ABU GRUNSHIE AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE [1966] GLR 572

Division: SUPREME COURT

Date: 20 JUNE 1966

Before: MILLS-ODOI, SIRIBOE AND LASSEY JJ.S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEALS against sentences imposed on the appellants by Koranteng-Addow J. sitting at the High Court, Sekondi, to which the appellants had appealed from the sentences of the Circuit Court, Takoradi.

COUNSEL

Appellants in person.

S. M. Boison, Principal State Attorney, for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF MILLS-ODOI J.S.C.

Mills-Odoi J.S.C. gave the reasons for the judgment of the court. [His lordship stated the facts as set out in the headnote and continued:] In arguing the appeal before us, each appellant, who had not the benefit of counsel, submitted that the sentence is manifestly excessive and pleaded with the court that it should be reduced; but the principal state attorney, Mr. Boison, thought otherwise. In supporting the sentences passed by the appellate High Court, Mr. Boison submitted that the circuit court judge had no jurisdiction to pass sentence upon the appellants because the prosecution proved that each appellant had more than two previous convictions recorded against him. He contended that the jurisdiction of the circuit court in passing sentence was taken away as soon as the provisions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 1 (1) of the Punishment of Habitual Criminals Act, 1963,1 were satisfied, namely, that each appellant was not less than twenty years of age and had a record of at least two previous convictions. He contended further that the committal order under section 3 of the aforesaid Act 192 is automatic.

The submissions of the principal state attorney will be given the consideration they deserve if it is shown in the instant case that the prosecution proved that the statutory provisions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 1 (1) of Act 192 were satisfied. Where a statute confers jurisdiction upon a court and that statute lays down conditions precedent to the vesting of that jurisdiction it is essential that those conditions must be strictly complied with; otherwise the jurisdiction does not become vested and any action which the court purports to take will be void of effect.

Under and by virtue of subsection (1) of section 3 of the Punishment of Habitual Criminals Act, 1963, jurisdiction is conferred upon three courts, including a circuit court, to commit an offender (i.e., a person who has been convicted of an offence other than an offence for which he is liable to suffer death) to the High Court for sentence if the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the offender is not less than twenty years of age, and (b) the offender has been convicted previously of at least two offences, each of which is either a felony or a misdemeanour. It would seem, therefore, that it is a [p.574] of [1966] GLR 572 pre-requisite to the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon the circuit court that the two statutory requirements stated above are complied with. If both requirements are not satisfied then any purported exercise of jurisdiction under section 3 (1) of Act 192 is an act in excess of jurisdiction and is therefore void of effect. The High Court has no inherent power to sentence an offender under the Punishment of Habitual Criminals Act, 1963. Its jurisdiction to pass sentence upon the offender is conferred upon it by subsection (2) of section 3 of the aforesaid Act 192, where the offender has been properly committed by anyone of the three courts, local, district or circuit court, to the said High Court. It is clear from the record of appeal in the instant case that each appellant had been convicted previously of more than two offences. But the other statutory requirement, namely, ascertaining the age of each appellant, which is one of the conditions precedent to the vesting of jurisdiction in the circuit court to commit the appellants for sentence to the High Court was not complied with. Indeed nothing is said about the age of each appellant. Therefore, the submission of Mr. Boison that the circuit court judge ought to have committed the appellants to the High Court for sentence is wholly unacceptable; because any purported exercise of jurisdiction by the circuit court judge would have been null and void. For this reason we do not wish to consider the other points raised by Mr. Boison.

It is beyond doubt, from the foregoing facts, that the appellate High Court judge acted without jurisdiction when he purported to deal with the appellants under and by virtue of the powers conferred upon him by paragraph (c) of section 1 (1) of Act 192. His right to act under the aforesaid Act 192 was taken away by the absence of any order by the circuit court committing the appellants for sentence to the High Court. The sentences passed by the appellate High Court judge upon the appellants are void of effect and are therefore quashed.

After considering the facts and all the circumstances surrounding this case we are of opinion that the sentence passed upon each appellant by the circuit court judge is warranted by law and is not manifestly excessive.

It is for these reasons that the appeal by each appellant was dismissed.

DECISION

Sentences of High Court quashed.

Sentences of circuit court restored.

G. N.