KPEKORO AND ANOTHER vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 580
14 August 1979 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 18 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 44Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Watara v. The Republic [1974] 2 G.L.R. 24.
(2) Forson v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 138.
(3) Alpha Zabrama v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 291.
(4) R. v. Durham Quarter Sessions; Ex parte Virgo [1952] 2 Q.B. 1; [1952] 1 All E.R. 466; [1952] 1 T.L.R. 516; 116 J.P. 157, D.C.
(5) Ofei v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 680, S.C.
(6) Kotokoli v. The Republic, High Court, Kumasi, 7 November 1969, unreported; digested in (1970)
C.C. 24.
(7) R. v. Muambo (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 27.
(8) Galos Hired v. R. [1944] A.C. 149; [1944] 2 All E.R. 50; 113 L.J.P.C. 60; 60 T.L.R. 430; 88 S.J.
289, P.C.
(9) Republic v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Aniagyei II [1976] 1 G.L.R. 394.
(10) Omenako v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 151.
(11) Republic v. James Town Circuit Court Judge; Ex parte Whiteside [1977] 1 G.L.R.99.
[p.583] of [1980] GLR 580
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the appellants against their convictions and sentences by the Circuit Court, Wa, on charges of conspiracy to smuggle contrary to the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), s. 23 (1) and the Subversion Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 90), s. 1 (h) as amended by the Subversion (Amendment) Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 94), and of subversion contrary to N.R.C.D. 90, s. 1 (h). The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
W. A. Atuguba for the appellants.
Mrs. Sophia Adenyira, State Attorney, for V. Y. Agudetse, Senior State Attorney, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
I have already allowed the appeals in this case and have consequently quashed the convictions and acquitted and discharged the appellants. I only wish to give reasons now for so allowing the appeals. The appellants were arraigned before the Circuit Court, Wa, charged jointly in count one with the offence of conspiracy to smuggle contrary to section 23 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), and section 1 (h) of the Subversion Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 90) as amended by the Subversion (Amendment) Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 94), and in count two with subversion contrary to section 1 (h) of N.R.C.D. 90 as amended aforesaid. The particulars of the offence are:
“(1) Edmund Kpekoro: Farmer, 2. Samuel Bewel: Farmer. On or about 22 June 1977 at Beat three area (Ghana-Upper Volta Border) near Hamile and within the jurisdiction of this court did conspire together with persons now at large to smuggle out of Ghana fifteen bags of fertilizer (type 15-15-15).
(2) Edmund Kpekoro: Farmer, 2. Samuel Bewel: Farmer. On or about 22 June 1977 at Beat three area (Ghana-Upper Volta Border) near Hamile and within the jurisdiction of this court did attempt to smuggle out of Ghana fifteen bags of fertilizer (type 15-15-15).”
When the case came before me for the hearing, I thought it involved legal points of extreme importance and as the appellants were unrepresented, I gave them leave to appeal without hearing them. On the hearing of the substantive appeal, Mr. Agudetse, senior state attorney, appeared for the Republic but the appellants were still unrepresented. On calling on the Republic to support the conviction, Mr. Agudetse said he could not support the conviction, but he submitted that in the circumstances of the case a re-trial should be ordered. The appellants were obviously indigent persons and as
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I was of the opinion that it was in the interest of justice that they should have the services of a lawyer to look after their interest, I assigned to them by way of legal aid Mr. Atuguba, learned counsel who was in court and who agreed to take up the assigned brief. I did this by invoking the powers of this court under the provisions of section 110 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) which states:
“110. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court may at any time assign a lawyer by way of legal aid to any party to any proceeding whatsoever before the Court in respect of which the Court is of the opinion that it is desirable in the interests of justice that that party should have legal aid and that he has not sufficient means to enable him to obtain the services of a lawyer.”
