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[1978] SLR (HC) 47High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

TACKIE vs. BANNERMAN [1979] GLR 44

4 April 1978 · EDWARD WIREDU J · ≈ 18 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 47
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OSCOLATACKIE v BANNERMAN [1979] GLR 44 [1978] SLR (HC) 47
APATACKIE v BANNERMAN [1979] GLR 44, [1978] SLR (HC) 47 (Ghana).
BluebookTACKIE v BANNERMAN [1979] GLR 44, [1978] SLR (HC) 47 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Alameddine Brothers. v. Paterson Zochonis & Co., Ltd. [1971] 2 G.L.R. 403, C.A.

(2) Kofi (Oppong) v. Fofie [1964] G.L.R. 174, S.C.

(3) Asante v. Sarpong [1963] 2 G.L.R. 359.

(4) Praka v. Ketewa [1964] G.L.R. 423, S.C.

(5) Cook v. Whellock (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 658; 59 L.J.Q.B. 329; 62 L.T. 675; 38 W.R. 534, C.A.

(6) Mackley v. Nutting [1949] 2 K.B. 55; [1949] 1 All E.R. 413; [1949] L.J.R. 803; 65 T.L.R. 255; 93 S.J. 197, C.A.

(7) Stratford v. Syrett [1958] 1 Q.B. 107; [1957] 3 W.L.R. 733; [1957] 3 All E.R. 363; 101 S.J. 850;

170 E.G. 569, C.A.

(8) Republic v. Accra Rent Magistrate; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1965] G.L.R. 613.

(9) Bassil v. Sfarijlani, High Court, Accra, 1 October 1966, unreported; digested in (1967) C.C. 20.

(10) Saad v. City Food Supply (Ghana) Ltd., High Court, Accra, 21 November 1966, unreported; digested in (1967) C.C. 33.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against the reversal by a rent magistrate of a rent officer’s dismissal of a complaint by a landlord asking for recovery of possession. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Jimmy Alarah for the appellant.

A. K. Bannerman-Williams for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.

This appeal is from the decision of his worship Mr. S. A. Afful, as he then was, sitting as a rent magistrate in an Accra District Court on a case stated to him by a Mr. Yaw Buadu, a rent officer, on the application of the respondent (who shall hereafter be referred to as the landlord). In that decision the learned magistrate reversed the decision of the rent officer dismissing the landlord’s claims for the recovery of

[p.46] of [1979] GLR 44 possession of premises occupied by the appellant (who shall also hereafter be referred to as the tenant) under section 17 (1) (g) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), and granted the complainant landlord the relief sought in his claim.

The event which seemed to have provoked the present controversy between the parties may be briefly stated as follows. Some time in the middle of 1970 the landlord let out the premises in question to the tenant at a monthly rent of ¢70, rent payable quarterly in advance. According to the landlord his main aim had been to provide accommodation for his children who were studying abroad and he therefore never entered into any written agreement with any tenant he took on. His evidence shows that when the tenant came to see him he made this clear to him and it was with this understanding that the premises were let out and accepted by him. Of course this is denied by the tenant. The evidence shows that some time ago the tenant was minded to put up a structure in front of the house to enable his wife to sell some provisions but this raised an objection from the landlord on the ground that to permit the construction of the structure would cause deterioration to the place and would inconvenience his children when time came for them to take up occupation. The landlord’s testimony shows that prior to the commencement of his action against the tenant there had been series of correspondence between him and one of his daughters, a Mrs. Phillips who had then qualified as dentist in London. In those letters Mrs. Phillips expressed her intention to come home with her husband to settle and work and requested her father (the landlord) to find her a suitable accommodation. Two of these letters were tendered in evidence to support the contention of the landlord.

