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[1978] SLR (CA) 23Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

REPUBLIC vs. JUDICIAL SECRETARY; EX PARTE TORTO [1979] GLR 444

19 December 1978 · ANIN JA · ≈ 25 min read

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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v JUDICIAL SECRETARY; ex parte TORTO [1979] GLR 444 [1978] SLR (CA) 23
APAREPUBLIC v JUDICIAL SECRETARY; ex parte TORTO [1979] GLR 444, [1978] SLR (CA) 23 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v JUDICIAL SECRETARY; ex parte TORTO [1979] GLR 444, [1978] SLR (CA) 23 (Ghana Ct. App. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Harris Y. Knight (1890) 15 PJD. 170; 62 L.T. 507; 6 T.L.R. 234, C.A.

(2) Knowles v. R. [1930] A.C. 366; 99 U.P.C. 108; 143 L.T. 28; 46 T.L.R. 276; 29 Cox C.C. 199, P.C.

(3) Warburton v. Loveland (1832) 6 Bli. (&s.) 1; 2 Dow. & C1. 480; 6 E.R. 806, H.L.

(4) King-Emperor v. Benoari Lai Sarma [1945) A.C. 14; [1945] 1 All E.R. 210; L.R. 72 I.A. 57; 114 U.P.C. 33; 61 T.L.R. 54; 88, S.J. 415, P.C.

(5) Abel v. Lee (1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 365; 1 Hop. & Colt. 515; 40 L.J.P.C. 154; 23 L.T 844; 35 J.P. 343;

19 W.R. 625.

(6) B. v. Oliver [1944] 1 K.B. 68; [1943] 2 All E.R. 800; 113 L.J.K.B. I 119; 170 L.T. 110; 108 J.P.

30; 60 T.L.R. 82; 42 L.G.R. 37; 29 Cr. App. R. 137, C.C.A.

(7) West v. Gwynne [1911] 2 Ch. 1; 80 L.J. Ch. 578; 104 L.T. 759; 27 T.L.R. 444; 55 S.J. 519, C.A.

[p.447] of [1979] GLR 444

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL inter alia, from an order of certiorari by Mensa Boison J. in the High Court, Accra, on 24 November 1978 quashing the decision of the Judicial Secretary that the respondent, a circuit court judge, should retire at the age of 55 years in accordance with L.I. 319 (as amended). The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Anin LA.

COUNSEL

B. J. da Rocha for the appellant.

E. N. Moore for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.

The appellant was sued in his official capacity as Judicial Secretary by the respondent, who was at all times material to this suit a circuit court judge stationed at Kumasi. The salient facts emerging from the supporting affidavits, exhibits and statement are briefly that on 17 August 1978 the respondent received a letter (exhibit A) dated 2 August 1978 from the office of the appellant reminding him that “the statutory retiring age for judicial officers other than judges of the superior courts is 55;” that according to official records he would attain that age on 8 October 1978; and that he should therefore retire from the service with effect from that date.

In his reply dated 1 September 1978 (exhibit 2) the respondent countered that the mandatory retiring age for officers in his category was 60 and not 55. Buttressing himself on regulation 48 (1) of the Judicial Service Regulations, 1963 (L.I. 319), he challenged the appellant to cite his authority for insisting upon the lower retiring age of 55; and warned that he would go to any lengths to vindicate his rights and that, pending a satisfactory reply, he would “continue to remain in harness.”

The appellant obliged with an explanation of the legal position in his reply dated 15 September 1978 (exhibit B). While conceding that L.I. 319 is still in force; and that regulation 48 (1) thereof permits the respondent to retire at 60 “unless the President otherwise directs, “ the appellant emphasised that “the truth is that the President has otherwise directed.” By a letter dated 26 February 1971, the government with the sanction of the President reduced the retiring age of all civil servants and all public servants from 60 to 55 years. This directive was communicated by him to all judicial officers and non-professional officers:

“in the Judicial Service by his circular letter No. RCS/9149 dated the 4th March, 1971.

As an expression of national policy on duration of Public service, this directive had been uniformly applied to all officers in the Judicial Service. There is no intention to discriminate against you in particular and no reason exists for doing so.”

