BREFOH vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 679
21 September 1979 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 41 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 25Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
[p.681] of [1980] GLR 679
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 C1. & F. 85; 6 State Tr. (N.S.) 79; 3 L.T. (0.S.) 277; 8 Jur. 793; 8 E.R. 1034.
(2) Fordyce v. Bridges (1847) 1 H.L. Cas. 1; 11 Jur. 157.
(3) Okoe v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 80.
(4) Boateng v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 444.
(5) Prah v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 278.
(6) Donkor v. The Republic [1977] 2 G.L.R. 383.
(7) Seidu v. The Republic [1978] G.L.R. 65.
(8) Great Western Rail. Co. v. Bater [1922] 2 A.C. 1; 8 T.C. 241; 91 L.J.K.B. 472; 127 L.T. 170; 38 T.L.R. 448; 66 S.J. 365, H.L.
(9) Mirehouse v. Rennell (1833) 1 C1. & F. 527; 7 Bli. (N.S.) 241; 8 Bing 490; 1 Moo. & 683, H.L. (10) Republic v. Greater Accra Regional Commissioner; Ex parte Naawu III [1976] 2 G.L.R. 25. (11) Rossage v. Rossage [1960] 1 W.L.R. 249; 104 S.J. 231; [1960] 1 All E.R. 600, C.A. (12) J. (An Infant), In re [1960] 1 W.L.R. 253; 104 S.J. 233; [1960] 1 All E.R. 603.
(13) R. v. Akosah [1975] 2 G.L.R. 406.
(14) Peacock v. Bell and Kendall (1667) 1 Wms. Saund. 69; 1 Sid. 330; 2 Keb. 226; 85 E.R. 81. (15) In re Cuno; Mansfield v. Mansfield (1889) 43 Ch.D. 12; 62 L.T. 15, C.A.
(16) Seward v. Vera Cruz (1884) 10 App. Cas. 95; 54 L.J.P. 9; 52 L.T. 474; 49 J.P. 324; 33 W.R. 477; 5 Asp. M.L.C. 386.
(17) Bristol Corporation v. Canning Sewers Commissioners’ Clerk for Lower Level of County of Gloucester (1906) 95 L.T. 183; 70 J.P. 528.
(18) Harlow v. Minister of Transport and Rugby Portland Cement Co., Ltd. [1951] 2 K.B. 96; 66 T.L.R.
(Pt. 2) 1037; 114 J.P. 603; 94 S.J. 821; [1950] 2 All E.R. 1005; 1 P. & C. 271; 49 L.G.R. 59, C.A. (19) Lancashire Asylums Board v. Manchester Corporation [1900] 1 Q.B. 458; 69 L.J.Q.B. 234; 82 L.T.
1; 48 W.R. 356, 48 J.P. 101, C.A.
(20) Gloucester (Bishop of) v. Cunnington [1943] K.B. 101; [1943] 1 All E.R. 61; 112 L.J.K.B. 151;
168 L.T. 68; 59 T.L.R. 83, C.A.
(21) Wiltshire County Valuation Committee v. Boyce [1948] 2 K.B. 125; [1948] 1 All E.R. 694; [1948] 1 J.R. 1135; 112 J.P. 212; 64 T.L.R. 179; 92 S.J. 219; 46 L.G.R. 165, C.A.
[p.682] of [1980] GLR 679 (22) Garnett v. Bradley (1878) 3 App. Cas. 944; 48 L.J.Q.B. 186; 39 L.T. 261, 43 J.P. 20; 20 W.R. 698, H.L.
(23) Hawkins v. Gathercole (1855) 6 De. G.M. and G. 1; 3 Eq. Rep. 348; 24 L.J. Ch. 332; 24 L.T. (O.S)
281; 19 J.P. 115; 1 Jur. (N.S.) 481; 3 W.R. 194.
(24) United Society v. Eagle Bank (1829) 7 Conn. 457.
(25) Palmar’s Case (1785) 1 Leach C.C. (4th ed. 355).
(26) R. v. Loxdale (1758) 1 Burr. 445; 97 E.R. 394.
(27) Chance, In re [1936] 1 Ch. 266; 105 L.J. Ch. 67.
(28) Kutner v. Phillips [1891] 2 Q.B. 267; 60 L.J.Q.B. 505; 64 L.T. 628; 56 J.P. 54; 39 W.R. 526; 7 T.L.R. 441, D.C.
(29) Public Lands Ordinance In the Matter of 1876 (1885) Redwar 245.
(30) Shannon Realties Ltd. v. Ville de St. Michel [1924] A.C. 185, 93 L.J.P.C. 81; 130 L.T. 518, P.C. (31) R. v. Poor Law Commissioners of England and Wales, St. Pancras Parish (1836) 6 A. & El. 23; 112 E.R. 1 (32) London and Blackwall Rail Co. v. Limehouse District Board of Works (1856) 3 K. & J. 123; 26 L.J. Ch. 164; 28 L.T.O.S. 140; 20 J.P. 789; 5 W.R. 64; 69 E.R. 1051.
(33) Fitzgerald v. Champneys (1861) 2 John & H. 31; 30 L.J. Ch. 777; 5 L.T. 233; 7 Jur. (N.S.)1006; 9 W.R. 850; 70 E.R. 958.
(34) Ashton-Under-Lyne-Corporation v. Pugh [1898] 1 Q.B. 45; 67 L.J.Q.B. 32; 77 L.T. 583; 61 J.P.
788; 46 W.R. 100, C.A.
(35) Dogbe v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 82.
(36) Hick v. Raymond and Reid [1893) A.C. 22; 62 L.J.Q.B. 98; 68 L.T. 175; 41 W.R. 384; 7 Asp.
M.L.C. 233, H.L.
(37) Monkland v. Jack Barclay Ltd. [1951] 2 K.B. 252; [1951] 1 T.L.R. 763; 95 S.J. 236; [1951] 1 All E.R. 714; 94 S.J. 713, C.A. reversing [1950] W.N. 387; 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 2) 150; 94 S.J. 457; [1950] 2 All E.R. 715.
