SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1978] SLR (HC) 51High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

HARUNA vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 189

8 December 1978 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 5 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 51
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAHARUNA v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 189 [1978] SLR (HC) 51
APAHARUNA v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 189, [1978] SLR (HC) 51 (Ghana).
BluebookHARUNA v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 189, [1978] SLR (HC) 51 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against a deterrent sentence of eight years imposed for the offence of possessing Indian hemp contrary to the Pharmacy and Drugs Act, 1961 (Act 64). The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Bawumia for the appellant.

Wiredu Peprah for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

This appellant originally appealed against his conviction and sentence for possessing Indian hemp contrary to sections 47 (1) and 57 (1) of the Pharmacy and Drugs Act, 1961 (Act 64), as amended. The offence is a really serious one for the quantity of Indian hemp involved was quite heavy since it weighed 17,706 grammes. The hemp was in fact contained in four bags. When the appeal came on for hearing, counsel in my view very properly abandoned the appeal against conviction. The evidence in support of the offence of possessing Indian hemp is so overwhelming that I think the most honourable thing for any offender who is remorseful is to throw in the towel and abandon an appeal which any tribunal bent on doing justice, will,

[p.191] of [1980] GLR 189

without hesitation, dismiss summarily. In the circumstances I dismissed the appeal against conviction summarily.

The appellant, however, was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment with hard labour. He is young and this is his first brush with the law. I have said it time and again that when young men have their first brush with the law, it is essential in the interest of the reformative element in criminal justice that they be not sent to prison unless a prison sentence is a mandatory legal requirement. If a prison sentence is not a mandatory legal requirement, then as a general proposition, unless there are special circumstances calling for a custodial sentence, the court must avoid incarcerating young offenders.

In this case the provisions of section 57 (3) of Act 64, mandatorily stipulate that the offence of possessing Indian hemp must carry a sentence of a least five years unless conditions spelt out in the proviso to that section are satisfied. These conditions are inapplicable here so prima facie the appellant must by law be mandatorily given at least five years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The learned circuit court judge, however, set out to award a deterrent sentence. He was certainly entitled in his discretion to award a deterrent sentence if the circumstances of the case called for it. The question of sentence is a matter of discretion with all courts of justice. The discretion, however, is exercisable on well-known principles.

In awarding sentence, particularly when the court sets out to award a deterrent sentence, which is an abnormal sentence, all the circumstances of the case must be considered. If there are circumstances tending to mitigate the application of the deterrent principle, then reasons must be given why those circumstances must be ignored if a deterrent sentence is imposed. If that is not done, then that discretion has not been properly exercised and an appellate court can interfere with the said exercise of discretion. If, however, all the circumstances relevant to the question of the appropriate sentence have been adequately considered, then since it is a matter of discretion, the said exercise of discretion by a lower court ought not to be impugned by an appellate court.

In this case the learned circuit court judge considered two matters in awarding a deterrent custodial sentence. The first was that the appellant was trading in Indian hemp by selling the said Indian hemp for profit. The second was that the quantity of Indian Hemp was huge being 17,706 grammes. These are the only two matters considered. There are, however, in my view, other circumstances which call for consideration. The first is that the appellant is the first offender. The second is that the appellant was quite young at the date of the offence being at that time only 26 years old. Thirdly, the

[p.192] of [1980] GLR 189

amount of money he was going to realise from the sale of the 17,706 grammes contained in the four bags was ¢480 calculated at ¢120 a bag. I think if he bought the hemp and was selling it at ¢480 then his profit margin must be a sum of money definitely less than ¢480.

There is a fourth matter that I propose to consider with considerable reluctance. It is common knowledge that the economic conditions in the country at the moment have reached a state where the average person is finding life really unbearable. The matter is so notorious that I propose to take judicial notice of it. The cost of living has reached such a high pitch that the average earnings of the average person would seem to be insufficient for the essentials of life. To lead a decent life now, the average worker, not self-employed, must either engage in additional legitimate trade or business outside his normal work or have recourse to dishonest means to augment his earnings.

Even those in the top income bracket and with good employment have not escaped the stranglehold of these general economic difficulties and so the dilemma of the person who is finding it difficult to obtain employment or to make ends meet by his own normal employment or calling must be indeed pitiable. The appellant is a farmer, probably a subsistence farmer, and in an area where the produce of the land depends on the vagaries of nature, bad weather and unpredictable rainfall conditions cannot but make the plight of the small-scale farmer unbearable. I do not think I can lose sight of this fact in awarding punishment although I agree that it is no excuse for committing a crime; nevertheless I think it is a matter to be considered when dealing with the question of whether the sentence to be awarded should be severe or not.

For all these reasons, I would not approve the award of a deterrent sentence. In the circumstances, I set aside the sentence of eight years’ imprisonment with hard labour and in its place substitute a sentence of five years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The appeal against sentence is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated in this judgment.

DECISION

Appeal against sentence allowed.

Sentence varied accordingly.

S. Y. B. -B.

Scroll to Top