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[1979] SLR (HC) 48High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

MENSAH vs. BIMPEH [1980] GLR 141

9 April 1979 · EDWARD WIREDU J · ≈ 18 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 48
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OSCOLAMENSAH v BIMPEH [1980] GLR 141 [1979] SLR (HC) 48
APAMENSAH v BIMPEH [1980] GLR 141, [1979] SLR (HC) 48 (Ghana).
BluebookMENSAH v BIMPEH [1980] GLR 141, [1979] SLR (HC) 48 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Vanderpuije v. Bimpeh, High Court, Accra, 7 January 1977, unreported.

(2) Yeboah v. Krah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 247.

(3) Robertson v. Reindorf [1971] 2 G.L.R. 289, C.A.

(4) Noel v. Ahuloo (1950) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 264.

(5) Badu v. Kwadjo (Atta) [1971] 2 G.L.R. 346

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff against the defendant for declaration of title to and recovery of possession of a house he bought at a public auction.

COUNSEL

S. A. X. Tsegah for the plaintiff.

Adusei for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.

Some time around May 1971 one John Emmanuel Vanderpuije sued the defendant in this court for title to a piece of land at Odorkor in Accra. He also asked for other consequential reliefs in his writ and obtained judgment against him. The monetary award arising out of that suit against the defendant resulted in the sale of his property which is now the subject of the present action.

The facts of the execution processes resulting in the auction of the defendant’s property are these: On or about 16 May 1977 the deputy sheriff of this court by a letter, exhibit El, despatched copies of sheriff’s notice and conditions of sale to a Mr. Okine, a licensed auctioneer of Accra (who shall hereafter be referred to simply as the auctioneer) asking him to sell the property in dispute described as “the property of the judgment debtor” now the defendant in this case. The attachment itself arose out of the case John Emmanuel Vanderpuije v. Yaw Bimpeh, High Court, Accra, 7 January 1977, unreported, referred to above; the evidence shows that the sale was to take place on 8 June 1977 at ten o’clock in the forenoon: (see exhibit E2, the sheriffs’ auction notice).

By another letter dated 6 June 1977 addressed to the auctioneer the deputy sheriff directed the suspension of the sale of the property

[p.144] of [1980] GLR 141 to await “further instructions.” The reason for the suspension being that “a motion for a stay of execution had been filed.”

On 13 September 1977, another letter, exhibit D, from the deputy sheriff to the auctioneer directed the latter to proceed with the sale of the property and acting on this authority, the auctioneer advertised the sale of the disputed property in an Accra daily for 1 October 1977 at 9 a.m. (see exhibit B.)

The facts further show that the property was auctioned on 1 October 1977 as advertised. The plaintiff in this case was declared the purchaser at a price of ¢29,760. On 31 October 1977 a certificate of purchase, exhibit A, was issued in favour of the plaintiff by the deputy sheriff.

The present action by the plaintiff is for a declaration of title, recovery of possession and mesne profits against the defendant who has refused to vacate the premises since the date of purchase.

The defendant resists the plaintiff’s claim and for his part contends that the judgment upon which the execution was levied against his property was void because he was not served with any hearing notice as ordered by the court in the earlier case Vanderpuije v. Yaw Bimpeh. It is his further contention that the auction sale itself was wrongful and illegal having been conducted in violation of the mandatory provisions of Order 42, r. 46 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). He therefore counterclaims for the setting aside of the sale.

The evidence brought by and on behalf of the plaintiff which I accept show that on 1 October 1977 the property in dispute was by the older of the deputy sheriff sold by the auctioneer at a public auction and that the property was knocked down to the plaintiff as the highest bidder and purchaser.

I shall at this juncture proceed to consider the points raised by the defendant to see how far they affect the validity or otherwise of the sale. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that by an order of this court dated 21 October 1976 in the case Vanderpuije v. Yaw Bimpeh the case was adjourned to 22 November 1976 for hearing with a specific instruction that he, the defendant, be served. This order according to counsel for the defendant was not carried out and therefore the defendant was not served. Counsel therefore contended that the hearing of the case on 22 November 1976 which resulted in the judgment in favour of Mr. Vanderpuije and in respect of which judgment he proceeded to attach the property in dispute in execution of the judgment debt, was void ab initio because of failure to notify the defendant of the hearing date. There is no doubt that if this contention by the defendant be true then his case is made out.

