BENDA vs. AWUKU [1979] GLR 320
25 July 1978 · ANNAN JA · ≈ 20 min read
[1978] SLR (CA) 10Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) University of Cape Coast v. Anthony [1977] 2 G.L.R. 21, C.A.
(2) British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd. [1912] A.C. 673; 81 L.J.K.B. 1132; 107 L.T. 325, H.L.
(3) James v. Hutton and Cook (J.) & Sons Ltd. [1950] K.B. 9; [1949] 2 All E.R. 243; 65 T.L.R. 441, 610; 93 S.J. 551, C.A.
(4) Bailey v. Bullock [1950] 2 All E.R 1167; [1950] W.N. 482; 66 T.L R. (Pt. 2) 791; 94 S.J. 689.
(5) Stedman v. Swan’s Tours (1951) 95 S.J. 727, C.A.
(6) Feldman v. Allways Travel Services [1957] C.L.Y. 934.
(7) Jarvis v. Sivans Tours [1973] 1 Q.B. 233; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 954; [1973] 1 All E.R. 71; 116 S.J. 822, C.A.
(8) Hobbs v. London and South Western Railway Co. (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 111; [1874-80] All E.R.
Rep. 463; 44 L.J.Q.B. 49; 32 L.T. 252; 39 J.P. 693 ; 23 W.R. 520.
(9) Addis v. Gramophone Co., Ltd. [1909] A.C. 488 78 L.J.K.B. 112.2; 101 L.T. 466, H.L.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a judgment of the trial judge awarding damages for, inter alia, loss of use and occupation in an action for breach of a building contract. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Annan J.A.
COUNSEL
S. Kwami Tetteh for the appellant.
Brodie-Mends (Amponsah-Dadzie) with him for the respondent.
[p.322] of [1979] GLR 320
JUDGMENT OF ANNAN J.A.
The defendant-appellant, a building contractor, hereinafter referred to as the builder, disputes the quantum of damages awarded the plaintiff-respondent, a building owner, hereinafter referred to as the owner, for breach of a building contract. By the terms of the contract the builder undertook to carry out certain specific works in the uncompleted building of the owner mainly for the purpose of finishing the interior of the building in the manner specified by the owner. The sum of ¢21,555 was agreed upon as the price for all the works, details of which were also agreed. The contract was not fully performed by the contractor. He had received a total of ¢13,780 out of the agreed price by 31 December 1971. The contract was entered into in early 1971. An additional sum of ¢2,000 was paid to the contractor in 1972.
According to the owner the work was to be completed by 31 December 1971. This the contractor denied. There is no dispute that by that date the work had not been completed. Between January 1972 and January 1973 the owner was in protective custody. According to him no work was done during this period.
After failing in his endeavour, after his release, to get the contractor to complete, the owner engaged a new contractor who commenced work in February 1974 and completed in June that same year for ¢10,000 which the owner paid.
The owner claimed, inter alia,
(a) ¢23,200 being loss of rent from January 1972 to May 1974 (both months inclusive), i.e. 29 calendar months at the rate of ¢800 per mensem or in the alternative the sum of ¢23,200 being the loss of the value of the use of the said house from January 1972 to May 1974 (both months inclusive), i.e. 29 calendar months at the rate of ¢800 per mensem.
(b) ¢12,000 general damages.
In his judgment the trial judge awarded the building owner ¢1,000 general damages “for the considerable inconvenience caused by the uncomplimentary conduct” of the building contractor from 1972 to 1974 when the agreement was terminated. He also awarded him a sum of ¢10,800 for loss of occupation and use of the building for one and a half years as a fair and just estimate of loss suffered, based on a figure of ¢600 a month which was derived from the evidence of the owner that the house could fetch a monthly rent of ¢800. Other awards, not relevant for the purposes of this appeal, brought the total damages awarded to ¢15,525. Costs of ¢1,500 were awarded to the owner.
In this appeal the contractor challenges the legal basis for the awards for loss of use and occupation, general damages and costs.
