AKAAKYI II vs. YEBOAH AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 176
12 April 1979 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 13 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 12Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
(2) Timitimi v. Amabebe (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 374.
(3) Asare v. Dzeny [1976] 1 G.L.R. 473, C.A. (full bench).
(4) Amoabimaa v. Badu (1953) 2 W.A.L.R. 214, W.A.C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
RULING on an application for an order to set aside an interim injunction restraining a grantee of the applicant from making further extension to farms on the land in dispute. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
James Mercer for the applicant.
Polley for Blay for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.
The plaintiffs herein, who claim to represent the stool of Agona, Ahanta, instituted this action only against the defendant, Morrison Imoru, claiming ¢5,000 damages for trespass to the plaintiffs’ stool land commonly known and called Asine land and bounded as set out in the writ of summons. They claim further that “the trespass complained of consists in the defendant’s entry upon the said land and starting extensive clearing thereon for farming purposes without the consent and concurrence of the plaintiffs.”
The defendant entered appearance through his solicitor, Kodwo Erskine, who filed the defendant’s statement of defence on 10 July
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1978. The plaintiffs having filed their reply to the defendant’s statement of defence by 15 January 1979, filed a motion for interim injunction under Order 50, r. 7 (1)-(2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The motion paper and supporting affidavit were served on the defendant’s solicitor, Kodwo Erskine on 31 January 1979. The defendant did by 22 February 1979 file an affidavit in opposition to the application for interim injunction.
When the motion came on for hearing, the defendant had not at the time filed his affidavit in opposition, and counsel for the defendant did not appear either. Polley for Blay for the plaintiffs thereupon moved the court in terms of the motion paper and the supporting affidavit. The application was granted on 22 February 1979 whereupon the defendant, his workmen and or agents were restrained from entering or dealing with the land, the subject-matter of the dispute and from making any extension of the farms made thereon already.
Nana Akaakyi II, who is now the co-defendant in the suit before the court, did apply, on 23 February 1979, to the court to be joined in this suit as a co-defendant. The application for joinder came on for hearing on 28 February 1979 when James Mercer appeared for the applicant and Hughes for Polley for the plaintiffs-respondents (hereinafter referred to as the respondents). Counsel for the respondents did not oppose the application and the defendant who appeared in person did not oppose it either. The application was accordingly granted and Nana Akaakyi II was thereby joined as a co-defendant. Immediately after this order for joinder has been made, Mercer for the co-defendant who obviously was aware of the existence of the order of interim injunction made on 22 February 1979 against the defendant, called the court’s attention to the fact that it appeared that the application for interim injunction did not ask for an order to restrain the defendant, his workmen and or agents from entering or dealing with the land, the subject-matter of dispute, but only to restrain the defendant, his workmen and or agents from making any extension of the farms made thereon already. The court being satisfied that this was a point well taken, decided to review the order made on 22 February 1979. The following is what I recorded:
“The application was for restraint as to extension of farming operations only and not restraint against entry.
The order made restraining the defendant from entering the land was therefore not asked for. I will here therefore review the order by deleting the portion which restrains the defendant from entering the land in dispute. He is restrained only from making further
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extension to the farm or farms he had already made on the land in dispute.”
Mercer for the co-defendant following upon this as it were, filed the present motion on 13 March 1979 asking for an order of this court to set aside its order of interim injunction made on 22 February 1979 and reviewed on 28 February 1979, restraining the defendant, his workmen, servants and or agents from making further extension to the farm or farms he has already made on the land in dispute.
Learned counsel for the applicant gave as his grounds for the application the following which I gathered from his submissions. Learned counsel submitted that the application has been brought on the ground that there is another action affecting a larger piece of land pending before Andoh J. and of which the subject-matter is a part. Learned counsel submitted that the land in respect of which the defendant herein has been restrained from making further farm or farms thereon, is a portion of a larger piece of land in respect of which the same plaintiffs have sued the co-defendant and one other person for declaration of title, in suit No. 41/77, in which they are also claiming perpetual injunction. The plaintiffs have there too applied for interim injunction to restrain the defendants in suit No. 41/77. The application, counsel submitted, was filed on 14 February 1979 and heard on 26 February 1979 and the ruling is yet to be given. Learned counsel submitted further that this application does not attack the merit of the order of this court but it is against the process adopted for the court to make the order. Counsel further submitted that the applicants in the present suit No. 16/78, should have informed the court that there is another suit affecting the same piece of land which forms part of a larger land, being the subject-matter of the suit before Andoh J. That if the court had been informed, the court might have considered as to whether or not it would be proper for both cases to be dealt with together, in terms of Order 49, rr. 1 and 2 of L.N. 140A; that is, the question of consolidation. That, this is to avoid internal conflict between judges of the same court in the same judicial division.
