Character evidence in Ghana case law.

In R. v. Jones (1909) 3 Cr.App.R. 64, C.C.A., it was held that prima facie, answers given by a prisoner to questions put in cross-examination are not a part of the “nature or conduct of the defence,” but are part of the case for the prosecution and that if such questions are in the nature of a trap, an involuntary imputation on the character of a prosecution witness made in the answer will not justify putting in evidence of the bad character of the prisoner. See also R. v. Baldwin (1925) 18 Cr.App.R. 175, C.C.A., and R. v. Eidinow (1932) 32 Cr.App.R. 145, C.C.A.

AVEGAVI AND OTHERS v. THE REPUBLIC  [1971] 1 GLR 428  [1971] SLR (CA) 7 · Court of Appeal · 1971 · ANIN JA

Under our law, cross-examination as to the previous convictions and bad character of the accused is permissible only when the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations against the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution which are not reasonably necessary for the conduct of the defence. In other words, an accused person under our law cannot be cross-examined as to his previous convictions and bad character if and when the conduct of his defence reasonably requires the making of injurious reflections or imputations on the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution.

AVEGAVI AND OTHERS v. THE REPUBLIC  [1971] 1 GLR 428  [1971] SLR (CA) 7 · Court of Appeal · 1971 · ANIN JA

It should, however, be remembered that quite apart from the issue of the admissibility of cross-examination about previous convictions or bad character in cases falling within the statutory exceptions, the trial judge has always an unfettered discretion to exclude such a cross-examination. How the discretion should be exercised must depend on the circumstances of the particular case and the overriding duty of the judge is to ensure that the trial is fair.

AVEGAVI AND OTHERS v. THE REPUBLIC  [1971] 1 GLR 428  [1971] SLR (CA) 7 · Court of Appeal · 1971 · ANIN JA

It is a question of fact and degree whether or not the nature or conduct of the defence in a particular case is such as to involve imputations against the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution which are not reasonably necessary for the conduct of the defence. The answer will depend very much on the charge, the plea, the nature and line of defence adopted, the questions put to the prosecution witnesses, whether the questions asked or the evidence adduced by the defence are reasonably necessary for the conduct of the defence, or whether they merely attack the character of the prosecution witnesses and are not reasonably required for the conduct of the defence. Applying these tests to the answer given by the third accused under cross-examination, it is quite clear that the learned judge erred in law by holding that the third accused had lost his statutory protection on account of the answers given by him. In the first place, we are satisfied that his answers constituted an emphatic denial of the charges preferred against him and were consistent with the plea of not guilty.

AVEGAVI AND OTHERS v. THE REPUBLIC  [1971] 1 GLR 428  [1971] SLR (CA) 7 · Court of Appeal · 1971 · ANIN JA