DABLA AND OTHERS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 501
14 August 1979 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 30 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 29Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Yeboah v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 715.
(2) Commissioner of Police v. Lagos (Tunday) [1962] 1 G.L.R.127, S.C.
(3) R. v. Isabella King (1920) 15 Cr.App.R. 13, C.C.A.
(4) R. v. Brighton [1963] Crim.L.R. 65, C.C.A.
(5) R. v. McCartney [1963] Crim.L.R. 64, C.C.A.
(6) R. v. Mothe [1963] Crim.L.R. 65, C.C.A.
(7) R. v. Savundranayagan and Walker [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1761; [1968] 3 All E.R. 439; sub nom. R. v.
Savundranayagan; R. v. Walker 112 S.J. 621; sub nom. R. v. Savundra (Emil); R. v. Walker (Stuart de Quincey Walker) 52 Cr.App.R. 637, C.C.A.
(8) R. v. Aston [1967] Crim.L.R. 488, C.C.A.
(9) R. v. Davies [1965] Crim.L.R. 251, C.C.A.
(10) R. v. de Haan [1968] 2 Q.B. 108; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 626; [1967] 3 All E.R. 618; 132 J.P. 75; 112 S.J.
189; 52 Crim.L.R. 25, C.A.
(11) R. v. Harper [1968] 2 Q.B. 108; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 626; [1967] 3 All E.R. 619n; [1967] Crim.L.R.
714: 112 S.J. 189; 52 Cr.App.R. 21, C.A.
(12) R. v. Percival [1969] Crim.L.R. 326, C.C.A.
(13) R. v. Williams, Court of Criminal Appeal, 21 November 1966, unreported.
(14) R. v. Linton, Court of Criminal Appeal, 28 September 1965 unreported.
(15) R. v. Gilmore and Holden, Court of Criminal Appeal, 2 June 1965, unreported.
(16) R. v. Deves, Court of Criminal Appeal, 9 March 1967, unreported.
[p.506] of [1980] GLR 501
(17) R. v. Redding, Court of Criminal Appeal, 10 March 1966, unreported.
(18) R. v. Hooper, Court of Criminal Appeal, 21 November 1966, unreported.
(19) Asaah alias Asi v. The Republic [1978] G.L.R. 1.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the appellants against their convictions and sentences by the Circuit Court, Wa, on charges of conspiracy to steal and stealing. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
I W. Mensah for the appellants.
Mrs. Sophia Adenyirah, State Attorney, for V. Y. Agudetse, Senior State Attorney, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
The four appellants in this case were arraigned before the Circuit Court, Wa, charged jointly with the offence of conspiracy to steal in count one and stealing sixteen cartons of Embassy cigarettes valued ¢10,890 and one carton of Sweet Menthol cigarettes valued ¢480 all to the total value of ¢11,370 in count two. The properties were said to belong to the Pioneer Tobacco Co., Wa. A fifth accused person was charged with receiving. He pleaded not guilty and was apparently separately tried. He is a non-appellant and is accordingly not concerned with this appeal.
