PRACTICE NOTE: STATE v. AMOAH [1961] GLR 195
10 April 1961 · VAN LARE JSC · ≈ 3 min read
[1961] SLR (SC) 26Other citation styles and permanent link
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DIVISION: SUPREME COURT
DATE: 10TH APRIL, 1961
HEADNOTES
To direct a jury on the question of insanity when there does not appear, on the evidence as a whole, to be any question whatsoever concerning the state of mind of the accused when he committed the act complained of, and the defence did not even attempt to establish a plea of insanity, is not only unnecessary but also dangerous because the jury could be misled and placed in a position of returning a verdict of guilty but insane, which verdict is, in the circumstances, not open to them.
A direction that: “Direct jury that on the whole of the evidence they can reasonably find that the accused intentionally caused the death of deceased” amounts to a direction that the jury should find the accused guilty of the offence preferred. This direction is improper. It is for the jury to make up their own minds upon the evidence no matter how clearly the evidence may point to guilt. The question of intent is principally a matter of fact for the jury to decide. Further, an act of intentional killing could not possibly be the act of an insane person who is presumed not to have intended the act, because he could not be said to know the nature of consequences of the act committed by him. If a person is capable of knowing that his act will cause death, then the question of a special verdict can hardly arise. A statement by the accused that: “I don’t know what came over me that caused me to shoot my brother” is not a suggestion of a black-out, but rather a suggestion of his inability to assign any reasonable explanation for shooting his brother, and it is improper, therefore, for the judge to direct the jury that: “According to the evidence of the accused his defence is that he had a total ‘black-out’ when he shot his brother.” It is the duty of the trial judge to place the prisoner’s case adequately before the jury, that is to say, he should remind the jury of the general nature of the defence, but not that he may present a different case no matter how favourable that may be to the prisoner. It is of the greatest importance that the jury should be directed in an impartial way on the facts, and not in such a way as to indicate what they should find; it is also imperative that the judge should point out the considerations for the jury to bear in mind in deciding whether or not they should find the [p.196] of [1961] GLR 195 prisoner guilty. Although a judge is not disbarred from expressing his own opinion on the facts, it is his duty at the same time to warn the jury that they are not obliged to accept the opinion expressed by him on the facts.
(State v. Yaw Amuah; van Lare, Sarkodee-Addo and Akiwumi, JJ.S.C. Judgement of the court delivered by van Lare, J.S.C.)