In order to understand the legal problems that arose in this case, I think it is essential to advert to the facts of the case and the proceedings at the trial. When the charges were read to the appellants they both pleaded guilty but added that they had explanations. After this, the prosecutor gave the following facts:
“On 22 June 1977, two police constables stationed at Hamile in Ghana visited a friend at Hamile in the Upper Volta. On their return to Ghana through a bush-path leading to Upper Volta at about 7.40 p.m. the two constables met the accused persons together with many others now at large. The accused persons were pushing a hand truck loaded with something and covered with tarpaulin and heading for Upper Volta. The two constables challenged the people but they abandoned the truck and they ran into the bush. The constables blew their whistles and two Border Guards officers rushed to the aid of the two constables.
Together they pushed the truck to the Border Guards Police Station and made a complaint. When the load was uncovered it was found to contain fifteen bags of fertilizer which were meant for farmers in Ghana. On the following day the first accused was identified and arrested. On the third day the second accused was identified and arrested. On 18 July 1977 the accused persons were arraigned before Nandom Court for a provisional charge pending the state attorney’s advice. Both accused persons were granted bail but the second accused jumped bail and was arrested seven months later. On 20 July 1978 the state attorney advised that the accused persons should be arraigned before the circuit court. The accused persons were accordingly charged before this court.”
[p.585] of [1980] GLR 580
The first appellant then offered the following explanation:
“It is correct that on 22 June 1977 I came from my farm. One agricultural officer stationed at Hamile came and called me and asked that I should take fifteen bags of fertilizer to one Alhaji Issah at Hamile. I told the officer in charge that that was prohibited. The agricultural officer told me that the man was not going to sell the fertilizer but was going to use them on his farm. That the Upper Volta people had been supplying us with beans and millets that was why we agreed to take the fertilizer to the Upper Volta. On the way we met two policemen in mufti. They asked us where we were taking the fertilizer to. We did not tell them where we were going to. They blew their whistle and we ran away. On the next day one staff sergeant saw me and identified me. He asked me to go with him. He took me on his motor-cycle to Hamile. At Hamile I told the police that it was one agricultural officer who sent me with the fertilizer. A lieutenant and a staff sergeant went out and brought the said agricultural officer. They later took the agricultural officer to Hamile and that ended the story of the agricultural officer whom I did not see again.”
After this, the second appellant gave his version:
“On 22 June 1977 I was informed by the first accused that both of us were wanted by the agricultural officer in his office. We both went to the office. He asked us to send the fifteen bags of fertilizer No. 15-15-15 to one Alhaji Issah at Hamile. I told the agricultural officer that this was prohibited by law. He however explained that the items were not going to be sold but to be used for farming. We agreed to send the fertilizer therefore in a truck. While the first accused and I with some others were going we met two peace officers in civilian dress. They asked us where we were sending the fertilizer to. They blew their whistles and two other border guardsmen came to their aid. We ran away. On the following day the first accused was identified and taken to the Hamile office. I was subsequently arrested. I told the lieutenant and the staff sergeant that it was the agricultural officer at Hamile who asked us to send the fertilizer to one Alhaji Issah at Hamile. I explained that when I told the agricultural officer that smuggling was prohibited he told us that he was in control of fertilizer in the area and that since the fertilizer was not going to be sold by Alhaji Issah but to be used for farming purposes this was no offence. Accordingly we agreed to convey them to Hamile in the Upper Volta for Alhaji Issah. The agricultural officer was summoned
[p.586] of [1980] GLR 580 by the staff sergeant and the lieutenant of the Border Guards to the station. He gave a statement. Later he was sent to the headquarters at Babile and this was the last we heard of him. I plead for leniency and this would serve as a lesson to me.”