When the appellants first appeared before the court, they pleaded guilty to the charge of stealing and not guilty to the conspiracy count. After they had so pleaded, the prosecution applied to amend the second charge to read sixteen cartons of Embassy instead of eighteen. The application was granted and the second count was accordingly amended. The appellants did not plead to the amended charge and this is a matter of complaint by counsel for the appellants, a complaint which I propose to examine in the course of this judgment. After the amendment, the prosecution then gave the facts of the case which they intended to prove as follows:
“On 11 August 1978 between the hours of 8.30 and 9 p.m. cigarettes transport van No. GT 4505 arrived at Wa and the driver parked the van in front of the store of the Pioneer Tobacco Co., Wa. The van carried a consignment of assorted cigarettes meant to be distributed for the Wa District. When the van was parked the driver alighted with his mate and handed over the van together with the consignment to the watchman. The watchman examined the vehicle and found all the doors of the van well-secured with a padlock. While the watchman watched the van, it started raining heavily. The watchman took shelter under the shed. The first and second accused who had closed
[p.507] of [1980] GLR 501 from the cinema were heading towards the lorry park. They met the third accused. The third accused informed the second and first accused that the cigarettes van had arrived and was waiting at the Pioneer Tobacco Co. office. The third accused advised that they should break into the van and carry some of the cigarettes. While the first and second accused were advancing towards the Pioneer Tobacco Co. main store they met the fourth accused standing by the Curiosity Drinking Saloon. Then the first, second and the third accused asked him what he wanted and he said he was after cigarettes. The first accused told the fourth accused that they were on their way to break into the van to collect cigarettes and that the fourth accused should follow them. The fourth accused agreed and followed as requested. Just as they arrived the third accused asked permission to find an iron rod to break the van. The three accused persons waited while the third accused brought an iron bar. With the aid of the iron bar they managed to break the van. The first accused entered and brought out first eight cartons of Embassy cigarettes. He gave two to the third accused and one carton to the first accused and he took five. The second accused watched the place while the others carried their booty. On their return the third accused entered and brought eight cartons Embassy and one carton of Sweet Menthol. The first accused asked where to hide the cartons till the next day when they would dispose of them. The second accused suggested the room of the fifth accused, his friend. The others agreed and they carried the cigarettes to the house of the fifth accused. The fifth accused was asleep and was awakened and met the first and second accused. The first and second accused told the fifth that they had brought some cigarettes which they wanted to be kept till the next day. The fifth accused asked how they came by the cigarettes, and the first accused was bold to say that the cigarettes were stolen from a Pioneer Tobacco Co. van and they promised him of his share the next morning. The fifth accused agreed and conveyed the cigarettes. On 12 August 1978 the watchman of Pioneer Tobacco Co. noticed the theft. He reported the matter to the area manager who advised that the case be reported to the police. By the use of the serial numbers from the way bill they discovered that sixteen cartons of Embassy and one carton Sweet Menthol had been stolen. During the course of investigation police sought the help of one woman who managed to get a carton which tallied with the serial No. 314-part of those cigarettes that were stolen. The informant told the police that she bought the cigarettes from
[p.508] of [1980] GLR 501 the fourth accused. The fourth accused was arrested. The fourth accused admitted that the cigarettes were given to him by the first, second and the third accused persons. The fourth accused’s room was searched with a warrant and a carton of Embassy cigarette was traced. This was retrieved. The fourth accused led the police to the room of the first accused and five cartons of Embassy cigarettes were found. The first accused led the police to the second accused in whose room the police found nothing. In the room of the third accused was found two cartons of Embassy. They were all brought together with the cigarettes to the police station. The first accused then told the police that nine cartons were kept in the room of the fifth accused. The fifth accused could not be traced and his room was forced open under the directions of the district superintendent of police in charge of crime. The nine cartons were recovered and that tallied with the serial numbers of the stolen cigarettes. Later in the night, the fifth accused also reported himself to the police and was arrested and jointly charged with the first second, third and the fourth accused persons.”
After these facts were given to the court, the learned circuit court judge invited the accused persons to reconsider their plea of not guilty to the charge of conspiracy. He referred those appellants who were then not represented by counsel to the provisions of section 23 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). The section states:
“23. (1) If two or more persons agree or act together with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime, whether with or without any previous concert or deliberation, each of them is guilty of conspiracy to commit or abet that crime, as the case may be.”
Having referred the appellants to this provision the judge said that since there was an overt act by all the appellants to apparently appropriate the cigarettes, conspiracy could be inferred. He told the appellants that in any case any sentence that he would impose on the charge of stealing would be concurrent with any sentence on the conspiracy charge. He thereupon directed that the charge should be read de novo to the appellants and each appellant then pleaded guilty to the charge of conspiracy.
