OBOAGYAN vs. GOMOAH [1980] GLR 664
25 October 1979 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 6 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 51Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Practice Note (Gblevi Family v. Amanie) [1961] 1 G.L.R. 1, C.A.
(2) Anto v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 218, C.A.
(3) Adraki v. Mankwa II, Court of Appeal, 23 February 1970, unreported.
(4) Badoo v. Ampung (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 439.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the judgment of Magistrate Court Grade II, Ajumako, dismissing the appellant’s action for damages for trespass and perpetual injunction. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
O. K. Sampson for the appellant.
J. D. Hammond for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.
This is an appeal against the judgment of the District Magistrate Court Grade II, Ajumako, which dismissed the plaintiff’s action and entered judgment for the defendant with ¢60 costs. The plaintiff had sued the defendant in the court below for trespass and for perpetual injunction. At the trial the plaintiff called three witnesses and the defendant two witnesses. The defendant also tendered certain documents of title to various portions of the land. After both parties had closed their case the court moved to inspect the locus. The trial magistrate dismissed the plaintiff’s case because he was satisfied “from the evidence adduced in court and the inspection at the locus in quo coupled with the contents of the documents on the land that the defendant had committed no trespass.”
The only ground of appeal filed on behalf of the plaintiff is the common ground that the judgment cannot be supported having
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regard to the evidence. When he came to argue this ground the plaintiff’s counsel contended that the trial magistrate erred in relying upon his inspection report as it offended the practice direction laid down by the Court of Appeal on 10 June 1959 reported in Practice Note (Gblevi Family v. Amanie) [1961] 1 G.L.R. 1, C.A. Counsel also argued that the documents of title tendered were irrelevant to the issue of trespass vel non. He sought to show that whilst the plaintiff had sufficiently proved the defendant’s trespass, the defendant on the other hand, tried to deny that the plaintiff owned any land in the area. Arguing in support of the judgment the defendant’s counsel also contended that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving his title which he failed to discharge as he called none of his boundary owners. Counsel then sought to justify the trial magistrate’s rejection of the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses. Counsel further argued that the procedure adopted in regard to the inspection was not fatal and that if the evidence about the inspection was left out that would still leave the decision impeccable.
The injunction prayed for by the plaintiff in his writ of summons is only one intended to restrain “the defendant his servants, workmen and agents from entering the plaintiff’s said meadow or from destroying or otherwise injuring the hedge or demarcation on south side thereof or from in any way interfering with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the said meadow.” The plaintiff then described the said meadow as bounded on one side by the property of the late Atseaserew, on the other side by the property of the defendant and on the other side by the property of late Abanor, Odikro of Akotsi, and on the other side by the property of Kojo Acquah. Even though by his claim for an injunction the plaintiff thereby also claimed title, title was not made an issue at the trial and the plaintiff had, therefore, no need to prove title to the general mass of his land: see Anto v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 218, C.A. This was especially so as the dispute mainly concerned the starting point and direction of their common boundary as well as the determination of the issue as to whether or not the defendant had crossed this common boundary. It was, therefore, not fatal that the plaintiff failed to call all his boundary owners.
To help the court below arrive at a decision it found it necessary to visit the locus. As noted before, the court’s reliance on what took place at the inspection has become the subject of attack as the inspection failed to comply with the procedure laid down in Gblevi Family v. Amanie and reported as the Practice Note (supra). The gist of that procedure is that all those persons who, at the inspection, pointed out such places and things which are material to the case must be
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put in the witness-box, when the court re-assembles and, on oath, state what part they took in the visit to the locus and what each did.
This procedure is, however, not inflexible. In Adraki v. Mankwa II, Court of Appeal, 23 February 1970, unreported, the court reviewed the law concerning an inspection of the locus in quo and laid down the principles which can be extracted from the cases reviewed. Some of those principles are that where the court considers it useful or essential to visit the land in dispute it is not necessary to include in the proceedings a separate written report of the inspection. There must, however, be some record of the visit and it will be sufficient if the judgment of the court contains a record of the inspection. The court went on to say that the recorded facts should leave no one reading them in any doubt about what was seen or not seen on the disputed land, and should indicate how the inspection supports or discredits the case of either party. The rationale behind this, as stated by the West African Court of Appeal in Badoo v. Ampung (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 439, is that a statement by the court in a solemn judgment must be taken as a correct account of what occurred and it is therefore final. Where, however, the parties and the witnesses at the inspection engage in a disputation at the scene which the court relies upon to arrive at a decision then the need to re-assemble for the parties and the witnesses to state on oath what was disputed at the locus becomes imperative.
At the inspection, in the instant case, there was so much argument, without the solemn sanction of any oath, which the court accepted as the basis of its judgment. This was an irregularity, which vitiated the trial as no evidence is legally admissible which is not on oath. Again, both parties were given full indulgence in eliciting whatever information they wished to build their case by asking leading questions. These are sufficient reasons why I set aside the judgment and costs of the court below and order that the case be tried de novo. By consent, I order that the case be transferred to the circuit court for re-trial. There will be no order as to costs in this court.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
New trial ordered.
D. F. L.