Loss of use and occupation:—In his evidence the owner said that before granting the contract to the builder he told him he wanted first class work as he was desirous of renting out the house to an embassy or any person who was prepared to pay a good rent. In October or November 1971 he had engaged the services of a company of estate agents who had arranged
[p.323] of [1979] GLR 320 for a tenant at ¢800 a month by 1 January 1972. The Contractor knew the house was to be let by 31 December 1971.
According to the estate agents they took ten prospective tenants to see the house and one of them agreed to take it at that rent provided he got possession on 1 January 1972. The house has five bedrooms, air-conditioning, a swimming pool, and by all accounts an expensive interior finish.
The builder’s evidence was that the owner told him he wanted first class work because he was going to live in the house himself. He was not told that the house was going to be let. In his findings the trial judge thought it safe to accept the contractor’s evidence that the owner told him the building was for his personal occupation. That finding has not been challenged before us by the owner, and we base our judgment on it.
There was also evidence before the trial judge that the owner lived partly in Cape Coast and partly in Accra and although one may doubt whether those other residences were anywhere near the new project in size and splendour the point of relevance here is that he had those places to live in, and there is no evidence that he suffered any particular disadvantage by continuing to live in those other residences rather than the new one.
The trial judge found that the builder had delayed in the performance of the contract for several months before its termination. He found a period of one and a half years acceptable as the period of delay. He said:
“It is clear from the above that the defendant unreasonably delayed in the execution of his part of the agreement. Up to this stage the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for any loss occasioned to him arising out of the defendant’s delay.”
The question then is, did the owner prove any damage flowing from the loss of use of the house owing to the builder’s delay of one and a half years? Loss of use arising from unreasonable delay is a head under which damages may be claimed. Such damage must however be proved by evidence of loss of the value of the use which he would have had of the premises during the period of the delay and which he did not have or by proof of loss of profits that he would have made from the premises.
I turn, firstly, to the measure of damages and I start with the proposition of principle by the learned author of McGregor on Damages (13th ed.) at p. 559, para. 820. That proposition is that:
“if the builder fails to complete the building by the time required by the contract the normal measure of damages should be the value of the use of the building during the period of delay, the value generally being taken as the rental value. Unfortunately there are no English cases on this.”
In a note the author states that there is ample American authority to be found for this proposition in McCormick, Damages (1935), para. 170 and Sedgwick, Damages (9th ed.) (1913), Vol. 2 para. 645. Unfortunately the author does not set down his own consideration of the proposition, being
[p.324] of [1979] GLR 320 content, I think to adopt and approve by his silence, the approach of the American courts.
No case specifically dealing with this aspect of this appeal was cited either in the judgment or before us and I have myself not been able to unearth one by this court. In these circumstances I have taken the course of setting down my own consideration of general principles, as well as the American position, in terms of rule 7 of section 49 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which is authority for seeking assistance and guidance from other systems of law: see the judgment of Apaloo J.A (as he then was) in University of Cape Coast v. Anthony [1977] 2 G.L.R. 21, C.A.
From the standpoint of our common law one may start with the basic well-known principle that:
“Damages for breach of contract are a compensation to the plaintiff for the damage, loss or injury he has suffered through that breach. He is, as far as money can do it, to be placed in the same position as if the contract had been performed. It follows that if the plaintiff cannot establish an actual loss, he is entitled only to nominal damages.
See. Chitty on Contracts (22nd ed.), Vol. 1, para. 1331, p. 565. The case of British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd. [1912] A.C. 673, H.L. confirms the first part of the principle. Viscount Haldane L.C. stated at p. 689:
“. . . as far as possible, he who has proved a breach of a bargain to supply what he contracted to get is to be placed, as far as money can do it, in as good a situation as if the contract had been performed.”
James v. Hutton and J. Cook & Sons Ltd. [1950] 1 K.B. 9, C.A. vividly illustrates the other leg of the principle. There a lessee of premises made alterations to the premises let, in terms of a licence in which he had covenanted upon request to restore the building to its original condition at the expiration of the lease. The alteration was to take down the shop front of the premises and to erect a new one. The lessee failed upon request to restore the old shop front and to reinstate the premises as they were before the licence was granted, in clear breach of the covenant. It was found that the only evidence was that of failure to restore in terms of the contract of lease and that the measure of damages is the general rule as to damages for breach of contract—the amount of the damage actually suffered and not the cost of the restoration, since there was no evidence that any restoration would make the premises suitable for any particular purpose or business or that the premises were in any way adversely affected or made less valuable by reason of the substitution of a new and modem shop front for an old one. Lord Goddard C.I. (who read the judgment of the court) said at p. 17:
“We see no ground here for assuming that the plaintiff in this case has suffered any damage at all . . .