The circuit court judge after hearing the explanations made the following order:
“It is clear from the explanations of both the first and second accused persons that they knew that it was illegal to export fertilizer to a foreign country to wit, the Upper Volta. From the point where the accused were seen they had crossed over the Ghana territory and had it not been for the timely intervention of the guardsmen they would have accomplished their cherished goal that was, sending the fertilizer to the said Alhaji Issah in the Upper Volta. I am satisfied that at the time the accused abandoned the fertilizer they had done more than enough to convey the items as to be guilty of attempt. I am also satisfied that they agreed between themselves to commit the offence. The accused persons are therefore convicted on their own plea and sentenced each to fifteen years’ imprisonment with hard labour on each charge. Sentences concurrent.
Exhibit recovered is to be confiscated, sold by auction to the farmers and proceeds paid into government chest.”
The appellants appeal against their convictions and sentences. The learned senior state attorney was unable to support the conviction. He submitted that although the appellants pleaded guilty they nevertheless offered explanations which were inconsistent with the guilty pleas. He said the trial judge was in such circumstances enjoined by law to enter a plea of not guilty and to proceed to hear evidence in the usual way and the procedure followed by the circuit court judge therefore was contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30). For this reason he was unable to support the conviction. He submitted, however, that the appellants had each served only seven and a half months of a fifteen-year sentence and if a new trial were ordered there would be no miscarriage of justice.
Mr. Atuguba, counsel for the appellants, submitted in reply that the general attitude of our criminal law is not in favour of re-trials particularly where appellants have served a considerable term of imprisonment. He referred me to holding (2) in the case of Watara v. The Republic [1974] 2 G.L.R. 24 and the concluding words of holding (5) in my decision in Forson v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 138 and submitted that these cases are authority for the proposition that I should not order a re-trial in the circumstances
[p.587] of [1980] GLR 580 of this case. He pointed out that each appellant had already served seven and a half months. If a re-trial were ordered and he was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years, he would at the end have served fifteen years and seven and a half months and this would be unfair. Since counsel for the Republic conceded that the conviction cannot be supported, the appellants’ counsel concentrated on the sentence and was understandably silent with regard to the conviction.
Before dealing with the sentence, I must say that although counsel for the Republic cited no authorities I agree with the submission that the conviction cannot be sustained quite apart from the reasons which counsel gave. I shall deal with this point later. No doubt in citing the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), counsel had in mind section 172 (1) which provides: “If the accused does not plead guilty to the charge, the Court shall proceed to hear such evidence as the prosecutor may adduce in support of the charge.”
Clearly, even if the charges preferred against the appellants are unexceptionable, and I do not think they are, then the principle which I canvassed in Alpha Zabrama v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 291 at p. 300, will make it extremely difficult to sustain the convictions in this case. It will be recalled that in that case I referred to the English case of R. v. Durban Quarter Sessions; Ex parte Virgo [1952] 1 All E.R. 466 and our local cases of Ofei v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 680, S.C.; Kotokoli v. The Republic, High Court, Kumasi, 7 November 1969, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 24 and R. v. Muambo (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 27 as authority for the proposition that: “A . . . ground on which guilty pleas are set aside on appeal is exemplified by those classes of cases where the appellant pleads guilty but gives an explanation which practically amounts to a defence or which negatives the plea of guilty.”
Obviously by their explanations the appellants were not admitting guilt and indeed they were endeavouring to set up defences. Clearly therefore assuming that their arraignment on the charges before the circuit court was proper, then the convictions against them would in principle and under the circumstances be legally erroneous.
However, I have indicated that, the charges against the appellants do not seem to be well-founded. The charges preferred against the appellants are by the standards of the normal criminal law very serious indeed. The substantive offence of smuggling under section 1 (h) of the Subversion Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 90), as amended by the Subversion (Amendment) Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 94), is:
“1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a person shall be guilty of the offence of subversion who— .
. .
[p.588] of [1980] GLR 580
(h) smuggles or attempts to smuggle any cocoa, timber, fertilizer, maize, kola-nuts, diamonds or gold out of Ghana . . .”
