KPORFOR AND ANOTHER vs. SOSU [1979] GLR 416
24 October 1978 · LAMPTEY J · ≈ 15 min read
[1978] SLR (HC) 25Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Asumah v. Khair [1959] G.L.R. 353. C.A.
(2) Sackitey’s Caveat, Re [1962] 1 G.L.R. 180.
(3) Afrifa v. Class-Peter [1975] 1 G.L.R. 359, CA.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from an award of damages in an action for breach of promise of marriage at customary law.
COUNSEL
Amesimeku for the appellants.
Gikunoo for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF LAMPTEY J.
In the court below the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter called the plaintiff) sued the defendants-appellants (hereinafter called the defendants) jointly and severally and claimed the sum of ¢200 being damages for breach of marriage agreement. The particulars of the claim were set out in extension language following:
“The first defendant agreed to marry the plaintiff and upon this agreement directed the plaintiff to consult the second defendant, the father of the first defendant, who also agreed that the first defendant should marry the plaintiff and accepted all the required head moneys from the plaintiff in accordance with customary marriage rules. That after the plaintiff had offered all the required expenses, the first defendant refused to come to the plaintiff as his wife upon the advice of the second defendant.”
He also claimed the sum of ¢137 being head money and expenses made on the first defendant.
After the trial magistrate had heard all the evidence he entered judgment for the plaintiff against the defendants and condemned the defendants in general damages of ¢100 and special damages of ¢134. The plaintiff was also awarded costs of ¢20.85. The defendants, aggrieved by the judgment, appealed to this court. The judgment of the lower court was attacked on a number of grounds which raised serious issues of law.
The first ground of appeal complained that the trial magistrate failed to make a finding on the issue of the capacity of the first defendant to marry. Mr. Amesimeku contended that there was evidence to show and establish that the first defendant was at all material times a married woman and not a femme sole. The first defendant therefore lacked capacity to contract another marriage when there was in existence a valid marriage between her and one Togbolo. Counsel for the defendants submitted that if the trial magistrate had made a finding that the first defendant was a married woman, he would have found further that any agreement on the
[p.418] of [1979] GLR 416 part of the first defendant to marry was contrary to customary law and therefore unenforceable.
In my view the issue whether or not the first defendant was a married woman at the material time is crucial to the success or failure of the plaintiff’s claim. The trial magistrate was in duty bound to resolve that issue one way or another. It is trite law that marriage can only be contracted between two parties each of whom has capacity to contract that marriage. Whether or not a person has capacity to contract a marriage is a matter of law. On the capacity of a woman to marry or be married this is how Sarbah put it in his Fanti Customary Laws (3rd ed.) at p. 46: “He who desires a woman, whether maiden or widow, in marriage, must apply to her family . . . “ (The emphasis is mine.) It seems to me fairly clear from the above passage that the woman whose hand is sought in marriage must be either a maiden or a widow. It cannot be doubted that a woman who is already married and therefore not divorced lacks capacity to contract another marriage.
In the instant case the defendants stated that there had never been any agreement on their part consenting to a marriage between the first defendant and the plaintiff. The defendants’ case was that the first defendant was at all material times a married woman with one child of that marriage.
The plaintiff’s case was that the first defendant was a single woman and that pursuant to consent given him by the second defendant, he the plaintiff, fully performed due and necessary custom resulting in marriage between the first defendant and himself. The conduct of the first defendant in refusing to move into the matrimonial home amounted to a breach of the marriage agreement. It was the case of the plaintiff that it was the second defendant who induced and counselled the first defendant to stay away from the matrimonial home.
Was there evidence from which the trial magistrate could resolve the issue of the capacity of the first defendant? On the record there was ample evidence. First, then, the evidence from the plaintiff himself. This is what the plaintiff told the lower court in his evidence-in-chief:
“The second defendant approved of the marriage, but informed me that the girl was married to someone who did not perform the necessary customary marriage and therefore he is prepared to give the girl up in marriage to me and therefore requested I should perform the custom in full.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Under cross-examination by counsel for the defendants on this very issue the plaintiff made the following reply, “There was no occasion the second defendant told me the first defendant was married. It is not true the second defendant told me the first defendant was married.”
There can be no doubt that the plaintiff had not told the court one consistent story on this vital issue. It is clear from the evidence-in-chief of the plaintiff that he was told in precise language that the first defendant was not a maiden. In my view having been informed of this fact, the plaintiff ought to have advised himself. I do not believe the second
[p.419] of [1979] GLR 416 defendant, in spite of the warning he gave to the plaintiff concerning the first defendant’s capacity, went on and advised the plaintiff to come forward and perform custom in respect of the first defendant.
