted.

The main ground of appeal argued by counsel for the appellants before this court was that:

“the learned judge erred in holding that the new Juabeng Traditional Council cannot go into the destoolment charges preferred against the respondent by the elders of his stool from his own relatives who are entiled under customary law to nominate, elect and destool the Kyidomhene.”

[p.917] of [1980] GLR 915

Counsel argued that the traditional council was the only body clothed with jurisdiction to deal with chieftaincy matters, and that the question of capacity was one within the competence of the council to decide.

Counsel for the respondent conceded that the traditional council had the right to decide whether or not it had jurisdiction in the matter, but that the supervising court also had power to decide whether or not the council was properly constituted. He argued that the traditional council was in collusion with the appellants to use the provisions of the law, section 15 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), to perform an illegal act – that of destooling the respondent to frustrate charges being brought against the omanhene for misconduct.

There was, however, no evidence of collusion before the court. Section 15(1) of Act 370 provides:

“15. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and to any appeal therefrom, a Traditional Council shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which arises within its area, not being one to which the Asantehene or a Paramount Chief is a party.”

Members of the panel who are to adjudicate on any matter before the traditional council are chosen from the members of the judicial committee of the said council. There was no evidence before the court that the members of the panel that had destooled the respondent in the earlier proceedings were to adjudicate on the new matter or that the only members of the judicial committee were the members of the panel that had adjudicated on the earlier matter. There was no evidence of bias against any member of the judicial committee other than the panel members who had adjudicated on the earlier matter and destooled the respondent.

The effect of the prohibition as it stands would be to disqualify the traditional council from hearing the new charges placed before it, on the ground of a real likelihood of bias – a principle of natural justice. The evidence, however, shows quite clearly that if there is any likelihood of bias it would be on the part of members of the panel that had destooled the respondent; but the order for prohibition failed to make that distinction.

In the exercise of their judicial functions, members of the judicial committee of the traditional council are bound by their oath to perform the functions of their office faithfully and without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. Where there is proof of bias or real likelihood of bias against any member of the adjudicating panel, that member may be disqualified from sitting on the panel. Evidence disqualifying members of one panel, however, cannot automatically

[p.918] of [1980] GLR 915

disqualify all the members of the judicial committee of the traditional council.

Section 15 of Act 370 gave exclusive jurisdiction to the traditional council to hear and determine any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which arises within its area. The High Court cannot oust the jurisdiction by means of an order of prohibition. As was stated by the Court of Appeal (full bench) per Amissah J.A. in Akufo-Addo v. Quashie-Idun [1968] G.L.R. 667 at p. 673, “where a statute clearly enjoins a person to perform an act, he has to do it even if its performance is incompatibe with the strict rules of natural justice.

For the reasons stated above this appeal is allowed and the order of prohibition is set aside. A panel other than the one that destooled the respondent in the earlier case should be constituted to adjudicate on the matter.

JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF ANNAN J.A.

A. I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

K. A. A. M.

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