It seems to me that the circuit court judge at that stage of the proceedings was not entitled to accept the facts which the prosecution gave as material affecting in anyway the conspiracy count. In my respectful opinion, it is necessary to appreciate that in a criminal trial there are generally only three types of facts that may emerge
[p.509] of [1980] GLR 501 at various stages of the proceedings: these are first, the facts which the prosecution may give before the commencement of the actual trial, indicating the material they intend to prove by admissible evidence. Then there are also facts which the accused person, may, if he chooses, lead in evidence in his defence. Finally, there are also facts which on a consideration of the respective facts of the prosecution and the defence mentioned above, the presiding judge or magistrate finds as representing in his opinion the actual facts. In a court of law operating under the adversary common law system it is the last specie of facts which can be considered as facts properly called and upon the basis of which the court is entitled to adjudicate or make pronouncements. The other facts are strictly speaking mere allegations and they are not facts until the judge or magistrate accepts them as such. In the circumstances to talk about overt acts and to suggest that the conspiracy count could be inferred from the so-called facts given by the prosecution is to misconceive the whole apparatus of the criminal justice system. At the time the circuit judge referred to overt acts, he did not have legal facts to entitle him to make his pronouncements. The presumption of innocence on a plea of not guilty is a principle militating against the course of conduct pursued by the circuit court judge in this stage. I shall return to this matter again in this judgment. On any view whatsoever of the procedure which was adopted here, I have no doubt that in referring the appellants who had unambiguously pleaded not guilty to the conspiracy count to section 23 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 and commenting on the concurrent nature of the sentence he would impose on the conspiracy count; the circuit court judge was anticipating before hearing evidence, the result of the trial and was thereby treading an unlawful course. On a plea of not guilty the statutory duty of the court is imperatively set down in section 172 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) which provides:
“172. (1) If the accused does not plead guilty to the charge, the Court shall proceed to hear such evidence as the prosecutor may adduce in support of the charge.”
It is now common knowledge that “shall” in section 172 (1) of Act 30 is generally mandatory. I do not therefore understand why instead of complying with this compulsory statutory duty the circuit court judge deemed it fit to invite the appellants apparently to change their plea and to go further to talk of the sentence he was likely to impose on a charge on which no evidence had been led and in respect of which the law presumes the appellants innocent. It is my firm view that until an accused person pleads guilty or is found guilty a court committed to dispense justice is in duty bound
[p.510] of [1980] GLR 501 to make no comments whatsoever as to the punishment it intends to mete out to him. If this principle is not religiously adhered to, persons accused of crimes will be embarrassed in defending themselves and the presumption of innocence forged after so many years of painful experiences will be eroded. Furthermore, to quote the provisions of the Criminal Code, 1960 to unrepresented persons accused of crimes and give them the impression that by virtue of the law contained therein, they are disabled from pleading not guilty is clearly subversive of criminal justice. Justice should not be sacrificed for promptness. As Kingsley-Nyinah J., as he then was, so rightly warned in Yeboah v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 715 at pp. 716-717:
“. . . our local, lay and district magistrates, and our circuit judges should always be mindful of the fact that justice is the better and more beneficially administered to the general satisfaction of all concerned if done carefully and painstakingly, rather than hurriedly and carelessly, with one eye constantly on their returns.”
I think the appellants were unlawfully prevailed upon to plead guilty and their convictions cannot in the circumstances be sustained. However, it is necessary to set down fully the manner in which the circuit court judge disposed of the case finally.
After the appellants had been unlawfully persuaded, I almost said pressurised, to plead guilty to the conspiracy charge, the first and third appellants, Yaw Dabla and Iddrisu, were said to have had previous convictions for stealing although they have had clean records for three years before this case. Holding that the third appellant was upon the facts the architect of the crime, he sentenced the appellants on each count as follows: The first appellant, Yaw Dabla, five years’ imprisonment with hard labour on each count; the second appellant, Issahaku Achim, five years’ imprisonment with hard labour on each count; the third appellant, Iddrisu Sidik, seven years’ imprisonment with hard labour on each count and the fourth appellant, Magiedu Alhaji Abubakari, five years’ imprisonment with hard labour on each count. The sentences were to run concurrently. It is against their convictions and sentences that the appellants have appealed to this court.
On behalf of the first appellant, learned counsel filed three grounds of appeal:
“(1) The judgment is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
(2) The sentence is manifestly excessive having regard to all the circumstances of the case.
