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Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (NRCD 175) as the courts read it.

4 passages from 3 cases, grouped by point of law. Each passage is in the court's own words and links to the place in the judgment.

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Section 2: written memorandum and material terms

Section 2 of the erstwhile Conveyancing Act 1973 (NRCD 175) which governed this instant transaction, mandated that transfers of land interests be evidenced by a written memorandum signed by the Party to be charged or his agent. This statutory requirement therefore envisages that the memorandum must state the material terms of the contract. Instructively, the language of this provision is mandatory, and the Courts have shown no reticence in striking down transactions which offend this statutory regime. See for instance the views of Apaloo CJ (as he then was) in the case of Acquah v. Oman Ghana Trust Holdings Ltd. [1984–86] 1 GLR 157 at page 167

M. J. STEEL (GHANA) VRS A. LANG LIMITED CIVIL APPEAL NO. J4/26/2024 [2026] SLR (SC) 16 · Supreme Court · 2026 · DARKO ASARE JSC

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Section 30: relief against forfeiture

Pertinent, it is, to note that the jurisdiction under Section 30 was not an equitable one. It was statutory although of equitable origin. The requirement to apply might have been procedural in character. But it was a procedure brought upon by a statute. And therefore, even if the Court retained its inherent equitable jurisdiction to grant relief, a tenant must apply for it. The law has not prescribed the form an application should take. It however indicated the path to use.

MRS AGNES GERTRUDE OSEI vs. INNOVA HOLDINGS LTD CIVIL APPEAL NO: J4/68/2023 [2025] SLR (SC) 16 · Supreme Court · 2025 · KULENDI JSC

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The need to satisfy the statutory requirement of an application under the section is to ensure that an applicant demonstrates sufficient factual and legal grounds to enable the Court consider whether or not relief ought to be granted and if so, on what terms. I shall reiterate that the jurisdiction is now statutory although equitable in origin and the statute has prescribed the mode of its invocation which I think must be followed. In my judgment, where the legislature steps in with a particular legislation on a particular subject, effect must be given to that legislation.

MRS AGNES GERTRUDE OSEI vs. INNOVA HOLDINGS LTD CIVIL APPEAL NO: J4/68/2023 [2025] SLR (SC) 16 · Supreme Court · 2025 · KULENDI JSC

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Pertinent, it is, to note that the jurisdiction under Section 30 was not an equitable one. It was statutory although of equitable origin. The requirement to apply might have been procedural in character. But it was a procedure brought upon by a statute. And therefore, even if the Court retained its inherent equitable jurisdiction to grant relief, a tenant must apply for it. The law has not prescribed the form an application should take. It however indicated the path to use.

MRS AGNES GERTRUDE OSEI vs. INNOVA HOLDINGS LTD CIVIL APPEAL NO: J4/68/2023 [2025] SLR (SC) 2 · Supreme Court · 2025 · KULENDI JSC

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