(38) Hartwells of Oxford Ltd. v. British Motor Trade Association [1951] Ch. 50; 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 2) 483;
94 S.J. 505; [1950] 2 All E.R. 705, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for bail pending trial for murder. The facts are fully set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
G. K. Mensa-Etsi for the applicant.
Yaw Wiredu-Peprah, Assistant State Attorney, for the Republic.
[p.683] of [1980] GLR 679
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
“A statute or Act of Parliament is the will of the legislature.” This is the opening sentence in Odgers’ exposition of the nature of a statute as is contained in Odgers’ Construction of Deeds and Statutes (5th ed.), at p. 233. In his oft-quoted treatise on the Interpretation of Statutes (11th ed.), Sir Maxwell also indicated in his very first sentence the basic and paramount principle applicable in searching for the said “will” of the legislature. As is also so stated in Maxwell, “A statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intent of them that made it.” This rule is supported in Maxwell by reference to Coke’s Institutes, the famous Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 C1. & F. 85 and Fordyce v. Bridges (1847) 1 H.L. Cas. 1.
This fundamental rule of interpretation is the unruly horse of the judiciary of almost all common law countries. I cannot pretend that it is easy to ride it but by the nature of our judicial function, I must come to grips with it when the occasion calls for it. This is one such occasion. This is simple application for bail pending trial. In our traditional approach such cases are invariably dealt with in as casual a manner as is consistent with some form of expeditious justice as I had occasion to remark in Okoe v. The Republic [1976 1 G.L.R. 80 at p. 83. In this case, however, the applicant is asking for bail in a murder case pending before this court. Applications for bail before trial have for some time now been regulated by statutory provisions and the entitlement of an applicant can only be ascertained on a true construction of these provisions.
There is, however, at the moment, what I consider to be ill-conceived views in many legal and judicial circles, that bail in murder cases has been completely proscribed by legislation and consequently that the superior courts have absolutely no jurisdiction to grant bail in such murder cases under any circumstances whatsoever. This is most unfortunate and in my respectful opinion it is the reason why it is essential that the true and proper principles applicable to the interpretation of the subsisting statutory provisions need to be adequately canvassed in order to determine their relevance in applications for bail pending trial. The instant application therefore is ill-suited for casual disposal.
Furthermore, I have noted, since 1 December 1975, when I first endeavoured to expound our principles for bail pending trial in Okoe v. The Republic (supra) that my learned brothers notably Osei-Hwere J. have made valiant and praiseworthy efforts to elucidate the principles governing applications for bail pending trial: see Boateng v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 444 per Mensa Boison J.; Prah v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 278 per Aboagye J.; Donkor v. The Republic [1977] 2
[p.684] of [1980] GLR 679
G.L.R. 383 per Osei-Hwere J. and Seidu v. The Republic [1978] G.L.R. 65 per Roger Korsah J. In a singular effort Osei-Hwere J. in Donkor v. The Republic (supra) brought a commendable analytical mind to the problem and I think as from 6 May 1977 when Donkor v. The Republic (supra) was decided by him, further light of a most revealing nature was thrown unto the problem.
In focusing on the problem, Osei-Hwere J. rightly in my view, took the proper course of subjecting the statutory provisions to judicial interpretation and although I respectfully disagree with his conclusion I have been tremendously assisted by his robust effort and fresh approach. The fact, however, that at the end of it all we differ is not surprising. In Great Western Railway Co. v. Bater [1922] 2 A.C. 1 at p. 11, Lord Buckmaster finding himself in a similar situation in the House of Lords made these poignant remarks:
“… my views are not shared by other members of the House, but this fact is not surprising. It is not easy to penetrate the tangled confusion of these Acts of Parliament, and though we have entered the labyrinth together, we have unfortunately found exit by different paths.”
The fact that on a fundamental and recurring problem of such extreme importance like the entitlement of an applicant to bail pending trial, divergent differences of judicial opinion exist ought not to discourage or embarrass us. It is a healthy sign in the judicial body polity. It shows that our conclusions are founded on principles not on a robot approach to stare decisis. It will enable us in this infant Republic to develop the law as a science. Parke J. anticipated and advised this approach long ago in 1833 in Mirehouse v. Renell (1833) 7 Bli. (N.S.) 241 at pp. 275-276, when he said, “It appears to me to be of great importance to keep this principle of decision steadily in view, not merely for the determination of the particular case, but for the interests of law as a science.”
Having said that much, I must now tackle the problem. The applicant applies for bail pending trial and in an affidavit filed on his behalf by his younger brother, it is deposed to as:
“(1) That I am the deponent herein and a younger brother of the above-named applicant.
(2) That the facts I depose to are partly within my own knowledge and partly from information supplied to me by the said applicant.
(3) That the applicant is a farmer and a hunter and until April 1976 had been living with his family at Numbereyiri village.
[p.685] of [1980] GLR 679
(4) That on 15 April 1976 the applicant was returning from hunting expedition when he saw two men dragging his goat away.
(5) That he challenged the men who were carrying the said goat and were running away with it.
(6) That in an attempt to stop the thieves from stealing the goat the applicant shot at the thieves with his arrows.
(7) That one of the thieves later died probably as a result of the injury from the arrow.
(8) That on 17 April 1976 the applicant was taken into police custody and later transferred to Tamale prison where he has since been held pending his trial on a charge of murder.
(9) That the stolen goat was shown to the police.
(10) That the prosecution witnesses have not been attending court since the case was committed to this honourable court.
(11) That the applicant has been in custody for well over three years and there is no likelihood that his case will be tried even in this year.
(12) That I have been informed by counsel and believe the same to be true that the charge of murder preferred against the applicant is misconceived in the circumstances.
(13) That the fact that the indictment charges the applicant with murder does not per se bring the case within section 96 of Act 30 as amended by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 309), s. 2 (7). Wherefore I swear to this affidavit praying this honourable court to grant bail to the applicant.”
On behalf of the Republic, Mr. Yaw Wiredu-Peprah, counsel for the Republic and an assistant state attorney in the Attorney-General’s Department, has sworn to an affidavit in opposition as:
“(1) That I am the deponent herein.
(2) That the facts I depose to have come to my knowledge through the police docket in respect of this case.