(3) The judge erred in accepting the plea of guilty when in the
[p.511] of [1980] GLR 501 light of the facts the judge should have entered a plea of not guilty and called on the prosecution to prove their case.”
And on behalf of the fourth appellant two grounds of appeal were field:
“(1) The procedure adopted by the trial circuit court judge so confused the appellant that he did not know the full effects of what he did in court thus occasioning a substantial miscarriage of justice.”
(2) The sentence is too harsh in all the circumstances of the case.”
All the four appellants personally filed grounds of appeals differently worded but complaining against the conviction and the sentence on various grounds but substantially identical, inter alia, with those put forward by counsel for the first and fourth appellants. One of the grounds rather untidily drafted by the appellants sought reduction of sentence on grounds of hardships to the parents of the appellants. I take the grounds filed by counsel as additional grounds and have considered them together.
Before considering the grounds of appeal, I must remark that all the appellants consistently pleaded guilty to the stealing count and speaking for myself, and taking a panoramic view of the whole corpus of our criminal law and procedure, I am unable to see anything wrong with the convictions of all the appellants on the stealing count. It is only in respect of the conspiracy count that I venture to think the grounds of appeal against convictions are tenable.
Nevertheless, arguments were strenuously urged on me by counsel for the appellants and the Republic that since after the appellants had pleaded guilty, the stealing charge was amended by the substitution of sixteen cartons of Embassy cigarettes for the eighteen cartons appearing thereat, and they were not given an opportunity to plead to the new charge, the convictions for stealing on the second count must be considered erroneous. As I have just indicated, this submission which I hope to show presently is misconceived, had the unstinted support of the senior state attorney appearing for the Republic. I am therefore obliged in the interest of justice to give serious consideration to it. It is not often that the Republic takes up the cause of an appellant in a criminal case particularly when the appellant is represented. But counsel for the Republic is a minister of justice and if in his view, he sees a point favourable to an appellant, I apprehend it is his duty to draw the court’s attention to it. It is a practice to be commended and I welcome it.
In urging upon me this submission, Mr. Mensah, counsel for the appellants, referred me to the decision of the erstwhile Supreme
[p.512] of [1980] GLR 501
Court in Commissioner of Police v. Lagos (Tunday) [1962] 1 G.L.R. 127, S.C. and the provisions of section 176 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 and stated that since the appellants were not called upon to plead to the amended charge in compliance with section 176 (2) of Act 30, the convictions on the stealing charge is erroneous in law. Section 176 of Act 30 provides:
“176. (1) Where, at any stage of a summary trial before the close of the case for the prosecution, it appears to the Court that the charge is defective, either in substance or form, the Court may make such order for the alteration of charge either by way of amendment of the charge or by the substitution or addition of a new charge as the court thinks necessary to meet the circumstances of the case.
(2) Where the charge is altered as aforesaid, the Court shall thereupon call upon the accused to plead to the altered charge.”
Now the facts of the Tunday case (supra) are that the appellant, a scrap metal dealer, was charged on a first count with stealing copper wire and in a second count with being in unlawful possession of certain other articles including copper and red wire believed to be the property of the Ghana Government. The trial was summary on a plea of not guilty. During the trial the judge made a minute recording that the prosecution had applied to amend the charges and that the amendment was granted. From the record of the trial it was difficult to ascertain whether the amendment was in fact made and it appeared that instead, a fresh charge sheet containing three counts was submitted. The appellant was apparently not called upon to plead to the substituted charges. Convictions were recorded against the appellant on two counts but what charge sheet they were in respect of was not clear. Van Lare J.S.C. delivering the judgment of the court, allowing the appeal said at p. 129:
“We find it difficult to appreciate the true position as to which of the two charge sheets the trial proceeded from at that stage. There was one with two counts and the other with three counts; but in the end convictions appeared recorded in respect of ‘1st Count’ and ‘2nd Count’. Whether the convictions were in respect of the two counts on the earlier charge sheet or in respect of the first two of the three counts on the subsequent charge sheet was not clear.
