REPUBLIC vs. STATE HOTELS CORPORATION; EX PARTE YEBOAH AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 875
15 November 1979 · EDUSEI JA · ≈ 11 min read
[1979] SLR (CA) 11Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 935; [1963] 2 All E.R. 66; 127 J.P. 295; 107 S.J. 313; 113 L.J. 716, H.L.
(2) Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v. Silva [1965] 1 W.L.R. 77; [1964] 3 All E.R. 865; 108 S.J. 896, P.C.
(3) R. v. Statutory Visitors to St. Lawrence’s Hospital, Caterham; Ex parte Pritchard [1953] 1 W.L.R.
1158; [1953] 2 All E.R. 766; 117, J.P. 458; 97 S.J. 590, D.C.
(4) R. v. Nat Bell Liquors, Ltd. [1922] 2 A.C. 128; 91 L.J.P.C. 146; 127 L.T. 437; 38 T.L.R. 541; 27 Cox. C.C. 253, P.C.
(5) Owusu-Afriyie v. State Hotels Corporation [1976] 1 G.L.R. 247.
(6) State Hotels Corporation v. Owusu-Afriyie [1977] 2 G.L.R. 488, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the appellant-corporation against the decision of the High Court, Sekondi, granting an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the appellant-corporation dismissing the respondents. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Edusei J.A.
COUNSEL
Zwennes for the appellants.
E. K. K. Akrasi for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.
By the judgment of the High Court, Sekondi, presided over by Sarkodee J. and dated 6 July 1977, the proceedings of a
[p.878] of [1980] GLR 875 board of inquiry of 6 September 1976, and the decision by the appellants to dismiss the respondents herein were quashed by an order of certiorari. It is against this judgment that the State Hotels Corporation have lodged this appeal.
I think a resume of the facts of this case may assist in the elucidation of the reasons about to be given in support of the judgment of this appeal. In my view this appeal also raises a very significant point of law of great interest to both employer and employee.
The respondents in this case were employees of the State Hotels Corporation and were posted to Atlantic Hotel, Takoradi. On a certain date Frank Yeboah, an accounts clerk at Atlantic Hotel, the first respondent, received 1,512 1bs. of potatoes meant for the said hotel at 70p. per 1b. from a certain gentleman called Ibrahim. The first respondent with the assistance of the other respondents sold the same potatoes to the hotel at the inflated price of ¢1 per 1b. thus making a profit of 30p. per 1b. for themselves. The cheque for ¢1,512 was made out in the assumed name of Kwaku Yeboah which turned to be the first respondent. Ibrahim received ¢1,058.40 as representing the sale price of his 1,512 1bs. potatoes at 70p. per 1b. The balance of ¢453.60 was shared in various proportions among the respondents with the chef, Mr. Antoine Yampane, receiving the lion’s share of the booty. The deal subsequently surfaced, and the State Hotels Corporation appointed a board of inquiry which heard the respondents and submitted a report to the managing director who, by his letter of 6 December 1976, summarily dismissed the respondents. The respondents in no uncertain terms admitted their guilt in the deal to defraud the State Hotels Corporation. I wish to interpolate here by adverting to what the trial judge said in his judgment, i.e. “In the course of their evidence they tendered statements which they had previously made (statements which indeed incriminated them).” (The emphasis is mine.) It was against their dismissal that the respondents sought via certiorari to quash both the report of the board of inquiry and the decision to dismiss them. In their supporting affidavit their chief complaint was couched in paragraphs (8), (9) and (10) thus:
“(8) That we were not allowed to cross-examine each other and none of us knew what other persons said before the board.
(9) That we were not put on trial nor told of any offences we had committed to enable us to put up a defence for ourselves at the said board of inquiry.
(10) That we received letters dated 6 December 1976 terminating our appointments with the State Hotels Corporation as a result
[p.879] of [1980] GLR 875 of the report of the said board of inquiry (copy of letter of dismissal attached and marked exhibit C).”