In the penultimate paragraph of exhibit B, the appellant conceded further that the government circular, in so far as it relates to the Judicial Service was not backed by any legislative instrument; nevertheless, under regulation 48 (1) of L.I. 319 the President’s directive could take any form, oral or written. Even though the directive had been written and circularised

[p.448] of [1979] GLR 444 among the officers concerned, it was nevertheless felt that as regulation 48 (1) stands at present, it may well mislead, especially if the circular is unknown to some of the officers concerned. For this reason, it was intended “to invite the government to consider whether its textual wording conforms with its present policy on retirement of public officers.”

In the concluding paragraph of exhibit B, the respondent was reminded of his impending retirement on 8 October 1978 and requested to wind up his affairs with the service by that date. This official request evoked from the respondent two more letters (the first dated 20 September 1978 and the second undated) criticising the official view point and reiterating his earlier argument that under the relevant law—regulation 48 (1) of L.I 319—he is not obliged to retire until the age of 60; and finally giving notice that he would fight the matter in the courts “to the bitterest end.”

The sequel to the war of words was the present action instituted by the respondent on 2 October 1978 in the Accra High Court for an order of certiorari to quash two official letters received by him (exhibits A and 11); and for an order prohibiting the appellant herein from retiring him at the age of 55.

Incidentally, prior to the institution of these proceedings on 1 October 1978, the Judicial Service (Amendment) Regulations, 1978, (L.I. 1168), had been promulgated on 15 September 1978 and published in the Gazette dated 22 September 1978. On account of its brevity and importance, it is reproduced here in full:

“L.I. 1168 JUDICIAL SERVICE (AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS, 1978 IN exercise of the powers conferred upon the Supreme Military Council by section 31 of the Judicial Service Act, 1960 (C.A. 10), these Regulations are made this 15th day of September, 1978.

1. L.I. 319 The Judicial Service Regulations, 1963 (L.I. 319) are hereby amended in paragraph (1) of regulation 48 thereof, by the substitution for the words ‘sixty years’ of that words ‘fifty-five years’.

2. Commencement These Regulations shall be deemed to have come into force on the 26th day of February, 1971.

LT.-GENERAL F. W. K. AKUFFO Chairman of the Supreme Military Council Date of Gazette notification:

22nd September, 1978.”

It was stated in paragraph (17) of the appellant’s affidavit in opposition to the main application filed on 26 October 1978 that the attention of the present respondent’s counsel was drawn to L.I. 1168 before the application for leave was heard by the court below. This paragraph was admitted by the respondent himself in his affidavit of 30 October. 1978; but he indicated in paragraph (6) thereof that he would “through counsel

[p.449] of [1979] GLR 444 contend that L.I. 1168 is a: nullity, it not having complied with the principal legislation on the judicial service.” And later in paragraph (12), the respondent contended that L.I. 1168 cannot deprive him of his vested rights.

The grounds relied upon by the applicant in support of his application for the orders of certiorari and prohibition are set out in his statement filed on 2 October 1978.

STATEMENT — ORDER 59 (2) (2)

DESCRIPTION OF APPLICANT

E. T. A. Torto, Circuit Judge

Kumasi Applicant

GROUNDS

(1) That the respondent has no power to order the applicant to retire from the service at the age of 55 in the light of the Judicial Service Regulations (L.I. 319), reg. 48 (1).

(2) That the respondent’s letters dated 2 August 1978 and 15 September 1978 were null and void and of no effect having been made without authority.

(3) That the respondent erred in relying on his circular letter No. RCS/9149 dated 4 March 1971 in the face of the Judicial Service Regulations (L.I. 319).

(4) That the respondent’s reliance on the government’s letter dated 26 February 1971 reducing the retiring age of all civil servants and public servants from 60-55 years was misconceived having regard to legislation affecting judicial officers.

(5) That the said order contained in the letters dated 2 August 1978 and 15 September 1978 being a ‘speaking order’ is bad in law in that the respondent cannot, be regarded as the appointer of the applicant for the purpose of enforcing the applicant’s retirement.”

