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[1979] SLR (CA) 4Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

GYEDU AND OTHERS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 480

31 July 1979 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 22 min read

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OSCOLAGYEDU AND OTHERS v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 480 [1979] SLR (CA) 4
APAGYEDU AND OTHERS v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 480, [1979] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookGYEDU AND OTHERS v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 480, [1979] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana Ct. App. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Lodonu v. The Republic [1973] 2 G.L.R. 355, C.A.

(2) R. v. Antwi (1955) 1 W.A.L.R. 29.

[p.483] of [1980] GLR 480

(3) R. v. Agyepong, Supreme Court, 21 October 1960, unreported.

(4) Adu Boahene v. The Republic [1972] 1 G.L.R. 70, C.A.

(5) Agyiri v. Commissioner of Police [1963] 2 G.L.R. 380, S.C.

(6) Egbetorwokpor v. The Republic [1975] 1 G.L.R. 485, C.A.

(7) Commissioner of Police v. Owusu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 364.

(8) R. v. Day [1940] 1 All E.R. 402; 27 Cr.App.R. 168, C.C.A.

(9) R. v. Grunshie (Abisa) (1955) 1 W.A.L.R. 36, W.A.C.A.

(10) Kuruma Son of Kaniu v. R. [1955] 1 All E.R. 236, P.C.

(11) R. v. Thompson [1893] 2 Q.B. 12; 62 L.J.M.C. 93; 69 L.T. 22; 57 J.P. 312.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from a conviction for conspiracy to murder entered against the appellants by the High Court, Sekondi. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of the court delivered by Mensa Boison J.

COUNSEL

Swaniker (with him E. D. Kom and Tagoe) for the appellants.

Amui, Chief State Attorney, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.

Mensa Boison J. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellants, thirteen in all, including one woman, were convicted at the Criminal Session of the Sekondi High Court on 3 May 1977, of conspiracy to murder, contrary to sections 23 (1) and 46 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), and in respect of three men of murder, contrary to section 46 of the Criminal Code, 1960. Two of the appellants have died since filing their appeals. The victim of the crime was one Nana Atta Agyemang, at the time the Omanhene of Sefwi Bekwai. He died from gunshot wounds on 3 April 1976.

It would appear that about a year or two before the fatal day, there had been differences of a constitutional nature, between him and a faction of his subjects. These eventually resulted in his unsuccessful defence against destoolment charges before the Western Regional House of Chiefs early 1976. From that decision, the deceased lodged a notice of appeal at the National House of Chiefs, and returned home, for the first time since the adverse decision, on Friday, 2 April 1976.

In the meantime, his adversaries, upon the faith of the decision of the Western Regional House of Chiefs, had declared his destoolment a fait accompli at Sefwi Bekwai. In fact, in February 1976, some of the kingmakers and their men had seized and occupied the state palace, and had slaughtered a sheep therein to mark their victory and to symbolise the destoolment of the omanhene. And although the police had persuaded the people to withdraw from the palace some weeks later, they had done so with a warning against the omanhene

[p.484] of [1980] GLR 480 ever returning to stay at the palace. In those circumstances, the deceased, on arriving at Sefwi Bekwai on the morning of 2 April 1976, went directly to his private house in town.

Although there was not wanting the usual courtesies of welcome from some of his elders, his arrival in town must have given the signal, and before nightfall there were portents of ominous plots seething against the safety of the omanhene. By early dawn of the next day, 3 April 1976, his house had been besieged by riotous and violent crowd swearing death at the omanhene. Some among the crowd were armed with stones and sticks, as well as a variety of other missiles. Yet a few had guns. The handful of policemen at hand in Bekwai were not inactive. The barracks sergeant had been placed at the main gate to the house, and stoutly resisted the surging crowd. But by 9 a.m., despite all exertions of the police, the mob had broken through another gate into the house. Amid the clamour, the report of a gun rang out from among the attacking crowd. Someone had shot at the omanhene in the shelter of his home; it was a fatal shot and within minutes the omanhene had died. It was a victory signal to the factious crowd. The brave were hailed and carried shoulder high, bedecked with white powder or festooned with fluttering strips of calico, amid asafo songs (war songs) as the jubilant crowd streamed away into town.

