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[1978] SLR (HC) 10High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

ADAMPTEY vs. STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION [1979] GLR 387

18 October 1978 · APATU-PLANGE J · ≈ 17 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 10
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OSCOLAADAMPTEY v STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION [1979] GLR 387 [1978] SLR (HC) 10
APAADAMPTEY v STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION [1979] GLR 387, [1978] SLR (HC) 10 (Ghana).
BluebookADAMPTEY v STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION [1979] GLR 387, [1978] SLR (HC) 10 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Fodwoo v. Northern Assurance Co., Ltd. [1962] 1 G.L.R. 296.

(2) Liesbosch, Dredger v. Edison, S.S. [1933] A.C. 449; 102 L.J.P. 73; 149 L.T. 49; 49 T.L.R. 289; 38 Com.Cas. 267; 18 Asp.M.L.C. 380; 45 Ll.L.Rep. 123; sub nom. The Edison [1933] All E.R. Rep.

144, H.L.

(3) Borketey v. Achinivu [1966] G.L.R. 92, S.C.

(4) Braimah v. Royal Exchange Assurance [1971] 2 G.L.R. 340, C.A.

(5) West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by an insured against his insurers for the pre-accident value of his vehicle and loss of earnings. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

A. Asante-Tannor for the plaintiff.

Jonas Lamptey for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF APATU-PLANGE J.

In this case, the plaintiff is claiming against the defendants: (a) the sum of ¢2,600 being the pre-accident value of Morris bus No. GO 2380 which was damaged through an accident on 10 February 1973; (b) loss of earnings from 19 February 1973 up to the date of judgment at an average rate of ¢20 per day. The defendants denied liability.

The facts of this case briefly put were as follows: The plaintiff is the owner of Morris bus No. GO 2380 and the defendants are a corporation [p.389] of [1979] GLR 387-395 carrying on, among others, the business of motor vehicle insurance. On 8 January 1973 the plaintiff entered into a contract of insurance with the defendant-corporation whereby a comprehensive policy No. C426 1973 was issued to cover the plaintiff’s vehicle for a period of three months commencing 8 January 1973 and ending on 6 March 1973. On 18 February 1973, the plaintiff’s vehicle was involved in an accident and the vehicle was extensively damaged.

The plaintiff then informed the defendants of this, and the vehicle was then towed to the workshop of Lodestar Engineering Co., Ltd. in Accra for repairs to be effected. Subsequently the defendants wrote to Lodestar Engineering Co., Ltd. requesting for estimates and the report which the engineering company sent with the estimates to the defendants pointed out clearly that it would be uneconomical to carry out the repairs. This letter which is exhibit B in this case will be referred to later in this judgment. Suffice it to say that in view of this letter the plaintiff approached the defendants and requested that in the circumstances his claim should be treated as a total loss and that he should therefore be paid the pre-accident value of his vehicle which was assessed by the engineers in their exhibit B as ¢2,600.

The defendants however, refused and insisted on having the vehicle repaired. This line of action taken by the defendants, according to the plaintiff, occasioned unnecessarily long delay in carrying out the repairs which repairs could not also be satisfactorily done. When the plaintiff found that the repairs could not be satisfactorily carried out and that it was therefore causing unnecessary delay, he again wrote to the defendants to pay him the pre-accident value of the vehicle to enable him to purchase another vehicle as early as possible since he was losing his only means of income. The defendants again paid no heed to this request with the result that the plaintiff could not take delivery of his vehicle which was then not satisfactorily repaired and has since not been able to do so. The plaintiff therefore mounted this present action claiming the reliefs above mentioned.

At the close of the pleadings, the issues that were drawn up and agreed upon for determination were:

“(1) Whether or not the repairs to the plaintiff’s vehicle were satisfactorily done.

(2) Whether or not the plaintiff informed the defendants about parts which were not satisfactorily repaired.

