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[1979] SLR (CA) 6Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

MAHAMA vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 100

5 March 1979 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 13 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (CA) 6
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OSCOLAMAHAMA v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 100 [1979] SLR (CA) 6
APAMAHAMA v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 100, [1979] SLR (CA) 6 (Ghana).
BluebookMAHAMA v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 100, [1979] SLR (CA) 6 (Ghana Ct. App. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) R. v. Gidado (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 60.

(2) Konkomba v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 698, S.C.

(3) R. v. Attard (1958) 43 Cr.App. R. 90.

(4) Gaio v. R. (1960) 104 C.L. R. 419.

(5) Asare alias Fanti v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 70, S.C.

(6) Egbetorwokpor v. The Republic [1975] 1 G.L.R. 485, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the judgment of Taylor J. sitting with a jury convicting the appellant and sentencing him to five years’ imprisonment with hard labour for the manslaughter of the deceased.

COUNSEL

Mensah Etsi for the appellant.

Mrs. J. Bamford-Addo, Principal State Attorney, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the judgment of the court. The only point of substance raised in this appeal is one of law, namely, whether an incriminating statement made by an accused through an interpreter is admissible in evidence if the interpreter is not called as a witness. If such statement is inadmissible, what legal consequence flows from its admission?

The facts of the case are quite simple. On 4 January 1976, there was, what can only be described as a communal fight at a village called Nyoragu in the Northern Region. Two antagonistic factions supported rival chiefs and the evidence shows that the fight erupted because one side was alleged to have insulted the reigning chief. Sticks, cutlasses and other offensive missiles were freely used and a number of persons sustained injuries as a result. That a large number of persons took part in this fight is shown by the fact that on that day, the police took into custody 29 persons including four females.

An elderly man whose age Dr. Acquaye estimated as 60 years, sustained injury in this fracas. He was called Issah Sulemana. According to the doctor, his skull was fractured and this caused his death on 9 January, that is five days after the incident. It was the Republic’s case, that the appellant caused his death by hitting him on the head with a stick. He was accordingly charged with manslaughter.

The prosecution called as a witness one Mama Ghapsie who said he was an eye-witness of the incident. According to him, when the deceased arrived at the scene, he “started to separate the fight and the accused hit him, with a piece of stick on his head.” Another witness, one Fati Sule, also testified that the accused hit the deceased with a stick. But she was not able to say what part of the body was so hit.

The appellant for his part, admitted taking part in the fight. He said one Fuseini slashed him at the back of his head with a cutlass and in retaliation, he threw a stick at him. It missed him. The deceased, who was Fuseini’s father, in turn hit him on his back with a stick. The appellant said he picked another stick from the ground and struck his ribs with it. The deceased then left the scene. He denied that he hit the head of the deceased with the stick. That it was the ribs rather than the head that the accused struck, was corroborated slightly by the testimony of Fati Sule, the prosecution’s second witness. She said in cross-examination, “The deceased was in the vehicle and later complained of pains in the ribs at the hospital.” But the doctor said, “I found nothing wrong with the ribs.” Since the cause of death was injury to the head, whether it was the head that the appellant struck with the stick or ribs was of some importance. The evidence that it was the appellant who hit the deceased’s head with a stick was given by only one witness.

[p.103] of [1980] GLR 100

The prosecution accordingly sought to tender in evidence through Police Sergeant Gyekye, a cautioned statement alleged to have been made by the appellant to the police. The statement was made by the appellant in Dagbani which the police did not understand. It wag interpreted into English to the sergeant by one Alhaji Sulemana. According to the police sergeant, after taking the statement, he “read it over to him in the English language and it was interpreted to him in Dagbani.” The interpreter was not available at the trial and was not called as a witness. When the police sought to tender the statement in evidence, it was objected to by counsel for the appellant on the ground that, “the statement does not reflect what the accused told the police through the interpreter. The statement is inaccurate.” The learned judge, Taylor J. overruled the objection and held that:

“The basis of the objection is that the statement is not accurate and does not reflect what the accused told the officer. As counsel for the Republic rightly submits, these are matters which can be dealt with in cross-examination. It is not being suggested that the statement is not voluntary. In the circumstance, I overrule the objection . . . The statement is accordingly admitted in evidence as exhibit A.”

In the statement, the appellant was put down as having said on this issue as follows:

“I could not sit down to look at them and I joined the fight of which I received injuries from Fuseini Issa. I was going after him with a stick I was holding but he ran so fast that I could not meet him and I threw the stick in order to hit him but it missed and Issa Sulemana (meaning the deceased) who was also running after me hit me with a club and it fell down. I took the club and hit his head where he fell down. After the fight, I saw that Mahama Salifu had been killed . . .”

