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[1979] SLR (HC) 31High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

FRIMPONG vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 575

13 July 1979 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 31
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OSCOLAFRIMPONG v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 575 [1979] SLR (HC) 31
APAFRIMPONG v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 575, [1979] SLR (HC) 31 (Ghana).
BluebookFRIMPONG v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 575, [1979] SLR (HC) 31 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Lawson v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 63.

(2) R. v. Christie [1914] A.C. 545; sub nom. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Christie 83 L.J.K.B.

1097; 111 L.T. 220; 78 J.P. 321; 30 T.L.R. 471; 58 S.J. 515; 24 Cox C.C. 249; 10 Cr.App.R. 141, H.L.

(3) R. v. Spencer [1959] Crim.L.R. 284, C.C.A.

(3) R. v. Golder; R. v. Jones; R. v. Porrit [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1169; [1960] 3 All E.R. 457; 124 J.P. 505;

104 S.J. 893; 45 Cr. App. R. 5, C.C.A.

(5) Davies v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] A.C. 378; [1954] 2 W.L.R. 343; [1954] 1 All E.R.

507; 118 J.P. 222; 98 S.J. 161; 38 Cr. App. R. 11, H.L.

(6) Commodore v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 471.

(7) R. v. Baskerville [1916] 2 K.B. 658; 86 L.J.K.B. 28; 115 L.T. 453; 80 J.P. 446; 60 S.J. 996; 25 Cox C.C. 524; [1916-17] All E.R. Rep. 38; 12 Cr. App. R. 81, C.C.A.

(8) R. v. Blake [1844] 6 Q.B. 126; 13 L.J.M.C. 131; 8 J.P. 596; 8 Jur. 666; 115 E.R. 49. (9) R. v. Stenson and Hitchman (1871) 25 L.T. 666; 36 J.P. 532; 12 Cox C.C. 111, C.C.R. (10) R. v. Duffeld [1851] 5 Cox C.C. 404.

(11) R. v. Patel [1951] W.N. 258; [1951] 1 T.L.R. 1018; 115 J.P. 465; 95 S.J. 854; [1951] 2 All E.R. 29;

35 Cr. App. R. 62, C.C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from a circuit court to the High Court against a conviction and sentence on charges of conspiracy to steal and stealing. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

E. D. Mahami for the appellant.

J. O. Amui, Principal State Attorney, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

I have already allowed the appeal of this appellant who was convicted on two counts and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with hard labour on each count, the sentences to run

[p.577] of [1980] GLR 575

concurrently. Together with his co-accused, they were convicted of to steal and stealing contrary to sections 23 (1) and 124 conspiracy (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), respectively. The facts of the case which were led by the prosecution are that during the month of July, fourteen outer tyres, the property of the Omnibus Services Authority, the employers of the appellant and the other person jointly charged with him, got missing from the omnibus yard. The tyres had been kept at an open place accessible to every one In the yard. A witness gave evidence that the other person (the non-appellant) some time in July gave him four of the tyres for sale, he told him that his master had given him the said tyres for sale. The witness, a bookman at the lorry station not far from the premises of the Omnibus Services Authority yard, sold the tyres for the said non-appellant to two other witness. The non-appellant was paid ¢320.00 for each tyre. The non-appellant gave the bookman ¢100.00 for his troubles and four days later he brought another five tyres also for sale in similar circumstances. These were also sold for ¢320.00 each and four days later another set of five tyres were similarly brought, they were also sold for ¢320.00 as the previous consignment and the proceeds of sale handed over to the non-appellant. There was not a single witness who gave evidence implicating the appellant. However, the non-appellant who was jointly charged with the appellant in a statement to the police alleged that it was the appellant who gave him the fourteen tyres for sale. This, of course, the appellant had denied in his own statement to the police.

