ATOMO vs. TEKPETEY [1980] GLR 738
26 October 1979 · APATU-PLANGE J · ≈ 14 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 18Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Yaw v. Domfeh [1965] G.L.R. 418, S.C.
(2) Asante v. Bogyabi [1966] G.L.R. 232.
(3) Kodieh v. Affram (1930) 1 W.A.C.A 12.
(4) Ebiassah v. Ababio (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 106.
(5) Tanor v. Akosua Koko [1974] 1 G.L.R. 451, C.A.
(6) Obeng alias Nkobiahene v. Dzaba [1976] 1 G.L.R. 172.
(7) Atuahene v. Amofa, Court of Appeal, 5 August 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 154. (8) Abadoo v. Awotwi [1973] 1 G.L.R. 393.
(9) Coleman v. Shang [1959] G.L.R. 390, C.A.
(10) Nartey v. Koshi [1961] 2 G.L.R. (Pt. II) 728.
(11) Kwan v. Nyieni [1959] G.L.R. 67, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION by the plaintiff claiming that she and her sisters are the natural daughters of their deceased father and therefore are entitled to inherit his properties. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
A. L. Djabatey for the plaintiff.
George Darko for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF APATU-PLANGE J.
In this case the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant as indorsed on her writ of summons is for: (a) account from the defendant as caretaker of the properties of the late Atomo Lawor of Osuwem from the date of his death up to the date of judgment;
(b) recovery of the amount found due for the purpose of being shared between the plaintiff and her sisters, the customary beneficiaries of the late Atomo’s properties;
[p.740] of [1980] GLR 738 an order upon the defendant to deliver unto the plaintiff and her sisters the properties of the late Atomo Lawor held by him and in his care; and
(d) an order of perpetual injunction against the defendant restraining him from further interference with the properties so handed over to the plaintiff and her sisters.”
The defendant resisted the claim by contending that the plaintiff cannot in accordance with Osuwem custom be described as a daughter of the late Atomo Lawor and that at the time of the death of late Atomo Lawor, he, the defendant, being the paternal nephew was the only relative of the late Atomo Lawor capable of inheriting him and that he, the defendant, was accordingly entrusted with the properties of the late Atomo Lawor by the head of family by name Kpong Teye as successor.
[His lordship here recounted the facts as summarised in the headnote and continued:] It is the case of the defendant that even if the plaintiff was born after the death of the fetish priest Chechedua, since her mother was married to Chechedua as a wayokwe, the plaintiff is still by custom regarded as the child of the fetish priest and not the child of her natural father, Atomo Lawor. This claim by the defendant is said to be one of the customs among the Osudokus and the second defendant witness in her evidence in support of this claim conflicted herself. In her evidence-in-chief this was what she said:
“I know what is a wayokwe for I married Chechedua as wayokwe. The plaintiff’s mother was also wayokwe.
I had children with Chechedua. Since Chechedua’s death, I had married again and had children. They are two in all and they belong to Chechedua because his money is behind me. This means that when I married Chechedua, the custom performed was such that when I bring forth without him, the children are still his.
The custom performed when I married Chechedua is the same custom performed for all those who married as wayokwe.”
Then under cross-examination this was what the very witness said:
“I know a woman called Nagadi for she also married Chechedua. After Chechedua’s death Nagadi married one Kwadzo Akpasu given to her by the family. The said Akpasu is dead and his properties were shared among his children. I know Nanyo, she too married Chechedua. She was given later to Obroni Auginbor.
She had no children. I knew Komleko, for she was married also to my husband. She was given to Awotei, but she refused and so got married to Awya. I admit that Grace
[p.741] of [1980] GLR 738
Atomo, the plaintiff’s mother, in like so was married to Awya but she refused him and she went to marry Atomo.”
Now the above evidence of the second defendant witness that after the death of Kwadzo Akpasu, the second husband of Nagadi, also formerly married to Chechedua as wayokwe, his properties were shared among Akpasu’s children with Nagadi, is in sharp conflict with the second defendant’s own evidence that any children born by any wayokwe, after the death of her fetish priest husband still belonged to the fetish priest. If that were the case then Nagadi’s children with Kwadzo Akpasu would not have been allowed to share the properties of Akpasu who by custom is not recognised as the father of the children.
Thus the evidence of the plaintiff was, in fact, corroborated by the evidence of the second defendant witness but there was no evidence to corroborate the defendant’s evidence on the issue that such children are not entitled to inherit their natural father’s properties.
Thus in Yaw v. Domfeh [1965] G.L.R. 418 at p. 423, S.C. it was held that:
“Where the evidence of one party on an issue in a suit is corroborated by witnesses of his opponent, whilst that of his opponent on the same issue stands uncorroborated even by his own witnesses, a court ought not to accept the uncorroborated version in preference to the corroborated one, unless for some good reason (which must appear on the face of the judgment) the court finds the corroborated version incredible or impossible.”
