DANIELS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1973] 1 GLR 31

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against conviction for stealing entered by a district court. The facts are set out in the judgment of Quashie-Sam J.

COUNSEL

Dr. Ekow Daniels for the appellant.

Mrs. Ansong, State Attorney, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF QUASHIE-SAM J.

In this appeal the only ground canvassed on behalf of the appellant is that of misdirection by the magistrate on the law pertaining to the evidence of an accomplice. Without going into the facts at length which are very clear on the record, there are certain aspects of this case which need to be commented upon. The principal witness in this case, one Acquah, was rightly found by the trial magistrate to be an accomplice in this case where ten iron rods being the property of the Posts and Telecommunication Department, Tema, were allegedly stolen by the appellant. Both the accused and Acquah were at the material time employees of the Posts and Telecommunication Department, and the evidence shows that both the accused and Acquah were living in one house and that it was Acquah who in fact conveyed the iron rods to the welder for work on the windows of that house.

On these facts, the learned trial magistrate made the following findings:

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“. . .to that extent he was an accomplice but I am satisfied, in full awareness of the danger in acting on the evidence of an accomplice without corroboration that the first prosecution witness is not only a truthful witness but also that his testimony commands corroboration sufficient to warrant the accused person’s conviction.”

The law is quite clear on what is required as to corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice. This is what it says in Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence & Practice (35th ed.), para. 930 (4):

“Absence of corroboration. The rule that a judge must give the jury a proper warning as to the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, although it is a rule of practice, now has the force of a rule of law. If such a warning is not given the Court of Criminal Appeal will quash the conviction, even if in fact there be ample corroborative evidence, unless the court can apply the proviso to section 4 (1)

of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907 (see post, s. 939): Davies v. D.P.P. [1954] A.C. 378; 38 Cr.App.R. 11. See also R. v. Tate [1908] 2 K.B. 680; 1 Cr.App.R. 39; R . v. Baskerville [1916] 2 K.B. 658; 12 Cr.App.R. 81; R.

v. Charavanamuttu, 22 Cr.App.R. 1; R. v. Lewis, 26 Cr.App.R. 110; R. v. Moore, 28 Cr.App.R. 111; R. v.

Savory, 29 Cr.App.R. 1.

Where also matters which cannot be corroboration are treated as being so, the court may quash the conviction. See R. v. Martin, Ansell & Ross, 24 Cr.App.R. 177. If after the proper caution by the judge the jury convict the prisoner, the court will not quash the conviction merely upon the ground that the accomplice’s evidence was uncorroborated , but will review all the facts of the case, and if it thinks the verdict unreasonable or that it cannot be supported having regard to the evidence the court will quash the conviction. R. v. Baskerville, ante. See also R. v. Norris, 12 Cr.App.R. 156. Where corroboration is required by statute, similar rules obtain. R. v. Baskerville, ante. See also R. v. Goldstein, 11 Cr.App.R. 27; R. v. Davies, 11 Cr.App.R. 272; R. v. Gregg, 24 Cr.App.R. 13; R. v. Winfield, 27 Cr.App.R. 139; R. v. Cleal, 28 Cr.App.R. 95; R. v. Dent, 29 Cr.App.R. 120.”

What is more, the fact of a witness being an accomplice, accessory or principal detracts very materially from his credit. See also Archbold (supra), para. 1292.

It is clear from the record in this appeal that after the trial magistrate had sufficiently warned himself on the danger of convicting on this uncorroborated evidence of Acquah, he proceeded not only to find him a truthful witness but also to adopt Acquah’s evidence as corroboration of Acquah’s own evidence by saying that “his testimony commands corroboration sufficient to warrant the accused person’s conviction.” This is wrong.

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The kind of evidence required in a case as such as the present one is defined in Archbold, (supra) as follows:

“The kind of corroboration required is not confirmation by independent evidence of everything the accomplice relates, as his evidence would be unnecessary if that were so: R. v. Mullins, 3 Cox 526, 531.

What is required is some independent testimony which affects the prisoner by tending to connect him with the crime; that is, evidence, direct or circumstantial, which implicates the prisoner, which confirms in some material particular not only evidence given by the accomplice that the crime has been committed, but also the evidence that the prisoner committed it: R. v. Baskerville [1916] 2 K.B. 658; 12 Cr.App.R. 81. The prisoner’s own evidence may afford the necessary corroboration, as may his conduct in the circumstances of the particular case: R. v. Medcraft 23 Cr.App.R. 116. See also R. v. Blatherwick, 6 Cr.App.R. 281. The fact that the prisoner has not gone into the witness box to give evidence cannot amount to corroboration. R. v.

Jackson, 37 Cr.App.R. 43.”

I have endeavoured to find from the record the kind of corroboration required by the law which the learned magistrate should have looked for, but I find none and the solution is not wrongly to treat one piece of evidence as corroborative of itself.

Upon these analyses, I think the conviction is wrong. The appeal therefore succeeds. The conviction is quashed and the sentence set aside. The appellant is acquitted and discharged and any fine paid by him must be refunded.

DECISION Appeal allowed.

S. O.