ACHIAA vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 770
19 November 1979 · AMPIAH J · ≈ 7 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 6Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. Dufa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 18.
(2) Osei v. The Republic (No. 2) [1971] 1 G.L.R. 449.
[p.771] of [1980] GLR 770 (3) Chief Superintendent of Police v. Camara (1957) 2 W.A. L.R. 84.
(4) Ofei v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 680, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against conviction by a district court grade I, for selling salt above the controlled price. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Yaw Manu for the appellant.
Annan, State Attorney, for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.
The appellant was on 21 October 1979 convicted of selling salt above the controlled price and sentenced to a term of three months’ imprisonment with hard labour by the learned magistrate at the Techiman District Court Grade I. She appealed against the said conviction and sentence. On 9 November 1979, I allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence. The appellant was consequently acquitted and discharged. I now proceed to give my reasons.
The statement of offence read:
“Selling above control price: contrary to sections 2 (1) and 3 (a) of the Price Control Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D.
305), as amended by the Price Control (Amendment) Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 93) and the Price Control (Amendment) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 146).”
No reference was made to the executive instrument which specified the commodity and the price at which it should be sold. Counsel for the appellant submitted therefore that the omission rendered the whole charge and the consequential proceedings bad as the information given the appellant was not sufficient.
Section 112 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), requires that every charge shall contain a statement of the specific offence with which the accused person is charged, together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge. Subsection (2) of the same section provides further:
“(2) The statement of the offence shall describe the offence shortly in ordinary language, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical terms, and without necessarily stating all the essential elements of the offence, and, if the offence is one created by an enactment, shall contain a reference to the section of the enactment.”
[p.772] of [1980] GLR 770
The import of these provisions has been modified by the provisions of section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), which states:
“1. Subject to the special rules as to indictments hereinafter mentioned, every charge, complaint, summons, warrant or other document laid, issued or made for the purpose of or in connection with any proceedings before any Court for an offence shall be sufficient if it contains a statement of the offence with which the accused person is charged together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge and notwithstanding any rule of law to the contrary it shall not be necessary for it to contain any further particulars than the said particulars.”
It seems therefore that it is not mandatory to refer to the enactment creating the offence. I am however of the view that if such omission is likely to occasion a miscarriage of justice then the charge is bad: see Republic v. Dufa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 18 and Osei v. The Republic (No.2) [1971] 1 G.L.R. 449. It was held in Chief Superintendent of Police v. Camara (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 84 that, provided the particulars were sufficient to give the accused person reasonable information as to the nature of the charge, the mistake or omission would not have occasioned any miscarriage of justice.
The particulars given in the instant case were:
“Yaa Achiaa Farmer: For that you on 21 October 1979, at Nkoranza market in the Brong-Ahafo Magisterial District and within the jurisdiction of the court, did sell 2 1bs. of salt at ¢2 instead of ¢0.56, thus making illegal profit of ¢1.44 to one Atta Kramo.”
Currently, when there are various price-fixing bodies, it would be a headache to determine the price of a commodity, at any particular time. The authority charged with the fixing of prices of commodities, also has power to amend the prices of the commodities by new orders from time to time. These orders are contained in executive instruments. Consequently, without stating the particular executive instrument which an accused person is supposed to have offended, in my opinion, creates a confusion in the mind of an accused person and puts him at a loss as to whether or not he has committed any offence at all. He may thus plead guilty to a non-existing offence.
Counsel for the respondent urged the court to take judicial notice of the existence of the Price Control (Maximum Prices) (Amendment) (No.1) Order, 1979 (E.I. 35 of 1979), which is the
[p.773] of [1980] GLR 770
current price-fixing instrument. Assuming that that is so, and in the absence of any other instrument on prices we take it that that is so in this instrument, the price of salt has been fixed at ¢0.28 per lb. at Nkoranza; 2 lbs. of such salt would be ¢0.56. One would therefore be tempted to conclude that the appellant had been given sufficient information in the particulars of the offence.
The situation is however further confused by the description of the salt in the executive instrument, i.e. E.I. 35 of 1979. The salt for which a price has been fixed in the instrument is supposed to have its source from Accra. A careful look at the whole instrument would show that where the instrument has fixed prices for certain commodities from one source, different prices are fixed for the same commodities which do not come from that source. In the case of salt, however, a price was fixed for salt coming from Accra; no price was fixed for salt coming from other sources. It is a fact that apart from Accra, salt which is edible is obtainable from other places in Ghana. Although this court did not have the privilege to examine the type of salt the appellant was alleged to have sold, it is a fact that there are at least three, if not more, types of salt sold on the market all over the country: there is the white smooth salt; the white rough salt and the dirty rough salt. The white smooth salt may be locally produced or imported. The facts given by the prosecution did not disclose the source of the salt sold by the appellant; we were also not told whether the salt was the rough type or the smooth type. To make the confusion doubly confounded, the prosecutor described the salt sold as “table salt.” Which is “table salt?” Is it the imported type or the Accra-source type? It is obvious that the situation created, if not confusing to the court, was likely to confuse the appellant and even the prosecutor who in his anxiety chose to describe the salt differently from how it has been described in the instrument. I am satisfied that this confusion prevented or might have prevented the appellant from appreciating the nature of the charge against her.
In view of this confusion, I hold that the information given the appellant was not sufficient and to convict her on the charge was to do injustice to her. The charge was bad and the conviction was a nullity. Although the appellant pleaded guilty, I am of the view that she did not appreciate the nature of the charge. Accordingly, allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence.
Since the trial was a nullity, it meant the appellant was, in fact, never tried. In such circumstances, it was usual for the appellant to be either discharged or for the court to order a re-trial. Ollennu J.S.C. (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the court in Ofei v The State [1965] G.L.R. 680 at p. 687, S.C. said:
[p.774] of [1980] GLR 770
“We are aware of the powers in us vested by section 16 (5) of the Courts Act, 1960, to order the appellant to be re-tried if justice would thereby be done. But having regard to the treatment the appellant received at the hands of the circuit court judge, the length of time she has wrongly been in custody and all the other circumstances of the case, we think, in the interest of justice, that this is not a case in which that power can justly be exercised.”
The provisions of section 16 (5) of the Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9), are similarly contained in section 26 (12) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). The appellant has already served a portion of her prison sentence. She had to be taken from Techiman to Kumasi to serve her sentence because there was no available prison for females in the region. She has suffered some humiliation on a charge which was bad. Looking at the circumstances of the case, I did not think it would be in the interest of justice to order a re-trial. Accordingly, I acquitted and discharged the appellant and set aside any order made consequent upon her conviction.
DECISION
Conviction quashed.
Appellant acquitted and discharged.
K. A. A. M.