[p.145] of [1980] GLR 141

For the plaintiff it was contended that the issue of service of hearing notice on the defendant in the case Vanderpuije v. Bimpeh was an issue estoppel. Learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that when judgment went against the defendant in that case he sought, by no less than four applications, to vacate the judgment. Counsel argued that three of such applications were struck out for want of prosecution and the last one dismissed on merits. Learned counsel argued that in all the applications the issue of non-service of hearing notice on the defendant was raised. Continuing his submissions learned counsel said, when all avenues open to the defendant was exhausted he appealed against the said judgment and the ruling dismissing his application to set aside the default judgment but his appeal to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed. He tendered in evidence exhibit H as the judgment of the Court of Appeal in that case. Counsel argued that in the Court of Appeal, one of the grounds raised and argued was the allegation of non-service of hearing notice on the defendant. According to counsel, exhibit H showed that that contention did not find favour with the court which rejected the arguments in support of that contention. He therefore submitted that the issue was dead and could not be raised in this court. Contrary to the view held by learned counsel for the defendant that the issue was still open and that the Court of Appeal’s finding in that regard was an obiter he submitted that the issue is now an “issue estoppel.”

In support of his contention that the sale was in violation of Order 42, r. 46 of L.N. 140A, learned counsel for the defendant submitted that it was not in dispute that the defendant owed the disputed property and lived in it at the time of the sale. Continuing learned counsel submitted that the evidence by the defendant that he owned movable property enumerated in his evidence, the total value of which exceeded the judgment debt should be accepted. He further argued that if this was accepted then Order 42, r. 46 rendered the sale of the defendant’s immovable property illegal since the provisions of that rule were mandatory. For authority that movables were first to be attached counsel cited the case of Yeboah v. Krah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 247.

On the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that a departure from strict compliance with its provisions grounded a cause for complaint under Order 51, r. 18 of L.N. 140A. He argued that at the time of the issuing out of the certificate of purchase (exhibit A) to the plaintiff, the sale had become absolute under Order 51, r. 19; he therefore submitted as untenable the argument that non-compliance with the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 rendered the sale void ab initio.

[p.146] of [1980] GLR 141

This case raises for consideration (a) what amounts to an “issue estoppel” and (b) the extent, scope and the effect of non-compliance with the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 of L.N. 140A.

There is no dispute in this case that some time in 1977 there was a judgment debt of this court standing against the defendant in this case. It is also not in dispute that in respect of this judgment debt execution was levied against the property of the defendant, now the house in dispute. The evidence which I have accepted show that this property was on 1 October 1977 sold at a public auction under the instructions of the deputy sheriff of this court and that the present plaintiff was the purchaser. There is also no dispute that the defendant in this case appealed against the judgment against him in Vanderpuije v. Bimpeh to the Court of Appeal and lost the appeal. It is also not in dispute that at the Court of Appeal one of the grounds raised and argued was the issue of service. The following is the relevant ground filed and argued on behalf of the defendant:

“(a) His lordship was wrong in coming to a conclusion without first calling for further evidence to determine the very important issue as to whether the appellant or his counsel was served with the hearing notice before the plaintiff-respondent obtained judgment.”

On ground (a) above this is what the Court of Appeal said:

“This court called for, the original docket of proceedings. There was a certificate of service on the defendant dated 29 October 1976 following the order made by the court on 21 October 1976 that the defendant should be served. If the judge in the court below had called for the original docket, he would have satisfied himself that the defendant was duly served even though a copy of the certificate of service did not appear in the record of proceedings.”

It is this finding quoted above which learned counsel for the defendant described as obiter and which learned counsel for the plaintiff describes as “issue estoppel.”

In Robertson v. Reindorf [1971] 2 G.L.R. 289 at pp. 302-303, C.A. Azu Crabbe J.A. (as he then was) had this to say about estoppel per rem judicatam:

“Estoppel per rem judicatam is a generic term, and the cases plainly show that estoppel deriving from a previous judgment can be classified under two distinct main heads. These are (a) Cause of action estoppel and (b) issue estoppel. The former has recently been explained by Diplock L.J. in Thoday v. Thoday

[p.147] of [1980] GLR 141

[1964] P. 181 at pp. 197 and 198, as ‘that which prevents a party to an action from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the existence of a particular cause of action, the non-existence or existence of which has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in previous litigation between the same parties. If the cause of action was determined to exist, i.e. judgment was given upon it, it is said to be merged in the judgment, or, for those who prefer Latin, transit in rem, judicatam. If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped per rem judicatam. This is simply an application of the rule of public policy expressed in the Latin maxim “Nemo, debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.” In this application of the maxim “causa” bears its literal Latin meaning.’