(3) That according to the said docket, the applicant without just cause, fired an arrow at one Alhassan Yamoba on 15 April 1976 at Numbereyiri village.
(4) That the said Alhassan Yamoba died soon afterwards from the arrow wounds.
(5) That the deceased was in the company of his brother, Fuseini Gyamfo, who also was fired at by the accused applicant.
[p.686] of [1980] GLR 679 (6) That according to Fuseini Gyamfo he and the deceased went to Numbereyiri village to go and buy eggs.
(7) That they never went to steal any goat and to the best of his knowledge no such goat has been shown to the police.
(8) That from the facts of the case, the charge of murder contrary to section 46 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), is the right charge.
(9) That the case is one within section 96 of Act 30 as amended by NRCD 309, s. 2(7).
(10) Wherefore I swear to this affidavit that the motion for bail pending trial should not be granted.”
I have deliberately set down in extenso the affidavit of the application as well as the affidavit in opposition so as to give in its proper perspective a full picture of all the relevant facts on the basis of which this application has been argued. The bill of indictment and the summary of evidence do show beyond question that the applicant is facing a murder charge. I take it that an issue which necessarily arises from the arguments of counsel is whether although the applicant is facing a murder charge, this can or cannot be considered a case of murder having regard to the affidavits. The contention of counsel for the Republic is that clearly if this is a murder case and he submits that it is, then under the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 309), s. 2 it would seem bail cannot be granted.
The relevant provision is, “A Court shall refuse to grant bail— (a) in a case of . . . murder . . . “ Since this is merely an application for bail I am of the opinion that it will be invidious if I examine the affidavits of the parties for the purpose of showing which version of the facts put forward by the parties is acceptable. It will be tantamount to a preliminary hearing of the case and this may prejudice the future course of the case. Much of the argument advanced before me on behalf of the applicant by his counsel centred around the contention of the applicant that he shot the deceased in defence of his property. This argument is no doubt meant to show that it is not a murder case.
In Seidu v. The Republic [1978] G.L.R. 65 p. 70, Roger Korsah J. made mention of an unreported application for bail which he dealt with in 1977 and in which the applicant had raised apparently in his affidavit a defence of self-defence. The said defence he would seem to have held, indicated that the applicant therein was properly facing a murder case. I agree with his reasoning and I think the defence disclosed in the applicant’s affidavit in this case is not capable of making the case not a murder case. This is because defence of property is a defence in a murder case in appropriate cases and it is
[p.687] of [1980] GLR 679 the court that decides whether the particular circumstance of such a defence falls within the category of appropriate cases.
As I have already indicated counsel for the Republic has sworn to an affidavit firmly deposed that this is a murder case. The facts which counsel so confidently deposed to are however not within his own knowledge; they were as he conceded hearsay matters gathered from the police docket. In Republic v. Greater Accra Regional Commissioner; Ex parte Naawu III [1976] 2 G.L.R. 25 at p. 31, I drew attention to the provisions of Order 38, r. 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), which, inter alia, provides that “affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the witness is able of his own knowledge to prove.” I held following the example of Bernard J. in the English case of Rossage v. Rossage [1960] 1 W.L.R. 249, C.A. and the approach of another English judge. Cross J. in Re J. (An Infant) [1960] 1 W.L.R. 253, that hearsay matter ought to be excluded in considering the contents of affidavits.
The facts also sworn to by the brother of the applicant are also partly hearsay and although under Order 38, r. 3 of LN 140A, the sources of hearsay material sworn to ought to be disclosed, the facts in the brother’s affidavit were jumbled together and no attempt was made to classify and isolate the hearsay matter from the matter which the deponent of his own knowledge could prove. In my view, the affidavits sworn to be by the parties do not afford any help in deciding the issue of whether the case is or is not a murder case. Fortunately I have the bill of indictment and the summary of evidence in the case. These are the legal documents which properly show that prima facie this is a murder case. I am therefore content and prepared to hold that this is a murder case and it is on this firm basis that I propose to decide this application.
I have already made reference to the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Decree, 1975 (NRCD 309), which introduce section 96 (7) to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), whereby it was enacted that our courts shall refuse to grant bail, inter alia, in a case of murder. Other relevant provisions also dealing with bail are article 15 (3) (b) (4) of the Constitution, 1969. The relevant provisions are:
“(3) Any person who is arrested, restricted or detained, (b) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit a criminal offence under the law of Ghana, and who is not released, shall be brought before a Court within twenty-four hours.
(4) Where a person arrested, restricted or detained in any circumstance as is mentioned in paragraph (b) of the immediately preceding clause is not tried within a reasonable time, then, without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought against him, he shall be released either unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions, including in particular such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears at a later date for trial or for proceedings preliminary to trial.”
After the revolutionary events of 13 January 1972, the operation of the Constitution, 1969, was suspended by the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972. Sections 2 (1) and 3(2) of the said proclamation were:
“2. (1) With effect from the 13th day of January, 1972 and subject to the other provisions of this Proclamation and any Decree that the Council may make, the operation of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana which came into force on the 22nd day of August, 1969 shall be suspended.
[p.689] of [1980] GLR 679
“3. (2) Subject to any Decree made under the immediately preceding subsection, any enactment or rule of law in force in Ghana immediately before the 13th day of January, 1972 shall continue in force and any such enactment or rule of law may by Decree of the Council be revoked, repealed, amended (whether by addition, omission, substitution or otherwise) or suspended.”
Following the uprising of 4 June 1979 the said Proclamation would seem to have been abrogated and a new proclamation. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, the now subsisting proclamation, took its place. There were no substantial variations between sections 2 and 3 (2) of the new and old proclamations. In the circumstance, previous judicial interpretations of the corresponding provisions of the old Proclamation are therefore still valid. The new provisions are:
“2. With effect from the 4th day of June, 1979, and subject to the other provisions of this Proclamation and any other decree that the Revolutionary Council may make, the operation of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana which came into force on the 22nd day of August, 1969 and which Constitution has been suspended shall continue to be suspended.”
“3. (2) Subject to any decree made under subsection (1) of this section any enactment or rule of law in force in Ghana immediately before the 4th day of June, 1979 shall continue in force and any such enactment or rule of law may by decree of the Revolutionary Council be revoked, repealed, amended (whether by addition, omission, substitution or otherwise) or suspended.”
