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[1979] SLR (CA) 2Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

ADJAVON AND OTHERS vs. GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION [1980] GLR 135

26 March 1979 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (CA) 2
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OSCOLAADJAVON AND OTHERS v GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION [1980] GLR 135 [1979] SLR (CA) 2
APAADJAVON AND OTHERS v GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION [1980] GLR 135, [1979] SLR (CA) 2 (Ghana).
BluebookADJAVON AND OTHERS v GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION [1980] GLR 135, [1979] SLR (CA) 2 (Ghana Ct. App. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Landergan v. Feast (1886) 54 L.T. 369; reversed 55 L.T. 42; 34 W.R. 691, C.A.

(2) Hughes v. London Edinburgh and Glasgow Assurance Co. (1891) 8 T.L.R. 81, C.A.

(3) Gilbert v. Smith (1876) 2 Ch.D. 686: 45 L.J.Ch. 514; 35 L.T. 43, C.A.

(4) Armah v. Addoquaye [1972] 1 G.L.R. 109, C.A.

(5) Mellor v. Sidebottom (1877) 5 Ch.D. 342; 46 L.J.Ch. 398; 37 L.T. 7; 25 W.R. 401, C.A. (6) Wright, In re; Kirke v. North [1895] 2 Ch. 747; 65 L.J.Ch. 37; 73 L.T. 396: 44 W.R. 125; 13 R.

849.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the ruling of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings under Order 32, r. 6 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Francois J.A.

COUNSEL

Tsatsu Tsikata for the appellants.

R. Bruce for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

The plaintiffs who are members of the Industrial and Commercial Workers and Timber and Woodworkers Union, sued their employers, the Tema Steelworks Division of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation for a breach of their collective agreement with them. Their endorsement on the writ, sought arrears of pay, an injunction and a declaration to preserve their status as employees of the defendant-corporation. And in their statement of claim, the plaintiffs urged that their services had been unlawfully terminated by the defendants and that they had been denied their entitlements under the collective agreement. The defendants in a traverse set out their version of the facts.

However, before issues could be settled for trial, the plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings under Order 32, r. 6 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The justification for invoking this procedure was the alleged admission by the defendants of the plaintiffs’ claim. The trial circuit judge, however, did not share the plaintiffs’ view of the matter and decided to hear [p.137] of [1980] GLR 135 the suit on its merits. Aggrieved by that ruling the plaintiffs have sought to have it reversed in this appeal. As the pleadings assume considerable importance in the rather narrow ambit of this appeal, they are set out in extenso. The statement of claim is as follows:

“1. The plaintiffs, members of the Industrial and Commercial Workers and Timber and Woodworkers Union, were employed by the Tema Steelworks Division of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, under the terms of a collective agreement between their unions and the defendant-corporation.

2. Under the terms of this contract the plaintiffs were entitled to be on the premises of the Tema Steelworks Division of the defendant-corporation to fulfil their contract and had a licence coupled with an interest to be on these premises.

3. Under the terms of this contract the plaintiffs were entitled to receive wages from the defendant-corporation.

4. The defendant-corporation, by its agents or servants or both, have since November 1975, without just cause or excuse, refused to allow the plaintiffs on the relevant premises to fulfil their contract of employment.

5. The plaintiffs have persistently sought access to the relevant premises of the defendant-corporation and remain willing and able to perform the terms of their contract of employment.

6. By the denial to the plaintiffs of access to the relevant premises of the defendant-corporation by the agents or servants or both of the defendant-corporation the plaintiffs have been unable to receive their wages since November 1975.

7. Wherefore plaintiffs claim:

(a) arrears of pay from November 1975 till the date of judgment with interest calculated at ten per cent;

(b) a declaration that the plaintiffs remain lawfully in the employment of the defendant-corporation;

(c) an injunction restraining the defendant-corporation, by its servants, agents or assigns from preventing the plaintiffs, during the currency of their contract of employment, from entering the premises of the defendant-corporation to fulfil their contract of employment;

[p.138] of [1980] GLR 135

(d) alternatively, plaintiffs claim damages for breach of their contract of employment.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The statement of defence filed thereto was as follows:

“1. The defendants admit paragraph (1) of the statement of claim.

2. Save that the plaintiffs had a licence to be on the defendants’ factory premises during normal working hours and when the factory was open and in operation paragraph (2) of the statement of claim is denied.

3. Save that the plaintiffs were entitled to receive wages when they worked for the defendants paragraph (3) is denied.

4. Paragraphs (4) and (5) of the statement of claim are denied.

5. In answer to paragraphs (4) and (5) of the statement of claim, the defendants say that in or about October 1975 the plaintiffs together with other employees unlawfully and without just cause withdrew their services from the defendants’ employment.

6. In spite of the plaintiffs’ refusal to work, the defendants held several meetings with representatives of the plaintiffs’ local union together with representatives of the Industrial and Commercial Workers and Timber and Woodworkers Union to persuade the plaintiffs and other employees to discontinue their strike action but the plaintiffs refused to resume work.

7. As the plaintiffs and some other union members persistently refused to work for about a fortnight and they indulged in wild and unruly behaviour on the defendants’ factory premises they (the defendants) were compelled to close their factory down.