If this statement were properly admissible in evidence, it tallies with the sole direct testimony given on this issue by Mama Ghapsie and is also consistent with the medical evidence which gave the cause of death as fracture of the skull. Counsel for the appellant said it amounted to a confession. So it is.

After a thorough and painstaking summing-up on the law and the facts, the jury returned a majority verdict of guilty of manslaughter by six to one. The judge accepted that verdict and proceeded to pass sentence of five years’ imprisonment with hard labour on the appellant.

It is against this conviction that the appellant appeals to this court. We granted him leave by counsel to argue only one additional

[p.104] ground of appeal formulated as follows: of [1980] GLR 100

“The learned trial judge was wrong in law when he admitted exhibit A, the statement of the appellant, in evidence. Since the said statement was not proved by the interpreter to have been made by the appellant. The said exhibit A must have weighed on the mind of the jury in convicting the appellant thus occasioning a serious miscarriage of justice.”

Although counsel for the appellant did not clearly articulate the legal basis of the objection, his complaint amounts to no more than that as the interpreter was not called, the reported confession of the appellant was inadmissible hearsay evidence. Properly analysed, it amounts to this: The interpreter Sulemana told the police that the accused said he clubbed the deceased on the head. The interpreter himself was not available and in so far as his statement reduced into writing by the police was produced in evidence as the truth of that fact, it offended the hearsay rule and was inadmissible on that score.

The case law on this subject is all one way, namely, that such statement is inadmissible. In the Cameroon case of R. v. Gidado (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 60, the court on a murder case “accepted the evidence of the twelfth and thirteenth witnesses for the prosecution as to incriminating statements alleged to have been made by the appellant when those witnesses testified to what was alleged to have been interpreted by persons whose evidence as to the correct interpretation was not called.” The West African Court of Appeal held at p. 62:

“It seemed to us that this failure on the part of the trial Judge to appreciate the inadmissibility as evidence of alleged statements by the appellant, when such statements were not confirmed and established by the persons acting as interpreters, was fatal to the conviction. . . “

Again in Konkomba v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 698, S.C. one Tarko Konkomba was alleged to have interpreted from Konkomba language to Twi to Constable Arthur that the appellant said he used a stool in hitting the deceased. This was denied by the appellant. Tarko himself was not called as a witness “to establish or confirm that the appellant did admit that he used a stool, the statement alleged to have been made by the appellant through Tarko is clearly inadmissible.” The court then gave expression to its view of the law as follows at p. 704:

“In several of the decided cases, it has been held over and over again that failure on the part of the trial judge to appreciate the inadmissibility of evidence of alleged statements by the

[p.105] of [1980] GLR 100 appellant, when such statements were not confirmed and established by the persons acting as interpreter was fatal to the conviction. . .”

In the Commonwealth, the legal principle on this question is not different. In the English case of R. v. Attard (1958) 43 Cr.App.R. 90, the prisoner, a Maltese who did not speak nor understand English, was charged with murder. During the course of the case for the prosecution, the Crown proposed to call evidence by a police officer of an interview which he had conducted with the prisoner through an interpreter. The defence objected that since neither the police officer nor the prisoner could understand what the interpreter said to the other, the evidence of the police officer was inadmissible as hearsay, and that only the interpreter could give evidence of the questions which he put to the prisoner on behalf of the police officer and of the answers given to him by the prisoner in the prisoner’s own language. Gorman J. held that that contention was correct and that the evidence of the police officer in relation to the interview was inadmissible.

In the Australian case of Gaio v. R. (1960) 104 C.L.R. 419, a Papuan native who did not understand nor speak English made a confession in a native dialect to a native interpreter. This was instantaneously interpreted into English to a patrol officer who had no knowledge of the native dialect. The latter transcribed by typewriter what the interpreter told him. The interpreter was called as a witness and he swore that he truly translated to the officer everything said by the appellant in answer to questions put to him. Objection was taken to the confession being admitted in evidence on the ground that it was hearsay. It was held by the High Court of Australia by a majority of four to one that the confession was admissible. Dixon C.J. said the translation word by word or sentence by sentence by an interpreter is not an ex post facto narrative statement of an event that has passed within the rule against the admissibility of hearsay but is an integral part of one translation consisting of communication through the interpreter. It is therefore enough if it is proved that what he did was to interpret faithfully.