Counsel submitted further that since the plaintiffs knew that the action taken in one court affects a piece of land which they subsequently made the subject-matter of another suit in another court, then the plaintiffs should be held guilty of having abused the process of the court. To have withheld that information from the court amounted to an offence in procedure within the rule in Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. An order or judgment not warranted by law must not be allowed to stand but be set aside ex debito justitiae.
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Counsel for the respondents has conceded that the land in respect of which the plaintiff sued the defendant herein in suit No. 16/78, forms part of a larger piece of land being the subject-matter of suit No. 41/77, pending before Andoh J. Learned counsel, however, contends that at the time the application for interim injunction was brought against the defendant herein, and the order was made restraining him, the co-defendant was not a party to this suit and he did not therefore consider it necessary at the time to inform the court of the pendency of suit No. 41/77. Counsel for the respondents has submitted further that the order made by this court restrained only the defendant, Morrison Imoru, from making further extension to the farm he has already made on the land; and in the suit before Andoh J. the defendant, Nana Akaakyi II, has been sued for declaration of title and the order being sought is to restrain him from bringing more tenant farmers unto the remaining portions of the larger piece of land to make farms thereon, pending the determination of the matter before the court. Counsel submits therefore that whatever order there is to be made by Andoh J. in respect of that application, will not affect the order already made on 22 February 1979, in respect of suit No. 16/78, affecting only the defendant, Morrison Imoru, who is not a party in suit No. 41/77. The application being without merit, learned counsel submits, should be dismissed.
It is my view that a judgment or order of a court of competent jurisdiction regularly obtained by a party entitled to obtain same may not be set aside, but may only be appealed against, notwithstanding the fact that it is palpably erroneous on the face of it on point of law or fact. However, a judgment or order may be set aside if it is obtained by fraud, or given without jurisdiction or upon discovery of new evidence which would have had a material effect upon the decision of the court. In the case where the judgment or order is given or made without jurisdiction it is void and need not even be set aside or appealed against: see Timitimi v. Amabebe (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 374 at p. 377, S.C. where Coussey J.A. had the following to say:
“There is a distinction between an order or judgment which a Court is not competent to make and an order which, even if erroneous in law or in fact, is within the Court’s competency. In re Padstow Total Loss and Collision Assurance Association (1882) 20 Ch.D. 137 decides that where there is no jurisdiction the proceedings are void; but where a Court of competent jurisdiction makes an erroneous order, it is appealable.”
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In this case, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that this application does not attack the merit of the order itself but the process adopted for the court to make the order. I think, by this, counsel is understood to mean that the order which he is seeking to set aside is not erroneous either on point of law or fact, but the process adopted for the order to be made is irregular; in the sense that this court’s attention, before making the order it did make, should have been called to the fact that the plaintiffs have also sued other defendants in another court of co-equal jurisdiction, in respect of a larger piece of land, of which the subject-matter of the suit in respect of which this application had been brought, is a portion.
It seems to me that if the plaintiffs having taken action for declaration of title against one or two defendants, in respect of a piece of land bring another action for trespass in another court of co-equal jurisdiction against another defendant, not being a defendant in the earlier case, in respect of a smaller piece of land being a portion of the land, subject-matter of the earlier case, jurisdiction of either court is not ousted merely by reason of the fact that both cases can, and may be consolidated, or that it is desirable to avoid internal conflict between judges of the same court (i.e. judges of co-equal jurisdiction), in the same judicial division. This is because neither judge of two courts of co-equal jurisdiction is bound to follow the decision of the other court. It was held in Asare v. Dzeny [1976] 1 G.L.R. 473, C.A. (full bench) (as stated in the headnote) at p. 474 that:
“Francois J. was not bound by the decision of Prempeh J. for a High Court judge was not bound to follow the decision of another judge of co-equal jurisdiction, though he might do so as a matter of judicial comity.”
