Although we are aware that circumstantial evidence may afford corroboration, this cannot in our view be so unless such circumstantial evidence points to no other conclusion than that the prisoner, and no one else, could possible have committed the offence which is under consideration. In other words, the chain of circumstances must without deviation connect the prisoner with the offence charged.
The law is that no person shall be convicted upon the uncorroborated evidence of a person who shall have given his evidence without oath or affirmation. This is so a fortiori in the case of a child of tender years.
Evidence of an independent witness or of the opponent’s witness
In Yoguo v. Agyekum [1966] G.L.R. 482, S.C. Ollennu J.S.C. stated the principle of law, which I feel persuaded must be applied in evaluating the force of neutral evidence. The learned judge said at p. 494: “The law as I understand it is that, where parties to a suit make contradictory averments and agree that there is one independent person seised of all the facts and whose evidence can therefore resolve the conflict, and that person gives evidence which confirms one of the averments as against the other, the trial court ought to reject the version which is not supported and accept the one which is corroborated by the independent witness except for very good reason which it should clearly state in the judgment.
The law is, that although matters mentioned in a judgment as affording corroboration are not in law corroboration, yet if there is evidence which affords corroboration, the misdirection by the judge is not fatal, and the appeal court will take cognisance of the evidence which provides the corroboration.
Warning on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice
It seems clear from the Davies case (supra) that where an accomplice in any of the three categories gives evidence, the rule of practice which now has the force of law requires that the judge should warn the jury of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, and if the judge failed to do this, the conviction should be quashed.
There is no magic in the word “accomplice”: see R. v. Hunt [1965] Crim.L.R. 607, C.C.A.; and a summing-up in which the jury are warned of the danger of convicting on tainted evidence without corroboration cannot, in the view of this court, be cavilled at. It was sufficient to direct, as the learned trial judge did in this case, that if the fifth, thirteenth and fourteenth prosecution witnesses each had an interest in exculpating himself and blaming the first appellant, they should not accept their evidence unless satisfied that they were truthful.
The learned trial judge realising that it is dangerous to convict in such a case unless there is corroboration of the prosecutrix’s evidence on the material points, directed the assessors and himself on the need for corroboration. In his summing-up to the assessors he directed them as follows: “Corroboration: evidence to be found in the blood stained drawers and frock of the girl also in accused’s joe singlet and the doctor’s report.” This direction presupposes that the matter requiring corroboration is the fact that sexual intercourse has taken place. That of course is not the case; the matter requiring corroboration is the contention of the prosecutrix that the sexual intercourse took place without her consent. That being the case, whether or not her hymen was broken during the act such that it caused bleeding and stains on her clothes or on the appellant’s clothes, is quite irrelevant to the issue at stake. Again, as learned state attorney conceded, the medical report which the learned judge referred to as corroborative evidence is inadmissible under our law. See Anane v. The State.1 Therefore it cannot operate to corroborate any evidence. Quite clearly therefore, the trial judge misdirected the assessors on the issue requiring corroboration, and consequently upon the corroborative evidence which they should look for.