This was also confirmed in the case of Asante v. Bogyabi [1966] G.L.R. 232. In my judgment, therefore, I hold that the plaintiff was born to the said late Atomo Lawor and the plaintiff’s mother after the death of the plaintiff’s mother’s first husband, Chechedua, and that it was Chechedua’s family that permitted the plaintiff’s mother to marry Atomo Lawor after she had refused to marry one Akiti offered to her by Chechedua’s family. I hold further that that being the case, the children begotten of Atomo Lawor with the plaintiff’s mother after their marriage are thus entitled to inherit Atomo Lawor’s properties, since succession among the Osudokus is patrilineal. Those children are the plaintiff, Comfort Klabia and Tekpeki.
But in case I am wrong in holding that Grace Atomo was born after the death of Chechedua and that the defendant’s contention that plaintiff was born out of an adulterous association was right and, therefore, by custom cannot be said to be the child of her
[p.742] of [1980] GLR 738 natural father, this court has to examine whether a custom denying a child the right to his natural father and to impose a stranger on him as his father is reasonable and not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.
It is trite learning that nothing shall deprive our courts of the right to observe and to enforce the observance of, or shall deprive any person of the benefit of any customary law which is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience nor incompatible either directly or by necessary implication with any law for the time being in force: see Kodieh v. Affram (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 12; Ebiassah v. Ababio (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 106 and Tanor v. Akosua Koko [1974] 1 G.L.R. 451, C.A.
The custom under consideration is that where a woman married to a fetish priest as a wayokwe, i.e. given in marriage to a fetish priest to appease the fetish to stop it from killing members of the woman’s family, then the said woman becomes permanently the wife of the fetish to the extent that if the said wife has an issue with another man to the knowledge of the fetish priest, or has the issue with another man she marries after the death of the fetish priest, the said issue in either case is not recognised by Osudoku custom as the child of the natural father but the child of the fetish priest, and the said child will not be allowed to inherit his father in a patrilineal society.
One cannot see the objective of this ancient custom. It seems to me that our customs must move with modern civilisation. In modern society where any father has a legal and moral duty to maintain and educate his children, it would be too harsh a custom to deprive a father of his own natural child merely because the mother had been formerly married to a fetish priest as a wayokwe.
The evidence by both parties explained what wayokwe means in Osudoku custom. Its explanation brings into sharp focus the admissibility of evidence as to the efficacy of fetish in our courts. In Obeng alias Nkobiahene v. Dzaba [1976] 1 G.L.R. 172, my brother Andoh J. sought at p. 177 to explain this belief in fetish powers by stating:
“The efficacy of the fetish is traditionally believed by Africans and Ghanaians alike. However, in a court of law it is difficult if not impossible to adduce legally acceptable evidence to establish the efficacy of the fetish. The method by which the fetish works cannot be comprehended… and it is doubtful whether their findings could found a cause of action in the law court.”
[p.743] of [1980] GLR 738
It is plain then that this whole custom of wayokwe marriage is mixed up with beliefs in fetish being able to kill by some supernatural powers and this court is unable to use this as a basis in holding that any such custom is reasonable. Indeed, there is something to be said for the proposition being put forward by this court that to deny a child the right to be recognised as the child of his natural father and to compel the natural father to disown and to disinherit him for what is after all not of his making seems to me to be out of step with modern reforms. It is my considered opinion therefore that the custom being relied on by the defendant to resist the claim of the plaintiff is unreasonable and repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience and cannot therefore be enforced in a court of law.
It is not in dispute that the plaintiff and her two sisters, Comfort Klabia and Tekpeki, are the natural children of the late Atomo Lawor. It was also not denied by the defendant that Atomo Lawor died possessed of two cocoa farms at Sefwi and Suissu in Brong-Ahafo. The defendant also admitted that the late Atomo Lawor had a cap gun and motor blow spraying machines. He however denied that the late Atomo Lawor had a herd of cattle at Nyapunya which he, the defendant, was originally taking care of. There was, however, sufficient evidence from the plaintiff and his witnesses and which I accept that the late Atomo Lawor had a herd of eight cows at the time of his death in the charge of the defendant and that one was slaughtered by the family to perform the funeral rites of Atomo Lawor leaving seven.
The defendant admitted that he rather had the cattle and that the said cattle had all died. The defendant admittedly never struck me as a witness of truth and I never believed this evidence of his that he rather owned the cattle.
The defendant sought to establish that the late Atomo Lawor made an oral will, i.e. samansiw of all his properties to him before he died, yet he never pleaded it. He however admitted that no one was present when the samansiw was made but that Atomo Lawor made it while he was dying. In Atuahene v. Amofa, Court of Appeal, 5 August 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 154, the Court of Appeal summarised the characteristics of samansiw as:
The disposition must be made in the presence of witnesses who must hear what the declaration is and know its contents.
Be made in anticipation of death.
(3) Be in respect of the self-acquired properties of the declarant. See also Abadoo v. Awotwi [1973] 1 G.L.R. 393. In the instant case, there was no evidence that the declaration was made in the presence of any witnesses and consequently no valid samansiw could be said to have been made, and the defendant cannot claim to be entitled
[p.744] of [1980] GLR 738 to the properties of late Atomo Lawor by virtue of the said alleged samansiw.