The arguments of counsel for the respondents in the court below seem to have weighed heavily with the trial judge, and he gave the order sought basing his decision on the ground that there was a breach of natural justice.
It is of utmost importance to bear in mind the nature of the relationship that existed between the State Hotels Corporation and the respondents who were employees of the former. It must also be borne in mind that there was a contract of service between the parties, and this is the collective agreement entered into between the State Hotels Corporation on one side and the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union on the other, and made in pursuance of section 10 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1965 (Act 299). The Industrial and Commercial Workers Union contracted on behalf of the employees of the State Hotels Corporation. It is my viewpoint that the relationship between the State Hotels Corporation and the respondents was that of master and servant. This relationship cannot by any stretch of legal ingenuity be controverted. Indeed, nowhere in the judgment of the trial court was there any assertion to the contrary as regards master-servant relationship that existed between the parties. The import of the judgment of the trial judge rather appreciated the relationship of the parties as that of master and servant. The respondents were servants of the State Hotels Corporation and this is further evidenced by the collective agreement which the respondents exhibited as exhibit G.
In this exhibit G, article 26 states, “(a) Any employee who in the opinion of the employer has been found guilty of a serious misconduct such as dishonesty, insubordination, drunkenness, dereliction of duty shall be dismissed summarily.” It is beyond doubt that the respondents themselves admitted their dishonest conduct in defrauding the State Hotels Corporation, and the master, i.e. the State Hotels Corporation, had the power to dismiss them summarily by virtue of article 26 of the collective agreement notwithstanding the proceedings of the board of inquiry. Indeed, in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40 at p. 65, H.L., Lord Reid in his speech made this all-important and categorical statement of law:
“The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt. There cannot be specific performance of a contract of service, and the master can terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for none.
But if he does so in a manner not warranted by the contract he must pay damages for
[p.880] of [1980] GLR 875 breach of contract. So the question in a pure case of master and servant does not at all depend on whether the master has heard the servant in his own defence: it depends on whether the facts emerging at the trial prove breach of contract.”
Again in Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v. Silva [1964] 3 All E.R. 865, P.C., a university professor, whose appointment was terminated in accordance with the terms of contract of service between him and the university council, protested strenuously on the ground that he should have been told of the accusations against him and given an opportunity to be heard in defence. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, in his usual vivid and straightforward style delivered the opinion of the Privy Council thus at p. 867:
“The law is well settled that if, where there is an ordinary contractual relationship of master and servant, the master terminates the contract the servant cannot obtain an order of certiorari. If the master rightfully ends the contract there can be no complaint: if the master wrongfully ends the contract then the servant can pursue a claim for damages.”
The university professor was thus told in plain words that his resort to certiorari proceedings was not available to him, so it is not in the instant case. Lord Morris concluded his opinion in these words at p. 875, “He invoked a procedure which is not available where a master summarily terminates a servant’s employment.”
It seems clear to me therefore that the remedy of certiorari is not o en to the respondents to quash the decision of the State Hotels Corporation to terminate their appointments, and in this respect the trial judge faulted. If the respondents, as servants of the State Hotels Corporation, think that the termination of their appointments was wrongful, their remedy is to pursue a claim for damages for breach of contract, and not to bring up and quash the decision of dismissal by certiorari proceedings.
I now come to consider the propriety or otherwise of the trial court’s order to quash the report of the board of inquiry. It is true that the board made certain recommendations to the Managing Director of the State Hotels Corporation, but the decision to dismiss summarily was entirely for the managing director who was in no way bound to accept the recommendations of the board. Even if he accepted the recommendations the decision to dismiss was still his alone; there is no legal obligation on the State Hotels Corporation to appoint a board of inquiry as was done in this case, and the report of such a board of inquiry which is not a decision cannot be subject
[p.881] of [1980] GLR 875 to the remedy of certiorari. Thus in the case of R. v. Statutory Visitors to St. Lawrence’s Hospital, Caterham; Ex parte Pritchard [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1158, D.C. the applicant moved for an order of certiorari to quash the report of the opinion of the visitors, and Parker J. who concurred in the judgment of Goddard C.J. said at p. 1166:
“I agree, and I would only add that in my opinion it cannot be too clearly understood that the remedy by way of certiorari only lies to bring up to this court and quash something which is a determination or a decision.”
