Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29) as the courts read it.

Intent is a thing which exists in a person’s mind. The proof of it may be given either by direct evidence of what the person himself says as to his purpose for doing a thing, or by inference from the nature and manner of the act he did and section 11 (1), (2) and (3) of Act 29 provide the guide for ascertaining a person’s intention or purpose for doing an act.

BOATENG v. THE STATE [1964] GLR 602 [1964] SLR (SC) 57 · Supreme Court · 1964 · OLLENNU JSC

If a person feloniously fires at another in such circumstances as would make the killing of that other person murder, but by accident hits and kills a third person whom he never intended to hit at all, that is murder. That has been laid down over and over again; there is plenty of authority for it.” This view of the law is also clearly set out in section 11 (5) of the Criminal Code, 1960,2 which reads as follows: “If a person does an act with intent to kill, . . . and his act happens to take effect, whether completely or incompletely, against a different person, he shall be liable to be tried and punished as if his intent has been directed against that different person . . .”

AMETEWEE v. THE STATE [1964] GLR 551 [1964] SLR (SC) 50 · Supreme Court · 1964 · MILLS-ODOI JSC

An appropriation of a thing is dishonest if it is made with an intent to defraud or if it is made by a person without claim of right, and with a knowledge or belief that the appropriation is without the consent of some person for whom he is trustee or who is owner of the thing, as the case may be, or that the appropriation would, if known to any such person, be without his consent.

BREMPONG II V. THE REPUBLIC [1995] SLR (CA) 1 · Court of Appeal · 1995 · BENIN JA

The argument seemed to be that the cashier, Henry Kwasi Gyan, could not part with or transfer the “ownership” of moneys belonging to the bank to others. But the answer to this argument is that Barclays Bank, D.C.O. is a corporate personality and it functions only through its servants with express or implied authority. The rule of the common law is expressed in the well-known maxim qui facit per alium facit per se, and in the normal course of banking business it is the duty of a cashier to transfer to anyone who presents a genuine cheque not only the possession but also the ownership of the cash represented by such cheque.

THE STATE v. AGYEMAN, ASEM AND BOAMONO [1962] 2 GLR 67 [1962] SLR (SC) 37 · Supreme Court · 1962 · CRABBE JSC

False pretence is defined in section 133(1) of Act 29 and by that definition, false pretence must involve a false representation of an existing fact. A promise of an event in the future can found liability if it is coupled with a false statement of an existing fact: see Chief Superintendent of Police v Ceesay (1957) 3 WALR 87. And a mere representation that something will happen or is likely to happen does not amount to fraud by false pretences

HEMANS v COFIE [1997-98] 1 GLR 144 [1997] SLR (SC) 1 · Supreme Court · 1997 · ACQUAH JSC

Section 149(1) of the Criminal Offences Act 1960 (Act 29) as amended provides as follows: "Whoever commits robbery is guilty of an offence and shall be liable, upon conviction on trial summarily or on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and where the offence is committed by the use of an offensive weapon or offensive missile, the offender shall upon conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than 15 years."

CHARLES ANSAH vs. THE REPUBLIC CRIMINAL APPEAL J3/02/2025 [2025] SLR (SC) 10 · Supreme Court · 2025 · DARKO ASARE JSC

For the prosecution to succeed it must show that the State incurred a financial loss through the action or omission of the accused person. Of the more than a dozen meanings of the word 'through', the most appropriate or relevant for this case are those indicating cause, reason or motive, in consequence of, by reason of, on account of, owing to, as a result of; by means of. In other words, it must be proved that the cause of the State's financial loss is the action or omission of the accused. There must be a direct causal link between the action or omission of the accused and the financial loss incurred by the State. It is not enough for the prosecution to show that the accused's action or omission could have caused or contributed to the loss.

THE REPUBLIC V. ERNEST THOMPSON & 4 ORS WRIT NO: J3/05/2020 [2021] SLR (SC) 1 · Supreme Court · 2021 · AMADU JSC

My Lords, as a starting point, it is well-settled that based on the charge the prosecution preferred against the 3rd Appellant, the prosecution had to prove its case that ‘there had been a financial loss, and it is to the state, and it was caused through the action or omission of the accused, intended or desired to cause the loss; foresaw the loss as virtually certain and took unreasonable risk of it; or foresaw the loss as a probable consequence of his act and took an unreasonable risk of it; or if he had used reasonable caution and observation, it would have appeared to him that his act would probably cause or contribute to the loss’.

REPUBLIC V. CASSIEL ATO FORSON & 2 ORS (2024) H2/22/2023 [2024] SLR (CA) 5 · Court of Appeal · 2024 · ACKAAH-BOAFO JA

The offence of the abetment of a crime, as defined in section 20 (1) of Act 29, may only be committed if the act or omission of another party which is purposely aided, facilitated, encouraged or promoted itself constitutes a crime. Therefore, if it is shown that the act or omission complained of in that other person does not amount to a crime known to our law, any act of whatever nature which aids, facilitates, encourages or promotes the commission of that other act, is not punishable as a crime.