One question posed by these Proclamations is whether article 15 (3) (b) and (4) survived the suspension of the operation of the Constitution, 1969 In R. v. Akosah [1975] 2 G.L.R. 406, I held that all the rules of law contained in the Constitution, 1969, were saved by the provision of section 3 (2) of the Proclamation, 1972, and it seems to me that section 3 (2) of the Proclamation, 1979, did not disturb the position. I also held in Okoe v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 80 at p. 93, that the provisions of article 15 (3) (b) and (4) of the Constitution, 1969, were specifically saved by the Proclamation, 1972.
In all these cases I took the view dictated by the form of its wording that section 3 (2) of the Proclamation, 1972, is so clear in its provisions that once it is conceded that the provisions of article 15(3) (b) and (4) are rules of law then the conclusion that these rules of law were saved by the said section of the Proclamation becomes inevitable. I did not therefore consider the matter at length. It seems I must do so now. Speaking for myself, I have not succeeded in finding out any rule of law or principle that can possibly operate to resist the clear implication of section 3 (2) of the 1972 or 1979 Proclamations once it is conceded that the provisions of the said article 15 (3) (b) and (4) are rules of law. Indeed, in Boateng v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 444 at pp. 448-449 Mensa Boison J. examined the problem from, inter alia, an alternative angle and he came to the same conclusion as I did.
Under section 4 (a) of the Proclamation, 1972, it is provided:
“4. Notwithstanding the suspension of the Constitution, and until provision is otherwise made by law, (a) all Courts in existence immediately before the 13th day of January, 1972 shall continue in existence with the same powers, duties, functions and composition as they had immediately before that date.’
The Proclamation, 1979, merely substituted 4 June 1979 for 13 January 1972 and maintained the same provision in its section 4 (a). Having regard to the provisions of sections 3(2) and 4(a) of the Proclamation, 1972, Mensa Boison J. in Boateng v. The Republic (supra) cited the old and well-known principle in Peacock v. Bell and Kendal (1667) 1 Wms. Saund. 69 at p. 74 and subjected these provisions to close scrutiny and remarked at pp. 448-449:
[p.690] of [1980] GLR 679
“In my respectful view the whole body of the laws of Ghana comprise enactments and common law; the latter comprises customary law, the principles of equity and English statutes of general application, which statutes are listed in the First Schedule to the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). The term ‘rules of law’ as used in section 3 (2) of the Proclamation, as opposed to ‘enactment’ would seem to embrace all laws other than the enactments. These by article 126 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, would include the common law, customary law and the doctrines of equity. Speaking for myself, articles 15 (3) (b) and (4), not being any of the common law rules, are in my opinion enactments like the 1969 Constitution itself.
But having come to that conclusion, I respectfully do not accede to the contention of the learned senior state attorney that the only provisions of the Constitution saved were the articles of chapter 9. Section 4 (a) of the Proclamation speaks of the continued existence of ‘all Courts … with the same powers, duties, functions and composition . . .’ I would speak of the content of article 15 (3) (b) and (4) as a power. A primary meaning of the word as given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary is ‘ability to do or act.’ The ability to grant bail under article 15 (3) and (4) is a power given to no other body but ‘a court’ by the Constitution. I am unable to limit the operation of section 4 of the Proclamation to chapter 9 of the Constitution only . . .
As it is, before the events of 13 January 1972, the superior courts exercised all the powers given to them under the Constitution, 1969. Section 4 (a) of the Proclamation saved the powers of the courts by saying merely that they exist ‘with the same powers, duties, functions . . . ‘ It cannot be interpreted to restrict the operation of section 4 (a) to chapter 9 of the Constitution only. For these reasons I am of the opinion that article 15 (3) (b) and (4), are included in the enactments that were saved by the Proclamation, 1972.”
My view of the matter which was thus shared by Mensa Boison J. has been subjected to a form of trenchant criticism by Osei-Hwere J. in Donkor v. The Republic [1977] 2 G.L.R. 383. It is in my opinion, worthwhile to appraise the reasoning behind the criticism. In that case Osei-Hwere J. observed at pp. 388-389:
“When section 2 (1) is read alongside the other sections of the Proclamation its effect is to suspend the operation of the Constitution, 1969, in its entirety except those of its articles relating to such organs of state as the courts, the public services
[p.691] of [1980] GLR 679 and the armed services, etc. which the Proclamation specifically permits to continue in force.
It again suspends the Constitution subject to any Decree the Council may make. Section 3 (2) also continues in force those enactments and rules of law existing before the Proclamation subject to the power of the Council to revoke, repeal, amend or suspend any of those enactments or rules of law. The Interpretation Act, 1960 (CA 4), s. 32 (1), defines ‘enactment’ to mean ‘an Act or statutory instrument.’ The definition given to ‘Act’ or ‘Act of Parliament’ by section 28 (3) of the Proclamation which amends section 32 of CA 4 is:
‘the Constitution, an Ordinance enacted before the 6th day of March, 1957, an Act (including Acts of the Constituent Assembly of 1960) enacted between the 6th day of March, 1957 and the 24th day of February, 1966 and also an Act enacted between the 22nd day of August, 1969 and the 13th day of January, 1972, and includes a Decree, but does not include an English statute applied by virtue of any enactment for the time being in force.’ It may well be said that, strictly speaking, as the Constitution, 1969, itself is an enactment in force 13 January 1972, then it has been saved, by section 3 (2) of the Proclamation. Such an interpretation will, of course reduce to absurdity section 2 (1) of the Proclamation which suspends the Constitution and render it inane except for those articles relating to those specific organs of state. In my view ‘any enactment … in force in Ghana immediately before the 13th day of January, 1972’ must exclude the 1969 Constitution.
In Okoe v. The Republic (supra) my brother Taylor J. proceeded on the notion that article 15 (3) (b) and (4) of the Constitution contain rules of law which still operate by reason of the continuation of laws provision in section 3 (2) of the Proclamation. The rules of law contained in article 15 (3) (b) and (4), like all the other rules of law entrenched in Chapter 4 of the Constitution which deal with the fundamental human rights, drew their breath from the Constitution itself and, provided there was some other law outside the Constitution to give them another lease of life the effect of section 2 (1) of the Proclamation was to leave them in a state of deflated suspension.