According to the landlord he gave three months’ written notice to quit to the tenant. In the notice (exhibit 2) it is stated clearly that the landlord had about a year prior to exhibit 2 informed the tenant of his intention of seeking the recovery of possession of the premises occupied by him. It was after the expiration of the three months’ notice to quit that the complainant landlord applied on 1 September 1975 under regulation 13 (1) of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369), on form 7, para. 4 as follows:

“Complaint, claims etc. (Attach affidavit if complaint involves an absconded tenant). Complaint is a tenant in the above premises. He occupies the ground floor flat. I require the flat for my daughter and her family (husband and child) who are now in England and who are coming home. My daughter is a dental surgeon and requires a whole flat with a garage for herself and her family. I gave him notice to vacate the flat on 30 June 1975. My daughter has written to me asking me to arrange the accommodation for her and she intends to come to Ghana as soon as her application to Government is approved.”

After hearing the parties the rent officer dismissed the landlord’s request for recovery of possession. Obviously aggrieved by this decision the landlord moved the rent magistrate under regulation 14 of the Rent Regulations of 1964.

[p.47] of [1979] GLR 44

The matter came before his worship Mr. S. A. Afful, as he then was, who after hearing submissions by counsel for the parties reversed the decision of the rent officer and upheld the landlord’s claim for recovery of possession as follows:

“ORDER:

(a) The appeal succeeds and the decision of the rent officer accordingly reversed and quashed.

(b) The appellant to enter into possession allowing the respondent about a month to vacate. This ends on 14 February 1975.

(c) The respondent to pay ¢20 costs to the appellant.

(d) Exhibits 1-4 to be returned to the appellant; other exhibits to owners.”

It is from this decision of the rent magistrate that the present appeal has been brought to this court on the following original grounds:

“(a) The determination of the court was against the weight of evidence.

(b) The determination of the court below was unreasonable and was based on wrong principles of law and fact.

(c) The determination of the district magistrate was wrong for failing to consider whether a rejected piece of evidence resulted in substantial miscarriage of justice.

(d) The determination of the district magistrate was wrong for taking extraneous matters into consideration, (e) The determination of the district magistrate was wrong for not considering matters he ought to have considered.

(f) The decision of the district magistrate court was harsh for not giving the defendant reasonable time to look for alternative accommodation.

(g) Other grounds shall be filed later.”

On 16 February 1976, the following additional grounds of appeal were filed:

“(h) The learned trial magistrate failed to consider the omission of plaintiff-respondent to comply with regulation 18 of Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369).

(i) The learned trial magistrate failed to appreciate the whole record of proceedings of the rent officer but limited himself only to the arguments of counsel.

(j) The learned trial magistrate erred in his interpretation of L.I. 369, regulation 39 (6) and regulation 4 (4), its effect on the whole proceedings and the circumstances surrounding the air letter (exhibit 4) being refused to be accepted in evidence by the rent officer and the genuineness of the said exhibit.

(k) The learned trial magistrate erred in fact by holding that the respondent-appellant knew of the contents of exhibit 2, i.e. the ejectment notice over a year ago.

[p.48] of [1979] GLR 44

(l) The learned trial magistrate failed to consider the proper effects of possession of numerous houses by the plaintiff-respondent.

(m) The learned magistrate misdirected himself in holding that there was nothing wrong in the plaintiff-respondent seeking to eject the defendant-appellant before his daughter allegedly wrote to him for accommodation from England when he sought to eject the defendant- appellant by virtue of the need of allegedly accommodating his daughter.

(n) The learned magistrate erred in law by his wrong interpretation placed on section 9 (1) of Act 220 of 1963 and in holding otherwise that the plaintiff-respondent was more responsible for his daughter’s accommodation than the husband of the daughter.

(o) The learned magistrate erred by holding that the daughter of the plaintiff-respondent had qualified as a dental surgeon in England, was returning to Ghana and had applied for employment at the Ministry of Health in Ghana (p) The learned magistrate was wrong in both law and fact by allowing himself to be influenced by morality at the expense of law and in his consideration of the former position of the plaintiff-respondent herein and adverting his mind to Governmental policy.

(q) Other grounds shall be filed later.”

I have not doubt in my mind that the extent of the nature of the grounds filed was precipitated to some extent by the very nature and form of the judgment appealed from and perhaps the not too easy a hurdle counsel had to surmount in order to upset the conclusion of the rent magistrate on the merits of the case.