BOATENG v. THE STATE [1964] GLR 602 [1964] SLR (SC) 57 · Supreme Court · 1964 · OLLENNU JSC

The effect of the new formulation of the offence of conspiracy as defined by this court is that the persons must not only agree or act, but must agree to act together for a common purpose. Having regard to this new formulation of the offence of conspiracy a person could no longer be guilty of conspiracy in the absence of any prior agreement.

THE REPUBLIC V. ERNEST THOMPSON & 4 ORS WRIT NO: J3/05/2020 [2021] SLR (SC) 1 · Supreme Court · 2021 · AMADU JSC

In the opinion of this court, the Ghana law of conspiracy is wider in scope and in content than the English law on the subject. It consists not only in the criminal agreement between two minds, but also in the acting together in furtherance of a common criminal objective.

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. AFARI AND ADDO [1962] 1 GLR 483 [1962] SLR (SC) 26 · Supreme Court · 1962 · CRABBE JSC

We think it necessary to state what we consider to be the true meaning of section 251(1) of the Criminal Code. In our view the section first of all defines those matters which in law amount to provocation. It then makes it clear that these matters do not necessarily excuse a killing so as to reduce it from murder to manslaughter. In the case, for example, of words of insult accompanied by a slap (assault and battery) this does not become extreme provocation unless the words and assault and other circumstances of insult “are to be likely to deprive a person, being of ordinary character, and such as being in the circumstances in which the accused person was, of the power of self control.”

R. v. ATTA [1959] GLR 337 [1959] SLR (CA) 33 · Court of Appeal · 1959 · GRANVILLE SHARP JA

The essential ingredient of the crime of forging a will, contra sec. 314 (1) of the Criminal Code, is that the forgery must be made with one or other of the following intents, namely, “intent to defraud, intent to defeat, obstruct or pervert the course of justice.” In the absence of such intent, the “forgery” is no offence against sec. 314 (1), and the existence of the intent in an abettor of the “forgery” could not supply the lack of intent in the “forger,” so as to make the “forgery” an offence against the section. And, indeed, each of the charges as laid in the information against Mensah for abetting, alleges that Tabi and Anyimadu had such an intent to defraud.

R. v. JACOB K. MENSAH [1959] GLR 314 [1959] SLR (CA) 30 · Court of Appeal · 1959 · OLLENNU J

We think that the use of force or harm in this section is subject to the limitation stated in section 32 of the Code which governs all sections relating to the grounds on which force or harm may be justified. Section 32 provides as follows: “Notwithstanding the existence of any matter of justification for force, force cannot be justified as having been used in pursuance of that matter - (a) which is in excess of the limits hereinafter prescribed in the section of this Chapter relating to that matter; or (b) which in any case extends beyond the amount and kind of force reasonably necessary for the purpose for which force is permitted to be used.”

YEBOAH v. THE STATE [1967] GLR 512 [1967] SLR (CA) 36 · Court of Appeal · 1967 · AZU CRABBE JA

Negligence, whether it be a ground for a claim in a civil court for compensation or an essential ingredient in the constitution of a crime, is the omission to take care where there is a duty to take care, with this difference that whereas in a civil claim there are no degrees of negligence, such degrees exist in a criminal court. Section 51 of the Criminal Code, 1960, lays down the degree of negligence necessary to constitute the felony of manslaughter in the following terms: “Whoever causes the death of another person by any unlawful harm shall be guilty of manslaughter. Provided that if the harm causing the death is caused by negligence he shall not be guilty of manslaughter unless the negligence amounts to a reckless disregard for human life.”

THE STATE v. TSIBA [1962] 2 GLR 109 [1962] SLR (SC) 43 · Supreme Court · 1962 · AKUFO-ADDO JSC

Section 52 reads as follows:— “52. When a person is accused of crime, the special verdict provided for in section 137 of the Criminal Procedure Code shall only be applicable— (1) if he was prevented, by reason of idiocy, imbecility, or any mental derangement or disease affecting the mind, from knowing the nature or consequences of the act in respect of which he is accused; or (2) if he did the act in respect of which he is accused under the influence of an insane delusion of such a nature as to render him, in the opinion of the jury or of the Court, an unfit subject for punishment of any kind in respect of such act.”

R v. FRAFRA [1959] GLR 442 [1959] SLR (CA) 43 · Court of Appeal · 1959 · GRANVILLE SHARP JA

In the case of R. v. Grumah (2 W.A.L.R. 255), the West African Court of Appeal held that for the purposes of section 52 (2) of the Criminal Code an insane delusion is a state of mind (induced by mental disease) in which a false belief is held that cannot be shaken by facts. That decision was followed by this Court in the case of R. v. Ayaaba Kusasi. In the judgment delivered in that case on the 28th March, 1958, their Lordships not only cited the case of R. v. Grumah, but also indicated their approval of the rationes decidendi drawn therefrom by the learned Editor of that judgment, namely, that section 52 (2) of the Criminal Code is concerned principally with whether or not the insanity is of such a nature as to render punishment pointless; it is not concerned with the form the delusion takes. We are of opinion that that is a proper interpretation of section 52 (2), and we so declare it.