It appeared to us in the circumstances that either the earlier charges were withdrawn and others substituted, in which case the original charges were no longer before the court at the end of the trial, and upon which convictions could not have been recorded;
[p.513] of [1980] GLR 501 or that there was no alteration of the charges in which case there would have been no need for the judge’s minute quoted above; but there was in fact another charge sheet of three counts. We assumed in the circumstances that the original charges were withdrawn and fresh charges substituted; in that event it was necessary to discharge the accused on the former charges and take fresh pleas on the new charges, and the trial should have commenced de novo. This was not done.
The learned trial circuit judge appeared to have overlooked the fresh charge sheet of three counts and in her otherwise carefully considered judgment dealt with the former charge sheet of two counts which were no longer before her, and made convictions in respect of them. We found it difficult to assume that the conviction on the first count as recorded related to the first count of the substituted charges, and that the conviction recorded as to the second count, related to the second or the third count of the substituted charges.
Even if we assumed the position to be so, there would still be remaining another count in respect of which it had to be assumed that the trial did not terminate . . .
We come to the conclusion after anxious consideration of the proceedings that the trial was unsatisfactory and it would therefore not be safe to let the conviction stand.”
One or two comments deserve to be made about the principle enshrined in this decision. The court did not take the view that the mere failure to take fresh pleas ipso facto invalidates the conviction. It appears that one consideration that dominated the reasoning in the case was the fact that the trial judge in the case had convicted on a charge sheet which was no longer before her. In any case, the particular charge sheet in respect of which the convictions were recorded was not identified in any way. It was apparently for these reasons that in allowing the appeal the court remarked that “after anxious consideration” it had come to the “conclusion” that “the trial was unsatisfactory and it would therefore not be safe to let the conviction stand.” (The emphasis is mine.) Furthermore. it must be noted that the Supreme Court’s decision was delivered on 23 February 1962. On 9 February 1965 following unsatisfactory acquittals by our appellate courts on technical grounds of the type urged on me in these proceedings, the legislature passed the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), in which it deprecated acquittals on technical and procedural errors and errors based on defective charge sheets, and to make assurance doubly sure it proceeded in section 7 thereof, which amended section 330 of Act 30,
[p.514] of [1980] GLR 501 to give a hypothetical case as an illustration of the type of situation in which it will not tolerate acquittals. The illustration is:
“(a) The charge upon which A is being tried is amended in the course of the trial. A is not called upon to plead to the amended charge. The case proceeds as if A has pleaded not guilty to the amended charge.
An appeal based only on the failure to call upon A to plead to the amended charge shall be dismissed.”
This as clearly appears in section 7 of Act 261, is merely an illustration and not exhaustive of the probable situations contemplated by the legislature; nevertheless, when I called the attention of the senior state attorney who was championing the submission to this illustration, he was undaunted and countered with a submission which I set hereunder in his own words:
“Although I see the force of the effect of Act 261, I am under the impression that it applies to a full trial in the sense of hearing evidence and not where an appellant had pleaded guilty and so discouraged the calling of witnesses.”
Although this submission found robust support from counsel for the accused persons, I am afraid it is misconceived. The appellants had pleaded guilty to stealing a quantity of cigarettes valued at ¢11,370. The quantity of a specie was said to be eighteen and the prosecution amended the eighteen to read sixteen. If the amendment had been from a smaller quantity to a larger quantity then probably an argument of a sort could be put forward touching on a miscarriage of justice since the appellants would have been convicted of stealing the excess articles in respect of which he had not pleaded guilty. How failure to take a further plea in the circumstances of this case can be said to have prejudiced the accused or occasioned a miscarriage of justice is difficult to imagine. I think in interpreting the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), s. 330 as amended by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), s. 7 the courts ought to construe it amply and beneficially for the purpose of giving effect to its provisions but not strictly and jealously and in a manner that will stultify the clear legislative intent spelt out in Act 261, s. 7. This principle applies to all penal legislations in this Republic: see sections 4 and 5 of the Criminal Code, 1960. I think therefore that the arguments advanced before me and which were calculated to show that the convictions of the appellants on the stealing count are erroneous, are unacceptable to me. I hold that the convictions on the stealing count are in order and accordingly I dismiss all the appeals on the stealing count.