The learned Lord Justice defined the latter in these terms at p.198:

‘The second species, which I will call “issue estoppel,” is an extension of the same rule of public policy. There are many causes of action which can only be established by proving that two or more different conditions are fulfilled. Such causes of action involve as many separate issues between the parties as there are conditions to be fulfilled by the plaintiff in order to establish his cause of action; and there may be cases where the fulfilment of an identical condition is a requirement common to two or more different causes of action. If in litigation upon one such cause of action any of such separate issues as to whether a particular condition has been fulfilled is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, either upon evidence or upon admission by a party to the litigation, neither party can, in subsequent litigation between one another upon any cause of action which depends upon the fulfilment of the identical condition, assert that the condition was fulfilled if the court has in the first litigation determined that it was not, or deny that it was fulfilled if the court in the first litigation determined that it was.’

Diplock L.J.’s classification of estoppel per rem judicatam was approved in Fidelitas Shipping Co., Ltd. v. V/O Exportchleb [1965] 2 All E.R. 4, where Lord Denning M.R. made these observations at pp. 8-9:

‘The law, as I understand it, is this: if one party brings an action against another for a particular cause and judgment

[p.148] of [1980] GLR 141 is given on it, there is a strict rule of law that he cannot bring another action against the same party for the same cause. Transit in rem judicatam: see King v. Hoare 153 E.R. 206. But within one cause of action, there may be several issues raised which are necessary for the determination of the whole case. The rule then is that, once an issue has been raised and distinctly determined between the parties, then, as a general rule, neither party can be allowed to fight that issue all over again. The same issue cannot be raised by either of them again in the same or subsequent proceedings except in special circumstances: see per Lord Macnaghten in Badar Bee v. Habib Merican Noordin [1909] A.C. 615, P.C.’ “

The facts of this case reveal that when judgment went against the defendant in the earlier suit Vanderpuije v. Yaw Bimpeh he applied on no less than four occasions to have that judgment set aside and that in all the affidavits supporting the various applications he raised the issue of non-service of hearing notice on him and when he lost the final application he appealed against both the default judgment and the ruling dismissing his application. In the appeal itself the issue of non-service of hearing notice was one of the points raised and canvassed on his behalf and in respect of which a definite finding or decision was taken by the court. I cannot see how the finding or the conclusion of the Court of Appeal on this crucial issue which was raised by the defendant, investigated by the court and a decision taken on it can be re-opened in this court. I hold in my judgment that the finding on that issue raises an “issue estoppel” against the defendant and dismiss as untenable the argument that the Court of Appeal’s holding on that issue was an obiter.

Even if I am wrong in saying that this finding is not an obiter the certificate of service as established in this trial is prima facie proof of service against which there had been no rebutting evidence to establish the contrary.

On the second issue, the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), is in the following language:

“46. If the judgment debtor has sufficient movable property within the Judicial Division in which the judgment was issued to satisfy the debt, damages, and costs recovered, his immovable property shall not be levied upon; but if he has not sufficient movable property within the Judicial Division it shall be optional to the execution creditor to levy upon his immovable property within the same Judicial Division before levying on his

[p.149] of [1980] GLR 141 movable property elsewhere, or to levy upon the movable property of such judgment debtor wherever it may be found within the Gold Coast, before having recourse to his immovable property.”

There are three local reported cases on the construction of the provisions of this rule. All the three being decisions of the High Court. My searches have not taken me successfully to an analogous provision of this rule in the English Rules of the Supreme Court, the White Book. I have therefore decided to be guided by the three local cases in attempting to define the extent, scope and effect of non-compliance with the provisions of the rule strictly.

The first reported case in chronological order is Noel v. Ahuloo (1950) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 264. In that case Coussey J. (as he then was) had this to say as stated in the headnote at p. 264 about Order 44, r. 14 of the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.) which is in a similar language as Order 42, r. 46 of L.N. 140A:

“(3) A departure from Rule 14 Order 43 did not render a sale void. It was for the judgment-debtor to apply to the court before the sale, disclosing movable property which could be sold instead of the land.”

The second, is the case of Badu v. Atta Kwadjo [1971] 2 G.L.R. 346, at p. 351. In this case Anterkyi J. considered the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 of L.N. 140A and following the Noel case (supra) held as stated in the headnote at p. 347:

“(1) Order 42, r. 46 is applicable where it is proved that the judgment creditor knows of the existence and whereabouts of the debtor’s movables. There was no evidence in proof of such knowledge in the present case.”

In the third case of Yeboah v. Krah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 247 Osei-Hwere J. took a contrary view in construing the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). In view of this departure I have decided to recite the facts of the Yeboah case which as stated in the headnote at p. 247 are that:

“In satisfaction of a judgment debt for ¢65.20, the creditor attached a house belonging to the plaintiff who stood as surety and it was sold for ¢900. The plaintiff sought to have the sale set aside, and took a preliminary point whether in view of Order 44, r. 14 of Cap. 4, Sched. II, a creditor could attach immovable property without first exhausting the debtor’s goods. It was submitted in reply that it was the debtor’s duty to disclose to the creditor what movables be had which could be attached.”