(3) Whether the plaintiff has suffered any loss of earnings by reason of failure on the part of the defendants to cause satisfactory repairs to be made on the vehicle.”

The plaintiff in his evidence explained that as soon as the accident occurred he promptly informed the defendants who requested him to complete a form which he did. He said later the defendants caused the vehicle to be towed from the scene of the accident to the workshop of Lodestar Engineering Co., Ltd. in Accra for the necessary repairs to be carried out and the defendants informed the plaintiff of this arrangement.

[p.390] of [1979] GLR 387-395

Now the evidence further revealed that on 17 April the Lodestar Engineering Company Limited wrote to the defendants informing them that they had found it uneconomical to repair the vehicle and therefore assessed the pre-accident value at ¢2,600 and the salvage at ¢800: see exhibit B. The evidence of the defendants’ first witness, a Mr. Adjaye, who was then the claims manager for the defendant-corporation, was that on receipt of exhibit B, the defendants were not satisfied that the vehicle was uneconomical to repair, so they requested R. P. Baffour and Associates, their external motor surveyors to have the vehicle reexamined. According to the defendants’ first witness, they later received a report from R. P. Baffour and Associates that the damage was repairable and economical to repair.

Counsel for the plaintiff strongly challenged this evidence, but despite this the defendants failed to tender the alleged report issued by the said R. P. Baffour and Associates, neither did they call them to testify to that effect. Since the said R. P. Baffour and Associates are a firm of repute working as external surveyors for an organisation like the State Insurance Corporation, it seems to me that they should have been called to give evidence and tender their report especially where their said report is in direct conflict with an earlier report, exhibit B, on the same vehicle issued by Lodestar Engineering Company Limited. This no doubt would have given the plaintiff, who is relying on exhibit B, opportunity to cross-examine them. As it turned out, this court was deprived of the benefit of the evidence of R. P. Baffour and Associates on the condition of the vehicle. In civil cases, he who asserts must prove, and the defendants therefore failed to prove that R. P. Baffour and Associates ever examined and reported on the damaged vehicle that it was economical to repair. The plaintiff however tendered exhibit B from Lodestar Engineering Co., Ltd. establishing clearly that they found the vehicle to be uneconomical to repair. This evidence I accept was true as is borne out by exhibit B.

There was further evidence from the plaintiff that despite exhibit B the defendants insisted on having the vehicle repaired and on 3 May 1973, they wrote to Lodestar Engineering Co., Ltd. asking them to proceed with the repair works: see exhibit D. Following this the Lodestar Engineering Co., Ltd. submitted to the defendants, the estimated cost of the repairs, and the defendants sanctioned the repairs to be carried out and the plaintiff to sign the garage’s “satisfactory note” on completion of the repairs and on being satisfied with same. The evidence of the plaintiff was that when he was informed that the repair works were completed and he went to collect his vehicle he found that repairs had not been satisfactorily done, so he refused to sign the said satisfactory note and collect his vehicle.

On 6 September 1973, therefore the plaintiff wrote to the defendants informing them that the repair works had not been satisfactorily done and also that the complete distributor and reverse gear were not available for replacement on his vehicle and that as this was delaying the repair works he should be paid the pre-accident value of his vehicle to enable him

[p.391] of [1979] GLR 387-395

to purchase another one. This complaint of the plaintiff is clearly supported by exhibit 1 tendered by the defendants themselves. In that exhibit which was a letter from Lodestar Engineering to the defendants dated 16 August 1973, they stated clearly that the complete distributer and reverse gear were not available for replacement. This exhibit 1 alone defeats the defendants’ contention that the vehicle was satisfactorily repaired and that the plaintiff refused to collect the vehicle.