[p.515] of [1980] GLR 501
I now come to the conspiracy count. I have already expressed firm views about the unsatisfactory nature of the procedure adopted by the learned circuit court judge in this court in respect of that count. The only question is what effect it has on the propriety or otherwise of the convictions. In R. v. Isabella King (1921) 15 Cr.App.R. 13, C.C.A., the English Court of Criminal Appeal, coram. Lord Reading C.J., Lawrence and Coleridge JJ. were faced with a similar situation. In that case the appellant pleaded not guilty at the Leeds Assizes before Roche J. to a charge of incest contrary to section 2 of the Punishment of Incest Act, 1908. Roche J. expressed the view that he thought that some statements made by her appearing in the depositions taken before the magistrate amounted to an admission of guilt and she was told that she might withdraw her plea of not guilty. As far as this case is concerned, the headnote of the case is very apposite indeed. It says at p. 13: “On a plea of not guilty there ought to be no suggestion by the Court that that plea should be withdrawn or that there should be a plea of guilty.” Clearly this caveat has not been heeded by the trial circuit court in this case. In delivering the judgment of the court quashing the conviction Lord Reading C.J. said at p. 14: “we are satisfied that the conviction ought not to stand, because it is by no means clear that she understood what she was doing or that she intended to admit the statutory offence with which she was charged.”
The decision of the English Court of Criminal Appeal is very short indeed. Although the conclusion of the court that the conviction be quashed, is right, I note that the decision of Lord Reading C.J. did not canvass in any detail the reasons why the conviction could not stand. I believe, however, that 1 have in this judgment endeavoured to give elaborate reasons why under our Code the procedure adopted by the learned circuit court judge is legally wrong. It is as I have already indicated a flagrant disregard of the provisions of sections 172 (1) of Act 30. It violates the appellants’ legal and constitutional rights to be considered innocent until the contrary is shown. For all the reasons I have already considered in this judgment, I think the convictions of the appellants on the conspiracy count is erroneous in law. I quash the convictions, set aside the sentences and acquit and discharge the appellants on the conspiracy count. Of course I have already dismissed the appeals relating to the convictions on the stealing count.
I now come to the sentences. Clearly in imposing the sentences which he imposed the learned circuit court judge was influenced by the allegation that there was a conspiracy and that therefore the stealing was a result of the conspiracy. This must be the reason why he called the third appellant, the architect of the crime, and singularly
[p.516] of [1980] GLR 501 sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment with hard labour. I think in imposing the sentences the circuit court judge never lost sight of the conspiracy charge. If he had, he would not have imposed such heavy sentences. Since I have set aside the conviction on the conspiracy count, it is my view that it will in a marginal way indirectly have effect on the question of the sentence imposed on the stealing count. This is because the circuit judge himself indicated that the two offences were to be considered in the imposition of concurrent sentences.
I propose to consider at some length the principles which in my opinion ought to be applied in these appeals against sentences, particularly as I have noticed that in imposing sentences on convicted persons, our trial courts in the lower hierarchy, have developed a tendency of ignoring mitigating factors and often without adequate reasons, they insist on imposing deterrent sentences. Furthermore, one or two of the grounds of appeal filed by the appellants herein against their sentences are recurring grounds in many petitions of appeal filed in this court, and it is therefore necessary to define their applicable ambit in order to afford their meaningful appraisal and discourage excessive reliance on them by counsel.
The third appellant who had seven years’ imprisonment with hard labour imposed on him had three previous convictions. The second and fourth accused had no previous convictions but they were given five years’ imprisonment with hard labour each; the same as the first appellant who had one previous conviction. The first and third appellants who had previous convictions, had maintained clean records for three years before the present offence. The English Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Brighton [1963] Crim.L.R. 64 dealt with the case of an appellant who had main tained a clean record for twelve years and for which reason the trial court remarked that his period of honesty had saved him from preventive detention. In reducing the sentence imposed on him from three years to two years, the appellate court remarked that a considerably shorter period of honest endeavour might have saved the appellant from a sentence of preventive detention and the court consequently felt that further credit should be given to the attempt that he had made. Other cases illustrative of this principle are also R. v. McCartney [1963] Crim.L.R. 65, C.C.A. and R. v. Mothe [1963] Crim.L.R. 65, C.C.A.