[p.150] of [1980] GLR 141

On these facts Osei-Hwere J. held as stated in the headnote at p. 247:

“there was no duty on the judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment creditor that he had sufficient movables to satisfy the judgment debt and it was not in all cases that there must be proof that the judgment creditor knew of the existence and whereabouts of the debtor’s movables before be would be prevented from exercising his right of sale over the debtor’s immovables. In the instant case, it was the duty of the judgment creditor to have applied for the attachment of the debtor’s movables and it was only when there was a return on the writ that there were no movables to be attached that he could direct the registrar or deputy sheriff to attach his immovables.”

I have had the opportunity of reading the full judgments in all the above cited cases and I have also independently considered the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 and it is my respectful view that the decisions of Noel and Atta Kwadjo represent the proper construction of the provisions of Order 42, r. 46 and that construction should be preferred to the stand taken by Osei-Hwere J. in the Yeboah case.

The very language of Order 42, r. 46 envisages that knowledge of the existence of movable properties of the judgment debtor sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt is a sine qua non to invalidate any sale of immovable property of the judgment debtor. It stands to reason that if the judgment creditor has no such knowledge he will be safe to attach any immovable property of the judgment debtor. If on the other hand the judgment debtor seeks to establish that he has sufficient movable property, then it is submitted that immediately his immovable property is attached it becomes his duty to notify the deputy sheriff of the existence of such movable property so that these can be valued and attached first to satisfy the judgment debt. In the event of such property not being sufficient then the judgment creditor will be at liberty to exercise his option. To request the judgment creditor to apply first for the debtor’s movable property and to wait for a return to the effect that there was no such property as envisaged under the Yeboah case (supra) before resorting to attaching his immovable property would be difficult if not impossible. For my investigations have revealed that the creditor is obliged to spell out details of the kind of movable properties to be attached in his applications before other processes of the sheriff can be invoked. To request the creditor therefore to give such details about items which he may not be aware of their existence will be throwing him away to chance and speculation. It will also send the officers of the court on a wild goose chase. This procedure which may yield fruitless results

[p.151] of [1980] GLR 141 will be time consuming and expensive. It is so frustrating and cumbersome that it should be discouraged. I think further that to follow the argument that in certain cases it would be safe to presume the existence of such movable property solely because the debtor himself built the house to be sold and stayed in it as a rule of practice or principle or law will be laying a dangerous precedent. Judicial processes require established facts from which certain inferences can be drawn. In saying this I must not be taken to mean that there are no presumption of facts recognised in legal jurisprudence. Against this general presumption it can be argued that if the judgment debtor had such movable properties sufficient to satisfy the debt why should he wait during the interval between the date of attachment and the date of sale?

The rationale underlying the view taken in both the Noel and Badu cases (supra) appear to me to be found on sound reasoning since the judgment debtor will have ample opportunity from the date of attachment to the date of the sale to furnish the deputy sheriff with inventory and value of his movable properties. Such a step would avoid all the inconveniences likely to be encountered in the practice envisaged in the Yeboah case (supra).

Modern tendency in the administration of justice has been to favour less cumbersome and expensive procedures, avoid waste and to save time. I therefore hold in my judgment that a departure from compliance with the strict language of Order 42, r. 46 of L.N. 140A does not render a sale void and that it is the duty of the judgment debtor to apply to the deputy sheriff disclosing movable property which can be sold instead of immovable property. It is an irregularity in procedure taken care of under Order 51, r. 18 of L.N. 140A.

Where under circumstances such as in this case the debtor who had the sale suspended because of his application for a stay of execution fails to take advantage of the time between the filing of the notice and the day of the sale he should be held estopped from raising the issue after the sale by complaining about non-compliance with the provisions of Order 42, r. 46. And this is especially so where a bona fide purchaser for value has acquired a right in the property.

In view of my above findings the counterclaim by the defendant fails on both grounds raised to support it. There will therefore be judgment for the plaintiff for title to the disputed house. There will also be an order for recovery of possession in his favour against the defendant.

Now on the question of mesne profits. The evidence show that the property under exhibit A passed into the hands of the plaintiff on or about 26 October 1977. Since that date the defendant has been

[p.152] of [1980] GLR 141 in occupation. I consider a monthly rent of ¢200 as fair and reasonable to recoup the plaintiff as mesne profits. The plaintiff will be entitled to ¢3,800 being mesne profits from November 1977 to April 1979.

Costs of ¢1,500 to the plaintiff.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiff.

Defendant’s counterclaim dismissed. D. R. K. S.

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