It appears that where a court has jurisdiction to deal with the matter before it and it makes an order therein, it is not competent for another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction to review the order. Thus it was further held (as stated in the headnote) of Asare v. Dzeny (supra) at p. 474:
“It was generally incompetent to review as on appeal the order or judgment of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Yet Francois J. was bound to ascertain whether or not the judgment relied on as an estoppel per rem judicatam was valid in the sense that Prempeh J. had jurisdiction to pronounce that judgment.”
It is my view that since the order made by this court is not binding on the court differently constituted by Andoh J. and having been
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made, unquestionably, within jurisdiction, whatever order that Andoh J. is likely to make in that other application, should not be considered as affecting the order of this court or vice versa, since either order will stand valid until it has been successfully vacated on appeal or set aside on good grounds. Moreover, this being an earlier order, I think, if only for the sake of consolidation, then it would have been more in keeping with the accepted common practice that the existence of the earlier order should have been brought to the notice of the court of the later application. In any event, I do not see how any order made by Andoh J. in that application will affect the position of the defendant in suit No. 16/78 who is not a party in suit No. 41/77. Andoh J. may or may not restrain the defendants in suit No. 41/77 from putting new tenants on the remaining portions of the land in dispute, and in either way, the defendant, Morrison Imoru, who is already on a portion of the land, is restrained from extending his farm or making fresh farm or farms thereon.
Learned counsel for the applicant cited the case of Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. where it was held, inter alia (as stated in the headnote) at p. 338:
“Where a judgment or an order is void either because it is given or made without jurisdiction or because it is not warranted by any law or rule or procedure, the party affected is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside, and the court or a judge is under a legal obligation to set it aside, either suo motu or on the application of the party affected. No judicial discretion arises here. The power of the court or a judge to set aside any such judgment or order is derived from the inherent jurisdiction of the court to set aside its own void orders and it is irrespective of any expressed power of review vested in the court or a judge; and the constitution of the court is for this purpose immaterial. Further, there is no time limit in which the party affected by a void order or judgment may apply to have it set aside. Craig v. Kanseen [1943] 1 K.B. 256, C.A.; Forfie v. Seifah [1958] A.C. 59, P.C.; Amoabimaa v. Badu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 214, W.A.C.A.; Concession Enquiry No. 471 (Ashanti) [1962] 2 G.L.R. 24, S.C. and Ghassoub v. Dizengoff [1962] 2 G.L.R. 133, S.C. applied.”
And, as was held in Amoabimaa v. Badu (1953) 2 W.A.L.R. 214 at p. 216 W.A.C.A., “A judgment or order obtained by some step not warranted by the rules or capable of being sanctioned is wholly void and may be set aside.” It is my view that the principles underlined in Mosi v. Bagyina (supra), Amoabimaa v. Badu (supra) and all the other cases applied, will apply in cases where the judgment or order complained of is void either because it is given or made without
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jurisdiction or because it is not warranted by any law or rule or procedure. As counsel has submitted, this application has not been brought to attack the merit of the order of this court; it has not been shown either that the order was made without jurisdiction or that it is not warranted by any law or rule of procedure, and that therefore it is void.
It seems to me also that an application to set aside a void judgment or order must be brought by the party affected by it: see Mosi v. Bagyina (supra). The order in question here was made against the only defendant at the time, Morrison Imoru, before the applicant, Nana Akaakyi II, the co-defendant now, applied to be joined as a co-defendant. It seems to me therefore that to show that he is entitled to bring this application, the applicant must establish that he is a party affected, and to what extent he is affected. It does not appear here that the applicant has shown to what extent he is affected by the order made restraining the defendant from making extension to the farm he has made on the land; he himself not being restrained by this order from making any farm or farms on the land in dispute. It is my view that he is not himself in his own right affected by the order, even though he is now a co-defendant. It seems the plaintiffs may have to bring a fresh application if they want to restrain the co-defendant herein from making fresh farms on the land.
It is my view that this application to set aside the order of this court cannot succeed for the reasons stated. The application being therefore refused, is accordingly dismissed with ¢150 costs in favour of the respondents.
DECISION
Application dismissed.
S. O.