To hold otherwise will, as I have indicated, make the construction of section 2 (1) and that of section 3 (2) of the Proclamation collide with each other. A military take-over is not a game of chess and it cannot, therefore, be supposed that the Proclamation that sought to suspend the Constitution and in its own way also sought to make due provisions ‘for the proper administration of Ghana and for the maintenance of law and order’ would, in the situation of the day, restore by section 3 (2) those irksome rules of law in the Constitution known as the fundamental human rights.
In my view article 15 (3) (b) and (4) have not survived the Constitution by reason of section 3 (2) of the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation to become existing rules of law. This is because the body of those rules of law, which is the Constitution, was generally suspended and section 3 (2) of the Proclamation permitted the continuance of those enactments and rules of law then existing other than the Constitution.”
I think Osei-Hwere J.’s reasoning and approach deserve a close scrutiny. In the first place the basic assumption inherent in his view that the Constitution in its entirety has been suspended is with respect not strictly correct. The actual suspending provision which is section 2 (1) of the Proclamation, 1972, now section 2 of the Proclamation, 1979, suspended the operation of the Constitution. It did not in terms suspend the Constitution. The distinction is not semantic.
The running or driving of a car as a car can be prohibited, nevertheless there is nothing preventing, permitting the dismantling of some of the parts like the battery, speedometer, tyres, carburettor, windscreen, bolts, nuts and other spares for use while the car is not being run or driven. So understood, nothing prevents the legislative body from merely suspending the operation of the Constitution without suspending further application of any of its specific provisions. This in my respectful opinion is precisely what has been done in Ghana with regard to the rules of law contained in the Constitution.
Moreover Osei-Hwere J. conceded, in my view rightly, that the provisions of article 15 (3) (b) and (4) of the Constitution 1969, are rules of law. He also accepts in my view rightly, that they drew their breath from the Constitution and properly pointed out that “provided there was some other law outside the Constitution to give them another lease of life the effect of section 2 (1) of the Proclamation was to leave them in a state of deflated suspension.” Nevertheless, although section 3 (2) of the Proclamation is a provision clearly outside the Constitution and thus satisfies his own proviso he found himself unable to accept the clear implication of section 3 (2) of the Proclamation on the ground that “a military take-over is not a game of chess.” I am unable with the utmost respect to understand what is meant by this and its significance in the reasoning.
[p.693] of [1980] GLR 679
However, accepting for the purpose of argument, that it means no more than that a coup is a serious business, I cannot see why coup leaders who as in Ghana seriously assume power “for the proper administration of Ghana and for the maintenance of law and order” will throw overboard fundamental human rights of international repute calculated to advance their avowed objectives even if the obligations they assume are self-imposed.
I think it must be understood that the operation of the Constitution involves the operation of the Parliament, the Presidency and all the other institutions established under the said Constitution as a unit. Our Constitution is however unique in that apart from these constitutional organs and entities it also contains rules of law and as Mensa Boison J. rightly remarks it also gives certain powers 3 (2) and 4 (a) of the Proclamation. I do not see anything wrong with that and with the greatest respect I am unable to agree with the conclusion which found favour with Osei-Hwere J. in Donkor v. The Republic (supra) that the rules of law contained in the Constitution, 1969, were suspended and made inoperative by the Proclamation, 1972. The clear language of section 3 (2) of the Proclamation, 1972, militates against such a conclusion.
Osei-Hwere J. in so holding, did, it appears to me, appreciate the difficulty inherent in his views. He would seem to have had some doubts and on the assumption that he was wrong, he looked properly at the language of section 96 (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), the section which was introduced by NRCD 309. In his opinion the language is simply peremptory: “A court shall refuse to grant bail in . . . a case of murder.” He felt that section 96 (7) was inconsistent with the provisions of article 15 (3) (b) and (4) of the Constitution, 1969, and falling on the rule of interpretation that where two enactments are inconsistent the “latter will be read as having impieldly repealed the earlier” he held that article 15 (3) (b) and (4) have been repealed by section 96 (7) of Act 30.
In doing so he was applying the Latin maxim made famous in Cokes reports: leges posteriores priores contraria abrogant. That maxim differently worded but with clarity is noted by the classical Roman writer Livy: Ubi duae contrariae leges sunt, semper antiquam abrogat nova. The maxim, however, is only applicable where the two provisions cannot by any legitimate mode of construction be made to co-exist.
It seems to me, however, that in coming to the conclusion that section 96 (7) of Act 30 cannot co-exist with article 15 (3) (b) and (4) of the Constitution, 1969, certain basic considerations and [p.694] of [1980] GLR 679 fundamental principles for the interpretation of statutes were overlooked by the court. I propose in this ruling to advert to these basic consideration and fundamental principles.
Clearly, before the Proclamation, 1972, an accused person who was not tried within a reasonable time had acquired a right to be admitted to bail. What the attitude of the law is to this acquired right was expostulated by Bowen L.J. in In re Cuno, Mansfield v. Mansfield (1889) 43 Ch.D. 12 at p. 17 when he said:
“… in the construction of statutes, you must not construe the words so as to take away rights which already existed before the statute was passed, unless you have plain words which indicate that such was the intention of the legislature.”
I shall later consider the statutory significance of the word “shall” appearing in both section 96 (7) of Act 30 and article 15 (4) of the Constitution, 1969, for the purpose of deciding whether it represented a plain word capable of taking away the acquired right under article 15 (4) of the Constitution, 1969.
Now quite apart from this question of acquired right there is no doubt that article 15 (3) (b) and (4) dealt particularly with unreasonable delay in a trial whereas section 96 (7) of Act 30 dealt generally with refusal of bail and did not consider unreasonable delay in trial. Section 96 (7) of Act 30 is therefore a general provisions and article 15 (3) (b) and (4) must be considered particular provisions. The rule applicable in considering such provisions was stated by Lord Selborne in Seward v. Vera Cruz (1884) 10 App. Cas. 59 at p. 68:
“. . . where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so.”
