THE STATE v. AHMAD [1961] GLR 96
13 February 1961 · APALOO J · ≈ 6 min read
[1961] SLR (HC) 10Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
DIVISION: IN THE HIGH COURT
DATE: 13TH FEBRUARY, 1961
BEFORE: APALOO, J.
COUNSEL
A. K. Gikunoo for the State.
Accused in person.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO, J.
The accused is charged with the offence of intentional libel. In the main, the facts of this case are not in dispute. On the 23rd April, 1960, the accused went from his cottage to his village at Keniago to vote. He called on the Keniagohene to do courtesy. He claims that on the orders of the Keniagohene, he was assaulted. He reported this to the central police at Kumasi on the 28th April. The police recorded this complaint in the station diary and sent the accused to the hospital. He was there
[p.98] of [1961] GLR 96 examined by a doctor and was given a medical certificate. When he took this to the central police, Kumasi, he was given an extract of the report and was asked to take this together with the medical certificate to the Bekwai police. The reason for this is that the alleged offence was committed within the jurisdiction of the Bekwai police. The accused says he took these papers to the Bekwai police on the 4th May, 1960, and handed them to Inspector Nicol. He in turn handed them to Detective Inspector Duncan to whom the accused says he was referred. Accused says the police were friendly and helpful. The Bekwai police handled this matter with admirable promptitude. On the very next day, both Inspectors Nicol and Duncan went with the accused to Keniago village. The accused there pointed out two persons whom he claimed were some of the people who assaulted him. Arrangements were made for them to report to the
Bekwai police on the 6th May, 1960. They both did. On that day, the accused himself called again at the Bekwai police station and he there identified to the police four other persons who had called at the police station on different matters. The police charged all these six for assaulting the accused. On the very next day all six appeared before P.W.2, Mr. Okyere Darko, district magistrate, at Kumasi. It would seem that they all pleaded not guilty and were remanded on bail to appear at the district court, Bekwai, on the 12th May, 1960. As is usual in these cases, there was a series of adjournments, but the case was finally disposed of at the district court, Bekwai, on the 4th June, 1960. All the then accused were acquitted.
The accused was the only witness called for the prosecution. His witness, who on the evidence, was waiting outside, was not called, nor was the medical certificate shown to the district magistrate. The reason for this has given rise to a conflict of evidence between P.W.2 the district magistrate, and P.W.4 the prosecuting officer. According to the magistrate when the accused concluded his evidence he asked for the 2nd witness. The prosecutor said there was no other witness and closed the case for the prosecution. Inspector Nicol on the other hand said that after the accused gave evidence the magistrate asked him certain questions. The accused was not able to satisfy the magistrate that the persons who assaulted him were the persons then before the court. The magistrate then decided that there was no case against the then accused and all six were discharged. I think that Inspector Nicol’s recollection is more likely to be correct. The learned magistrate may have been a little impatient with the accused, but there is, in my opinion, no foundation whatsoever for the allegation that either the magistrate or the police inspectors were corrupted by the Keniagohene.
The accused says that as a result of the acquittals, the accused in the case before the magistrate jeered and scoffed at him. He therefore returned to his village and on the 9th June, 1960, he addressed a petition to the Attorney-General. This petition gave rise to the present prosecution. In that petition which was tendered as exhibit B and which the accused admitted writing, the accused said among other things that the chief of Keniago called on the district magistrate at Kumasi and corrupted him, [p.99] of [1961] GLR 96 and similarly corrupted the two Inspectors Nicol and Duncan. The accused implied therefore that but for this corruption, his case would not have come to the end it did. He therefore prayed the Attorney-General “to reopen the case by means of a law officer from Accra to proceed to deal with necessary investigation”. In this court, the accused made no attempt to justify any of the allegations which he made against the officers concerned. I have no doubt whatsoever in my mind that the allegations of corruption are false and defamatory of the district magistrate and the two inspectors. I am satisfied that the accused unlawfully published this to the Attorney-General through P.W.1, Mr Tettey.
The only real question I have to decide is whether in publishing this undoubted libel the accused acted negligently or deliberately, in the sense that he intended to defame the officers named therein.
The accused is a man in his middle sixties and lives in a somewhat outlandish part of the country.
There can be no doubt that he was assaulted on the 23rd April, 1960, and in the events which happened the accused thought, not without reason, that justice was denied him. He strikes me as simple and honest, and he felt that the injustice which he fancied he suffered by the summary acquittal of his assailants ought to be redressed by a review of the case. That seems to me the motivating factor behind the absolutely misguided petition which he sent to the Attorney-General. I do not find that in sending the libellous exhibit B to the Attorney-General his intention was to defame the officers he named in it. But I cannot acquit him of negligence. He found Inspectors Nicol and Duncan friendly and helpful and had no previous reason to distrust them. He did not mention to them or try to find out from anyone else the truth of what he said the Keniagohene said in his hearing. He took no steps to find out whether the Keniagohene had in fact been to Kumasi to see the district magistrate. He himself was falsely accused on the 23rd April, 1960 of receiving a bribe from the Nkawiehene, and he ought to have realised that allegations such as these are sometimes made in extreme levity and without regard to their truth. I find therefore that the accused published the defamatory petition negligently. By this finding, I have arrived at a conclusion which is at variance with the one unanimously reached by the assessors but in the view that I take of this case, I regret that I cannot come to any other conclusion. I find the accused not guilty of intentional libel as charged, but under section 154(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), I find the accused guilty of negligent libel and convict him.
DECISION
Accused convicted.
