ROCKSON vs. AGADZI AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 106
14 April 1978 · AMPIAH J · ≈ 12 min read
[1978] SLR (HC) 41Other citation styles and permanent link
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JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.
On 25 June 1976, the plaintiff instituted this action against the defendant claiming: (a) A declaration of title to land at Abeka, Accra, and (b) An order of injunction to restrain the defendant, her servants and agents from interfering with the land in dispute.
On 9 July 1976, the plaintiff instituted a similar action against the Attorney-General (vide Land Suit No. 610/76). By the order of this court, dated 18 October 1976, the Attorney-General was joined as a co-defendant to this action; on 7 December 1976, Land Suit No. 610/76 was struck out with liberty. On 1 March 1977, the following issues were agreed upon and set down for trial:
“(1) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the land in dispute, and (2) Whether the co-defendant published and served on the plaintiff in accordance with the provisions of the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125), the relevant legislative instrument.”
The plaintiff’s case was that the land was granted to him as a gift in 1964 by the Asere stool. He tendered in evidence exhibit A, a duly stamped and registered conveyance evidencing the grant to him; the said grant was also concurred in by the appropriate commissioner. According to the plaintiff, he took possession of the land, placed pillars at the corners
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and fenced it. He engaged one Alpheus Ayitey Addy, who had been involved in the acquisition of the land, to look after the property for him. There was no interference with his enjoyment of the property until the fence was broken down by one Dwomoh. He warned the said Dwomoh and asked his counsel to write to him. That was between 1971 and 1972. As soon as an action was taken against the said Dwomoh of Beno Enterprises, the interference ceased. He was therefore advised to drop the action and he did so. The present action, he said, was the second occasion on which his enjoyment has been interfered with. He said the defendant had been known to him for some time as a neighbour and that she had even in 1968 asked permission from him to use a portion of his land as a playground for the children of her school—Anne’s Preparatory School. In 1971 and 1972 the overseer of his land, Mr. Addy informed him of the claim by the defendant. According to him, the defendant claimed that a portion of his land had been leased to her by the government which had acquired the whole area. Not satisfied with this claim, he inquired from his land owners, the Asere stool, who refuted the claim by the defendant. He then followed up his inquiries at the Lands Department where he was told that the land had been acquired by the government in the public interest. He asked why he had not been informed and he was told that the said acquisition had been published in the Gazette. He denied knowledge of any such notice and said that although he had been visiting his land regularly nobody had served him with any notice of the alleged acquisition. He contended therefore that he was still the owner of the land since the alleged acquisition was not legally effective to deprive him of his ownership of the land.
In support of his case the plaintiff called as his first witness, one Alpheus Ayitey Addy, an estate agent. This witness testified that after having helped the plaintiff to acquire the land in dispute, he was engaged by the plaintiff to look after the land in dispute for him; he visited the land regularly. He said up to the date he met the defendant on the land, he had not seen any notice of acquisition affixed to the land. On the first occasion when he met the defendant, he was shown a copy of a letter from the Ministry of Lands, and the defendant told him that the land had been acquired by the government and that that portion had been leased to her. He informed the plaintiff and accompanied the plaintiff to the Lands Department where they were told the whole land had been acquired for industrial purposes. He said that prior to this incident one Dwomoh had trespassed on the land and that when the plaintiff had instituted action against the said Dwomoh, the trespass ceased and Dwomoh left the land.
In this case, I do not think there is any real dispute as to the plaintiff’s prior title to the land. The plaintiff’s land which, admittedly, was stool land, acquired the character of private land when he acquired it in 1964 from the stool. In the circumstances the land could only become state land by proper acquisition under the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125). The only issue, to my mind, is therefore whether or not the plaintiff has been legally divested of his ownership in the land.
[p.109] of [1979] GLR 106
It is the contention of the plaintiff that he has not been divested of his title as the provisions of the relevant enactment for the effective acquisition of his land had not been complied with. The onus therefore lies on the defence to establish due compliance with the provisions of the acquiring statute, the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125), s. 1 (1) of which provides:
“1. (1) Whenever it appears to the President in the public interest so to do, he may, by executive instrument, declare any land specified in the instrument, other than land subject to the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123), to be land required in the public interest; and accordingly on the making of the instrument it shall be lawful for any person, acting in that behalf and subject to a month’s notice in writing to enter the land so declared for any purpose incidental to the declaration so made.”
(The emphasis is mine.) Subsection (3) of the same section provides that:
“On the publication of an instrument made under this section, the land shall, without any further assurance than this subsection, vest in the President on behalf of the Republic, free from any encumbrance whatsoever.”
(The emphasis is mine.) Thus, while on the making of an executive instrument “it shall be lawful for any person acting in that behalf . . . to enter the land so declared for any purpose incidental to the declaration so made,” the land itself shall become vested in the President only on the publication of the said executive instrument.
There is no dispute that an executive instrument was made. E.I. 124 of 1969 was tendered in evidence as exhibit Al by the co-defendant. The issue is: Was there a publication of this instrument so as to divest the plaintiff of his title in the property and vest it in the President? What then is publication? I agree with counsel for the plaintiff that we can look for the meaning of publication only from the acquiring Act itself. Although the defence gave some evidence of publication in the Gazette the evidence of both the defendant and the co-defendant was substantially to the effect that there has been due compliance with the provisions of section 2 of Act 125 which explains publication. Section 2 of the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125), states:
“A copy of the instrument made under the preceding section shall, (a) be served personally on any person having an interest in the land; or (b) be left with any person in occupation of the land; and (c) be affixed at a convenient place on the land; and (d) be published on three consecutive occasions in a newspaper circulating in the district where the land is situate.”
