DABALGA MAMPRUSI v. THE STATE [1966] GLR 291

Division: SUPREME COURT

Date: 18 APRIL 1966

Before: CRABBE, APALOO AND AKAINYAH JJ.S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against conviction of murder by the High Court, Tamale, presided over by Bannerman J. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court.

COUNSEL

Acheampong for the appellant.

Gyeke-Dako, Senior State Attorney, for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO J.S.C.

Apaloo J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant was, on 10 March 1965, convicted of the murder of his wife Nyeboah Mamprusi by the High Court of Tamale and was sentenced to death. The facts on which the prosecution relied are extremely simple. In the evening of 25 December 1964, the appellant visited the house of his father-in-law one Sumi Mamprusi where his wife, the deceased, was also living. He was carrying a loaded gun. The appellant called [p.292] of [1966] GLR 291 the deceased and while the latter stepped in his direction, the former without any apparent reason, aimed the gun and fired it at her. She sustained injuries to her chest and died moments afterwards. The appellant then showed a clean pair of heels. Shortly afterwards, the appellant turned up at the police station at Walewale with a gun and reported that he had killed his wife and had wanted to kill one Fulani man also but had not succeeded in locating him. He accordingly surrendered himself to the police and was taken into custody. Two days later, that is 27 December, the appellant gave a full statement to the police. In his statement, the appellant gave the reason for his hitherto inexplicable conduct. He said he suspected his wife of carrying on an amorous association with one Kugurna Tia who was said to be a rich man and that his go-between for this purpose was the Fulani man Sambo whom he had also wanted to kill. When put upon his trial, the appellant introduced some significant variations into his original story. After recounting his matrimonial differences with the deceased, he said on the day of the incident, while on a routine visit to his wife, he saw one Sambo hand her meat in suspicious circumstances. While admonishing her about her conduct, he said the deceased abused him and he abused the deceased in return. At that stage, according to the appellant, the deceased’s sister Nabilla Mamprusi arrived and held him and invited the deceased to slap him. He did not say the deceased in fact did so, but he said both the deceased and her sister Nabilla held him and while they were struggling, the gun which was already loaded, went off.

The facts put up by the appellant raised the legal defences of accident and provocation, and in a very slight degree, self-defence. All these alternative defences were put to the jury in a fairly comprehensive summing-up by the learned trial judge, Bannerman J. The jury must have taken a particularly poor view of the appellant’s case, because they took only seven minutes to arrive at a unanimous verdict of guilty of murder. It is against this that the appellant appeals to this court.

Three grounds of appeal were argued, none of which, in our opinion, contains any real merit. First, it was contended for the appellant, that the verdict was unreasonable having regard to the evidence. It was said the evidence of the first witness for the prosecution was unreasonable and she being the only eyewitness, the other evidence was inadmissible. We see nothing in this submission. Whether the witness Nabilla was a truthful witness or not was a matter for the jury and we can find nothing improbable about her evidence which was in fact not only supported by a host of other witnesses but by admissions made by the appellant himself.

[p.293] of [1966] GLR 291

It was next argued that the learned trial judge did not sufficiently emphasize the case of the defence. Whatever that means, we are satisfied that the learned trial judge put the case of the defence fairly and adequately to the jury and directed them on all the alternative verdicts open to them. The jury rejected the defence and on the facts, we are not prepared to say that they were wrong in so doing. It was finally submitted for the appellant that the learned judge misdirected the jury on the law of provocation as he adopted an objective rather than a subjective test. It seems in directing the jury on provocation, the learned judge did not direct his mind to the provisions of our law with regard to provocation especially to sections 53 and 54 of the Criminal Code, 1960.1 He seems to have followed the guidance laid down in English law. But we cannot see that he misdirected the jury in any way, since our law of provocation is substantially the same as the English law; nor do we believe that an ordinary person in Walewale ought to have fired a gun at two unarmed females, who according to the appellant, held him. In any event, the jury, by their verdict, rejected the appellant’s version of the facts and we cannot see how the jury would have returned a different verdict if the learned judge had read to them the provisions of sections 53 and 54 of Act 29.

In our opinion, on the facts which the jury accepted, they arrived at the right conclusion. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

S. K. T.