At the trial, the fact that some person or persons had intended and had shot the deceased in circumstances that amounted to the crime of murder was hardly disputed. Nor has it been otherwise contended in this court. What was and is here strenuously disputed is who the culprits were. A mass of evidence of identification was consequently presented to the trial court. The jury found the appellants guilty of the respective offences charged, save the second, twelfth and thirteenth defendants, who were found not guilty on the conspiracy count; and the ninth defendant who was acquitted of murder but found guilty of conspiracy. The second, twelfth and thirteenth accused were therefore acquitted and discharged.

By the acquittal of these, learned counsel for the appellants found his first two grounds, which were argued together, namely:

“(i) As the evidence led by the prosecution in support of the charge of conspiracy is substantially the same against all the appellants, the acquittal of the second, twelfth and thirteenth accused persons on the said charge, and the conviction of the other appellants on the conspiracy charge makes the verdict of the jury inconsistent and contrary to law.

(ii) The verdict of guilty recorded against the tenth and eleventh appellants is for the reasons set out in ground (i) above,

[p.485] of [1980] GLR 480 also inconsistent in view of the jury’s verdict of not guilty against the ninth appellant.”

The essence of Mr. Swaniker’s submissions was that the evidence of the prosecution against the several accused was basically the same — resting on evidence of identification and the acquittal of some, i.e the three accused, as indicated earlier, was a clear expression by the jury that they did not believe the prosecution evidence. In that case, it was inconsistent for the jury to rely on the self-same evidence to return a verdict of guilty against these appellants. For the submission learned counsel relied on Lodonu v. The Republic [1973] 2 G.L.R. 355, C.A. That was a case where five persons were tried for manslaughter. The prosecution evidence rested mainly on the dying declaration of the deceased in which he alleged that he was the victim of a brutal and unjustifiable attack by a bunch of suspicious villagers who tracked him in the bush and cut him down with cutlasses. None of the other prosecution witnesses witnessed the attack and after the close of the prosecution case the judge ruled that there was no evidence against the second and third accused and directed the jury to return a formal verdict of not guilty. The defence of the appellant, the first and fourth was in substance the same. That is, the deceased had attacked the first and fourth accused in the bush with a cutlass, and that the appellant had gone to their aid. In the ensuing fight, the first and fourth accused sustained injuries; the deceased was also mortally wounded and died thereafter. The jury found the first and the fourth accused persons not guilty of manslaughter or any other offence but convicted the appellant. It was held, allowing the appeal, as stated in the headnote at p. 355:

“(1) where two or more accused persons were tried on the same charge, and the evidence adduced before the court with regard to all the accused persons was substantially the same, the conviction of some and the acquittal of others of the accused persons would be an inconsistent result unless it was shown that the apparent inconsistency in the result of the trial was attributable to some significant difference either as to matter of fact or law which affected some and not the others of the accused persons.”

We think the principle of law is sound and subscribe to it. It is to be observed that to invoke that principle of inconsistency the emphasis is to be placed on all the several accused facing substantially the same evidence. In the present case, it seems the several prosecution witnesses had varied opportunity as to their own respective positions at the scene in relation to the attacking crowd. There was,

[p.486] of [1980] GLR 480 for instance, the third prosecution witness, an escort sergeant on guard at the gate. There were some of the relation witnesses, like the sixth and eleventh prosecution witnesses whose view was from inside the house; and yet others like the seventh and eighth prosecution witnesses who spoke of incidents from positions outside the house. Such witnesses, as it happened, could only identify some only of the accused according to their viewpoint. In such a situation the weight to be given by the jury to any evidence of identification would depend upon the jury’s assessment of the witness’ opportunity to observe the occurrences and his credibility. To mention the case of the third prosecution witness, who was no relation of the deceased, and who speaks of having had altercation with some of the accused while resisting them from breaking through the gate, his spontaneous identification of the seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh and fifteenth accused might well have been regarded by the jury as very telling and corroborative of that of other witnesses.