I accept the proposition inherent in the circuit court judge’s approach that in imposing sentences on persons jointly convicted, the sentences should reflect the role which each party played; if one person’s role is minor and the other is, say, the architect, then the sentences should reflect these roles, the architect as a general rule
[p.517] of [1980] GLR 501 receiving more than the one who played a minor role. This was the approach of the English Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Savundranayagan and Walker [1968] 3 All E.R. 439.
The first and fourth appellants helped the police in recovering practically all the stolen articles. I think such behaviour is normally accepted by the courts as a mitigating factor in punishment. For instance in R. v. Aston [1967] Crim.L.R. 488, C.C.A. the fact that the appellant gave assistance to the police was considered to be a mitigating factor and his sentence was accordingly reduced. Furthermore, all the appellants pleaded guilty to the stealing count. A plea of guilty has always been a mitigating factor: see R. v. Davies [1965] Crim.L.R. 251, C.C.A., and the judgment of Edmund Davies L.J. in R. v. de Haan [1967]3 All E.R. 618, C.C.A. In R. v. Harper [1967] 3 All E.R. 619n, C.C.A. Lord Parker C.J., delivering the judgment of the court stated at p. 619:
“it is quite improper to use language which may convey that an accused is being sentenced because he has pleaded not guilty, or because he has run his defence in a particular way. It is, however, proper to give an accused a lesser sentence if he has shown genuine remorse, amongst other things by pleading guilty.”
A ground of appeal filed by all the appellants was calculated to highlight the adverse effect which the sentences of imprisonment would have on their families. Typical of the said ground is this formulation by the third appellant:
“Your appellant is begging the court to forgive me and consider me being sentenced to seven good years’ imprisonment and left my two wives and children at home and my old father, I am caring for them in farming but now I am no more. Therefore I hope that the court will see to it and sympathise me in my sentence.”
I think the attitude of the courts to the effects of sentence on a criminal’s family has long been settled by the English courts although our own courts do not seem to have given any serious consideration to the problem in spite of the fact that appellants persistently petition the courts for a reduction of sentences for the sake of family difficulties. It seems to me the English solution is not wrong in principle and for this reason I propose to be guided by it. The English attitude is exemplified in R. v. Percival [1969] Crim.L.R. 326 at p. 327, C.C.A. coram. Winn and Widgery L.JJ. and Lawton J. where the court refused to disturb a sentence of eighteen months’ imprisonment with hard labour imposed on the appellant, a widower, for receiving 170,000 cigarettes despite the fact that the conviction had brought
[p.518] of [1980] GLR 501 extreme hardship on his little son and teenage daughter. The court pointed out that the adverse effect the conviction had had on the appellant’s family was an irrelevant consideration. In R. v. Williams, 21 November 1966, unreported, the English Court of Criminal Appeal in refusing to reduce the sentences of three persons sentenced to ten years and one to twelve years for armed robbery indicated:
“In this case, as in so many that this Court gets, our attention has been brought to the said condition in which the applicants’ families stand … The prospects of those wretched women and children … is not one which the courts contemplate lightly but the public have got to be protected and the criminals who go out on these expeditions will get no sympathy from this court by saying that … their wives and children are in difficulties because of long sentences. They ought to have thought about the difficulties their wives and children would have been in before they ever started out on this kind of criminal enterprise.”
The same sentiments have been expressed previously by the English Court of Criminal Appeal in cases like R. v. Linton, Court of Criminal Appeal, 28 September 1965, unreported; R. v. Gilmore and Holden, Court of Criminal Appeal, 2 June 1965, unreported and in the subsequent case of R. v. Deves, Court of Criminal Appeal, 9 March 1967, unreported. I am grateful to D. A. Thomas, Fellow of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, from whose Principles of Sentencing at p. 190 these unreported English decisions are culled.
