ALFA ENTERPRISES LTD. vs. PAN AFRICAN TRADING CO. AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 571
18 December 1978 · JIAGGE JA · ≈ 11 min read
[1978] SLR (CA) 8Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Finlay v. Liverpool and Great Western Steamship Co., Ltd. (1870) 23 L.T. 251; 3 Mar. L.C. 487.
(2) Clemens Horst (E.) Co. v. Biddell Brothers [1912] A.C. 18; 81 L.J.K.B. 42; 105 L.T. 563; 28 T.L.R. 42; 56 S.J. 50; 12 Asp.M.L.C. 80; 17 Com.Cas. 55, H.L.
(3) Sanders Brothers v. Maclean & Co. (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 327; 52 L.J.Q.B. 481; 49 L.T. 462; 31 W.R.
698; 5 Asp.M.L.C. 160, C.A.
(4) Craven v. Ryder (1816) 6 Taunt. 433; Marsh. 127; 128 E.R. 1103.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a summary judgment of the High Court in an action by the holders of a bill of lading against the carriers for failure to deliver the goods to them as consignees and owners. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court read by Jiagge J.A.
COUNSEL
E. D. Kom for the appellant.
S. Okudjeto for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.
Jiagge J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. The Nichenen Co., Ltd. of Tokyo, Japan shipped 108 steel envelopes of galvanised iron sheets valued at US $49,769.75 to Tema on the Straat Freedom, a vessel belonging to the first defendant company. The goods were consigned on the bill of lading to Banque Libane Francaise registered in Lebanon. The consignee endorsed the bill of lading to the first plaintiff who in turn endorsed it to the second plaintiff through the Standard Bank of Ghana Ltd.
On presentation of the bill of lading by the second plaintiff it was discovered that the first defendant had already released the goods to Alfa Enterprises Ltd., a company indicated on the bill of lading as notifying party. The third defendant signed an indemnity of ¢5,000 for the release of the goods which were subsequently traced to the second and fourth defendants.
The second defendant averred in his defence that he had purchased the goods from Alfa Enterprises Ltd. The fourth defendant in his defence, denied that he ever purchased steel envelopes of galvanised iron sheets but admitted that he purchased 1,500 bundles of Star Brand corrugated iron sheets from the second defendant at the cost of ¢25,560. The second defendant applied for an order for a joinder of Alfa Enterprises Ltd. as co-defendant.
Alfa Enterprises Ltd. also applied to be joined as co-defendants. The court in dismissing the application held that the applicants had been struck off the register of companies, that the applicants took no action to have their names restored on the register but formed a new company which purported to take over the assets and liabilities of the old company. The court held further that the new company could not properly be joined as a party to the suit because it was not in existence when the goods
[p.573] of [1979] GLR 571 were shipped and could not have any rights in the iron sheets at that time; further that section 261 (5) of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179), did not apply to the circumstances of this case.
The name Alfa Enterprises Ltd. by a ruling of the High Court was restored in the register of companies and the application for joinder was later granted making Alfa Enterprises Ltd. and George Djabanor, as director of the company, co-defendants.
The co-defendants in their defence averred that the first plaintiff was the parent company in Lebanon of Establishment Tanios Saba & Co. (Ghana) Ltd. and that Mr. Ashkar, a manager of the first plaintiff company was also a senior manager of Establishment Tanios Saba & Co., all the orders of which were placed by the first plaintiff and that the goods in question were shipped in execution of an agreement between the co-defendants and Establishment Tanios Saba & Co. (Ghana) Ltd. The co-defendants therefore claimed ownership of the goods.
The co-defendants averred further that, in order to save rent accruing at the harbour due to the delay of Establishment Tanios Saba & Co. (Ghana) Ltd., they obtained the consent of the third defendant to take delivery of the goods by signing a joint indemnity in that behalf. The co- defendants averred further that the first plaintiff knew of the agreement between Establishment Tanios Saba & Co. and themselves and that the endorsement of the bill of lading to the second plaintiff was an unlawful act. The co-defendants admitted selling the goods to the second defendants who in turn sold to the fourth defendants. The co-defendants averred that the second plaintiff had no cause of action and that the first and second plaintiffs were not entitled to their claim.
On applications made by the second and fourth defendants to strike out the writ as it disclosed no reasonable cause of action against them the second defendant succeeded and the writ was struck off against him but the motion by the fourth defendant was dismissed—the issue raised on behalf of the fourth defendant that the action would have been proper only if it had been in conversion was held by the court to be an issue to be resolved arising out of the pleadings. The court granted applications from the plaintiffs to withdraw the action against the second and fourth defendants and the case against them was accordingly dismissed.
On the application of the plaintiffs for an order for judgment “by virtue of the admissions in the pleadings and or that the ownership of the goods is as evidenced by the bill of lading,” the court invited legal arguments (which the court considered would dispose of the matter) on the significance of the bill of lading. The judge held that the issue of whether or not there was a breach of contract could be taken up in a claim for damages.
The trial court finally ruled that the first defendant having failed to deliver the iron sheets to the plaintiffs or assigns were liable to them and judgment was awarded to the plaintiffs against the first defendant. On the application of the first defendant for judgment on the indemnity given by the first co-defendant, the court held, “Since the co-defendants agreed to indemnify the defendants in this case there is no opposition to
[p.574] of [1979] GLR 571
their application for judgment.” Which was accordingly awarded in favour of the first defendant.
The co-defendants appealed to this court against the ruling of the court below on the grounds: “(a) whether or not the second defendant received or converted 108 steel envelopes of galvanised iron sheets shipped by the first plaintiff per the vessel Straat freedom; (b) whether or not the third defendants signed an indemnity in respect of the goods claimed; and (c) whether or not the third defendant was negligent in executing the said indemnity.”