(The emphasis is mine.) The learned judge in conclusion said at p. 1168, “In my view, this motion fails on the ground that there is no decision or determination to be quashed . . .” It is abundantly clear therefore that the report of the board of inquiry set up by the State Hotels Corporation is outside the competence of certiorari proceedings for the simple reason that it was not a decision or determination of a dispute, and here too the trial judge was in error.
In the result, the appeal by the State Hotels Corporation succeeds and the judgment of the Sekondi High Court dated 6 July 1977 is accordingly set aside, and the application of the respondents dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.A.
I also agree that this appeal should be allowed. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court is clearly stated in section 20 of the Courts, Act, 1971 (Act 372), and it is restricted to all inferior courts in Ghana and any adjudicating authority other than a military court or tribunal. The question that has to be answered simply is whether the State Hotels Corporation as an employer in deciding to dismiss the respondents was acting as an adjudicating authority. The answer must be No.! The State Hotels Corporation constituted a board of inquiry to investigate the circumstances leading to the purchase and payment for a certain quantity of potatoes bought for the corporation by its employees. The board of inquiry had no legal or statutory basis and it was not bound by any rules of procedure laid down by law. The board just investigated the matter in the same manner a police detective would be expected to investigate a crime. The board was purely an internal administrative ad hoc machinery set up to bring the facts to light. It reported its findings to the corporation which acted on them. The respondents appeared before the board of inquiry and they were heard. Indeed, the board observed the rules of natural justice. The complaint of the
[p.882] of [1980] GLR 875 respondents was that they were not allowed to cross-examine witnesses. On what procedural rules established by law were the respondents relying to cross-examine witnesses? None.
It seems to me that the decision to dismiss was made by the corporation and in taking that decision, the corporation was not acting as an adjudicating authority. It was exercising its right under a contract of employment to terminate the appointment of its servants and in such circumstances, the prerogative writs of the High Court do not lie.
In R. v. Nat Bell Liquors, Ltd. [1922] 2 A.C. 128 at p.156, P.C. Lord Sumner stated the supervisory jurisdiction of the English King’s Bench thus:
“Its jurisdiction is to see that the inferior Court has not exceeded its own, and for that very reason it is bound not to interfere in what has been done within that jurisdiction, for in so doing it would itself, in turn, transgress the limits within which its own jurisdiction of supervision, not of review, is confined. That supervision goes to two points: one is the area of the inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of the law in the course of its exercise.”
In the present appeal, the State Hotels Corporation in dismissing the respondents was not acting as an inferior court or an adjudicating authority as contemplated by section 20 of the Courts Act, 1971. There was no law binding on the corporation which it failed to observe and there is no evidence that the corporation had by law contracted never to terminate the appointments of the respondents. Nor is there any evidence that the corporation by law had contracted to employ the respondents till eternity. It follows that in the circumstances the relief sought by the respondents was obviously inappropriate and should have been dismissed by the court below.
There is no doubt that the court relied on the case of Owusu-Afriyie v. State Hotels Corporation [1976] 1 G.L.R. 247. That judgment was delivered at the High Court, Accra, on 15 May 1975, but it was overruled by the Court of Appeal in State Hotels Corporation v. Owusu-Afriyie [1977] 2 G.L.R. 488, C.A. on 14 July 1977.
The limitations on the use of the prerogative writs have not been removed by local statute law and the courts should be extraordinarily wary of any attempted extensions to their ambit of operation.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
D. R. K. S.