We may not be vehicle mechanics and so may have little or no knowledge about what is required of a vehicle before it can be described as roadworthy. But commonsense alone can tell us that a vehicle without a sound complete distributer and reverse gear cannot be said to be a roadworthy vehicle. If in the events that arose therefore Lodestar Engineering were unable to obtain new reverse gear and complete distributer to replace the damaged ones then the plaintiff was perfectly entitled to refuse to collect the vehicle on the grounds that it had not been satisfactorily repaired. That conduct of the plaintiff therefore cannot be said to be unreasonable.

It seems to me that when in August 1973, i.e. six months after the date of the accident, Lodestar Engineering Company Limited wrote to the defendants that they could not still obtain certain spares for replacement, the defendants should have taken steps to pay the plaintiff the pre-accident value of his vehicle as was pointed out by Lodestar Engineering Company Limited from the beginning and also as was requested by the plaintiff in his letter of 6 September 1973. The defendants however failed to pay the plaintiff the said pre-accident value of his vehicle and further failed to take steps to ensure that the unavailable spare parts were obtained and replaced to make the vehicle roadworthy. The defendants’ insistence or contention that the plaintiff should have collected the vehicle even in that condition, and despite exhibit 1, amounted to nothing short of gross disregard to the claim of’ the plaintiff and the loss that he was suffering.

Learned counsel for the defendants in his address submitted that the plaintiff’s action is frivolous and misconceived. He contended that it will be a most dangerous precedent for an insured to attempt to claim from his own insurers loss of use or earnings for his vehicle undergoing repairs. This submission did not find favour with this court because it is plain that the contract of insurance between the plaintiff and the defendants gives the defendants the option to repair and consequently once the insurers opted to repair, any subsequent breach of duty to repair the vehicle satisfactorily gave the plaintiff a cause of action to sue the insurers for that breach.

Secondly it is common knowledge that before any insurance company decides to repair a damaged vehicle, it first has to consider an engineer’s report on the damaged vehicle. In the instant case the evidence was clear that the engineer’s report from Lodestar Engineering Company Limited pointed out that the repairs were uneconomical to carry out.

[p.392] of [1979] GLR 387-395

For purpose of clarity I reproduce below the contents of the said engineer’s report from Lodestar as contained in exhibit B:

“MOTOR CLAIMS AR 965/73 INSURED MR. J. K. ADAMPTEY-MORRIS BUS NO. GO 2380 We have examined the above vehicle and found it uneconomical to repair. We therefore assess pre-accident value to be ¢2,600 the salvage to be ¢800.

We hope the foregoing will meet your requirement.

Thank you, Yours faithfully, Lodestar Engineering Company Limited.”

Now despite the above report the defendants insisted on repairing the damaged vehicle. This therefore implied that the defendants would see to it that however extensive the damage, the repair work is carried out satisfactorily. This the defendants failed to do. The result then was that the defendants committed a breach of their contractual duty to repair the vehicle satisfactorily.

There was further evidence that the plaintiff on realising that the defendants were unable to repair the vehicle satisfactorily wrote to them asking that his claim be treated then as a total loss so that he could be paid the pre-accident value of the vehicle as recommended by Lodestar Engineering but the defendants refused to heed this: see exhibit 3. It seems to me that this exhibit 3 demonstrated clearly an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to mitigate his damages but the defendants refused to co-operate. In all the circumstances of this case therefore the plaintiff acquired a right in law to sue for loss of profits occasioned by the conduct of the defendants for failing to pay the plaintiff the pre-accident value of the vehicle.

Counsel for the defendants further sought to impress upon the court that the workshop where the plaintiff’s damaged vehicle was sent, i.e. Lodestar Engineering Co., Ltd., was the plaintiff’s own approved garage and so they the defendants could neither cause nor fail to have the plaintiff’s vehicle repaired satisfactorily by that workshop. The plaintiff on the other hand contended otherwise. He maintained that it was the defendant-corporation which caused his vehicle to be towed to the Lodestar Engineering workshop after he had reported the accident to them. I am inclined to accept the plaintiff’s story as the truth because of the nature of the communication that subsequently transpired between the defendants and Lodestar Engineering Co., Ltd. But granting even, that the workshop was the plaintiff’s own choice, the defendants eventually approved of it by negotiating with the workshop to have the vehicle

[p.393] of [1979] GLR 387-395

repaired, and this court does not see how that should affect the right of the plaintiff in the present claim.