On the issue of publication, the defendant relied substantially on the evidence of the co-defendant. The defendant in her evidence claimed title through the Lands Commission and tendered in evidence exhibit 2, the
[p.110] of [1979] GLR 106
conveyance covering the lease on the land, and exhibit 1, a letter from the Lands Department on the application for the lease of the land. In fact it was only a portion of the plaintiff’s land which was affected by the grant to the defendant. According to the defendant whatever she did on the land was done in pursuance of the grant made to her. I have no doubt in my mind that if it was found on the evidence that there had been due publication of the acquiring executive instrument, the defendant would be entitled to the land under the lease.
We have to find out from the evidence of the co-defendant whether there was any such publication. As I have already stated, the onus is on the defence to establish due publication of the executive instrument. On the other hand, it is obviously undesirable that a man should be deprived of title long and continuously enjoyed merely because its formal creation by statute is incapable of proof. There is evidence on record to show that the land was allegedly acquired by the state in 1969—vide exhibit A—and that a lease of a portion of it was granted to Beno Enterprises which failed to utilise the land. The state then re-entered the land and granted a lease of it to the defendant in this case. Although in his evidence the plaintiff appeared not to have had any notice or knowledge of the lease to Beno Enterprises, it is clear from the pleadings that the plaintiff was aware of this grant. On this, I do not believe the evidence of the plaintiff. The lease to Beno Enterprises was in 1970, this action was taken in 1976. The law is prepared in accordance with the maxim ex diuturnitate temporis omnia praesumuntur esse rite et solemnitur acta (from lapse of time all things are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly) to infer from this long enjoyment that all those acts were done that were necessary to create a valid title in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
The defence however decided to give evidence of due publication and relied on this to discharge the onus on them. The relevant evidence was given by the first and the second defence witnesses and their evidence showed clearly that there was no service of the executive instrument either on the plaintiff as owner or on any other person as a person in occupation of the land. This evidence substantially supports the evidence of the plaintiff and his witness who denied knowledge of any notice or service of the executive instrument on them. The conveyance of the plaintiff’s land was duly concurred in, stamped and registered. By section 25 (1) of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), the co-defendant must be deemed to have had actual notice of the plaintiff ‘s title to the land and the fact of its registration. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 2 of the State Lands Act, 1962, require that a copy of the executive instrument be served personally on any person having an interest in the land or be left with any person in occupation of the land. There is unchallenged evidence that the plaintiff, until the alleged acquisition of the land, was the owner of a portion of the land and was in possession of the land. It was therefore incumbent on the co-defendant to serve the plaintiff personally. I accept the evidence of the plaintiff that he was not served with any instrument. I find therefore that there was no service of E.I. 124 on the plaintiff personally either as owner of the land or as the person in occupation.
[p.111] of [1979] GLR 106
Next, the law required that a copy of the executive instrument be affixed at a convenient place on the land—vide section 2 (a) of Act 125. It is not clear whether such a copy should be affixed to every plot of land included in the would-be acquired land or to a convenient place on the whole land but the Act requires that all persons with any interest in the land should be served personally. The land allegedly acquired was about 140.874 acres; the plaintiff’s land is only about 0.92 acre. I am of the view, however, that the affixing of a copy of the executive instrument at any convenient and conspicuous point on the whole land would be sufficient. In this case there is evidence that red crosses were marked on some properties on the land to be acquired, and also that a copy of the instrument was affixed at a point on the land. I am satisfied with this evidence and I find that a copy of the executive instrument was affixed at a convenient place on the land.
To make the publication regular, it must also be published on three consecutive occasions in a newspaper circulating in the district where the land is situate—vide section 2 (d) of Act 125. It is not disputed that the Gazette is not a newspaper. I hold therefore that the publishing of the executive instrument (E.I. 124) in the Gazette would not be sufficient for purposes of publication under section 2 (d) of Act 125. The evidence of the defendant’s first witness was that after the instrument had been made, copies of it were sent to Cadco Ltd. and the registrar of the High Court. Cadco Ltd. then caused the instrument to be published in the Graphic (a daily newspaper circulating all over the country including the district where the land was to be acquired). Later two newspaper cuttings of the publication of the instrument were received by the Lands Commission. No attempt was made to tender these cuttings and no evidence was led to show when the instrument was published in the newspaper. Even if I should accept that the two cuttings were for two consecutive occasions, this did not comply with the requirements under the law which stipulated that the instrument should be published on three consecutive occasions. The Graphic is a daily newspaper; effective publishing of the executive instrument could only have been done on three consecutive days. I find therefore that the executive instrument (E.I. 124) was not published on three consecutive occasions as required by law.
I am satisfied on the whole evidence that the plaintiff’s evidence is a sufficient rebuttal of the presumption that all that was necessary for the valid and effective vesting of the property in the President had been rightly and regularly done. I find on the evidence that the defence has failed to discharge the onus on them, the defendants having failed to comply with paragraphs 2 (a), (b) and (d) of the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125). I hold therefore that there was no publication of the executive instrument (E.I. 124), for the legal and effective vesting of the land in dispute in the President of Ghana. The title in the land therefore remained in the plaintiff as the owner and the Lands Commission could not transfer any interest in the property to the defendant—nemo dat quod non habet. The defendant had no title to the land and all her dealings with the land were therefore unlawful.
[p.112] of [1979] GLR 106 The plaintiff therefore succeeds in his claim; he is declared the owner of all that piece of land at Abeka, Accra, fully described in his writ of summons. I further order that the defendant, her agents, servants and workmen be restrained from interfering in any way with the land in dispute. There will be costs of ¢500 in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant and the co-defendant.
DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff with costs.
L. F. A.