Besides the defence was largely that of alibi. The alibi of the various accused persons were not the same on the facts. The evidence to be considered by the jury in respect of each or some of the accused persons thus becomes different. The submission therefore that there was the same evidence against all the accused persons is not quite the case on the facts.

The case of R. v. Antwi (1955) 1 W.A.L.R. 29, is an instance where one only of several accused persons was properly convicted of murder. There the appellant was one of several persons who had unlawfully assembled and determined to oppose with force, if necessary, the removal of the Krontihene’s stool of Nkoranza, by a destooling group, who were termed malcontents. Several shots were fired into the destooling group, from the opposing assembly, injuring some of the destooling group seriously. One Kobina Nsiah was killed by one of such shots fired by an unknown person at the unlawful assembly. The appellant was one of several persons armed with shotguns. The accused’s defence of alibi having been rejected he was convicted of murder as one taking part in the unlawful assembly, although his shot did not take the life of the deceased; because the evidence of his identification was by reason of corroboration accepted, while the thirteen others likewise pleading alibi were acquitted. The West African Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal. It is fair to say that the trial was with assessors, but the principle is, in our opinion, the same.

We are satisfied that in the present case there were significant differences as to matters of fact, which affected some and not others

[p.487] of [1980] GLR 480 of the accused persons. We are of the opinion that there was evidence upon which the jury could return the verdict of guilty against some only of the accused.

Closely linked with the above submissions were grounds (iv) and (v) of the additional grounds of appeal, which in a gist charged that the failure to conduct a formal identification parade, to get the prosecution witnesses, both civilian and policemen, to identify any persons alleged to have taken part in the attack, occasioned a miscarriage of justice, and that it was a misdirection to have directed that formal identification was unnecessary. It appears to be the case here, that the constitutional dispute had created a deep rift among the subjects of the Sefwi Bekwai stool, and the accused (and no doubt their following) were in evidence described as malcontents to the deceased’s rule, as opposed to the omanhene’s supporters. As it happened, apart from the police witnesses, the bulk of the prosecution witnesses were either relatives of the deceased or his supporters. It is in these circumstances that Mr. Swaniker urges that the danger that such a partisan witness would point at any malcontent presented to him as a culprit being very real, the informal identification conducted was undesirable.

We share counsel’s fears and repeat what was once said that in the circumstances of this case and particularly having regard to the atmosphere in which the incident took place it was necessary to scrutinise the testimony of the witnesses with considerable caution: see R. v. Agyepong, Supreme Court, 21 October 1960, unreported.

On the issue of identification although we find that the summing-up did not devote as much detailed attention to it as might possibly have met the criticisms of learned counsel, it is as well to observe that each case will always depend on the nature of the evidence and the particular set of facts raised. As already stated the accused were in most cases previously known to the respective prosecution witnesses before the incident. The fact of the existence of a faction described as malcontents, as opposed to the loyalists or supporters, was an accepted fact. In addition, the incidents took place in the light of day and in the open. It was in our view substantially a case of credibility of the witnesses depending upon the opportunity they had for observation.

Three passages of the summing-up may be quoted:

“On the other hand, you might say as the defence submitted that some of the people were leaving the area because they were some of the malcontents and would most likely be the first target if there were to be arrests. They wanted to stay out of suspicion.”

[p.488] of [1980] GLR 480

Again, “You must consider carefully the question of identity of the accused. It seems the crowd which surrounded the house of Nana Atta Agyemang was not more than 300 strong. Can you say with certainty a person standing yards from the crowd would be able to identify persons in the crowd? Of course there were the cases where the first, second and third prosecution witnesses got near the crowd as to be able to see those close to them.”