In our opinion, therefore, she cannot be entitled to any more than nominal damage, which we should assess at twenty shillings.”
[p.325] of [1979] GLR 320
Turning to the American law, McCormick, Damages (1935) (supra), para. 170 at p. 652 states:
“‘General’ damages allowable for delay in securing the building are measured by the rental value of the premises with the building completed. ‘Special’ damages for loss of a specific opportunity to rent the premises or to earn profits therein are recoverable only when the builder was notified of the special intended use when he contracted to build.
If the builder fails to carry on the work and complete the building at the time agreed upon the usual measure of general damages for delay is the rental value of the building during the period for which the completion was delayed.”
Rental value is taken as “net” after allowing for expenses of maintenance. It is also said there that where the structure is one which is not ordinarily rentable, such as a church or a railroad bridge, resort must be had to some other measure, such as the value of the use or the interest on the payment made upon the contract price. This rule is stated as the rule for general damages. Special damages may however be claimed for the loss of a specific opportunity to use or rent the building due to the delay or for loss of profits from delaying operation of a business therein or for other unusual consequences of the delay if the owner brings himself within the rules requiring that such losses be shown to have been within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made. Several cases are cited in support. Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 5, another American author, is more explicit. There is this statement at p. 420, para. 1092:
“If the building contractor’s breach of contract consists, in whole or in part, of delay in completion of the structure, the injured party can get judgment for its rental value during the period of delay. During this period the owner is being deprived of the use of property, and rental value is used as a practical and a reasonably accurate measure of just compensation. The use of rental value as a test does not at all depend upon the fact that the owner expected to rent the property after its completion or upon the fact that prospective hirers or tenants could have been found. It is enough that the property is of such a character that its rental valuation, that is, the market value of its use, can be established with reasonable certainty by expert testimony.”
It is further said that application of the rental value test as the normal measure of damages obviates the difficulties that usually exist in proving the amount of the income that would in fact have been received. It also obviates the difficulty in proving that the building contractor had reason to foresee that such an income would have been received. Several cases are cited in support.
In my evaluation of these principles of American law I have unfortunately not been able to avail myself of the detailed reasoning of the judges who decided those cases since the law libraries at my disposal do not have them. I may observe that if the full meaning is to be given to
[p.326] of [1979] GLR 320 rule 7 of section 49 (1) of Act 372, it must be necessary precondition that meaningful facilities be made available.
In my view where the purpose is to live in the house the value of the use that is to be made of it need not be seen necessarily as the rental value of the house but may equally well be seen as the satisfaction of living in it derived from the use of its facilities, its comforts, its special amenities—the feeling of security in being in your own home. In tort there is the head of damage known as loss of amenities. In contract the notion of convenience or inconvenience is available as a compendious term under which to consider the matter. This is a non-pecuniary head of damage like that of amenities in tort. Assessment is naturally not easy but then that difficulty is not unfamiliar in the area of non-pecuniary damage, like pain and suffering, which is all the time assessed by these courts in terms of money “as far as money can do it” in both tort and contract.
To adopt rental values as a uniform test in all such cases may afford a neat solution of the difficulty and is certainly attractive but then that course does not seem to be justifiable if it is taken, as the American approach seems to do, as the normal measure of damages.