8. Consequent upon the plaintiffs’ refusal to work and the closure of the defendants’ factory they (the defendants) were compelled to invite fresh applications through the newspapers and radio from the public and also the defendants’ old employees who were willing to start work with the defendants.

9. All applicants were interviewed and those found capable were selected and subsequently appointed to work in the defendant’s factory.

10. The defendants deny paragraph (6) of the statement of claim.

[p.139] of [1980] GLR 135

11. The plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief sought in this action or to any other relief.

12. The defendants deny each and every allegation of fact contained in the statement of claim as though the same had been set out and expressly traversed seriatim.”

Save for the agreement that their contractual relations were regulated by the collective agreement, a more fulsome denial of the claim could not have been made.

Yet it is the defendants’ admission that they were bound by the collective agreement that has lent the spur and has become the fulcrum of the plaintiffs’ argument. It is formulated, as near as I can understand it, as follows: Since the defendants concede that they engaged the plaintiffs by virtue of the collective agreement, and the pleaded facts do not show that their services were terminated in accordance with the provisions of that agreement, the dismissals were void and ineffectual; and the defendants must be deemed to have admitted as much. Consequently there was no need to proceed to call evidence and judgment should have been entered for the plaintiffs. Such a stance could only be successfully maintained if either directly or by necessary implication the defence had capitulated and conceded the matters in issue.

It must be noted that no reply was filed and no issue was joined on the defence. The necessary implication is that the plaintiffs were not controverting new facts urged by the defence if they were not already in issue.

The defendants do not accept the view that there were admissions in their pleadings; they cite for instance paragraph (5) of their defence which charges that the plaintiffs “unlawfully and without just cause withdrew their services from the defendants’ employment.” They have drawn our attention to provisions in the collective agreement; for instance to article 13 (2) thereof, forbidding an employee from absenting himself from his duties without permission. If he does so “for more than five consecutive working days he will be regarded as having vacated his post without notice and thereby be deemed to have been dismissed.” Again under article 13 (5) “summary dismissal may be effected by the management for just and reasonable cause involving dishonesty, fraud, wilful refusal to obey a legitimate and reasonable instruction and proven gross misconduct.” That is, of course after the worker has been given opportunity to defend himself.

It is obvious that a court must hear evidence and evaluate the facts deposed before coming to a conclusion whether the collective agreement had been breached. Had the issues been set out for trial

[p.140] of [1980] GLR 135 on a summons for directions it would have been clearly discerned what burden lay on the respective parties.

In my view, the claim for arrears of pay and the issue of breach vel non of the provisions of the collective agreement require evidence for their determination. This is particularly so where the plaintiffs contend that they have not abandoned their other claims on the writ, which clearly cannot be resolved by this procedure. Under the English practice in the Queens Bench Division it is unusual to invoke this rule for only part of the claim: see Annual Practice, 1962, p. 736.

A court must not be put in the position of guessing at facts not established by the evidence. Facts at large in this case, inter alia, relate to the locking out of the plaintiffs from the defendants’ factory; the unruly and destructive conduct of the plaintiffs which necessitated the closure of the plant; and the issue of dismissal or its justification.

In my view, where the whole subject-matter of the dispute is in issue the procedure under Order 32, r. 6 of L.N. 140A is most inapposite. Indeed the fact that counsel for the plaintiffs thought fit to file 43 authorities for our consideration eloquently testifies to his own diffidence that the case was plain or clear.

The rule enabling judgment to be obtained on the pleadings under Order 32, r. 6 applies where there is no controversy, and the matter is clear and unequivocal: see Landergan v. Feast (1886) 34 W.R. 691, C.A.; Hughes v. London Edinburgh and Glasgow Assurance Co. (1891) 8 T.L.R. 81, C.A.; Gilbert v. Smith (1876) 2 Ch.D. 686 at p. 689, C.A. and our own Armah v. Addoquaye [1972] 1 G.L.R. 109, C.A. among a host of authorities. Again where there is a serious question of law to be argued the rule will not be applied: see Gilbert v. Smith (supra).

In this case whether the collective agreement was breached or not appears to be the real legal kernel, and, it could only be best cracked on the application of the relevant law to the ascertained evidence on oath.

In my view, the defence filed, far from making concessions, sought to set out the existence of a state of facts, in justification of the defendants’ course of conduct. Whether the facts were accurate or whether the actions consequent thereupon were warranted can only be determined on the evidence and the application of the law thereto. No short-circuiting can help, least of all that which aims at shutting out the defendants from defending their position.

The final comment I make springs from the basic defect in the appellants’ standpoint; and that is the lack of appreciation that the remedy under Order 32, r. 6 is discretionary. In my view, where a court finds that a case cannot be conveniently tried on such a motion

[p.141] of [1980] GLR 135 it can exercise its discretion against such a course and its ruling may not be reversed on appeal: see Mellor v. Sidebottom (1877) 5 Ch.D. 342, C.A. and In re Wright; Kirke v. North [1895] 2 Ch. 747 at p. 750.

It is unfortunate that this academic exercise has meant an unnecessary delay in the determination of the rights of the parties. The appeal is without merit and must be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed. D. R. K. S.

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