The penalty for the offence as is contained in section 2 (b) of the Decree is “a term of imprisonment not less than fifteen years and not more than 30 years.” The trial was summary and was thus devoid of the elaborate safeguards associated with the indictment procedure applicable normally in serious cases. Moreover, the appellants were not defended. The Decree itself did not define “smuggling” and I believe our own courts are yet to work out its appropriate meaning having regard to the intention of the legislature, if such smuggling cases are by some procedural freaks ever to come to the superior courts for adjudication. The legal points involved in the present appeal do not call for a definition of smuggling and I do not therefore feel called upon to expound its meaning. Suffice it to say that, the charges were read to the appellants in English and they were then explained to them in Walli. I do not know how sophisticated is the Walli language as a vehicle for conveying the true meaning of the English expression “attempt to smuggle.” I know that of the three African languages I speak the translation of the expression is not without difficulty.
Be that as it may, it seems to me that in order to safeguard the liberty of the citizens in whose interests the laws of the Republic are promulgated, it is essential that indigent and illiterate persons, ignorant of the legal process and accused of serious crimes carrying harsh penalties, are not left to their own devices but are assigned learned counsel by way of legal aid. The Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), in its section 110 (2) makes adequate and ample provision for this contingency even in the lower hierarchy of our judiciary and it is about time circuit court judges and district court magistrates turned their attention to these provisions in order to avoid unnecessary injustices now becoming too frequent in their operation of the criminal law. Section 110 (2) of the Courts Act, 1971 provides:
“(2) Subject to the provisions of this section a Circuit Court or a District Court may also with the prior approval of the Chief Justice assign a lawyer by way of legal aid to any party in any proceedings whatsoever before the Court where it appears to the Court desirable in the interests of justice that that party should have legal aid and that he has not sufficient means to enable him to obtain the services of a lawyer.”
In this case, I assigned a lawyer to the appellants at this appeal and a senior state attorney from the law office represented the
[p.589] of [1980] GLR 580
Republic. I have no doubt whatsoever, that like the circuit court judge before them, they were all anxious to do their respective duties properly, nevertheless the central legal reason which makes it quite clear that the appellants ought not to have been tried at the circuit court on these charges eluded their vigilance as it escaped the circuit court judge and I left the court, a little wiser and pondered over the remark which I recall Viscount Maugham, delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council made with commendable perspicacity in Galos Hired v. R. [1944] A.C. 149 at p. 155, when he said: “The importance of persons accused of a serious crime having the advantage of counsel to assist them before the courts cannot be doubted . . .” (The emphasis is mine.)
Now what is the proper forum for the trial of an offence under section 1 (h) of the Subversion Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 90)? The Decree itself in its section 4 provides the answer:
“4. (1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, any person who commits an offence under this Decree shall be tried by a Military Tribunal as provided in this section.
(2) Where any person does any act which constitutes an offence under this Decree as well as under any other enactment the Attorney-General may direct in writing that he shall be proceeded against and tried under the other enactment and such direction shall have effect accordingly.”
I need not point out that “shall” in an enactment is mandatory. The offences under which the appellants were tried before the circuit court, are only justiciable by a military tribunal as section 4 of the Subversion Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 90), too plainly shows. Indeed a true construction of the section reveals beyond doubt that the Attorney-General is incapable of ordering the trial of a person for an offence under section 1 at a court other than a military tribunal. It is only if the act of a person constitutes an offence under the Decree, as well as an offence under another enactment that he is empowered to order, in his discretion, a trial under the other enactment before the appropriate court. I am not aware of any other enactment under which the acts of the appellants can be said to constitute an offence. This must have been the reason why on receiving the views of the representative of the Attorney-General, the police mounted the prosecution under the Subversion Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 90), at the circuit court. The advice therefore said to emanate from the office of the Attorney-General’s agent, the state attorney, whereby the police were ordered to try the appellants for the offence of subversion at the Circuit Court, Wa, is clearly erroneous in law. If the acts of the appellants amount to an offence under
[p.590] of [1980] GLR 580 another enactment, then a direction in writing by the Attorney-General that the appellants should be proceeded against under the said enactment would confer jurisdiction on the circuit court, otherwise jurisdiction will be in the military tribunal. I recall saying in Republic v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Aniagyei II [1976] 1 G.L.R. 394 at p. 399: “when by law power is given to a person or body, the person or body must exercise the power in accordance with the terms of the enabling law.” As Anterkyi J. in characteristic style pointed out in Omenako v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 151 at.p. 156, once the Attorney-General’s prior consent is required then “compliance thereof must found the prosecution, otherwise the prosecution should be deemed to be founded on quicksands and should therefore collapse.”