Learned counsel for the tenant did not expressly abandon any of the grounds filed but it was apparent at the close of his submission that some of the grounds filed had not been covered. The pith of counsel’s lenghty submission on the grounds argued can be summarised under four main heads, namely:

(a) That the landlord failed to prove his title to the premises in question and as such showed himself an untruthful witness and that it was wrong for the rent magistrate to have dismissed as irrelevant the issue of the landlord without giving consideration as to how this affected his credibility.

(b) That the landlord having failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of regulation 18 of L.I.

369, his action should have been dismissed. It was here contended that compliance with the requirement was a condition precedent to maintaining an action under section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220 and that that requirement was mandatory.

(c) That the landlord failed to reconcile the apparent discrepancy of dates on exhibits 1 and 2. (The letter of 21 August 1975 received by the landlord from his daughter and the written notice to quit sent by the landlord to the tenant). Counsel argued that the basis of the

[p.49] of [1979] GLR 44 landlord’s claim was that on receipt of exhibit 1 he gave a written notice (exhibit 2) to the tenant.

Counsel contended this could not have been the case because the date on exhibit 2 showed that it preceded the letter exhibit 1 which was supposed to have prompted the serving of exhibit 2.

Counsel therefore argued that the landlord’s case was faulty and the rent magistrate erred in failing to consider this crucial flaw in his case. Counsel submitted that since the tenant denied having received exhibit 2 the maid who served it should have been called.

(d) That it was wrong for the rent magistrate to have admitted as exhibit 4 a letter which the landlord sought to tender in evidence which the rent officer rejected. Counsel argued that admissibility of documents under the Rent Act was based on genuineness and relevancy of the document to the matter at issue. He argued that whether a document was genuine and relevant were issues of fact for the rent officer who had rejected the document, and it was wrong for the rent magistrate to have usurped that power and accepted the same in evidence and to have relied on it to reverse the finding and decision of the rent officer.

I did not call on Mr. Bannerman-Williams for the landlord to reply to the issue of title. In his submissions in reply to the other points raised, learned counsel argued that compliance with regulation 18 of L.I. 369 was not a condition precedent to maintaining an action under section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220. He cited in support of his contention the case of Alameddine Brothers v. Paterson Zochonis & Co., Ltd. [1971] 2 G.L.R. 403, C.A.

On the issue of the notice to quit, learned counsel for the landlord contended that there was overwhelming evidence on record that the tenant had been told of the landlord’s intention to recover possession and that the unchallenged evidence showed that several letters had been written to the landlord by his daughter in connection with the accommodation problem and that the combined effect of the two letters tendered by the landlord showed that the premises were reasonably required for the purpose intended. On the final issue as to whether the rent magistrate was competent to make findings of fact, counsel submitted that sitting as an appellate court, the rent magistrate was competent and cited the cases of Oppong Kofi v. Fofie [1964] G.L.R. 174 at p. 175, S.C.; Asante v. Sarpong [1963] 2 G.L.R. 359 and Praka v. Ketewa [1964] G.L.R. 423, S.C.

This appeal raises for consideration the following:

“(a) Whether in landlord and tenant cases it is a sine qua non to sustaining the landlord’s claim that he proves his title.

(b) Whether compliance with regulation 18 of L.I. 369 is a condition precedent to maintaining an action under section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220.

(c) Whether it is mandatorily required by Act 220 to serve notice to quit on a tenant before an action can lie under section 17 (1) (g).

(d) Whether the rent officer was competent to deal with actions for recovery of possession under section 17 (1) (g).”

[p.50] of [1979] GLR 44

I have no doubt in my mind that the rent magistrate was right when he held that the issue of the landlord’s title was irrelevant to the determination of an action brought under section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220. I am of the view that it was not open to the tenant to raise that issue in view of his own admission that it was the landlord who admitted him into occupation and let out the premises to him. Under Act 220 a landlord is defined in section 36 as follows:

“‘Landlord’ means any person who leases premises to another person in consideration of the payment of rent and includes any person deriving title under the original landlord.”