It seems plain that if the interpreter had not been called, the confession would have been rejected as offending the hearsay rule. But even in that case McTiernan J. in a powerful dissenting judgment held that the confession infringed the hearsay rule and was inadmissible even though the interpreter testified that he interpreted faithfully because the confession was being tendered by a person who did not hear it being made or if he did, never understood when it was being made. Professor Cross, an acknowledged authority on the law of

[p.106] of [1980] GLR 100 evidence in an article entitled The Periphery of Hearsay in Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 7, pp. 3-5 felt that the minority view of McTiernan J. was right “unless a further exception to the rule against hearsay is recognized.”

The weight of judicial authority is however in favour of admitting the statement if it is confirmed by the interpreter as being a faithful interpretation made by him. It is a convenient aid to justice that incriminating statements made by illiterate accused and faithfully interpreted and recorded should be admitted in evidence if the interpreter confirms this in evidence. It is particularly so in this country where a not inconsiderable number of persons accused of crime are illiterate and can only communicate in English through interpreters. As however the interpreter was not called in this case, the admission of the statement infringed the hearsay rule. We think therefore that counsel for the appellant was right in his contention.

But counsel for the Republic relied on Asare alias Fanti v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 70, S.C. In that case, it was held that where objection is raised against the tendering of a statement alleged to have been made by an accused person, evidence will be heard only when the accused alleges that no statement was made at all or that the statement was made under duress. But when objection is raised against such a statement on the ground of inaccuracy its admissibility becomes a question of law for the judge and the weight to be attached to it is a question of fact for the jury and it must therefore first be admitted before it can be evaluated. It was submitted therefore that the judge’s ruling on the issue of admissibility was right. In view of the ground proffered for the objection, we agree that the ruling was correct. But at that stage, the question whether the admission of the statement infringed the hearsay rule was not raised. Unless counsel for the accused knew at that time that the interpreter was not going to be called, the issue of the statement being inadmissible as hearsay could not have been raised. There is nothing to suggest he knew then. In any event, the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence being a point of law, can be raised at any stage and certainly competently on appeal.

The evidence shows that it became apparent after cross-examination that the interpreter was not available. He was apparently involved in a fraud case and had disappeared and his whereabouts was unknown to the police. When therefore the prosecution closed its case without his evidence, it ought to have struck the learned judge that the allegation that the appellant admitted hitting the deceased on the head with a stick rested only on what the absent interpreter claimed the appellant told him in Dagbani. That incriminating statement was clearly hearsay and the judge ex proprio

[p.107] of [1980] GLR 100 motu, should have excluded it in evidence and advised the jury to ignore it. The judge did precisely the opposite. It is obvious that he himself cannot have appreciated that the confession was inadmissible as hearsay. He reminded the jury of this statement and said, inter alia, “In a statement which the accused made to the police on 11 January 1976 two days after the death, that is exhibit A, the accused admitted that he took a club and hit the head of the deceased with it and the deceased fell down.” He then read the medical evidence and pointed out its consistency with the alleged admission.

It was contended by counsel for the appellant that this confession must have weighed on the mind of the jury and helped it convict the appellant. This, he submitted occasioned a serious miscarriage of justice. For the Republic, it was replied that even if that confession were disregarded, there was other evidence to justify the verdict. It seems plain that where inadmissible prejudicial evidence was admitted, the conviction cannot stand unless the court can be satisfied that the jury must have returned the same verdict even if the evidence had not been given. In Egbetorwokpor v. The Republic [1975] 1 G.L.R. 485 at p. 495, C.A. the court examined the legal principle and the case law on this subject in some depth. It came to the conclusion that where there has been misreception of evidence or serious misdirection, the court must be satisfied that if the offending evidence is excluded or on a proper direction, it must be possible to say the jury must inevitably or would certainly have returned the same verdict.

Can this be said in this case? The only direct evidence that in the communal fight which erupted, it was the appellant who struck the deceased on the head with a stick was given by a single witness. There was indirect corroboration of this testimony. But the appellant’s evidence that he hit only the deceased’s ribs was equally indirectly supported by evidence given by the prosecution. What seems to have tipped the scales against him was the inadmissible confessional statement. In the circumstances, the court cannot say that if such evidence had not been led, the jury would inevitably have returned the same verdict.

We think therefore that the conviction cannot stand. It ought to be and is hereby quashed. For it, we substitute a verdict of not guilty. The appellant is discharged.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

S. O.

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