After a full argument by both counsel for the parties the learned judge in a reserved ruling dated 24 November 1978 granted the application and quashed the “decision” contained in exhibits A and B, holding firstly that the applicant entered the service before 26 February 1971; and secondly that, “there will be a declaration that the applicant having first been engaged as a holder of judicial service office before 26 February 1971, his right to retire on compulsion on reaching the age of 60 is unaffected by regulation 48 (1) of L.I. 319.”

From this ruling, the appellant has appealed to this court under four grounds of appeal, two of which affirm the validity of L.I. 1168 and its conclusiveness on the issue of the respondent’s compulsory retirement at 55; while the other ground of substance dealt with the applicability of the government circular (exhibit 5) of 26 February 1971 to the respondent’s class in the judicial service. It would be convenient to deal with the argument based on L.I. 1168 first. Under this head, Mr. da Rocha argued two grounds together, namely, (i) that the learned judge, having held that L.I. 1168 was valid, was wrong in interpreting it so as to exclude the applicant from its operation; and (ii) that the learned judge erred in

[p.450] of [1979] GLR 444 holding that the applicant by his contract of employment had acquired a vested interest in retiring at the age of 60 years and that therefore such interest could not be abridged by general legislation such as L.I. 1168.

Both in the court below and in this court, it was strenuously contended by Mr. Moore, learned counsel for the respondent herein, that L.I. 1168 was invalid. The trial judge disagreed and held in his ruling that it was valid. Before us, the gravamen of Mr. Moore’s argument was that section 31 of the Judicial Service Act, 1960 (C.A. 10), as substituted by paragraph 3 (j) of the Judicial Service Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 83), enacted that:

“31. The National Liberation Council acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission may by legislative instrument make regulations providing for any matter which under this Act is to be provided for by regulations or in respect of any matter which is to be prescribed or which otherwise relates to the administration of the Judicial Service.”

Mr. Moore then submitted that it is apparent from the appellant’s letters (exhibits B and C dated 15 September 1978 and 2 October 1978 respectively) that before promulgating L.I. 1168, the Supreme Military Council did not act on the advice of the Judicial Council, as it was obliged to do under section 31 of C.A. 10 as amended by N.L.C.D. 83 (supra) but rather it acted on the prompting of his lordship the Chief Justice. Since the anterior procedural step of seeking advice from the Judicial Council had, in his submission, not been taken by the Supreme Military Council the published enactment (L.I. 1168) was a nullity.

For the appellant, Mr. da Rocha canvassed the trial judge’s correct holding that the amending L.I.. 1168 is valid and commended to us his ratio decidendi on the point. His main complaint, however, was that, having reached a correct conclusion on the validity of L.I. 1168, he nevertheless gave it such a restrictive and erroneous interpretation as to exclude the respondent herein from its operation.

For a proper assessment of counsel’s rival arguments, it is necessary to take a close look at the learned judge’s ratio decidendi on L.I. 1168, as well as at the wording of the enactment itself. In the first place, the trial judge observed that the caption to L.I. 1168 correctly referred to the enabling power for the subsidiary legislation, i.e. section 31 of C.A. 10. Secondly, he held that if evidence had been adduced to show that the prior advice of the Judicial Council had not in fact been sought by the Supreme Military Council before promulgating L.I. 1168, then the instrument would have been declared void. However, in his view:

“the evidential burden here is that L.I. 1168 having on the face of it been made under section 31 of C.A. 10, satisfies the presumption of regularity. The burden of displacing the presumption lies on the applicant. No doubt it was in their power (sic) to obtain by some process that evidence if the applicant thought it fit.”

Thirdly, even though he had come to the conclusion that the government circular (exhibit 5) did not emanate from the President (S.M.C.) and

[p.451] of [1979] GLR 444 that it was not intended to apply to holders of judicial office, and consequently the appellant herein “tendered erroneous advice or promoted an enactment on wrong premises,” nevertheless the court cannot go behind the enactment to find out how it came to be made. Fourthly, the Supreme Military Council being a deliberative body on matters of policy and not a judicial body with a duty to act judicially, is not amenable to certiorari in respect of its enactments. “I therefore hold,” the trial judge concluded, “that the amending L.I. 1168 is valid and if the words are clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to them.”