I think it is more realistic and more in accord with the compensatory nature of damages in contract that a distinction be drawn, on the one hand, between the case where the owner’s purpose was to let the house or in other ways to derive pecuniary benefit from an economic user, and on the other, where the clear intention is to make a personal user in a purely domestic sense. Where the intention is to live in it I find it difficult to see any case of pecuniary loss capable of being measured in terms of the rental value of the premises itself. Actual loss may occur such as where other accommodation had to be temporarily secured or where furniture has had to be temporarily stored, to give two examples of the situation where money has had to be reasonably spent as a result of delay and loss of use. So long as damages for breach of contract are compensatory in nature I would find it difficult to award a normal measure of damages for loss of use per se on the basis of rental value. The owner who in fact loses a chance of letting the house as a result of the delay in performance loses the profits that he would have made. It is a loss of user profits which would be in the contemplation of the parties or otherwise made known to the builder. An owner who, for a period, loses the personal use of his house, does lose among other things the satisfaction which he would have had from his enjoyment of the house and its special attractions. That could be a real personal loss to the owner, but what is the value of the use that is lost and how do you proceed to measure it? I do not think it is the rental value. I do not think an economic valuation base on rent ought to come into a case where the loss of use is of a personal or domestic nature and there is no actual loss of money or the prospect of earning money.
What actual loss or damage then did the owner prove under the head of loss of use or occupation? There is no evidence of lost rents, actual or prospective or of rent paid by him as a result of the unavailability of the premises for his use during that period of one and a half years. No case
[p.327] of [1979] GLR 320 was attempted that he had had to have other Premises for which he paid rent while waiting for the new house to be completed. Indeed there is no evidence that he was paying any rents at all for his residences in Cape Coast and Accra. The evidence of rent related to the new house and what it could have fetched, namely ¢800 a month. But then the trial judge found expressly that it was not safe to say that the owner was going to let the house.
He said he preferred to take the case on the basis that he was going to live in the house, rejecting thereby the evidence of the owner and the estate agent as to the matter of letting. If that was the basis the trial judge preferred, and this was a matter for him arising as it did from a conflict in the evidence, on that basis, how was the owner damnified by being kept out of occupation? Had he for instance lost a chance of increasing his business profits because he was not living in that grand house? Or had he somehow or the other lost business goodwill thereby?
In my view of the evidence, having failed to impress the judge on the issue of letting the premises, which would have been a good plank for damages, the owner ought to have led other evidence of damage, if indeed such there was, in order to succeed on the claim for special damage of ¢23,200. I do not see any evidence of actual pecuniary loss. The trial judge came to a different conclusion. He assessed the loss at ¢600 per month for one and a half years. The question that naturally arises is this: In what way was it demonstrated that the owner suffered a loss of ¢600 every month and for eighteen months? Was it shown that because he did not have the use of the house for eighteen months he thereby lost ¢600 every month for that period? How did the loss arise? Or could it be said that if he had had the use of the house for that period of eighteen months he would have gained ¢600 every month?
In such a case as this, loss, if any, is non-pecuniary and other considerations apply. In my view the owner did not suffer any pecuniary loss and the award of special damages was wrong in law. I would disallow it entirely.
General damages:—A sum of ¢1,000 was awarded “for the considerable inconvenience caused by the uncomplimentary conduct of the defendant from 1972 up to 1974 when the agreement was terminated.”
I would consider the matter separately under the two heads of damage used by the trial judge. Both are for non-pecuniary loss and though that type of loss may properly be claimed as part of general damages the courts have set limits to what they have been prepared to entertain in contract cases. Damages have been allowed on the grounds of inconvenience or discomfort: see Bailey v. Bullock [1950] 2 All E.R. 1167; Stedman v. Swan’s Tours (1951) 95 S.J. 727, C.A. and Feldman v. Allways Travel Services [1957] C.L.Y. 934. In Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd. [1973] 1 All E.R. 71, C.A. the authorities including these three cases, were reviewed and it was held that in addition to purely physical inconvenience and discomfort, grounds like annoyance, vexation, disappointment “in a particular thing you have set your mind upon” are relevant considerations. Commenting on the limitations set out in the old case of Hobbs v. London and South Western
[p.328] of [1979] GLR 320
Railway Co. (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 111 at p. 122 where Mellor J. said that:
“ . . . for the mere inconvenience, such as annoyance and loss of temper, or vexation, or for being disappointed in a particular thing which you have set your mind upon, without real physical inconvenience resulting, you cannot recover damages.”