Then lastly: “They contend that the accused persons were arrested because they were some of the malcontents and not that they were seen at the scene.” We think on the evidence the issue of identification was straightforward and simple. It hardly required such meticulous evaluation as a distinction between facts that might establish intention in murder and negligence in manslaughter would require. In these circumstances, we think the direction that formal identification was not necessary in the case of the persons with previous acquaintance of the accused persons could not on the facts, lead to substantial miscarriage of justice by the verdicts found: see Adu Boahene v. The Republic [1972] 1 G.L.R. 70, C.A.

The identification in court by the third prosecution witness of certain accused persons, for the first time deserves particular mention. It was a case where the witness had not known the accused persons he identified prior to the incident. And it might well be said that he saw them for a somewhat brief period during the commission of the offence. In that case, it may be said that the failure to hold an identification parade would detract from the weight which the jury might attach to his evidence. It is in such situations that identification in court may be most unreliable: see Agyiri v. Commissioner of Police [1963] 2 G.L.R. 380, S.C. But here the incident appeared to have exposed the third prosecution witness to a particularly striking opportunity, as can be seen from his description of the clothing and account of his confrontation with and assault from those accused persons. Consequently, though brief, his identification in court might well have weighed greatly with the jury.

It is clear, from passages in Adu Boahene v. The Republic (supra) that like all questions of fact, the weight to be attached to evidence of identification is to be left to the jury. We think that the absence of a specific direction to the jury on how to assess the evidence of identification of the third prosecution witness was unfortunate. But we are of the opinion that when the third prosecution witness is excluded, there remains enough evidence of identification against the seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh and fifteenth accused persons upon which the jury might have acted.

[p.489] of [1980] GLR 480

Next, by grounds (a) and (b) of the additional ground of appeal learned counsel complained of wrong reception of evidence in that:

“(a) contrary to law the eighth prosecution witness gave evidence which did not form part of the summary of evidence to the prejudice of the first appellant’s defence.

(b) The learned trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of the twelfth prosecution witness on the farming custom of Sefwi Bekwai when the prosecution contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 had not served the appellant with notice of additional evidence. The wrongful admission of the said additional evidence was highly prejudicial and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”

It seems that with the death of the first appellant, additional ground (a) was as a matter of fact abated. However, in deference to counsel we think the point is shortly answered. Section 182 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, enjoins the prosecution to furnish an accused person with a summary of the evidence each prosecution witness intends to give. The summary, as the word indicates, is the gist of what that witness had said in his statement given to the police, which becomes the witness’s proof of evidence. If at the trial there is material departure, by way of addition to the matters indicated in the summary of evidence of a particular witness this might well be ascertained. Firstly, that those matters were not contained in the witness’ statement to the police; and in that case it is open to defence counsel to discredit the witness. Secondly, the new matter might well have been given in the witness’ police statement, but only that the gist of it did not appear in the summary of evidence. In that case the witness would have proved consistent. In either situation it seems the course open to the defence is to obtain a copy of the police statement by virtue of section 268 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), to decide on what course to take.

In the instant case, when objection was taken to the evidence of the eighth prosecution witness as to her seeing the first appellant on her visit to the rest-house after the shooting, what the learned judge said was:

“Learned counsel has seen the summary of evidence and the statement the witness made to the police. He will be perfectly entitled to cross-examine the witness as to the incident and as to why she has told this court what she did not tell the police when she made her statement.”

We think the learned judge’s ruling cannot be faulted as it was, in our opinion, consistent with the law. We are satisfied that the reception

[p.490] of [1980] GLR 480 of that part of the evidence of the eighth prosecution witness was proper and cannot be said to have been prejudicial to the first appellant’s defence of alibi.