The value of the cigarettes stolen is quite great, but it is significant that all the stolen cigarettes have been recovered. In R. v. Redding, Court of Criminal Appeal, 10 March 1966, unreported a postman was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment with hard labour for stealing a number of postal packets. In reducing the sentence to twelve months the English Court of Criminal Appeal remarked: “this man has repaid the whole of the depredation.” Similarly in R. v. Hooper, Court of Criminal Appeal, 21 November 1966, unreported the English Court of Appeal reduced a sentence for obtaining various sums of money by false pretences partly on the ground that a substantial portion of the amounts involved had been repaid. These two cases are also discussed at p. 197 of D. A. Thomas’s book already referred to.
In imposing sentence on appellants, a court must give due weight to all mitigating factors. Apatu-Plange Ag.J., as he then was, indicated the applicable principle in appeals in Asaah alias Asi v. The Republic [1978] G.L.R. 1 at pp. 2-3 when he said:
[p.519] of [1980] GLR 501
“Now in dealing with an appeal of this nature the court has to find out whether there were any mitigating factors which the trial magistrate took or failed to take into consideration. If the record reveals that he took all the said mitigating factors into consideration before imposing the sentence, then his discretion can be said to have been properly exercised, and in the absence of any special circumstances, an appellate court will be slow to interfere with such a sentence. If, however. the record does not reveal that the trial magistrate took any such mitigating circumstances into consideration, then the appellate court will find out whether the said mitigating factors were such that if the trial magistrate had adverted his mind to them, he would probably not have imposed the said severe sentences.”
I propose to be guided by this principle. In these appeals I note that the appellants are all young persons. They all pleaded guilty and two of them helped the police to retrieve the stolen articles. They made no attempt whatsoever to waste the time of the court and their conduct showed remorse. There was no premeditation and the offence seemed to have been committed on the spur of the moment as they were returning from the cinema. The second and fourth appellants are young offenders with no previous convictions. I have said many times in this court, in the course of criminal appeals, that when young offenders have their first brush with the law, it is essential for the purpose of the reformative element in criminal justice that as a general rule they are not given custodial sentences unless the trial court has legally no other alternatives or a non-custodial sentence is on principle and for good reasons not feasible. If this approach is not adopted and such young persons are invariably sent to prison on their first going wrong, they will obviously get contaminated by contacts with hardened criminals. This will certainly not be in the interest of the public, for it may launch those inexperienced and impressionable young persons on a life of crime as they rub shoulders with the garrulous criminal recidivists.
The appellants were sentenced on 16 August 1978. Having regard to their conduct, previous records, each individual’s circumstances and the principles I have discussed in this judgment I propose to set aside the sentences imposed on them and in their places impose the following sentences: For the first appellant, Yaw Dabla, with one previous conviction, but who helped the police, the sentence of five years’ imprisonment with hard labour on the stealing count is set aside and in its place is substituted a sentence for two years’ imprisonment with hard labour. For the second appellant, a young first offender who showed much remorse, I will substitute for the
[p.520] of [1980] GLR 501 sentence of five years’ imprisonment with hard labour imposed a sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour so as to enable him to be immediately discharged. For the third appellant, with three previous convictions, described by the circuit court judge as the architect of the crime, I will substitute for the seven years’ imprisonment with hard labour imposed a sentence of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour. For the fourth appellant, a young first offender who helped the police and played a minor role, I will substitute for the sentence of five years’ imprisonment with hard labour a sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour so as to enable him to be immediately discharged.
In the result the appeals against the convictions on the conspiracy count are allowed. The convictions are quashed and the sentences imposed on the appellants on the said conspiracy count are set aside. The appellants are acquitted and discharged on the conspiracy count. The appeals against the convictions on the stealing count are however dismissed, but the appeals against the sentences on the stealing count are allowed to the extent already indicated in this judgment.
DECISION
Appeal against convictions on cons piracy count allowed. Appellants acquitted and discharged.
Appeal against convictions on stealing count dismissed but sentences varied.
D. R. K. S.
