Article 105(1)(c): leave to appeal on a substantial question of law
For my part, I am perfectly satisfied and I do hold the view that this case involves outstanding and substantial questions of law of far reaching implications; and moreover, in so far as there have been divergent opinions expressed on those questions of law by distinguished justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, I think that this is eminently a case in which leave to appeal to the Supreme Court ought to be granted.
“Successor” is the key word; though not a term of art, it is pre-eminently the language used in conveyancing; in the context of this article, it connotes the take-over by the present courts of the jurisdiction, rights and privileges of the displaced courts, subject of course, to such correlative restrictions upon jurisdiction as there existed before the take-over. This is in addition to any extension of jurisdiction that the Constitution might have given. In effect, the Constitution did not entirely abolish the courts but merged the old into the new and created a new hierarchy of courts.
Article 126(6): commencement of rules laid before the National Assembly
The provisions of article 126 (6) are mandatory, and in the absence of any other evidence properly brought before us to show why the commencing date should be 25 March 1971 instead of 16 March 1971, it is my view that this submission of learned counsel for the respondents was not only invulnerable, but also unanswerable, and I feel bound to say that I could not be persuaded by the submission of the applicant’s counsel in reply to this well founded argument.
First Schedule, Part IV, section 13: pending proceedings and applications for review
It seems to me that section 13 (2) of the Transitional Provisions must be read to include all pending applications for review before the full bench, whether actually filed or not. It does seem to me that counsel for the respondent appreciates the effect of the conversion for he argues that on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius the framers of the Constitution let in those applications for review which were before the full bench and excluded those that could have been before it but were in fact not filed. In other words, if the applicant-company had applied for review before the coming into force of the Constitution, it would have had a right of appeal; not having done so, it had lost its right.