This rule thus stated by Lord Selborne is an elaboration of the Latin maxim generelia specialibus non derogant. It was quoted with approval by Buckley J. in Bristol Corporation v. Canning (1906) 95 L.T. 183 at p. 186 and more recently by Somervell L.J. in Harlow v. Minister of Transport [1951] 2 K.B. 96 at p. 102, C.A. Instances of its application can be found in Lancashire Asylum Board v. Manchester Corporation [1900] 1 Q.B. 458 at p. 471, C.A.; by A. L. Smith L.J. in Gloucester (Bishop of) v. Cunnington [1943] K. B. 101, C.A. and Wiltshire County Valuation Committee v. Boyce [1948] 2 K. B. 125, C.A. Perhaps one of the best statements of the principle is to be found in the opinion of Lord Hatherley in Granett v. Bardley (1878) 3 App. Cas. 944 at p. 950. After he had discussed the similar views of Turner L.J. expressed in Hawkins v. Gathercole (1855) 6 De G.M. and G. 1 Lord Hatherley enunciated the rule thus:
“. . . an Act directed towards a special object, or special class of objects will not be repealed by a subsequent general Act embracing in its generality those particular objects, unless some reference be made directly or by necessary inference to the preceeding special Act.”
In considering the applicability of section 96 (7) of Act 30, it must not be forgotten that the provisions of article 15 (3) (b) and (4) are pari materia with the said section 96 (7) of Act 30. In the American case of United Society v. Eagle Bank (1829) 7 Conn. 457 at p. 470, Hosmer J. attempted to explain what is meant by statutes in pari materia when he said:
“Statutes are in pari materia which relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things. The word par must not be confounded with the word similis. It is used in opposition to it as in the expression magis pares sunt quam similes, intimating not likeness merely but identity. It is a phrase applicable to the public statutes or general laws made at different times and in reference to the same subject.”
I hold that by this definition, section 96 (7) of Act 30 and article 15 (3) (b) and (4) are statutes or enactments in pari materia. As statutory provisions in pari materia, section 96 (7) of Act 30 and article 15 (3) (b) and (4) of the Constitution, 1969, must be interpreted in accordance with the English rule laid down by the twelve judges in Palmar’s Case (1785) 1 Leach C.C. (4th ed.), 355 to the effect that they “are to be taken together as forming one system and interpreting and enforcing each other.” As was laid down by Lord Mansfield in R. v. Loxdale (1758) 1 Burr. 445 at p. 447:
“Where there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system, and as explanatory of each other.”
If this principle is followed, we have a statutory provision in article 15 (4) of the Constitution, 1969, apparently mandatorily empowering the courts to give bail in cases of unreasonable delay in trial and another statutory provision also apparently mandatorily
[p.696] of [1980] GLR 679 empowering the courts to refuse bail in murder cases and the enabling word which imposed these apparently mandatory duties is in each case the word “shall.” Are these statutory provisions inconsistent with each other so that the “later will be read as having impliedly repealed the earlier” as was decided in Donkor v. The Republic (supra) at pp. 389-390 or can the two provisions so co-exist in the words of Lord Mansfield “as forming one system and interpreting and enforcing each other?”
In this connection, it is worthy of note that, the later provision, namely, section 96 (7) of Act 30 made no reference whatsoever to article 15 (4) of the Constitution, 1969, or to unreasonable delay in trial and if as my learned brother Osei-Hwere J. will have it, it operates to the exclusion of the said article 15 (4). This conclusion does not take cognisance of the fact that the courts lean very strongly against implied repeal. Indeed, the duty of the court when faced with apparent conflicting provisions contained in an earlier Act and a later Act was stated by Farwell J. in In re Chance (1936) 1 Ch. 266 at p.270 when he said, “… if it is possible it is my duty so to read the section; that is to say, so to read it as not to effect an implied repeal of the earlier Act.” In re Chance (supra) was cited with approval by Osei-Hwere J. and Kutner v. Phillips [1891] 2 Q.B. 267 also cited by Osei-Hwere J. is also a respectful authority for the proposition contained in the views of Farwell J. in In re Chance (supra). In that case A. L. Smith L. J. stated the rule at p. 272:
“Unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be implied, and special Acts are not repealed by general Acts unless there is some express reference to the previous legislation, or unless there is a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together.”
It seems to me in reading the judgment in Donkor v. The Republic (supra) that one consideration that must have dominated the reasoning of Osei-Hwere J. is the word “shall” appearing in the provision. I believe the reasoning proceeded thus: “shall” in section 96 (7) of Act 30 is mandatory. As he put it at p. 389, “The language of section 96 (7) (a) of Act 30 which is no less peremptory commands that ‘A court shall refuse to grant bail in a case of … murder’.” Since the language of article 15 (4) is also mandatory, he held, “The two provisions standing side by side are undoubtedly inconsistent with each other” and from this he concluded that the later provision which is section 96 (7) of Act 30 must prevail.
[p.697] of [1980] GLR 679
I think the reasoning proceeded upon a palpably false notion regarding the meaning of “shall” in an enactment. I think because the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), provides that “shall” is mandatory, many persons hold the view that “shall” is at all times and for all purposes “mandatory.” This is clearly an error because the Interpretation Act, 1960, merely provides that “shall” in an enactment is mandatory subject to a contrary intention appearing in the enactment. Since the two provisions are in my view in pari materia when read together it becomes obvious that article 15 (4) of the Constitution, 1969, shows a contrary intention, in the otherwise absolute mandatory operation of section 96 (7) of Act 30.
Clearly, when read together, the two provisions can be contained by the interpretation that a court shall refuse to grant bail in murder cases, etc. except in cases of unreasonable delay in trial as is provided for in article 15 (4) of the Constitution, 1969, I do not think it is proper to consider the “shall” in section 96 (7) of Act 30 as if it stood alone. In our own local case, namely, In the Matter of the Public Lands Ordinance 1876 (1885) Redwar 245, decided on 5 June 1885, Macleod C.J. was invited by learned counsel, the Queen’s Advocate, to consider “shall” in section 10 of the Public Lands Ordinance 1876.