The view I hold is buttressed by other evidence on record. This is the evidence of the first defendant: “During my confinement to sick bed the plaintiff paid me regular visits as a friend. On one occasion my uncle [the second defendant] took objection to his visits and warned him of my being a married woman. . .”(The emphasis is mine.) Then there is the evidence of the second defendant:
“Following that [visit] the plaintiff again came and sat next to the first defendant. But this time I could not control my feeling and I protested to the plaintiff about his conduct to the first defendant. I also pointed out to the plaintiff that the first defendant was married and he should not seduce her.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
From the above pieces of evidence it is plain that there was some kind of relationship between the plaintiff and the first defendant which brought them together as often as possible. Both the first and second defendants freely and truthfully volunteered this crucial evidence. I do not therefore see any reason why I should reject and disbelieve the equally vital evidence from each of them that on one occasion the plaintiff was told that the first defendant was a married woman. I am satisfied on the evidence on record that the plaintiff was warned by the second defendant that the first defendant was a married woman. I do not believe the statement of the plaintiff under cross-examination that the second defendant never told him that the first defendant was a married woman.
In my view the failure of the trial magistrate to consider this piece of vital and crucial evidence on the issue of the capacity of the first defendant to enter into a contract of marriage and to proceed to make a finding thereon is fatal to the whole judgment. In conclusion I find that the plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have known that the first defendant was at all material times a married woman and not a maiden. The first defendant therefore lacked capacity to contract another marriage while her earlier marriage remained undissolved. I find the trial magistrate erred in law in holding that there was breach of an agreement to marry. The appeal against that finding succeeds.
The next ground of appeal was that the trial magistrate misdirected himself on the customary law to wit, consent to marry must and ought to be given by the family of the man and the family of the woman. Counsel submitted that such consent as the customary law required and deemed satisfactory must not be given by the individual intending to marry each other.
On this matter I can do no better than quote the first holding of the headnote in the case of Asumah v. Khair [1959] G.L.R. 353 at p. 354 C.A.:
“(1) that where a man desires to marry, he applies to the woman’s family for consent, taking to them certain customary gifts which vary according to his means. If the family give their consent by accepting the gifts, that concludes a marriage valid in customary law.”
[p.420] of [1979] GLR 416
Then in the case of Re Caveat by Clara Sackitey [1962] 1 G.L.R. 180 Ollennu J. (as he then was) on this issue, that is, the essentials of a valid customary marriage expressed himself thus at pp. 181-182:
“(b) consent by the family of the man that he should have the woman to his wife; that consent may be actual, i.e. by the family of the man going to the family of the woman formally to ask for her hand . . .
(c) consent of the family of the woman that she should have the man for her husband, this consent too may be actual, i.e. where the family of the woman accept drinks offered by the family of the man…”
(The emphasis is mine.)
It is important to point out that the Clara Sackitey case was followed with approval by Francois J.A. in the case of Afrifa v. Class-Peter [1975] 1 G.L.R. 359 at pp. 363-364, C.A.
In the instant case nowhere was there evidence that the family of the plaintiff went to the family of the first defendant formally to ask for the hand of the first defendant in marriage. The evidence on record showed quite clearly that it was the plaintiff himself accompanied by his friend Gabriel Wormenor, his first witness, who went to the second defendant alone and from the second defendant alone sought the hand of the first defendant in marriage.
Again on the occasion the customary gifts were sent by the plaintiff, the evidence on record was that the messengers were sent by the plaintiff and not the family of the plaintiff to the second defendant and not the family of the first defendant. It is therefore plain for all to see that the plaintiff failed to follow and observe the essential requirements of a valid customary marriage. The trial magistrate was plainly wrong in finding that there was a valid customary marriage between the plaintiff and the first defendant. The appeal on this issue therefore succeeds.
Mr. Amesimeku’s next ground of appeal was that the trial magistrate erred in law when he held that an action for damages for breach of promise to marry was known to the customary law. He referred to and relied on the case of Afrifa v. Class-Peter (supra) at pp. 361-362 and submitted that the trial magistrate was wrong in awarding the plaintiff ¢100 general damages. Mr. Gikunoo for the plaintiff submitted that breach of promise to marry was actionable at customary law and that damages were a remedy. He also referred to and relied on Afrifa v. Class-Peter (supra) at p. 362.
I have carefully and critically read the case of Afrifa v. Class-Peter. I am left in no doubt that the view of the Court of Appeal as can be gleaned from the judgment of Francois J.A. at p. 361 was that the point “is arguable.” I do not think the learned judge decided the issue one way or another. This is how Francois J.A. stated the position in Afrifa v. Class-Peter at p. 361:
“counsel for the respondent essayed to defend his pleadings by asserting that breach of promise of marriage was unknown in customary law . . . After propounding such a profound legal point, counsel’s subsequent diffidence in advancing the submission, was to say the least, disappointing. No serious foray was made to support
[p.421] of [1979] GLR 416 the argument with authority, and the forensic spring dried up even before it could well up.
The point, however, is interesting and worth fuller consideration at a more opportune occasion. Meanwhile it will suffice to say that it is arguable.”
The learned judge at p. 362 quoted from Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Laws (3rd ed.) at p. 46 as follows:
“Nor is there any remedy for breach of promise of marriage. If a man fail to marry a woman for whose hand he had applied, or if such woman refuse to marry him, or her family withdraw their consent, no action arises, and no damages are incurred by the person in default, who, however, forfeits any consawment or anything given to the other.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Francois J.A. at the same page sought to put the record straight by the more recent statement of the customary law position on this issue by the following quotation at p. 223 from the text-book Essays in African Law published in 1960 by Professor Allott:
“Breach of a bare promise to marry which has not led to the establishment of the bethrothal-status often involves no legal liability to compensate.