After considering the amendment introduced by L.I.. 1168 and its retrospective commencement date, the learned judge concluded that:

“L.I. 1168 is not free from ambiguity and consistently with the presumption against taking away vested rights of persons and the further principle that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective effect than its language renders necessary, I hold that regulation 48 (1) operates as from 26 February 1971 to affect the retiring age of officers engaged in the service since that date. That is to say for all holders of judicial service office engaged before 26 February 1971, the retiring age is 60 years.”

As I see it, the crucial question posed by this appeal is, did the learned judge come to the correct conclusion on the meaning and effect of the amending legislation, L.I. 1168? Before discussing this question, it is first necessary to reproduce the relevant regulation 48 (1) of L.I. 319 as amended by L.I. 1168. As a result of the amendment introduced by W. 1168, regulation 48 (1) now reads: “A holder of a judicial service post on pensionable terms otherwise than on a limited engagement, shall retire from the Service on reaching the age of fifty-five years . . .” The commencement date of the amended regulations is stated in regulation 2 of L.I. 1168 to be 26 February 1971; in other words, regulation 48 (1) has been amended with retrospective effect as from 26 February 1971.

On the validity of the enactment, I have no doubt whatsoever that the learned judge’s reasoning is sound; and I respectfully endorse it. The relevant maxim is that, omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium (All things are presumed to have been done properly and with due formalities, until it be proved to the contrary). This common law rule means in practice that “formal requisites to judicial, official, or public act, or to titles to property which are good in substance, will be presumed”: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 15 at p. 348, para. 628 and the cases cited under footnote (e). The reasons given for this presumption appear to be the improbability of any person assuming functions unless he were duly appointed and of a public dereliction of duty. As Lindley L.J. put it- in Harris V. Knight (1890) 15 P.D. 170 at pp. 179-180. C.A.:

“The maxim, ‘Omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta,’ is an expression, in a short form, of a reasonable probability, and of the propriety in point of law of acting on such probability. The maxim expresses an inference which may reasonably be drawn when an intention to [p.452] of [1979] GLR 444 do some formal act is established; when the evidence is consistent with that intention having been carried into effect in a proper way; but when the actual observance of all due formalities can only be inferred as a matter of probability. The maxim is not wanted where such observance is proved, nor has it any place where such observance is disproved. The maxim only comes into operation where there is no proof one way or the other; but where it is more probable that what was intended to be done was done as it ought to have been done to render it valid; rather than that it was done in some other manner which would defeat the intention proved to exist, and would render what is proved to have been done of no effect.”

To cite but one illustrative instance of the application of the maxim one recalls to mind the first murder case in Ashanti involving an Englishman who was convicted of the murder of his wife upon a trial without a jury. By section 9 of the Ashanti Administration Ordinance, 1902 (No. I of 1902), “so far as it is practicable and local circumstances permit,” the procedure, civil and criminal in the Ashanti court was to be the same as in the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast Colony in which it was imperative by Ordinance that a trial for murder should be with a jury. The Privy Council held, applying the maxim, that it should be presumed that a trial with a jury was not practicable or was not permitted by local circumstances, and accordingly upheld the presumed regularity of the tribunal which conducted the trial without a jury: see Knowles v. R. [1930] A.C. 366 at p. 371, P.C.

Where the maxim applies—as in this case—the rule is that the evidential or provisional burden of displacing it rests on the party who alleges want of due compliance with the requisite formalities or non-performance of any statutory condition precedent. Such a burden is not discharged by a bare assertion made in an argument; it must be established by relevant evidence. In this case, however, the respondent herein, having raised the matter, failed to adduce or point to any piece of relevant evidence to sustain his allegation of the Supreme Military Council’s omission to seek advice from the Judicial Council before passing L.I. 1168. The respondent herein was not sued in his capacity as ex officio secretary to the Judicial Council; and there was no evidence from the lawgivers or their accredited representative about any prior advice sought by them from the Judicial Council. The mere fact that the respondent and the judicial administration took active steps in promoting the legislation in question-and this fact is indisputable, vide exhibits B and C-does not amount to a discharge of the evidential or provisional burden incumbent on the respondent herein. Their promotional activities are res inter alios acta. They do not constitute the relevant’ evidence required; for the issue is not, who promoted L.I. 1168, but rather, was statutory advice sought by the Supreme Military Council from the Judicial Council? On this vital issue, there was no proof one way or the other: the evidence was silent.