R. v. MOSHIE [1959] GLR 343 [1959] SLR (CA) 35 · Court of Appeal · 1959 · OLLENNU J

The judicial interpretation which is given by the courts in this country to section 53 (c) of Act 29 is that for an accused person to avail himself or herself of the benefit of this defence it must be proved strictly that actual sexual intercourse has been indulged in by the other spouse in his or her presence which may cause in him or her a sudden and temporary loss of self-control: see R. v. Tekyi (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 122 and R. v. Grunshie [1960] G.L.R. 56, C.A.

KEKEY v. THE REPUBLIC [1968] GLR 53 [1968] SLR (CA) 1 · Court of Appeal · 1968 · LASSEY JA

The authoritative decisions on this matter show the consistency with which the courts have persistently resisted the pressure to extend the meaning and purpose underlying the spirit of the paragraph beyond what is intended by the legislature. The unwillingness of the courts to permit any wider interpretation of the paragraph than what it actually says in plain language is also responsible for their holding in cases which have come before them that even a sudden confession of adultery by a wife to her husband without more can never constitute provocation of a sort which might have the effect of reducing murder to manslaughter. See the cases of State v. Nimoh [1960] G.L.R. 203, S.C. which decided that even if the husband has cause to believe that his wife had been associating with other men, without any attendant circumstances of further aggravation, that alone would not amount to such extreme provocation as to reduce the crime to one of manslaughter, and State v. Ofori [1961] G.L.R. 162, S.C.

KEKEY v. THE REPUBLIC [1968] GLR 53 [1968] SLR (CA) 1 · Court of Appeal · 1968 · LASSEY JA

Mr. Asare’s arguments seems to imply that for a blind man who has lost his ocular vision, the ear could be a substitute for the eye in the interpretation of the words “in view of.” Although this matter is strictly obiter, we think there is some force in this contention. We think if a blind man caught his wife in the act of adultery and he, on the spur of the moment inflicted the fatal injury, it would be wrong to deny him the defence of provocation, for the only reason that he could not see the act of adultery with his own eyes. In those circumstances, it would seem to us reasonable to say that for a blind man the expression “in the view of’ reasonably means “to the hearing of.”

KEKEY v. THE REPUBLIC [1968] GLR 53 [1968] SLR (CA) 1 · Court of Appeal · 1968 · LASSEY JA

In the present case although the evidence on the whole suggests that the appellant reasonably suspected his wife of having committed adultery with the unknown man, this alone could not in law have amounted to such extreme provocation as would reduce the offence to one of manslaughter. In fact the issue of provocation under section 53 (c) of Act 29 was not supported by the evidence, and we think the judge should not have even left that issue to the jury. The appellant’s explanation could not in law have raised any such defence.

KEKEY v. THE REPUBLIC [1968] GLR 53 [1968] SLR (CA) 1 · Court of Appeal · 1968 · LASSEY JA

section 53 (c) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), which successfully raised on the evidence, may have the effect of reducing the charge of murder to one of manslaughter. It reads as follows: “(c) an act of adultery committed in the view of the accused person with or by his wife or her husband, or the crime of unnatural carnal knowledge committed in his or her view upon his or her wife, husband, or child ....” In the present case there is no allegation of adultery, and in fact there is no evidence from which such provocation as stipulated by the subsection could be inferred.

KEKEY v. THE REPUBLIC [1968] GLR 53 [1968] SLR (CA) 1 · Court of Appeal · 1968 · LASSEY JA

Mere falsification of a document does not constitute the crime of forgery. Under our Code, sections 159 and 164, falsification or alteration of a document can only constitute the offence of forgery if it is done with one or other of the intents mentioned in the said sections 159 and 164. The intent relied upon by the prosecution in the present case as alleged in counts 1 and 2 is to defraud. Therefore in order to convict the court must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the object or purpose with which the alteration or falsification was made, is to defraud.

RABBLES v. THE STATE [1964] GLR 580 [1964] SLR (SC) 55 · Supreme Court · 1964 · OLLENNU JSC

Murder is defined in section 47 of the Criminal Code, 1960, as, “Whoever intentionally causes the death of another person by any unlawful harm is guilty of murder . . .” and manslaughter is defined in section 51 as “Whoever causes the death of another person by any unlawful harm shall be guilty of manslaughter.” These definitions show that (i) manslaughter is homicide caused by unlawful harm with nothing else, and (ii) murder is homicide intentionally caused by unlawful harm. Unlawful harm itself is defined in section 76 of the Criminal Code, 1960, which reads, “Harm is unlawful which is intentionally or negligently caused without any of the justifications mentioned in Chapter 1 of this Part.” When the definition of unlawful harm is applied for an analysis of manslaughter and murder respectively we have the following results: (1) Manslaughter is death caused by unlawful harm, that is to say by harm intentionally inflicted. (2) Murder is death caused intentionally by harm, intentionally inflicted. Therefore all the important elements of manslaughter form part of the essential ingredients of murder, in other words, murder is first and foremost manslaughter plus something more.

IDRISU GONJA v. THE STATE [1964] GLR 573 [1964] SLR (SC) 54 · Supreme Court · 1964 · OLLENNU JSC