Misrepresentation in Ghana case law.

The law as I understand it is that a contract obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation is voidable, not void; it is valid until it is avoided, and it is voidable, at the option of the party defrauded. Dawes v. Harness (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. p. 166; Cakes v. Turquand (1867) L.R. 2 H.L. 325 at 346, 375 and 376; and see Chitty on Contract, (21st ed.) Vol. 1, p. 533, para. 1007, where the subject is fully discussed . . . Although the plaintiff was given a car which was not what it was represented to be, yet his possession and use of it was lawful ... It was open to the plaintiff to elect to repudiate the contract and return the car to the defendant-company; it was also open to him to affirm and keep the car in which case the company could give him legal title to it, and he could then sue for damages.

KPEGLO v. SCOA MOTORS [1962] 2 GLR 82 [1962] SLR (SC) 39 · Supreme Court · 1962 · ADUMUA-BOSSMAN JSC

the practice has always been for a Court of Equity to give this relief [of rescission] whenever, by exercise of its powers, it can do what is practically just, though it cannot restore the parties precisely to the state they were in before the contract.” See also Hulton v. Hulton4(4) where Swinfen Eady L.J. stated that: “The general rule is that as a condition of rescission there must be restitutio in integrum, but at the same time the Court has full power to make all just allowances.

KPEGLO v. SCOA MOTORS [1962] 2 GLR 82 [1962] SLR (SC) 39 · Supreme Court · 1962 · ADUMUA-BOSSMAN JSC