In the words of Lindley L.J. in Harris v. Knight (supra), the presumption of regularity comes into operation; for it is more probable to infer

[p.453] of [1979] GLR 444 that what was intended to be done was done as it ought to have been done to render the enactment valid, rather than that it was done in some irregular manner to defeat the intention to amend the regulations under powers conferred by the enabling enactment, C.A.10, s. 31. It is significant that this enabling enactment was expressly referred to in the caption to L.I. 1168.

The next question arising from the trial judge’s ratio decidendi is whether the enactment (L.I. 1168) is, as he held, indeed ambiguous. With the greatest respect, I find his reasoning and conclusion on ambiguity faulty. In the first place, the learned judge mistook an alleged uncertainty in the effect of the enactment on serving judicial officers for ambiguity, properly so-called, i.e. double-meaning, obscurity or unintelligibility of the language of the legislative instrument. Thus in discussing the alleged ambiguity, he first posited that:

“a possible interpretation is that it retrospectively affects those engaged since 26 February 1971. In other words, those officers are ‘deemed’ to have contracted for engagement under the regulation 48 (1) then in force before the amendment. It may also mean that regulation 48 (1), not having expressly taken away accrued rights shall be deemed to have come into force on 26 February 1971 without prejudice to officers already in. the service on the date of L.I. 1168—15 September 1978. The third possible interpretation appears to be that the right to retire at 60 was abolished for all officers now serving on 26 February 1971 irrespective of the date of first engagement.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The learned judge’s first and second interpretations show an obsession with the effect of the enactment on the contractual or “accrued rights” of serving officers. By contrast, his third interpretation gives due and proper weight to the meaning of the words of the enactment. I find his third interpretation to be the correct one; and hold that L.I. 1168, read together with regulation 48 (1) of L.I. 319, enacts that “a holder of a judicial service post on pensionable terms, otherwise than on a limited engagement shall retire from the Service on reaching the age of 55 years, unless the President otherwise directs,” and the commencement date for these new regulations is stated to be 26 February 1971. I fail to see the ambiguity in all that.

In the second place, before arriving at his first and second possible interpretations, the learned judge imported phrases and words into the very enactment being interpreted. Thus in his first interpretation, he added the phrase “those engaged since” the commencement date; these, according to him, “are to be deemed to have contracted on the basis of the unamended regulation.” And in his second interpretation, he introduced the concept of “accrued rights,” and added for good measure that “the commencement date for the amended regulation is to be deemed to be without prejudice to officers already in the service.” With respect,

[p.454] of [1979] GLR 444

I can see no legal justification or authority for this interpretation or mode of interpretation.

On the contrary, in Warburton v. Loveland (1832) 2 Dow. & C1. 480, H.L., Tindal C.J. laid down the relevant rule of construction thus at p. 489, “Where the language of the Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences; for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature.”

In King-Emperor v. Benoari-Lal Sarma [1945] 1 All E.R. 210 at p. 216D Viscount Simon L.C. delivering the opinion of the Privy Council said: “Again and again, this Board has insisted that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used.”

And in Abel v. Lee (1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 365 at p. 371, Willes J. said: “No doubt the general rule is that the language of an Act of Parliament is to be read according to its ordinary grammatical construction, unless so reading it would entail some absurdity, repugnancy, or injustice. One recognises that rule where the repugnance arises between the words of the section to be construed and those of some other section in the same Act or in some other Act which is in pari material with it. But I utterly repudiate the notion that it is competent to a judge to modify the language of an Act of Parliament in order to bring it in accordance with his views as to what is right or reasonable.”