The section provides, “The Colonial Secretary shall at any time on production in the Supreme Court of a Conveyance to any lands be entitled to receive a Certificate of Title to the Lands described in the said Conveyance.” The Queen’s Advocate appearing for the Colonial Secretary produced a conveyance and submitted that the Colonial Secretary was entitled to a certificate of title in accordance with the apparent mandatory provision of section 10. If section 10 is looked at in isolation the Queen’s Advocate is right; if other sections, namely, sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are looked at, a contrary intention is revealed. In refusing the application, Macleod C.J. at p. 248 said, “However startling the results of any enactment may be, I am bound to give effect to that enactment, provided it is clear and unmistakable in its terms; but I cannot induce myself to construe section 10 as if it stood alone.”
Conceding that article 15 (4) of the Constitution, 1969, is a subsisting provision, is it to be contended that it has been impliedly repealed by an enactment which is completely silent about the provision and the new rule therefore is that even if there is an unreasonable delay in the trial of a person, he is nevertheless to be denied bail? I think not. In Shannon Realties Ltd. v. Ville de St. Michel [1924] A.C. 185, Lord Shaw reading the opinion of the
[p.698] of [1980] GLR 679
Privy Council said at pp. 192-193:
“Where the words of a statute are clear they must, of course, be followed; but, in their Lordships’ opinion where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce, uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system.”
Under English law as under our law “shall” is mandatory unless the context otherwise provides. It is therefore not so absolutely imperative as is erroneously thought to be the case in Donkor v. The Republic (supra) and in many legal and judicial circles. Thus in R. v. Poor Law Commissioners for England and Wales, St. Pancras Parish (1838) 6 A. & El. at p. 23, an Act (59 Geo. c. 39), specifically applicable to a parish vested powers of overseers of the poor in certain ex-officio directors and forty other persons nominated by the vestry of the parish.
While the said parish overseers were thus operating under the said Act, the Poor Law Commissioners were given power by section 39 of the Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834 to: “direct that the administration of the laws for the relief of the poor of any single parish shall be governed and administered by a board of guardians.” Under the said section 39 the said guardians were to be elected in a prescribed manner not substantially nominated as, inter alia, in the provision in the earlier Act. The court nevertheless held that in spite of the mandatory legislative language indicated apparently by “shall,” section 39 did not impliedly repeal the earlier Act. Referring to the said section 39 of the Act of 1834 Patteson J. said at pp. 22-24:
“The Court is now called upon to construe this section, and is urged to decide, from the generality of the expression used in it, that it applies to all parishes without any limitation, and that it necessarily gives an implied power to the Poor Law Commissioners to repeal, at their will and pleasure, all local Acts so far as they regard the administration of the poor laws.
If the legislature intended to give so extensive a power to the Commissioners, it might reasonably have been expected that it would have done so in express terms; … Even without express terms, if the thirty-ninth section would be inoperative unless such construction were put upon it, the Court might be compelled to infer that such a power was implied. If, however,
[p.699] of [1980] GLR 679 the section can be made fully effectual by a more limited construction, there can be no conclusive proof that the more extensive power was contemplated.”
The reason for the rule which bars a subsequent general enactment from impliedly repealing an earlier special enactment was stated by Wood V.C. in London and Blackwall Rail Co. v. Limehouse District Board of Works (1856) 3 K. & J. 123 at p. 128 and again by the said Vice-Chancellor five years later in Fitzgerald v. Champneys (1861) 30 L.J.Ch. 777 at p. 782. In the earlier case he said:
“The legislature, in passing a Special Act, has entirely in its consideration some special power which is to be delegated … on public grounds . . . When a general Act is subsequently passed it seems to be a necessary inference that the legislature does not intend thereby to regulate all cases not specially brought before it; but, looking to the general advantage of the community without, reference to particular cases, it gives large and general powers, which in their generality might, except for this very wholesome rule of interpreting statutes, override the powers which, upon consideration of the particular case, the Legislature had before conferred by the Special Act for the benefit of the public.”
The result of a contrary rule of construction he pointed out is that the legislature having upon due consideration enacted a special Act would be supposed afterwards by general words without considering the implication to throw overboard the special Act. Wood V.C.’s view was subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal in Ashton-under-Lyne Corporation v. Pugh [1878] 1 Q. B. 45, C.A.
Upon consideration of all the principles of interpretation I have canvassed in this ruling, it is my firm view that article 15 (3) (b) and (4) of the Constitution, 1969, are subsisting provisions in no way repealed by section 96 (7) of Act 30 as I had occasion to decide in Dogbe v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 82 at p. 96.
However, in Donkor v. The Republic (supra) at p. 390, it was also held that once a person has been detained on a court’s order for the purpose apparently of subsequently bringing him before the court in execution of the court’s order, then article 15 (4) will be inapplicable on ground that the article itself intrinsically restricts the grant of bail in the circumstance. I have read the article times without number but I have not succeeded in finding out how proprio vigore it is self-restrictive. In arriving at the conclusion, however, that it imposes its own intrinsic restriction this is how Osei-Hwere J.
[p.700] of [1980] GLR 679 considered the matter at p. 390:
“. . . article 15 (3) (b) and (4) impose their own intrinsic restrictions in their area of operation. For the command that bail should be granted where there is no trial within a reasonable time only applies where the person has been arrested, restricted or detained in any circumstance as is mentioned in paragraph (3) (b). It is for no idle purpose that in circumstances as mentioned in article 15 (3) (a) clause (4) does not apply. I think that the different situations envisaged by article 15 (3) (a) and article 15 (3) (b) are clear. The former contemplates the situation where the restriction or detention is ordered by the court and the latter where it is by some agency other than the court.
This is exemplified upon reading article 15 (1) which sets out the situations where the deprivation of personal liberty will be lawful. It seems to me, therefore, that where an accused person has been detained for the purpose of bringing him before the court in execution of the court’s order which so remanded him in custody, clause (4) of article 15 will have no application.”