Counsel for the defendants further submitted that the plaintiff’s action is misconceived and premature. In support of this he argued that the plaintiff ought first to have invoked the arbitration clause under clause 8 of the conditions enumerated under the policy, exhibit 4. He maintained that since the plaintiff did not avail himself of this clause which is a condition precedent to the institution of the present action also within the prescribed period as contained in the policy, he is disabled from suing the defendants. It is indeed surprising that counsel for the defendants should for the first time raise the invocation of the arbitration clause in his address. I say so because this arbitration clause was never pleaded and furthermore was never raised by them throughout the trial. On the other hand the defendants chose to contest this case and in fact contested it on the merits. In the circumstances, it seems to me that it will be palpably unjust and too late in the day for this court to allow them to seek any protection under the arbitration clause.

In this regard, I refer to the case of Fodwoo v. Northern Assurance Co., Ltd. [1962] 1 G.L.R. 296. In that case the plaintiff insured the goods in his store with the defendant-company against theft through buglary or house-breaking. Later the store was broken into and large quantities of his goods were stolen. In consequence of the said theft the plaintiff submitted a claim for £2,800, the full amount for which his goods were insured. The defendants repudiated liability in consequence whereof the plaintiff instituted an action claiming £2,800 as part of the loss he has suffered. The defendants-company denied liability on many grounds one of which was that: “the claim should first have been submitted to arbitration as contained in the insurance policy.” Apart from pleading the arbitration clause the defendants led no evidence whatsoever nor advanced any arguments in support of it. They rather took full part in the proceedings on the merits. The court therefore held at p. 298 that:

“As far as the arbitration clause is concerned, the defendants did nothing more beyond pleading it, and no arguments were advanced by them on it. Having taken full part in the proceedings on the merits, the defendants cannot now be heard to claim the benefit of the arbitration clause.”

It is significant to note that even in the above-cited case the defendants pleaded the arbitration clause but only failed to lead any evidence or advance any arguments on it, and yet the court denied them the right to claim the benefit of the arbitration clause. In the instant case the position is worse because the said arbitration clause was even never pleaded. I hold therefore that the defendants herein cannot now be heard to claim the benefit of the arbitration clause.

In the result, I hold that the plaintiff’s claim should succeed and he is entitled to judgment. The plaintiff is claiming the sum of ¢2,600 being the pre-accident value of his Morris bus and also loss of profit or earnings from 19 February 1973 up to the date of judgment at an average rate of ¢20 per day.

[p.194] of [1979] GLR 387-395

Now it is not in dispute that up to the time plaintiff gave evidence in this court in this case, he had not had his vehicle satisfactorily repaired, despite an attempt by Lodestar Engineering Company Limited to repair same as was reported by the defendants. It seems to me therefore that this fact alone lends support to the report issued by Lodestar Engineering that it was uneconomical to repair the vehicle. In The Edison [1933] All E.R. Rep. 144 at p. 160, the House of Lords laid down a proposition of law which has since been regarded as good law and it is that: “the dominant rule of law is the principle of restitutio in integrum, and subsidiary rules can be justified only if they give effect to that rule.” This principle was reiterated differently by Apaloo J.S.C., as he then was, in reading the judgment of the former Supreme Court in the case of Borketey v. Achinivu [1966] G.L.R. 92 which was an appeal from the High Court. He said at p. 94: “Differently put, the principle appears to be that the plaintiff is entitled to receive as damages such a sum of money as will place him in as good a position as he would have been if the accident had not occurred.” In another part of the same judgment at p. 96 he also stated as follows:

“In my opinion, the true rule of law is what the learned judge himself quoted from Charlesworth on Negligence (4th ed.), p. 532, para. 1255 to wit: ‘Where a chattel is completely destroyed or so damaged as not to be worth repairing, the measure of damages is the value of the chattel together with any consequential loss following on the destruction of the chattel.’ By this principle, where the chattel is a private car which is permanently lost to its owner, the consequential loss will be the cost of hiring alternative transport until the procurement of a new car and where the car is a taxi, the consequential loss will be the loss of earnings until such time that another taxi can reasonably be obtained.

Accordingly, in my judgment, the plaintiff was entitled not only to the market value of the taxicab at the date of the accident, but also to the profits he would have made had the car remained on the road.”

Counsel for the defendants invited the court to consider the case of Braimah v. Royal Exchange Assurance [1971] 2 G.L.R. 340, C.A. and hold that the defendants were not bound to have the plaintiff’s vehicle repaired within a reasonable time. It seems to me that the facts of the present case are slightly different from the Braimah case. This is so because in that case the engineer’s report was to the effect that it was economical to repair the vehicle. In the instant case despite the engineer’s report that it was uneconomical to repair, the defendants insisted upon repairing it with the result that lack of spare parts made it impossible for the defendants to complete the repairs within a reasonable time. Admittedly if the defendants had adhered to the engineer’s report they would have immediately paid the plaintiff the pre-accident value of his vehicle and he would have also purchased another one and put it on the road. It is for this reason that this court is unable to apply the decision in the Braimah case to this instant case. Now in West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78, C.A. it was held that (as stated in the headnote at p. 80): “Where an

[p.395] of [1979] GLR 387-395

income earning vehicle is damaged beyond economic repair, the period for which loss of profit is recoverable is a reasonable time depending on the circumstances of each case. What is a reasonable time is a question for the discretion of the court.” In the instant case, the accident occurred on 18 February 1973 and the vehicle was soon after towed to the workshop. On the insistence of the defendants that the vehicle should be repaired the plaintiff had no alternative but to wait for it. It was not until August 1973 that the engineers wrote to the defendants that they could not get certain parts to finish up the repairs: see exhibit 1. On 6 September 1973, the plaintiff wrote to the defendants complaining of the delay in repairing the vehicle satisfactorily due to lack of certain spares: see exhibit 3. In October 1973, the defendants wrote back to the plaintiff to come down for a brief discussion on the matter: see exhibit E. Thus it was after October 1973, that the plaintiff realised that the vehicle could not be satisfactorily repaired. He was therefore to look for a new one. From his own letter, exhibit 3, it was evident that such Morris buses were available on the market and if the plaintiff had the means, he would have bought a new one soon after realising in October 1973 that his vehicle could not be satisfactorily repaired. It would then have taken about four weeks to have the vehicle ready to be put on the road. Allowing for delay it would take about two months to replace the vehicle. I hold therefore that the loss of earnings must be reckoned from the date of the accident, i.e. 18 February 1973 up to two months after 6 October 1973, i.e. December 1973.

The plaintiff stated that he was earning an average of ¢20 a day, in plying with his Morris bus as a passenger vehicle. I do not think an average of ¢20 a day is an unreasonable amount for a passenger bus to earn in 1973 and I allow this figure. The loss of profits therefore from 18 February 1973 to December 1973 covers a period of ten and a half months, i.e. 315 days at ¢20 a day. This comes to ¢6,300. The evidence is clear that the pre-accident value of the vehicle was put at ¢2,600 and the plaintiff is entitled to this amount too.

There will therefore be judgment for the plaintiff against the defendants in the total sum of ¢8,900. This case was commenced in 1973, and had had not less than 52 adjournments. It seems to me that this is a proper case to award substantial costs. I therefore assess the costs at ¢1,200.

DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff with costs.

L.F.A.

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