In the third place, before reaching his conclusion that, “I hold that regulation 48 (1) operates as from 26 February 1971 to affect the retiring age of officers engaged in the service since that date,” the learned judge invoked two presumptions, the one against taking away vested rights of persons and the other that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective effect than its language renders necessary. I would content myself with a brief comment that the express words of the enactment in question do not warrant the invocation of either presumption. With respect to “vested rights,” holders of judicial service posts falling into the category of the respondent herein unfortunately do not enjoy the same constitutional guarantee or entrenchment of their rights in respect of retirement, leave of absence, gratuity, pension salary, privileges and other conditions of service as their senior counterparts, the judges of the Superior Court of Judicature or, say, the Auditor-General. Compare articles 117 and 172 (2) (b) proviso (1) of the 1969 Constitution (for judges of the Superior Court of Judicature) and articles 135 (ii) and 172 (2) (b) proviso (1) (for the Auditor-General) ‘With articles 120, 122, 172 (2) (b) proviso (ii) and 172 (4) (for other judicial officers, officers and servants of the courts of Ghana). The principal enactment providing for the retirement of inferior judges including the respondent is still the Judicial Service Act, 1960 (C.A. 10), as amended by N.L.C.D. 83, para. 3; and section 31 of C.A. 10 as amended, empowers the Supreme Military Council to make regulations for a wide range of matters affecting them and relating to the administration of Judicial Service generally.

[p.455] of [1979] GLR 444

Before leaving the issue as to the validity of L.I. 1168, I must state that the enabling power has got to be read with a little caution. The amendment effected by the Judicial Service Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 83), enacted that, “The National Liberation Council acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission may by legislative instrument make regulations. . .” It was argued, rightly in our view, that for the expression ‘National Liberation Council “the expression “Supreme Military Council” should be substituted. To that I agree, if only because there is legislation which legitimately leads to the conclusion that the Supreme Military Council is a successor to National Liberation Council.

The same thing, however, cannot be said when one comes to deal with the Judicial Service Commission. Article 119 of the 1969 Constitution established the Judicial Council. Nowhere in Chapter 9 dealing with-the judiciary nor indeed anywhere else in the 1969 Constitution has it been stated-and I am not aware of any other legislation-that the Judicial Council is the successor of the Judicial Service Commission. In my view therefore it is at least arguable whether or not the advice of the Judicial Council was required before an instrument made pursuant to the provisions of section 31 could be clothed with validity.

As a pensionable officer the respondent is apparently subject to the general law contained in the Pensions Ordinance, Cap. 30 (1951 Rev.); and in particular to section 6 thereof which enacts that:

“6. (1) No officer shall have an absolute right to compensation for past services or to pension, gratuity, or other allowance; nor shall anything in this Ordinance affect the right of the

[President] to dismiss any officer at any time and without compensation.”

A terrifying enactment, whose asperity does not appear to have been mollified by any constitutional provision to the contrary under the 1969 Constitution, saving of course such exceptional cases as those of the judges of the Superior Court of Judicature and Auditor-General already mentioned. Nowhere in the 1969 Constitution have judges of the inferior courts, i.e. persons of the respondent’s class, been constitutionally protected from compulsory retirement before a stipulated age. The general law is to be found in the regulations for the time being in force duly passed by the President (S.M.C.). The right of judges of the inferior courts to retire compulsorily at a particular age does not appear to be “vested” in the sense of it being free from all contingencies. It is primarily dependent on the regulations in force at any given time passed under the said enabling enactment by the President.

In my judgment L.I. 1168 is the current legislation controlling the compulsory retirement age of judicial officers in the respondent’s class. I find its wording to be clear and unambiguous; and I hold that it must be interpreted in its ordinary sense, free from the glosses and interpolations placed on it by the learned trial judge. The argument based on inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the enactment is in fact ambiguous or obscure and there are legitimate alternative methods of construction-which is not of the trial judge; and hold that upon a true construction of L.I. 1168 read together with regulation 48 (1) of L.I. 319, the compulsory retiring

[p.456] of [1979] GLR 444 the case here. As already stated, I fully endorse the third interpretation age of 60 has been abolished for all holders of judicial service post on pensionable terms otherwise than on limited engagements-the respondent herein included as from 26 February 1971, irrespective of the date of their first engagement. The new compulsory retiring age for them is, since 26 February 1971, 55.