Counsel on behalf of the co-defendant-appellants argued that mere possession of the bill of lading was not enough to qualify the consignee as the owner of the goods and that cognisance should be determined by the true intentions of the parties as to who should take possession of the goods. Counsel for the appellants admitted that there was no transfer of the bill of lading to the appellants and that the bill was endorsed by the consignee to the first respondents.
Counsel argued that the principle in Finlay v. Liverpool and Great Western Steamship Co., Ltd. (1870) 23 L.T. 251 should apply.
Counsel argued further that the significance on endorsement of the bill of lading that the co-defendants be notified was that the co-defendants were persons with an interest in the goods and that the court should have taken evidence to determine nature of that interest. Counsel submitted that the trial judge erred in adopting the summary procedure under Order 25, r. 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). Counsel argued that the summary procedure should be used only in plain and obvious cases and that pleadings indicated that the issues were complicated.
In reply, counsel for the respondents argued that the action was one between the carrier and the consignee and that any claim that was irrelevant to the issues before the court should not be admitted. That the appellant on his pleadings failed to establish a prima facie case in support of his claim. The claim of the appellant that he was owner of the goods merely because he negotiated with a of company in Ghana to buy such goods could not substantiate a claim of ownership and negotiations to purchase did not amount to purchase. Counsel argued further that a notifying address did not raise a presumption of interest in the goods nor did it confer any title on the person to be notified.
“The right to have possession of the goods passes to the transferee of the bill of lading, that is the symbol of the goods, and a transfer of it is, symbolically, a transfer of the possession of the goods themselves. Until the goods have been delivered, a delivery of the duly indorsed bill of lading operates, as between the transferor and the transferee, and all who claim through them, as a physical delivery of the goods would do.”
Carver on Carriage of Goods by Sea (10th ed.), pp. 710-711.
In E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Biddell Brothers [1912] A.C. 18, H.L. there was a contract for the sale of hops shipped c.i.f (cost, insurance
[p.575] of [1979] GLR 571
freight). There was no provision in the contract for payment against shipping documents. The buyer contended that the time for payment did not arise until there was physical delivery and acceptance of the goods when they reached their destination and the buyer had had an opportunity of examining them. According to section 28 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict., c. 71), payment is to be against delivery. The issue to be resolved by the court was “when is there delivery of goods which are on board ship?” Is the position different from delivery of goods on land? The House of Lords per Earl Loreburn L.C. at pp. 22-23 resolved the issue as follows:
“The answer is that delivery of the bill of lading when the goods are at sea can be treated as delivery of the goods themselves, this law being so old that I think it is quite unnecessary to refer to authority for it.”
Bowen L.J. in Sanders Brothers v. Maclean & Co. (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 327 at p. 341, C.A. also said:
“the indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading operates as a symbolical delivery of the cargo. Property in the goods passes by such indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading, whenever it is the intention of the parties that the property should pass, just as under similar circumstances the property would pass by an actual delivery of the goods. And for the purpose of passing such property in the goods and completing the title of the indorsee to full possession thereof, the bill of lading, until complete delivery of the cargo has been made on shore to someone rightfully claiming under it, remains in force as a symbol, and carries with it not only the full ownership of the goods, but also all rights created by the contract of carriage between the shipper and the shipowner. It is a key which in the hands of a rightful owner is intended to unlock the door of the warehouse floating or fixed, in which the goods may chance to be.”
However, unlike a bill of exchange or a promissory note, a bill of lading cannot like a negotiable instrument pass to a bona fide transferee for valuable consideration without regard to the title of the transferor. The transferor cannot transfer to another any better title to the goods than the one he has. If the transferor had no title then his endorsement on the bill of lading cannot convey any title. In Finlay v. Liverpool and Great Western Steamship Co., Ltd. (supra) submitted by the appellants counsel for our consideration, the goods were shipped by someone who had no right nor title to them but obtained and negotiated a bill of lading which he endorsed to a transferee. The court held that the bill of lading passed no property to the endorsee, that the goods were never, in fact the property of the shipper and never ceased to be the property of the true owner and that upon the intervention of the true owner the latter was entitled to receive the goods from the shipowner who was thereupon relieved from the liability of delivering them according to the bill of lading.
[p.576] of [1979] GLR 571
The issues in Finlay v. Liverpool are in no way the same as the issues before this court. Nowhere was it alleged that the shipper had no right nor title, nor that the consignees, the bank in Lebanon, had no right nor title to pass. A notifying address in no way becomes a consignee, on the bill of lading. The issues to be resolved in the court below were between the consignee and the carrier. The allegation by the co-defendant that he negotiated with a company that was not a party in the agreement between carrier and consignee, to purchase the goods was completely irrelevant to the issues before the court and was properly ignored.
The issues before the court were clear and straightforward, the carriers delivered the goods at their own risk to the co-defendants who were neither in possession of the bill of lading nor were they consignees. In Craven v. Ryder (1816) 6 Taunt. 433, an intended purchaser of sugar was to pay for it and be given a receipt which alone would entitle him to possession. He however improperly obtained a bill of lading without the receipt and proceeded to assign the sugar to his assignee who paid for it. The court held that the assignee had no title and the carrier was liable for signing the bill of lading without the receipt.
The pleadings were clear on the issues to be resolved between the consignee and the carrier. There was no need, therefore, for evidence to be taken and the summary procedure adopted was the most appropriate. We find no merit in this appeal and we dismiss it accordingly.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
J. D.