I think the principle of construction contained in section 4 (a) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), is that our criminal legislation is to be construed amply and beneficially for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions thereof. When the legislature uses clear language showing that any person who is detained under the circumstances prescribed in article 15 (3) (b) is by article 15 (4) of the Constitution, 1969, entitled to be tried within a reasonable time failing which he must be granted bail, I cannot see, with all due respect, how a court can stultify this legislative intent by ignoring to try the person within a reasonable time and then resort later to an argument that because it has itself remanded the person in custody the legislative intention is to be of no effect. There is, if I may say so, nothing in the wording of article 15 (3) (b) and (4) of the Constitution, 1969, justifying this interpretation and I regret therefore that I am unable to accept it.
In my respectful opinion the provisions of article 15 (3) (b) and (4) are subsisting provisions in regard to bail applications and constitute, so to speak, understandable exception to the apparently wide and general language of section 96 (7) of Act 30. I intend therefore to consider this application on the basis of whether the applicant is entitled to bail in accordance with the provision of article 15 (4) of the Constitution, 1969.
In Dogbe v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 82 at p. 96 I examined the meaning of “reasonable time” contained in article 15 (4) of the
[p.701] of [1980] GLR 679
Constitution, 1969. I referred to the views of Lord Herschell L.C. as well as the opinions of Lord Ashbourne and Lord Watson in Hick v. Raymond and Reid [1893] A.C. 22, H.L. and I cited a definition of Asquith L.J. in Monkland v. Jack Barclay Ltd. [1951] 2 K.B. 252 at pp. 259-260, where he said:
“… reasonable time means a time reasonable in all the circumstances. Such a time may be extended beyond its normal span by special circumstances, and these may include circumstances which did not exist at the time of the contract but which supervene later, hampering performance.”
The meaning of reasonable time is now well settled: see for instance Hartwells of Oxford Ltd. v. British Motor Trade Association [1951] Ch. 50, C.A. After studying these authorities I also in Dogbe v. The Republic (supra) offered a definition. I said at p. 96:
“In view of the authorities it can safely be said that reasonable time for an act is such period of time the duration of which may be fairly conceded by any reasonable person having regard to the purpose for which the time is required, the nature of the act or duty to be performed and all the attendant circumstances reasonably existing or anticipated or supervening.”
In this case the applicant was taken into custody on 17 April 1976. Committal proceedings were completed before the district court and he was committed to this court on 10 January 1979. The trial of the case has been delayed because on one or two occasions witnesses for the prosecution have unavoidably been absent from court through no fault of the prosecution. Furthermore, other murder cases committed to the High Court before the applicant’s case are taking their turn on the court’s cause list. It seems therefore that there has not been delay and if this delay is unreasonable time and in the applicant has not been tried within a reasonable time and in the circumstance he would be entitled to be released on bail.
However, in Dogbe v. The Republic (supra) at p. 97 I furthermore dealt with unreasonable delay. In that case, I referred to the observation of Lord Watson in Hick v. Raymond and Reid [1893] A. C. 22 where he said at pp. 32-33:
“… the condition of reasonable time has been frequently interpreted; and has invariably been hold to mean that the party upon whom it is incumbent duly fulfils his obligation, notwithstanding protracted delay, so long as such delay is attributable to causes beyond his control, and he has neither acted negligently nor unreasonably.”
[p.702] of [1980] GLR 679
As I have already pointed out, there has clearly been delay in trying the applicant. The question is, is the delay unreasonable? In the Dogbe case (supra) I proffered a definition of unreasonable delay. I said at p. 97:
In my view an unreasonable delay necessarily means that the person on whom it is incumbent to act has been unreasonable in not acting timeously as Lord Watson points out in the Hick case (supra). Such a person must necessarily be at fault.”
In this case as in the Dogbe case the organs responsible for timeous prosecution are the court and the Attorney-General. Is the delay in this case applying the criteria I have set out above, the fault of the court or the Attorney-General? I am unable to find that the Attorney-General or the court is at fault and it seems to me therefore that there has not been unreasonable delay in this case. It is for this reason that I hereby refuse the application for bail and not on the ground of the submission of counsel for the Republic that this court lacks jurisdiction because of the peremptory and imperative language of section 96 (7) of Act 30.
I must say though that I have been tremendously assisted by the learned assistant state attorney, Mr. Yaw Wiredu-Peprah, who appeared for the Republic. Although he has not been long at the bar his research capacity was commendable and he put forward legal propositions with such clarity as is associable with the preformance of experienced counsel. For this reason, it would have given me great pleasure to have decided the question of lack of jurisdiction in his favour. In view of the authorities, however, it is with genuine regret that I hold that I have jurisdiction to deal with the application.
Of course on the coming into force of the Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana as a result of the Third Republic of Ghana (Promulgation) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 24), which was promulgation on 18 September 1979 and made to come into force on 24 September 1979 much of the points raised in regard as to the effect of the Proclamations, 1972 and 1979, becomes otiose and academic. This is because article 21 (3) (b) and (4) (a) of the Constitution, 1979, has re-enacted substantially the provisions of article 15 (3) (b) and (4) of the 1969 Constitution. The new provisions are:
“21. (3) A person who is arrested, restricted or detained, (a) for the purposes of bringing him before a Court in execution of the order of a Court, or
[p.703] of [1980] GLR 679
(b) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence under the law of Ghana, and who is not released, shall be brought before a Court within twenty-four hours.
(4) Where a person arrested, restricted or detained in any circumstance as is mentioned in paragraph (b) of clause (3) of this article is not tried within a reasonable time, then, without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought against him:
(a) he shall be released either unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions, including in particular such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears at a later date for trial or for proceedings preliminary to trial.”
Although on the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, on 24 September 1979, the Proclamations will be no more, the issue as to whether section 96 (7) of Act 30 can co-exist with article 21 (3) (b) and (4) (a) will be raised into sharp relief and the most casual consideration of the problem will reveal that it is impossible by any process of interpretation to contend that the constitutional provisions repeal the said section 96 (7) of Act 30. The two ought to be read together and the principles of statutory interpretation I have canvassed in this ruling demonstrate that the law immediately before the Constitution, 1979, and after it, is that a court is to refuse bail in murder cases, etc. except in the cases of unreasonable delay in trial as is provided in article 21 (4) (a) of the Constitution, 1979.
The application for bail is in the circumstance and for the reasons I have dealt with in this ruling, refused.
DECISION
Application refused.
S. O.