It must be remarked in passing that Mr. Moore did not support the learned judge’s grounds for holding that the enactment was ambiguous. He rather contented himself with an alleged ambiguity in the phrase “unless the President otherwise directs” appearing in regulation 48 (1), as amended, and submitted that this phrase lends itself to more than one interpretation because the President is thereby enabled to retire officers either below or after 55. I disagree. I find no ambiguity in the phrase quoted. The meaning and intendment are clear and explicit. It provides that in exceptional cases, the President may at his discretion retire an officer compulsorily at an age other than the prescribed age of 55. Mr. Moore’s objection is really not about any inherent ambiguity of language of the phrase, but rather about the uncertain exercise of the President’s exceptional discretion.

In the second place Mr. Moore alleged an ambiguity in the commencement date of L.I. 1168. He wondered whether the effective date affects those already in the service. Here again his complaint is really not about the language of the enactment but about an uncertainty in its application or effect on serving officers. The true position is, as I have already explained, that the new regulations are deemed to have come into effect on 26 February 1971; consequently all those persons who were at that date holding judicial service posts on pensionable terms otherwise than on a limited engagement are caught by the enactment on account of its retrospective commencement date and must compulsorily retire at 55 instead of 60. The respondent clearly falls into the affected category; for he was a holder of just such a judicial service post on pensionable terms on 26 February 1971.

The relevant rule of construction is that whenever the intention is clear that the Act should have a retrospective operation, it must unquestionably be so construed even though the consequences may appear unjust and hard: see Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (10th ed.) p. 222. See also R. v. Oliver [1944] 1 K.B. 68 at p. 76, C.C.A. and Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (4th ed.) at p. 322 quoted by Kennedy L.J. in West v. Gwynne [1911] 2 Ch. 1 at p. 15, C.A.: “that no statute shall be construed so as to have a retrospective operation, unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication.” (The emphasis is mine.) In that case, the English Court of Appeal gave retrospective effect to section 3 of Conveyancing Act of 1892, now repealed, in respect of all leases whether executed before or after the Act in due compliance with the express terms of the enactment.

[p.457] of [1979] GLR 444

For the above reasons, I conclude that the learned trial judge, having correctly upheld L.I.1168 as valid, nevertheless interpreted it wrongly by excluding the applicant (respondent herein) from its operation. In my judgment, (i) the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous; (ii) the enactment was by the express provision of regulation 2 given retrospective commencement date, to wit, it was deemed to have come into force on 26 February 1971; (iii) when the enactment (L.I. 1168) is read together with regulation 48 (1) of L.I. 319 (which it amended), it provides that as at 26 February 1971, any person holding a judicial service post on pensionable terms otherwise than on a limited engagement shall retire from the service on reaching the age of 55 years; (iv) from the record of proceedings it is clear that the applicant-respondent was holding a judicial service post on pensionable terms otherwise than on a limited engagement on 26 February 1971; (v) it is also cleat that he attained the age of 55 on 8 October 1978; (vi) consequently in terms of L.I. 1168 and regulation 48 (1) of L.I. 319, as amended and as already interpreted by me, he was obliged to retire compulsorily from his judicial service post on 8 October 1978; (vii) the appellant’s letters to him (exhibits A and B) calling on him to retire on the said date are in the event not bad in law, neither were they written without authority; (viii) in the circumstances the respondent is not entitled to the orders of certiorari and prohibition or a declaration awarded in his favour by the learned trial judge; (ix) the learned judge erred for the reasons already stated in holding otherwise and in the interpretation he placed on L.I. 1168 and regulation 48 (1) of L.I. 319 as amended.

In view of the conclusion reached by me, it is unnecessary to consider the remaining grounds of appeal urged upon us; nor the part of the judgment dealing with the Cabinet Circular (exhibit 5) and its applicability to the judicial service. The respondent’s compulsory retiring age issue, in my opinion, has been finally resolved by L.I. 1168 promulgated before the institution of these proceedings; and in my view the correct legal construction of that administrative circular is now of only academic interest.

In the event I would allow this appeal, quash the ruling dated 24 November 1978 appealed from, together with the orders and declaration made therein as well as the order as to costs. If the costs have been paid, they must be refunded to the appellant. I would further dismiss the respondent’s application. The appellant. herein would be entitled to his costs in the court below assessed at ¢1,000 and in this court fixed at ¢500.

JUDGMENT OF ANNAN J.A

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

J. D.

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