On additional ground (b) it appears the twelfth prosecution witness had been put down in the summary of evidence as deposing to his having identified the body of the omanhene to the doctor for post-mortem purposes. When therefore he gave evidence on the custom that Saturdays were non-farming days in the Sefwi Bekwai Traditional Area, it was quite rightly a surprise to the defence. Yet when the court properly offered to adjourn if the defence so wanted, none of the defence counsel indicated their desire for such adjournment. Indeed, the evidence of the twelfth prosecution witness seemed to have been of no significance to the case of the defence, as the twelfth prosecution witness was not cross-examined at all. In those circumstances, we are unable to see any foundation as to what extent the evidence of the twelfth prosecution witness must have “highly prejudiced” the tenth appellant’s defence that, contrary to the custom, he was away to the farm on the Saturday morning when the crowd stormed the omanhene’s house. Indeed,. the reception of that evidence can be justified on the same footing and reasoning as that of the eighth prosecution witness.

Furthermore section 266 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), in providing for the calling of additional witnesses for the prosecution, gives a guide in determining what is reasonable notice that the prosecution may give. But it further provides by section 266 (3) that “No such notice need be given if the prosecution first became aware of the evidence which the witness could give on the day on which he is called.” The rationale here, in our view, is that a witness may, in fact, be called by the prosecution without notice containing the summary of his evidence. All that justice requires would be for the court to give the defence reasonable adjournment to enable them to meet the new evidence. This the learned trial judge did, and was declined. We are of the opinion that the appellants are not entitled to complain and the two grounds must fail.

Again by ground (d) of the additional grounds learned counsel complains, and we think rightly, that the evidence of the nineteenth prosecution witness, a police investigator, as to certain entries made in the patients’ attendance book in the clinic of one dispenser, Ofori, was hearsay and therefore inadmissible. That evidence of the nineteenth prosecution witness was:

“I investigated the allegation that Dagarti (the tenth accused) went to him (Ofori) for treatment. I contacted the dispenser Mr. Ofori. I collected a statement from Ofori. He has a register

[p.491] of [1980] GLR 480 for patients visiting the clinic. I inspected the register. I did not see the name of Kwaku Dagarti.”

Hearsay has been defined as “oral or written statements made by persons who are not parties and who are not called as witnesses … to prove the truth of the matters stated”: see Phipson on Evidence (10th ed.), p. 273. When the nineteenth prosecution witness deposed to the fact that the name of the tenth accused did not appear in the register of attendance for 3 April 1976, he sought to establish the truth of a matter asserted out of court by dispenser Ofori. That we have no doubt was hearsay and inadmissible.

The question is what legal consequence flows from this? On this, there is no dearth of authority. In Egbetorwokpor v. The Republic [1975] 1 G.L.R. 485, C.A. this court examined the case law in some depth and came to the conclusion that if the offending evidence were excluded on a proper direction, it must be possible to say that the jury must inevitably or would certainly have reached the same verdict. We have looked at the hearsay evidence in this case. It seeks obliquely to negative the tenth accused’s evidence that he went to Ofori’s dispensary on the day of the incident. But according to the positive evidence of some of the eye-witnesses, the tenth accused was one of the heroes of the day. He fired the fatal shot and in recognition of his bravery was one of the persons carried “shoulder high with pieces of white cloth tied to his right thumb.” It seems to us unlikely that such a prominent actor could have been mistakenly identified. Six other eye-witnesses also identified him. In our opinion, even if the hearsay evidence to which objection has rightly been taken had been excluded, we think the jury would inevitably have reached the same verdict.

A further complaint of admissibility was made in additional ground (e) to the effect that the accused persons’ police statements, having been recorded contrary to law were inadmissible, and that the learned trial judge erred in not directing the jury to disregard such statements once they had been wrongly admitted. The submission of learned counsel as we gather was that the absence of an independent civilian witness rendered the recording of such statements bad and therefore inadmissible; learned counsel further urged upon the court for a ruling as to the necessity of having literates as such independent civilian witnesses. A particular instance was the police statement of the fourth accused, exhibit O, at p. 330 of the record. It shows that together with the opening caution, the fourth appellant’s answer that he had been cautioned and wished to make a statement which he desired someone to write down for him, was witnessed by the detective inspector, the twentieth prosecution witness, who took down the