The court said (per Lord Denning M.R.) at p. 74:
“The courts in those days only allowed the plaintiff to recover damages if he suffered physical inconvenience, such as, having to walk five miles home, as in Hobb’s case; or to live in an overcrowded house: see Bailey v. Bullock.
I think that those limitations are out of date. In a proper case damages for mental distress can be recovered in contract, just as damages for shock can be recovered in tort. One such case is a contract for a holiday, or any other contract to provide entertainment and enjoyment. If the contracting party breaks his contract, damages can be given for the disappointment, the distress, the upset and frustration caused by the breach. I know that it is difficult to assess in terms of money, but it is no more difficult than the assessment which the courts have to make every day in personal injury cases for loss of amenities.”
Describing the plaintiff’s loss in terms of a grave disappointment because he was expecting to enjoy himself with all the facilities promised, he was held entitled to compensation for the lack of those facilities and for the loss of entertainment and enjoyment which he was promised and which he did not get. He got damages of £125.
Jarvis’s case as well as Stedman’s case and Feldman’s case were all “holiday” cases, in which various facilities promised did not materialise, i.e. bedroom and accommodation not up to standard (Stedman’s case); entertainment, service and company, special treat, etc. not provided (Jarvis’s case). Bailey v. Bullock (supra) should be looked at since Jarvis’s case only in relation to the head of purely physical inconvenience. In that case a husband, wife and their boy of six had had to live in temporary accommodation for more than a year, in the small house of the wife’s elderly parents sharing one bedroom. Damages of £300 were awarded (in 1951).
In so far then as the trial judge awarded general damages for inconvenience the award should be sustained as matter of law and the legal challenge fails. On the evidence while I see no case of purely physical inconvenience, it is, I think, possible that a case of non-physical inconvenience or other suffering such as vexation, disappointment, upset, frustration and may be, even some mental distress, could be made out. It was left rather vague, I think, but then the appeal was really concerned with the legal basis rather than the facts.
With regard to the aspect of uncomplimentary conduct, I am a little, uncertain as to what exactly was meant to be conveyed by that expression, and the judgment did not elaborate on it. It must however relate to conduct of the builder towards the owner seen as deserving condemnation
[p.329] of [1979] GLR 320 perhaps because it was not praiseworthy or considerate or courteous. I find some difficulty in admitting such a basis for damages in contract. Conduct of the defendant towards the plaintiff in the course of committing a breach of contract which leads to injury to the feelings of the plaintiff has been disregarded in assessing damages even where the defendant had believed in a harsh and humiliating manner. Addis v. Gramophone Co., Ltd. [1909] A.C. 488, H.L. is long-standing authority for this proposition as also for the general proposition that no exemplary damages are awarded in contract. This is on the basis of the general rule that damages for breach of contract are given by way of compensation for loss suffered and not by way of punishment for wrongful behaviour. So the measure of damages is not affected by the manner of the breach. To the extent therefore that the sum awarded for general damages was influenced in this way I think the amount should be reduced since the principle applied was wrong in law. I would reduce general damages by half, i.e. ¢500.
Costs:—The sum of ¢1,500 awarded would now have to be reduced. I think a figure of. ¢500 is reasonable. In the result I would allow the appeal, set aside the award for loss of use and occupation and reduce the award for general damages and costs. The final position then would be that: (a) the award of ¢2,225 for the difference between the original contractual price and the price subsequently paid as a result of the delay in performance stands. This was not challenged in this appeal;
(b) the builder will refund the sum received by him in excess of the contract price and for which he did no work, with this agreed correction that the figure be amended to read ¢2,000 instead of ¢1,225 as appears by mistake in the judgment;
(c) the award of ¢10,800 for loss of use and occupation of the building is entirely disallowed; (d) the award of ¢1,000 for general damages is reduced to ¢500;
(e) costs are reduced to ¢500 inclusive of counsel’s costs.
Total damages then stand at ¢3,725 and there is judgment for the owner for that sum.
As to costs in this court, the builder has won a substantial reduction in damages and costs succeeding mainly on points of law. I think he deserves his full costs.
JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION Appeal against award of damages for loss of use and occupation allowed.
Appeal against general damages allowed in part.
D. R. K. S.