In this case the position is different. The enactment creating the offence created the tribunal to deal with it by the use of as imperative an expression as it is capable of. I think therefore that the prosecution of this case before the circuit court is wrong. The circuit court has no jurisdiction and the conviction is therefore null and void.
I have been asked to order a re-trial, but can I do so? The circuit court as I have said has no jurisdiction and I cannot see how I can confer jurisdiction on it by ordering a new trial before it, for, if I order a new trial, the judge will still not have jurisdiction to sit on the case. Nor do I even think it will be a proper exercise of the judicial power, if I order a trial before the military tribunal. There are good reasons for this. Under section 4 (7) of the Subversion Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 90), the decision of a military tribunal appointed under the Decree is final and no appeal shall lie from such a decision.
Now a military tribunal is manned by military men. There is no indication that they are men with legal training. I am therefore in no position to know how far they are capable of appreciating and applying those elaborate and complex provisions of the criminal law, the fruits of over a hundred years of painstaking search for a formula that will at the same time protect the citizen and safeguard the public interest. Judges are afterall human beings and must necessarily have some psychological inhibitions. As I said in Republic v. James Town Circuit Court Judge; Ex parte Whiteside [1977] 1 G.L.R. 99 at p. 108: “judges are a part and parcel of the community and they do not practice outrages on the society of which they are a part.” In view of their training and the social millieu within which they operate, they cannot over-reach themselves. How do I then with my training and true to my judicial oath to dispense criminal justice in accordance with our traditional concept of law, use my discretionary power to order a new trial of these ordinary appellants before an extraordinary tribunal indulging in a novel type of justice?
[p.591] of [1980] GLR 580
How do I as a responsible person respectfully pursue this course of action that will deny to those illiterate appellants a right to a review and thus deprive them of the right to demonstrate to another competent tribunal the fallibility of human reason—a human failing that is demonstrable even by the course which this trial did take?
Aware apparently of the oppressive nature of the Decree, even the legislature in its wisdom has invested a statutory person, the Attorney-General, with a discretionary power to order a trial before the normal courts in cases which but for the discretion would be tried by a military tribunal. The instant case in my opinion is an example of an abortive attempt to exercise this power apparently to protect the appellants from the harsh sanction of this ill-conceived and piecemeal legislation, i.e. N.R.C.D. 90. How then do I use my own discretionary power to deprive the Attorney-General of the discretionary statutory function by ordering a re-trial before this out of the way court which seems to be an aberration in our criminal justice system?
In any case as counsel pointed out, the appellants have already served unlawful sentences and it would be unfair to order a re-trial. Although this principle is applicable in cases where there is a power to order a re-trial, in this case there is, in fact, no power to order a re-trial and so even if I had the power, the principle of the said cases of Watara (supra) and Forson (supra) would have disabled me from exercising the power.
In all the circumstances of the case, I do not see how, I can in fairness to the appellants, order a new trial. It is for these reasons that I allowed the appeals, quashed the convictions, set aside the sentences of fifteen years’ imprisonment with hard labour on each count concurrent imposed on each appellant and acquitted and discharged them and refused to order a re-trial.
DECISION
Appeals allowed.
Appellants acquitted and discharged.
Application for re-trial refused.
D. R. K. S.