[p.492] of [1980] GLR 480 statement, on the fourth appellant thumb-printing these. Likewise the appellant’s thumb-print to his recorded statement, and that of one Mintah to the certificate were also witnessed by the same police inspector. At the trial, while giving evidence, the fourth appellant denied certain parts of the contents of his recorded statement, and further denied the contents having been read over to him, or seeing one Mintah being present and certify the statement as having been given voluntarily. This attack was obviously directed to the weight of evidence, which can be legitimately done even if the admissibility was not challenged: see Commissioner of Police v. Owusu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 364, In this case, however, these matters going to weight were never put to the twentieth prosecution witness at any time, except by implication that the witnesses to the statement were invariably illiterates. The attack on weight was bound to lose its effect. Nor do we consider it valid criticism that the prosecution ought to have called evidence in rebuttal to the attack on the statement. The defence must have long known its case. If the attacks had been made while the twentieth prosecution witness was giving evidence he might well have answered them. For the defence to air those matters, for the first time, while the fourth appellant was giving evidence does not make the matter one arising ex improviso so as to make it obligatory for the prosecution to call evidence in rebuttal: see R. v. Day (1940) 27 Cr. App. R. 168, C.C.A.

But the suggestion in this court that the absence of an independent civilian witness, preferably literate, who could have certified the thumb-prints and made the certificate, made the admissibility of those statements questionable, seems to be putting the issue too high. What the courts have so far said goes no further than that it is desirable in serious offences to have an independent civilian witness present at the taking of an accused’s statement by the police. Thus in R. v. Abisa Grunshie (1955) 1 W.A.L.R. 36 the West African Court of Appeal said at p. 39:

“It has been pointed out ad nauseam by the courts in this country that the proper procedure in taking voluntary statements from prisoners, especially confession statements in murder cases by the police, is to require the presence of an independent civilian witness who should sign the statement at the relevant time.”

It is as well to note that the observance of this practice is to ensure the voluntary nature of the statement. Confession statements apart, the criterion for admissibility is relevance only. This principle of the law of evidence was authoritatively restated in 1955, in the

[p.493] of [1980] GLR 480

Privy council case of Kuruma Son of Kaniu v. R. [1955] 1 All E.R. 236, in an opinion delivered by Lord Goddard C.J. at p. 239, P.C. It stated:

“In their Lordships’ opinion, the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained.”

Then at p. 240 it is further stated (citing R. v. Thompson [1893] 2 Q.B. 12):

“It is right, however, that it should be stated that the rule with regard to the admission of confessions, whether it be regarded as an exception to the general rule or not, is a rule of law which their Lordships are not qualifying in any degree whatsoever. The rule is that a confession can only be admitted if it is voluntary and, therefore, one obtained by threats or promises held out by a person in authority is not to be admitted.”

The statement of the fourth appellant, and indeed of nearly every accused, was substantially a denial and not a confession. The objections raised to the statement of the fourth appellant and the others were matters of weight, and we are of the opinion that the ground of admissibility addressed to us here must fail. All the same on the question of the procedure in taking statements of accused persons, it is enough to say that the procedure as enjoined in the Abisa Grunshie case (supra) is a matter of practice and not law. In a country where illiteracy is predominant, the practical difficulty of getting literate independent civilian witnesses may be real, especially in remote parts of the country. To the existing practice we would here only add that whenever practicable the police should endeavour to get literate independent civilian witnesses.

Finally, learned counsel raised in conjunction with the several grounds, and separately, various complaints of misdirection. These include non-direction on the delay by prosecution witnesses in reporting the alleged crime to the police and on the evidence contradictory to police evidence that a gun was recovered from the premises of the sixth accused, to mention only two. We have examined the record with care and considered the various submissions under this head and we have unhesitantly come to the conclusion that even had there been a perfect summing-up the jury who heard all the evidence, must certainly have come to the conclusion that the appellants were

[p.494] of [1980] GLR 480 guilty of the offences of which they were respectively convicted. The appeal of each appellant is accordingly dismissed.

DECISION

Appeals dismissed.

S. O.

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