Again the defendant sought to lay claim to the properties on the grounds that he was appointed customary successor by Kpong Teye, the head of family, to take care of the properties. This was denied by the plaintiff who contended that Kpong Teye made the defendant only a caretaker of the properties until the conclusion of the funeral and related final rites. Issue was therefore joined and it was for the defendant to prove his said successorship. At the time of the hearing of this case Kpong Teye had died. But there was evidence that one Wahiem buried him and the defendant could have called him to satisfy the court as to the appointment of the defendant as successor to late Atomo Lawor. He however failed to call him.
There was also evidence from the plaintiff and the second plaintiff witness that the defendant, while a caretaker, rendered accounts to Kpong Teye twice in 1964 and 1965 of which the plaintiff was a witness, but the plaintiff left the farm as a result of her marriage in 1965 and did not know what happened to the accounts again.
The evidence of the plaintiff was that the properties were handed over to the defendant to take care of until they could be shared among the customary beneficiaries of the late Atomo Lawor. These beneficiaries are his children, successorship in Osudoku being patrilineal. This evidence was corroborated by the defendant’s first and second witnesses that the properties were given to the defendant as caretaker to look after for the children. This evidence is very likely to be true because at the time of late Atomo’s death, in 1962 all his children were minors, the eldest, the plaintiff, then being nineteen years old.
I hold, therefore, that the late Kpong Teye appointed the defendant as a caretaker to look after late Atomo’s properties for the children of Atomo and that was why the defendant was rendering accounts to the late Kpong Teye. The defendant’s claim that the properties were given to him by way of samansiw and also later as successor to the late Atomo cannot, therefore, be true; otherwise the defendant would have called the present successor to Kpong Teye by name Wahiem to testify to that effect.
In Coleman v. Shang [1959] G.L.R. 390, it was held by the Court of Appeal that by the customary law of Osu (as a Ga-Adangbe Community), succession is patrilineal, and all children, however born, are entitled to share equally in the father’s estate. This decision clearly supports the plaintiff’s claim that once she is accepted or recognised as the natural daughter of the late Atomo Lawor, she is entitled in customary law, however born, to share equally in her father’s estate.
[p.745] of [1980] GLR 738
Counsel for the defendant in reply to this submitted that the judgment on Coleman v. Shang being a case involving Osu people cannot be said to be a decision of general application so as to cover Osudoku people. With respect, this argument cannot be sustained because Coleman v. Shang dealt with the Ga-Adangbe tribe where succession is patrilineal and the Osudoku people being Ga-Adangbes where succession in patrilineal, this decision can be reasonably be said to cover them; so is the present case.
Counsel for the defendant in his address submitted that inheritance is not automatic; that contention cannot be disputed; but in a patrilineal society, for the purposes of succession, children belong to their father’s family and come within the class of persons from whom a successor may be appointed to succeed their father: see Nartey v. Koshi [1961] 2 G.L.R. (Pt. II) 728. In the instant case, the society to which the late Atomo Lawor belonged being patrilineal, his children come within the class of persons from whom a successor may be appointed to succeed him. This court has held that Atomo Lawor’s children now living are the plaintiff, Comfort Klabia and Tekpeki.
The plaintiff is proved to be the eldest of the three. By custom, the head of family is normally the proper person to sue in respect of family property. But where the head of family is indifferent or is for some reason unable to act, any member of the inheritable family may institute an action for the purposes of recovering the family property.
In the instant case, it is clear that Kpong Teye, the head of family, who appointed the defendant as the caretaker of Atomo Lawor’s property did not take steps to share the property among the late Atomo Lawor’s children. Kpong Teye died in 1974 and his successor, Wahiem, has also since not done anything or taken any steps to preserve the interest of late Atomo’s children who are entitled to share in their father’s property. In the circumstances, the plaintiff is perfectly entitled to institute this action to retrieve their father’s property from the defendant for the enjoyment of herself and her other paternal sisters: see Kwan v. Nyieni [1959] G.L.R. 67, C.A.
In the result, the plaintiff succeeds in her claim and she is entitled to judgment. There will therefore be judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant for: (a) accounts from the defendant of the late Atomo Lawor’s properties in his care from the date of the late Atomo’s death up to the date of judgment; and (b) recovery of the amount found due for the purpose of being shared among the plaintiff and her sisters who are the customary beneficiaries of late Atomo’s properties. This court hereby orders the defendant to
[p.746] of [1980] GLR 738 deliver up to the plaintiff and her sisters the following in his possession: cocoa farms at Sefwi; cocoa farms at Suissu, one cap gun, two motor blow spraying machines and a herd of seven cows at Nyapunya.
There will, therefore, be an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his servants and or agents from future interference with the said properties so handed over to the plaintiff and her sisters in any manner whatsoever.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiff
D. F. L.