At the close of the case for the prosecution, the only evidence against the appellant was the statement which the non-appellant had made. This statement is clearly hearsay. It was never given by a witness for the prosecution and it was never given on oath. As is provided in section 57 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372): “Subject to any enactment or rule of law to the contrary, a Court shall require any witness to be examined on oath.” The non-appellant at the close of the case for the prosecution had not given evidence, had not been and could not be examined on oath to establish his credibility and make any evidence he gave admissible. In the circumstances, his statement was hearsay and as I held in Lawson v. The Republic [1977]1G.L.R. 63 at pp. 70-71 following the English cases of R. v. Christie [1914] A.C. 545, H.L.; R. v. Spencer (1959) Crim. L. R. 284, C.C.A. and R. v. Golder (1960) 45 Cr. App. R. 5, C.C.A., such a statement by a co-accused is inadmissible against a person and it is therefore no evidence against his co-accused as the appellant is in this case.

It follows therefore that the appellant ought to have been acquitted and discharged when his counsel, Mr. E. D. Mahami in the

[p.578] of [1980] GLR 575

court below, made a submission of no case for him. The learned circuit court judge, however, wrongfully ruled against him and on calling upon the non-appellant, evidence adverse to the appellant was given. The non-appellant is clearly an accomplice and it was necessary that his evidence should be corroborated in accordance with the principles enunciated by the House of Lords in Davies v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] A.C. 378 at p. 400, H.L. This principle is now commonplace. I recall dealing with this matter at some length in Commodore v. The Republic [1976] 2 G.L.R. 471 at pp. 486-487 where I drew attention to Lord Reading C.J.’s formulation of the principle in R v. Baskerville [1916] 2 K.B. 658 at p. 667, C.C.A. where Lord Reading said:

“ . . . evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that is, which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed, but also that the prisoner committed it.”

There was in this case, if I may say so, not an iota of independent evidence connecting the appellant apart from the accomplice’s own assertion made after the close of the prosecution’s case and in defence. In the circumstances, it is clear to me that the conviction cannot be supported.

In holding, however, that the appellant was guilty of the conspiracy charge the learned circuit court judge adopted a line of reasoning that needs consideration. The non-appellant was the first accused, in the case and referring to his second statement which is exhibit A, he said:

“In his evidence on oath the first accused said that the contents of his statement were correct and that he relied on them. In Republic v. Blake & Tye (1844) 6 Q. B. 126, it was held that ‘acts and also statements by one of several conspirators are evidence against the other party or parties to the conspiracy as if the acts or statements were done or made by him or them so far as they were in the execution or in furtherance of their common purpose but not otherwise.’ In the instant case the statement — exhibit A — of the first accused which is evidence against the second accused shows that the second accused was the brain behind the whole conspiracy to steal the tyres.”

It seems to me that the principle contained in R v. Blake (1844) 6 Q.B. 126 has been misconceived by the learned circuit court judge. The principle is easily misunderstood and I recall having heard the

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principle bandied about without its true ambit and limitations expostulated. It is true that R v. Blake (supra) did lay down the principle that “The acts and declarations, also of any of the conspirators in furtherance of the common design, may be given in evidence against any other conspirator.” See Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (36th ed.), para. 4074, but the Blake principle is subject to important qualifications: There are conditions precedent which must operate before the principle can be brought to play, namely, before such evidence of acts and declarations can be given it is necessary to prove firstly the existence of the conspiracy, secondly the connection which the accused has with the said conspiracy and lastly it must be proved that the person whose acts or declarations are allowed to be given was connected with the accused in the same conspiracy and that the acts or declarations were in furtherance of the common design: see R. v. Stenson and Hitchman (1871) 12 Cox C.C. 111, C.C.R., R. v. Duffeld (1851) 5 Cox C.C. 404 and R. v. Patel (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 62, C.C.A. and a number of cases cited in Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (36th ed.), para. 1024 in support of the said proposition.

In this case the existence of the conspiracy was never proved nor was the appellant’s alleged connection established and it is rather the declaration of a self-confessed conspirator which is the very basis of conspiracy charge and the supposed connection. I think the principle of R. v. Blake (supra) is clearly inapplicable in this case and the learned circuit judge was in error on relying on it to convict.

In the circumstances, the conviction is erroneous and it is for these reasons that I allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, set aside the sentence of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour each concurrent on the two counts and acquitted and discharged the appellant.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

Conviction quashed and sentence set aside.

S. O.

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