Nowhere in the Act has it been stated that a landlord must necessarily be the owner of the premises or that he must have title to them. The general view of the law in respect of landlord and tenant is to estop the tenant from denying the title of the landlord by whom he was let into possession at the time of demise.

The above doctrine of estoppel is not confined to leases by deed: see Cook v. Whellock (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 658, C.A. It applies to tenancies from year to year, at will or at sufferance: see Mackley v. Nutting [1949] 2 K.B. 55, C.A. The case of Stratford v. Syrett [1958] 1 Q.B. 107, C.A. established that a landlord by estoppel can be a landlord for the purpose of Rent Acts. I find in my judgment that on the admission by the tenant that it was the complainant landlord who let out the premises to him he was estopped from denying the title and it was therefore wrong for the rent officer to have allowed himself to have been persuaded in this regard and that the learned magistrate was right in holding that the issue of title was irrelevant to the determination of the issue before him.

In the case of Alameddine Brothers v. Paterson Zochonis & Co., Ltd. [1971] 2 G.L.R. 403, C.A. the content of regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369), was considered. It was decided in that case that compliance with regulation 18 was not a condition precedent to maintaining an action under section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220. Sowah J.A. said at p. 411, “I have examined the regulation and cannot spell out of it the condition alleged.”

On the third issue as posed above, it is trite law that the right to determine a continuing tenancy by a notice to quit is an inseparable incident to the tenancy. A stipulation in an express tenancy from year to year by which either party professes to deprive himself of that right is void. A tenancy from year to year and other continuing tenancies of like nature, such as that of yearly, quarterly, monthly or weekly may be determined by a notice given by either the landlord or tenant. Section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220 under which the landlord in this case brought his action does not contemplate the right of the tenant to be given notice to determine the tenancy as a condition precedent to commencing an action under it. That this is so is apparent from the clear language of the section. Unlike section 17 (1) (h) where a mandatory six months’ notice is required as a condition precedent, what is envisaged under section 17 (1) (g) is the duty of the landlord to establish by evidence that he reasonably requires the premises for the purpose stated within the language of the section subject to such

[p.51] of [1979] GLR 44 limitations as are provided under paragraph (g) (i) and (ii). The court however in making an order for recovery of possession under the section is entitled to consider giving the tenant a reasonable grace period taking into consideration such facts as the nature of the tenancy and the accommodation problem prevailing at the time, etc. Since the tenant in this case in my observation above was not entitled to any notice under section 17 (1) (g) on which the landlord’s action was founded, he cannot complain of any defect in the notice. The three months’ notice given merely terminated the tenancy between him and the landlord and since the tenant held on he became a statutory tenant who could be sued under section 17 (1) (g).

Perhaps the most serious point for consideration in this appeal is the issue of the jurisdiction of the rent officer. This point was not originally argued but came up for consideration in the course of writing my judgment. I therefore had to stop and invited counsel to come and argue this issue of jurisdiction of the rent officer. On this issue Mr. Bannerman-Williams for the complainant landlord submitted that under section 5 (1) (b) of Act 220, the rent officer was empowered to investigate complaints by a landlord for the recovery of possession of premises let out and to make recommendations to the rent magistrate who was empowered to make an effective order for ejectment and recovery of possession. He argued that the very fact that the rent officer himself could not make the order did not mean he had no jurisdiction to entertain such complaints. Learned counsel referred to the case of Republic v. Accra Rent Magistrate; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1965] G.L.R. 613 at p. 615 and submitted that the powers of the appropriate rent officer under section 5 (1) (b) were not to be restricted to arrears of rent. Counsel therefore argued that in the instant case the rent officer did investigate the complaint of the landlord and refused to recommend for the recovery of possession by dismissing the complaint, a duty which was well within his jurisdiction. He therefore contended that the complaint of the landlord was properly laid before the rent officer and his jurisdiction in this regard could not be impeached. Counsel for the appellant did not appear to argue this point and the appellant himself who was in court intimated to me that he was leaving the matter ultimately in my hands.