Ghana customary laws conform to the general pattern in this respect. Actions for breach of promise of marriage are found in the native court records…”
In the light of the facts before the learned judge he quite rightly concluded the debate in language following: “further discussion of this issue will be purely of academic relevance.”
It is instructive to look at Professor Ekow Daniels’ note in (1976) 8 R.G.L. dealing with “Defences to breach of promise of marriage.” At p. 56 appears the following passage:
“Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent in reply stoutly defended the pleadings by asserting that an action for breach of promise of marriage . . . was unknown to customary law. The appellate court felt that the issue raised was purely of academic relevance’ as there was overwhelming evidence that the marriage contemplated by the parties was of the Christian monogamic variety. The debate, said Francois J.A. must therefore be left for a future occasion.’ One would have thought that it is beyond argument that actions for breach of promise of marriage are known to customary law.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Unfortunately, Professor Daniels failed to support his bold statement with any authorities, more particularly, since the learned professor did state that the issue is “beyond argument.” It is also significant to note that though Professor Daniels conceded that the Court of Appeal was of the view that the issue raised “was purely of academic relevance” and therefore left a decision on it (one way or another) “for a
[p.422] of [1979] GLR 416 future occasion,” he nevertheless courageously and boldly stated at p. 58 thus:
“The Court of Appeal in Afrifa v. Class-Peter found Sarbah’s view to be erroneous. The court preferred the contrary view expressed by Professor Allott who during his researches came across cases where damages had been awarded by the native courts.”
With great respect to Professor Daniels I do not think the Court of Appeal in Afrifa v. Class-Peter did state that Sarbah’s view was erroneous. The Court of Appeal merely stated the customary law position as it is to be found in Sarbah’s book. The Court of Appeal did not make any comment or observation on Sarbah’s statement of the customary law on that particular issue which could by any canon of interpretation make Sarbah’s statement of the law erroneous. Indeed, the Court of Appeal quite properly in my view, pointed out that the issue was “arguable.” The Court of Appeal did not make a preference for Professor Allott’s view on the issue.
It seems to me that Professor Ekow Daniels’ view on the issue is that an action for breach of promise of marriage is known to the customary law. Indeed, he felt the matter was beyond argument, yet he failed to cite any authority to support his statement of the customary law. I do not have the benefit of good library and hence I have no opportunity for research. I am therefore satisfied with the statement of the law in Afrifa v. Class-Peter that “the issue is arguable.”
Another complaint made by the defendants was that the trial magistrate was wrong in law in rejecting the whole of the evidence of two witnesses who gave evidence for them. These were the defendants’ first and second witnesses. Counsel for the defendants submitted that in law the evidence of the two defence witnesses who remained in court during the hearing yet gave evidence was admissible. In so far as the trial magistrate rejected the whole of the evidence of the defendants’ first and second witnesses he could not be said to have considered the whole case put forward by the defendants, and his judgment ought not to stand. I turn to the following passage in the judgment of the lower court:
“The plaintiff objected to the evidence of the defendants’ first and second witnesses on the ground that these two defence witnesses did not leave the court when witnesses were ordered by the court to leave and remained in their presence. This statement is true . . . Their evidence will be rejected in my judgment as a wrongful admission of evidence is a ground of appeal.
It should be noted, however, that if inadmissible evidence has been received (with or without objection) it is the duty of the judge to reject it when giving judgment; and if he had not done so, it will be rejected on appeal.”
I have no doubt that the trial magistrate was confused as to what evidence was admissible and what was not. In the circumstances in which he found himself his conclusion that the evidence of the defendants’ first and second witnesses was inadmissible is clearly and plainly wrong. It is
[p.423] of [1979] GLR 416 trite learning that a witness who remained in court during actual hearing and receiving of evidence may give evidence and his evidence is in law admissible. The law, however, requires the trial court to consider what weight it attaches to such evidence. I agree with the submission of counsel for the defendants that the judgment ought not to stand for this other reason.
In conclusion I find and hold that the trial magistrate was wrong in entering judgment for the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to prove and show that the first defendant was a maiden at the material time. The plaintiff failed to adduce evidence to establish that there was an agreement of marriage between his family and the family of the first defendant. The trial magistrate was wrong in law in rejecting the whole of the evidence of defendants’ first and second witnesses as inadmissible evidence. I accordingly set aside the judgment of the lower court. I dismiss the plaintiff’s action and enter judgment for the first and second defendants. Consequently I set aside the general damages of ¢100, the special damages of ¢134, as well as the costs of ¢20.85 awarded the plaintiff against the first and second defendants. I award the first and second defendants each ¢50 costs against the plaintiff as costs in the court below. I award the first and second defendants each ¢30 costs against the plaintiff in this court. DECISION Appeal allowed with costs.
J. D.