There are at least three known decided local cases in which the jurisdiction of the rent officer under section 5 of Act 220 has been discussed and all the three are decisions of the High Court. Chronologically they are: Republic v. Accra Rent Magistrate; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1965] G.L.R. 613; Bassil v. Sfarijlani, High Court, Accra, 1 October 1966, unreported; digested in (1967) C.C. 20 and Saad v. City Food Supply (Ghana) Ltd. High Court, Accra, 21 November 1966, unreported; digested in (1967) C.C. 33.

All the three cases do recognise the jurisdiction of the rent magistrate as a judicial officer to make orders for ejectment and recovery of possession of premises under Act 220 but the same cannot be said of the rent officer. Whilst Archer J., as he then was, in the Ofosu-Amaah case (supra) appeared to have conceded a limited amount of jurisdiction in actions for recover

[p.52] of [1979] GLR 44 of possession in the rent officer under section 5 (1) (b) of Act 220, both Edusei J., as he then was, and Anterkyi J. in the two latter cases respectively deny such jurisdiction in the rent officer.

In the Ofosu-Amaah case (supra) it was held as stated in the headnote that:

“no provision in the Rent Act, 1963, or the Rent Regulations, 1964, enables rent officers to order delivery of possession of premises by tenants. It is the rent magistrate who is authorised to make such an order and, in making any such order, the magistrate must always act judicially.”

In the Bassil case (supra) the plaintiff, the lawful attorney for Bassil, brought proceedings for recovery of possession and pleaded that the defendant was estopped by the ruling of the rent officer from contesting the suit. It was held as stated in the digest that:

“(1) the jurisdiction of the Rent Officer is limited to that contained in section 5 of the Rent Act 1963 (Act 220). By the said section a Rent Officer has no jurisdiction to entertain complaints of the type lodged by the defendant—that a landlord has refused to accept rents and insists on getting his possession of his premises. His decision, whatever it was, having been given in excess of jurisdiction, cannot ground a plea of estoppel;

(2) a landlord can recover possession only in accordance with the provisions of Act 220. The plaintiff’s claim is not within the said Act 220, and cannot succeed.”

And in the Saad case (supra) it was held as stated in the digest that:

(1) the jurisdiction of a rent officer as contained in section 5 of the Rent Act 1963 (Act 220) does not include the power, to make orders for possession and/or ejectment;

(2) section 5 (1) (b) of Act 220 under which the landlord purported to have acted in lodging his complaint to the Rent Officer does not confer any such right . . .

(3) the complaint which a rent officer is entitled to receive and deal with under the said s. 5 cannot include one for possession and/or ejectment, which are expressly reserved by s. 17 for ‘the appropriate Rent Magistrate or any other judge of a Court of competent jurisdiction’. A Rent Officer has no jurisdiction in possession and ejectment cases. The order of the 20th September, 1966 was therefore made without jurisdiction; it is null and void.”

As I have indicated above all these decisions are decisions of the High Court and have no binding effect on this court. Nonetheless they deserve to be treated as persuasive. I have carefully examined the judgments in all the three cases and I have also carefully considered the language of section 5 (1) (b) of Act 220 and I have come to the conclusion that the correct statement of the law is what has been stated in the Bassil and Saad cases (supra). The rent magistrate’s court is a special creature of

[p.53] of [1979] GLR 44 the Rent Act, 1963, with express jurisdiction under section 6 (d) to make ejectment orders and under section 17 to make orders for recovery of possession against tenants. The rent officer in exercising the jurisdiction under section 5 of Act 220 constitutes himself as an inferior tribunal and has only such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred on him by the Act creating him. Section 5 should therefore not be construed to include actions brought under section 17 of Act 220. I therefore hold in my judgment that section 5 (1) (b) of Act 220 under which the landlord purported to have acted in lodging his complaint to the rent officer does not confer any such right. The complaints which the rent officer is entitled to receive and deal with under section 5 cannot include ones for recovery of possession or ejectment.

In the result the appeal succeeds on this ground and the same is accordingly allowed. The judgment appealed from is hereby set aside with costs of ¢100.00 to the appellant.

DECISION

Appeal allowed with costs.

J. D.

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